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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the deployment and operation of security through Australian 
political history. In doing so, it takes a distinctive approach to both the concept of 
security and the historical material which it encounters. Rather than seeing security as 
an ontologically stable concept or state of affairs, it analyses security as a political 
technology which has had a profound impact on the political, cultural and economic 
forms of life which have been held to characterise the Australian nation and the 
modernisation path of the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, it argues that security needs to be 
placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and 
scientific developments as one of the key events of our modernity. By the beginning of 
the twentieth century security had been entrenched as a unique and pervasive form 
which combined 'totalising' and 'individualising' modes of power-here liberal 
constructions of atomistic, acquisitive subjectivity were integrated with a strong image 
of the nation-statei which became the principle for a movement of geopolitical power in 
which colonisation and trade were portrayed as progressive and universalising forces. 
In its practical operation, security thus combines modes of personal identity and 
discipline with macroeconomic management and international policy. The remainder of 
the thesis describes this technology's operation through the history of Australia and its 
region, from the initial impetus for colonisation in the desire of the British to rid their 
island of an entire criminal class, to the construction of an allegedly whole 'Australian' 
subject at Federation in confrontation with racial, industrial and geopolitical images of 
the Other. It then traces this politics of security and identity through the vast sacrifice of 
the Great War, the division and trauma of the Depression, the patriotic struggle for 
survival of the Pacific War, and the militarism and 'development' of the Cold War, 
concluding with a chapter which examines how dramatic surface changes in the national 
identity after 1969 were marred by an underlying continuity to which the violence and 
rigidity of the past remained essential. In this way the tragedies of East Timor, 
Cambodia or Soeharto's Indonesia were politically (and ontologically) continuous with 
the Vietnam war and the genocidal assault on Australia's Aboriginal peoples. The thesis 
concludes by speculating that a path beyond security will simultaneously empower 
subjects to challenge the forms of power which construct them and, at the level of the 
state and economy, will replace a coercive and exploitative relation to difference with an 
'ethic of engagement' in which the Other might finally begin to speak on its own terms. 
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Introduction 
A Study of Security? 
Security-it seems to be on everyone's lips, at the close of a century some claim to 
have permanently realised the highest ideals and aspirations of humankind, others think 
more notable for the development of fantastic new technologies of violence and 
extermination, and which now provides us with stark evidence of global economic 
turmoil and failure. Through 1998, Prime Minister John Howard was telling 
Australians that his government had delivered them 'security, safety and stability', and 
that they should continue to place their faith in him to deliver 'safety and security' to the 
Australian economy even as Asia sank deeper into its worst economic crisis in fifty 
years. (Howard, 1998a) Only a few months before, the Australian Labor Party's 
national conference, under the leadership of Kim Beazley, had adopted a new platform 
which declared the party's central values as 'security and opportunity', and elevated 
security to an overarching goal which linked, in a seamless continuum, the personal 
security of individuals and families to the security of the nation itself. (ALP, 1998a) 
Obviously, a few months out from a general election and in a time of considerable 
social and economic turmoil, they were seeking to tap into a palpable community mood; 
however the focus of this work is on the longer political and philosophical history 
which gives their speech meaning. Long a hegemonic concept in international relations, 
these men had reminded us of security's broader function as the most basic 
'governmental' promise of modemity.1 
1 Likewise US President Bill Clinton prefaced the 1997 National Security Strategy by saying that 
'protecting the security of our nation-our people, our territory and our way of life-is my 
foremost mission and constitutional duty.' Dr Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia has argued that 
'national security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony', 
while in 1995 former Australian leader Paul Keating argued that 'a prime minister's duty, his first 
duty, is to the security of his country.' (Cited in Smith, 1997; SMH, 16.12.95) 
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Why is security, the promise of security, so important to Howard and Beazley 
now? Why has it been elevated from a silent (albeit primary) goal of international policy 
to the very surface of domestic political discourse? One reason is because, as I have 
suggested, it has much deeper political roots and a more sweeping organising function 
within western modernity-which has been forgotten as strategic analysts have sought 
to narrow and quarantine the space of their inquiry to largely technical issues of defence 
and 'strategic stability.' This is true even as liberal ideologues gloat that 'the state is in 
retreat'. The other reason lies in the peculiar crisis of this moment, less than eighteen 
months from a new century and millennium. 
THE CONTEMPORARY MOMENT: 
THE 'ASIAN' CRISIS 
As I write, the worst economic crisis to hit southeast Asia in fifty years has taken on 
global dimensions, as Russia defaults on key foreign loans and its currency goes into 
free-fall. In a single day, August 28, 1998, the Dow Jones recorded its third largest 
ever fall, the Japanese share market fell to a twelve year low and gold struck its lowest 
price in eighteen years. Latin American stock markets fell ten per cent. The Australian 
dollar, first floated on international currency markets in 1984, slumped to an all-time 
low of just US$55.04, raising fears of recession if its position worsened.2 Pressure on 
the $A has been exacerbated by the Asian crisis, with a $1 billion fall in exports in the 
first quarter of 1998 pushing the current account deficit to its second highest ever level. 
Some analysts are now predicting a global recession of a severity not seen since the 
great depression of the 1930s. (SMH, 29.8.98: 1) 
This is hardly news to Southeast Asians, though it is certain to prolong their 
misery. All of Southeast Asia is now in recession, the effect of massive currency 
depreciations and capital flight since the first rumblings of the earthquake in July 1997 
as the Thai baht crumbled under sustained attack from speculators. In the first four 
months of the crisis regional currencies lost between thirty and fifty per cent of their 
value, and companies and banks have gone into liquidation as fantastic rates of growth 
(between five and ten per cent through the 1990s) came to a shuddering halt. In 
Indonesia, worst hit, the impact has been little short of catastrophic. The Indonesian 
rupiah is now trading at around 11,000 to the US dollar, an unsustainable level, having 
lost eighty per cent of its value since the beginning of 1997. In just three days in 
January it lost over forty per cent of its value. At that level analysts calculated 
2 In September 1998 the executive director of the National Institute for Economic and Industry 
Research, Dr Peter Brain, predicted that the Australian economy would see zero growth and 
double-digit unemployment by 2001 as the global economic slowdown-which will see 
contractions in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Korea of between 5-15% and 2% in Japan and 
China-takes effect. (SMH, 9.9.98) 
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Indonesia's annual output was worth only $US33 billion in contrast with a total foreign 
debt of $140 billion. 266 of its 288 listed firms are classed as technically insolvent. In 
the first quarter of 1998 Indonesia's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 8.5 per cent, 
and a full year fall of over twenty per cent is predicted. Inflation has hit 69 per cent, and 
official unemployment 20 per cent, some fourteen million people. The International 
Labor Organisation (ILO) estimates that 37 per cent of the population, seventy-five 
million people, have fallen below the poverty line and that another seventy million will 
have joined them in another year. The inability to afford food, particularly rice, in such 
conditions has already produced incidents of rioting, looting and crime, and presages 
further damaging unrest. (AFR, 25.1.98: 1-3; SMH, 3.6.98: 1; SCMP, 31.8.98) 
Worse, the crisis was deepened by weeks of uncertainty, rioting and upheaval as 
Soeharto, impregnable for thirty years, came under increasing pressure to resign, 
finally doing so on May 21 after the ruling party, the national parliament, his own 
cabinet and the military withdrew their support. In the interim violence swept Jakarta 
and other major cities, millions of dollars of real estate was burned to the ground and 
wealthy Chinese-the target of much popular hatred-fled the country taking with them 
valuable expertise and capital. Poorer Chinese, unable to fly out, became targets for an 
apparently systematic campaign of arson, murder and rape. 3 During these weeks over a 
thousand people were killed, while unknown soldiers-suspected to have been special 
forces troops-fired on student protesters, killing four and wounding thirty-five. 
Special Forces officers were also behind the abduction, torture and murder of scores of 
radical activists in the course of a shadowy play for power by Soeharto's son-in-law 
Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto. (Asiaweek, 24.7.98) 
In this context currency markets and investors punished Indonesia particularly 
severely, as panic over political instability and uncertainty was added to perceptions of 
the nepotism and corruption which had distorted investment decisions, disadvantaged 
foreign investors and enabled banks to lend wildly-many of the ingredients which 
precipitated the broader regional crisis. While the successor regime led by Soeharto's 
Vice-President B. J. Habibie has made many dramatic reforms-including the release 
of large numbers of political prisoners-and promised new general elections in 1999, 
further violence and uncertainty is inevitable as a traumatised society tries to rebuild 
from the ashes of an untenable political order. Panic-prone markets are unlikely to 
allow the Rupiah to recover any time soon. 
3 According to Asiaweek journalists Susan Berfield and Dewi Loveard, who conducted a month-
long investigation into the turmoil preceding Soeharto's resignation, 40 malls and 2,470 
shophouses were looted or destroyed, 1, 188 people were killed, and as many as 468 women 
were raped. (Human rights groups claim 168 women were raped and 20 murdered, while the 
Habibie Government denies any rapes). They record graphic eyewitness accounts of Chinese 
girls being stripped naked, of pack rapes, and of women being killed afterward or committing 
suicide. They also cite allegations that soldiers (associated with Jakarta military commander 
Maj-Gen Syamsuddin, a close ally of Prabowo) may have helped mastermind some of the rioting 
and violence and set fire to packed shopping malls. (Berfield and Loveard, 1998; AFP, 8.9.98) 
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While only a few alert economists had seen the clouds gathering after early 1996, 
political signposts to Indonesia's turmoil were visible much earlier-glaringly so from 
July 1996, when the military intervened to drive the popular Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
the daughter of Indonesia's first President, from her position as leader of the rival 
Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). A brutal raid on her central Jakarta headquarters-
occupied for weeks by youthful supporters-was then followed by two days of 
damaging rioting. The Government responded by issuing orders to shoot on sight, 
making mass arrests of activists, and imprisoning a number of high profile government 
critics. (Asiaweek, 9.8.97) The 1997 general 'elections' were the most violent on 
record, seeing rioting and clashes which left hundreds dead. Yet until well into 1997 
the Howard government was publicly expressing confidence in Soeharto, while playing 
down the deepening repression with which he sought to shore up his ever more 
unpopular rule.4 This was perhaps unsurprising, given that for thirty years successive 
Australian governments had lauded Soeharto's New Order regime as a bulwark of 
stability and certitude-as essential not only to the security and prosperity of Indonesia, 
but to that of Australia and the whole southeast Asian area. This faith also had crucial 
ontological and economic dimensions-with the New Order projected as central to a 
structure of renewed Australian identity which could sympathetically integrate with a 
cohesive, liberalising and economically dynamic 'Asia-Pacific community' in which 
Australian-based corporations could prosper. 
To any dispassionate observer, the depth and ferocity of the crisis in Indonesia 
should have swept those platitudes away. Far from being a bulwark of stability and 
prosperity Soeharto had-through corrupt economic management and a refusal to clear 
the way for a more democratic and stable political order-helped bring Indonesia's 
social cohesion to breaking point and laid the ground for a disaster which has seen 
almost a quarter of the national economy vanish in a few months. (SCMP, 31.8.98) 
The crisis has dealt a severe blow to the central axiom of Australian foreign policy 
which saw pragmatic accommodation-even partnership-with repressive elites as 
essential to Australia's security and 'national interests'. Just as significantly, the 
broader Asian crisis has brought the second great plank of Australia's modem foreign 
policy-which saw increasingly porous global markets for capital, trade and labour as 
uniformly progressive and beneficial-into serious question. Given the way massive 
and volatile flows of portfolio investment had laid the ground for the crisis, and panic-
4 This writer was one who, while not foreseeing the depth of the economic disaster, feared the 
political and social consequences of Soeharto's dying rule. In September 1997 I warned in The 
Jakarta Post of 'the increasing despair over the current political stalemate in Indonesia', and of 
the fears of many that 'the myriad incidents of violence prior to and during the election campaign 
portend an explosion.' (Burke, 1997: 4) In a similar vein Jim George and Rodd McGibbon warned 
in 1997 that 'Australia's support for the Soeharto regime is actually undermining, rather than 
enhancing, the long-term prospects for a stable, secure and prosperous regional environment.' 
(George and McGibbon, 1997: 18) 
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stricken currency traders drove it to unseeable depths once it began, only the most 
blinkered free-market ideologues could still claim that markets, left to themselves, can 
allocate and price resources rationally, efficiently or responsibly, or that this kind of 
invisible hand writ large could guarantee the system's long-term survival.5 While the 
justice and fairness of late-twentieth-century global capitalism has long been under 
question, the crisis has raised real concerns about its underlying stability. As always, it 
is those on the very bottom who suffer most. 
The nature of this crisis also presents challenges to the analyst. Given that it is so 
fluid and volatile, a moment still in the course of playing out, I feel it important to 
acknowledge that its contours and meaning are still far from clear. For this reason, I 
have for the moment left the crisis out of the main chronology of the thesis, which 
stops at the end of 1995-on its edge. This point forms a useful coda: when the 
aggressive neo-liberal optimism of the Pacific Century was still unshaken, Soeharto 
was still visibly in control, his regime's importance to Australian security still 
axiomatic, and when this whole structure of certitude seemed secure. Yet at least since 
1969 Australian policy has been driven by an underlying anxiety over the ability of 
domestic and regional elites to direct and control changing forms of being and 
international order. The Asian political and economic crisis is only the latest and most 
serious of such challenges in the last thirty years, which earlier arose after the failure of 
American arms in Vietnam, and again in the early 1990s as the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from Vietnam and the peace settlement in Cambodia destroyed the geopolitical 
certainties which had underpinned policymaking for decades. In tum such crises 
echoed earlier events such as the challenge of decolonisation after World War II, or the 
rise of Asian powers like Japan after the tum of the nineteenth century. What links 
these processes is that they have all constituted profound challenges to dominant 
systems of Western identity, belief and economic, political and strategic order. Worlds 
have been made from the attempt to limit and contain them. 
THE CONTEMPORARY RESPONSE: 
'CERTAINTY' 
In this way we can begin to understand the function of the Australian Prime Minister's 
bland assurances that 'safety and security' can be provided through the current crisis. 
The rhetoric and politics of security, having helped create such a situation, is now 
5 Even the beneficiaries of rampant liberalism are asking questions about its destructive side-
effects. Billionaire financier George Soros, in recent testimony to the US House of 
Representatives banking committee, said that the prevailing orthodoxy that financial markets, 
left to themselves, tend towards equilibrium was 'false', and called for the formation of an 
International Credit Insurance Corporation with powers to regulate and supervise the 
international banking sector-contrasting the IMPs harsh treatment of governments with the 
lack of penalties for imprudent lenders and borrowers. (SMH, 16.9.98) 
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deployed as a refusal to acknowledge the deeper imperatives of the moment. The 
historical operation of this technology has both helped prepare the ground for the crisis, 
and in tum affects how it is being interpreted and tackled-as a manageable process 
viewed through the impoverished prism of self-interest. In line with a deep-rooted 
Cartesian arrogance the Asian crisis is seen as little more than a series of technical 
problems, which a calibrated set of strategic interventions can resolve. As the 
Government's foreign policy white paper, In The National Interest, said on the very 
eve of the crisis in 1997: 'Australians should have confidence in Australia's capacity to 
shape its future.' The Government has not since revised this claim, nor have they 
acknowledged the massive error of the claim, made in the same document, that 
'economic growth in industrialising East Asia will continue at relatively high levels over 
the next fifteen years.' (DFAT, 1997: iii-v) Instead we are treated to a repetition of 
familiar certitudes, with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer arguing in May that for a 
sustained regional recovery to occur, affected nations must adhere to the conditions of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance packages and maintain 'the momentum 
for economic reform and liberalisation.' To this is added an over-optimistic rhetoric 
which trivialises both the political challenges of the crisis and its human disaster: 
'[Australia] is uniquely placed ... to not only pass the tests that confront us, but to ride 
the crest of the wave of economic resurgence that will inevitably come to the region.' 
(Downer, 1998a, 1998b) 
At no point is there an acknowledgment that the crisis represents one of the most 
profound challenges to dominant policy paradigms for decades. Not only has the 
combined indiscipline of global capital markets and corrupt regional elites destabilised 
the key assumptions of neo-liberal economics, but political changes forced in its wake 
have punctured many associated assumptions about political order. Open, accountable 
and democratic political structures are now being looked to as crucial future 
frameworks of both financial and political stability, when only a couple of years before 
commentators were arguing the immutability of 'Asian values'. In Indonesia hundreds 
of new political parties have formed, and bastions of the New Order like Habibie and 
armed forces chief Wiranto have cautiously embraced the cause of human rights and 
democratic reform-although it is far from clear how far this process will be allowed to 
develop. In Malaysia former ruling party finance minister Anwar Ibrahim has been 
dismissed and arrested after attacking cronyism and advocating a freer political system, 
generating large protests on the streets of Kuala Lumpur. (The Australian, 21.9.98) 
The effects have even flowed through to the region's key international institution, The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)6, which at its last meeting split over 
6 ASEAN was formed in 1967 and for three decades comprised Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei and the Philippines. More recently it has accepted the membership of Vietnam, Laos and 
Myanmar (Burma), and is poised to accept Cambodia as a full member. 
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a Thai proposal that the hallowed policy of non-intervention in internal affairs-which 
for thirty years had allowed members to ignore the repression and mismanagement of 
others-be abandoned. (Asiaweek, 7.8.98) 
An August Asiaweek editorial, musing on ASEAN' s failure to respond to the Asian 
crisis, the terrible forest fires in Indonesia or the India-Pakistan nuclear tests, asked 
whether the organisation was becoming irrelevant. Most dramatically, the editorial 
called on ASEAN to present a strong front to the IMF, to develop regional economic 
initiatives to deal with the crisis, and to seriously consider 'what kind of governance 
and political culture it wants to aspire to'-that member nations should nail their 
colours firmly to the mast of 'openness, justice and freedom.' Yet with the Indonesian 
government stalling for time and new members Burma and Cambodia becoming 
increasingly repressive, such pressures might well split the organisation apart. Since its 
formation in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam war and in the wake of Indonesia's 
'confrontation' of Malaysia, successive Australian governments have looked to the 
organisation as a bastion of stability and common regional cause. It still forms a crucial 
conduit for Australian diplomatic influence, and hosts the eighteen member security 
dialogue (The ASEAN Regional Forum) which forms a major plank of Australia's 
regional defence policy. Yet Asiaweek charged the ARF (of which Australia is a 
member) with being too weakened by the demand for harmony and consensus to act 
decisively on security issues. (Asiaweek, 7 .8.98) As the challenges of the moment take 
their toll, another article of Australian policy faith may yet disappear. 
Less critical observers even wonder if one of the great structures of regional 
economic liberalisation, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), may be another 
casualty. Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, who at APEC' s inaugural 
leaders meeting in Seattle in 1993 declared the birth of a new 'Asia-Pacific community', 
argued that APEC' s failure to develop united strategies in managing the crisis could see 
it become increasingly irrelevant. He worried that 'the whole direction in which the 
Asia Pacific has been moving-towards economic and political openness, towards a 
sense of Pacific community-is at risk. It is a perilous moment and there are real 
questions in my mind as to whether we and our institutions can meet it successfully.' 
The biggest threat to APEC, he thought, was the recent inclusion of Russia which he 
called 'an act of international vandalism' that would paralyse co-ordination and prevent 
APEC becoming the basis for a 'fund to address future balance of payment problems in 
the region, because the potential additional demands it would create are just too great.' 
Yet he then resorted to lecturing APEC to show a 'determination to move forward on 
the Bog or free trade and investment agenda.' (Keating, 1998a) 
Such mantras, which still lie at the heart of Australian foreign policy and its 
response to the crisis, betray a blindness typical of the refusal to see beyond established 
certitudes. Keating refuses to see both how it was precisely his kind of earlier 
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boosterism that created an atmosphere in which Russia would be brought in, and how 
all the rhetoric about 'community' and common cause papered over dramatic (and 
highly political) differences in economic structure and interest. As economies like 
Malaysia and Hong Kong seek to re-regulate capital flows and trading in a desperate 
attempt to bring some stability to their currencies, and liberals attack them for betraying 
free market faiths, such divisions can only grow. (SCMP, 8.9.98; AFR, 25.8.98) 
Similarly the classically liberal prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund-
which emphasise cutting government deficits and tightening credit-have been blamed 
for driving economies into recession, increasing market paranoia and worsening the 
impact of the crisis. 7 The IMF' s role and function in the global economy is under 
intense scrutiny, as its reserves shrivel under the impact of a record $US26 billion in 
loans last year and the US Congress stalls on the release of new funds. (SMH, 
14.9.98) 
Liberals cannot see that it has been the darker effects of the globalisation agenda 
(environmental destruction, labour repression, and capricious flows of capital and 
investment) which have underpinned the current disaster. Now, afraid Asians will 
locate the blame where it lies, they offer sage advice to maintain faith in openness. The 
deeper problem, as Walden Bello reminds us, is that an entire model of development is 
under challenge-a model which suppressed domestic capital formation and 
industrialisation in favour of huge inflows of foreign capital, in the illusory belief that 
countries could 'leapfrog' the arduous course to developed country status. Rather than 
being a rapid path to prosperity, the liberal policies which attracted such inflows 
increased third world dependence on export markets and foreign investment, weakened 
domestic markets and sources of supply, and suppressed welfare spending and people-
centred development strategies which might have moderated hardship and unrest. 
Likewise the strikes in Korea over layoffs, and the increased militancy of workers in 
Indonesia, indicate that one of the key unwritten assumptions behind southeast Asian 
competitiveness-that labour could be easily beggared and repressed-no longer holds. 
With the promise of easy prosperity banished, worker rights and social justice are being 
pushed to the forefront of Asia's new political agenda. Both critics like Bello and 
liberals like Keating are also arguing that development strategies based on foreign 
7 Former Philippines President Fidel Ramos argued in September 1998 that 'The IMF must 
rethink its bailout tactics .. when typically borrowers need credit, and economies need pump-
priming' and that calls for internal reforms and liberal policies did nothing to curb 'the volatility of 
short-term capital movements'. Director of the Harvard Institute for International Development 
Jeffrey Sachs argues the IMF has pursued the wrong course in Asia-encouraging deflation 
rather than 'slightly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to counterbalance the decline in 
foreign loans'-and would push otherwise healthy economies into far deeper recessions than 
they should expect. 'These bailout operations,' he said, 'could end up helping a few dozen 
international banks to escape losses for risky loans by forcing Asian governments to cover the 
losses on private transactions that have gone bad.' (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16.9.98 
www.inquirer.net; Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'The wrong medicine for Asia', The New York Times, 3.11.97, 
and 'IMF is a power unto itself, The Financial Times, 11.12.97) 
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investment and 'easy exports of manufactures' are no longer viable-Bello because 
export strategies involve 'beggaring one's labour force' in a 'race to the bottom that 
benefits only international investors', and Keating, pragmatically enough, because 'the 
world is becoming clogged with exports'. Both agree that domestic markets will have 
to be the main source of future growth. (Bello, 1997 a; Keating, 1998b) 
Having pledged some US$3 billion to bailout programs for Korea, Thailand and 
Indonesia, the Australian Government clings to the illusion that the IMF programs are 
basically sound, and that high levels of growth will return within three to five years.a 
We could hardly expect less, given that the Howard Government is the most radically 
nee-liberal in Australia's history, and has spent three years obsessed with the need to 
banish perceived uncertainties of all kinds-economic, strategic, cultural and 
ontological. Indeed the problem of managing and controlling uncertainty has been a 
declared objective of Australian policy for at least ten years, and is crucially linked with 
the problematic of security that is the focus of this study. 
An obsession with certitude-whatever that has been taken to mean, and it needs to 
be placed under question-has been a constant theme of Australian governmental 
discourse for at least a century, if not longer. It has been a major influence in 
Australia's dependence on imperial benefactors-Great Britain as Japan became more 
powerful during the first decades of the century, and the United States as 
decolonisation challenged western interests and certitudes after World War II-and fed 
into a reliance on militarism and repression to ensure security. As a political 
technology, security has constantly sought to limit and conquer uncertainty, but it has 
also crucially been employed to produce images of it. Thus the definition of certainty, 
as of security and stability, has been a highly political affair, being used to define 
certain political, economic and cultural developments as ideal and others as threatening 
and disruptive. In tum this technology has been made more effective by imagining such 
ideals (equated with the state, nation or civilisation) as organic and progressive unities 
according to a fixed idea of cultural and economic life; political and economic forces 
which appear to challenge that idea are expelled from the imaginary unity and repressed 
as threats to security. In its practical operation, this has enabled highly effective, and 
destructive, forms of political control and intervention. 
In the current context a drive for certitude arises not only from the maelstrom of the 
Asian crisis, but from a broader challenge to long-standing images of security and 
8 The Howard Government has announced its willingness to provide the funds as a 'second line 
of defence' should the position of the three nations (in regard to external reserves) deteriorate to 
a point where they could not be managed by existing IMF resources. The monies for Korea and 
Thailand would take the form of a currency swap at market rates, to be reversed once the crisis 
had passed. The money for Indonesia would be in the form of a loan, which would eventually be 
repaid. In all cases strict adherence to IMF programs is a condition. Despite announcements 
that $US300 million would be brought forward for Indonesia and US$330 million for Korea, at the 
time of writing no funds had been released. (Press Releases from the Treasurer, 11.8.97, 
1.11.97, 4.12.97, 25.12.97, and the Prime Minister, 8.4.98) 
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identity since a range of social movements arose to challenge the Vietnam war, the 
historic treatment of indigenous peoples, and the broader military and economic 
structures of western imperialism. After that time governments abrogated the White 
Australia policy, rejected the cold war premisses of Australia's strategic planning and-
at least rhetorically-proclaimed a new independence of thought and respect for justice 
as cardinal tenets of a new foreign policy. During the 1980s and 1990s a series of 
Labor governments accelerated some of these changes, declaring that Australia's future 
(and a renewed and modernised form of national identity) lay in the Asia-Pacific region 
and in a deeper cultural understanding of its neighbours. Most dramatically, they 
embraced the High Court's decision incorporating a form of native title into the 
common law as the basis for a new 'reconciliation' between indigenous and non-
indigenous Australians. 
On the other hand these governments also sought to manage, control and thwart 
much of the pressure for change, while surface rhetoric embracing change masked 
deeper structural and discursive continuities with the past. No government sought to 
challenge the evolving structures (and new hegemonic ideas) of the international 
economy, or to extricate themselves from the ANZUS alliance, and while direct military 
deployments into Asia were now ruled out, they were replaced with military aid for 
Asian proxy armies to defend regional 'security interests' which were defined in largely 
unchanged terms. Thus Australia provided large amounts of military and economic aid 
to the Soeharto regime while turning a blind eye to the vast massacre which enabled his 
rise to power, and to the abuses of his army over decades in East Timor, Irian Jaya, 
Aceh and throughout the Indonesian archipelago. As new uncertainties appeared with 
the end of the cold war in 1989, such structures of security and being were clung to 
with even greater fervour. Thus by the time the Howard Government was elected in 
1996, the New Order regime had been made into a bedrock of Australian foreign and 
strategic policy, with disastrous consequences. 
In this sense, certainty was an even greater obsession of the Liberal-National 
Coalition. While continuing the neo-liberal thrust of Australia's economic diplomacy, 
and its pragmatic embrace of Asia-Pacific elites, it sought to arrest whatever 
transformations this might make in the national identity. As the Government's foreign 
policy white paper announced, in words chosen by the Prime Minister, ' .. closer 
engagement with Asia [does not] require reinventing Australia's identity or abandoning 
the traditions which define Australian society ... Australia does not need to choose 
between its history and its geography.' These views were presaged by Howard's 1996 
visit to Indonesia where he said that Australia 'does not claim to be Asian' and brings 
'its own distinct culture, attitudes and history to the region.' The Government sought 
certainty in a revived strategic partnership with the United States, and edged away from 
Labor's (already weak) internationalism with renewed declarations of 'national interest' 
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as a basic test of policy and action. (DFAT, 1997: iii-iv; Gordon and Walters, 1996: 1; 
MacLachlan, 1996a) 
Any doubts about the Coalition's determination to wind back the clock were erased 
by their aggressive efforts to reverse the political gains of Aborigines. Funding to the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) and the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) was cut, and in response to the High 
Court's Wik decision-which extended native title to a right of co-existence on pastoral 
properties-they introduced legislation which sought to extinguish native title on 
pastoral leases and wind back indigenous rights across a broad range of areas. This 
course, Howard said in a November 1997 address to the nation, was pursued to deliver 
'fairness, justice and certainty.' (Howard, 1997c) With similar symbolism, the 
Government also refused-after the publication of the Human Rights Commission's 
landmark report Bringing Them Home-to make an official apology to indigenous 
Australians who had been victims of the systematic policy of removing children from 
black communities. This policy, which its practitioners admitted was aimed at causing 
the permanent disappearance of the Aboriginal race, has been denounced by 
commentators on right and left alike as an attempt at genocide. (Rowley, 1971: 4; 
Manne, 1997) 
THE AUSTRALIAN SUBJECT 
AND THE STRATEGIC IMAGINATION 
What was so clear in these gestures was the Government's determination, in defending 
older forms of 'tradition' and identity from challenge, to maintain a unitary image of 
Australian character and being-at a time when its claims were never more tenuous, or 
its social and economic impact more under question. Indeed the rigidity of the 
Government's approach mirrored the depth of the challenge it sought to contain and 
banish. Howard's remarks in Jakarta, and their reappearance in the text of the white 
paper, were less remarkable for their statement of what Australia is-which is largely 
assumed-than for their statement that it is not Asian. Buried there, and in the refusal to 
acknowledge the corrosive power of Australia's Aboriginal history, is an ontological 
anxiety of the most profound kind. This study demonstrates that such a drive for 
sameness has been a crucial part of security's operation as a political technology-
enabling it to not only construct dominant images of domestic life and social 
organisation, but to generate far-reaching principles for foreign policy and for the 
structural operation of the international system. 
Concepts like 'the national interest', and statements which assume the existence of 
an unproblematic ontological unity like 'Australia', with an identifiable character and 
'way of life', are markers of this political technology in operation. Turned onto 
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citizens, such discourses form an emotional appeal to subjectivity and link it with larger 
obligations and forms of belonging; turned into the international arena, they make 
'sovereignty' into a representational principle for the actions of states and the operation 
of the global system. Between these realms security constructs ever more tightly woven 
flows of meaning and power that come to seem inescapable. However by returning to 
some of the founding texts of western political philosophy and political economy, this 
study argues that such a system, rather than arising out of ever more refined accounts 
of reality or universal truth, has been the product of entirely interested and strategic 
efforts of political imagination. In particular the study demonstrates how both 
individual experiences of being and larger collectives of social and economic 
organisation were imagined in remarkably similar ways. The key point here is that the 
individual, the state, and even interstate forms of co-operation and alliance (although 
never the international system as a whole) have been imagined as particular kinds of 
subjects. 
At an individual level this subject is imagined as an embodied and psychic unity-a 
monad-with powers of rationality, calculation and self-knowledge. Although it exists 
within society, its psychic life is largely self-contained and its priorities generally 
selfish. Later liberal accounts made key conditions of subjectivity work, desire and 
self-interest-qualities we recognise in the most contemporary liberal discourses. Yet 
security in turn introduces the liberal subject into a larger spiral of being in which the 
fullest realisation of subjectivity takes place only when individual desire is subordinated 
to, or at least placed in productive tension with, greater structures of identity and 
obligation. Both Hobbes and Locke maintained that men would only find security and 
freedom within the protective embrace of the state which, far from being a foreign 
carapace erected over them through unhappy necessity, was a larger, higher expression 
of their own being-a body-politic, a subject writ large. Thus Hegel maintained that the 
ethical life of the individual reached its pinnacle only in the state and in a broader 
European movement of progress of which colonisation was a natural and inevitable 
outgrowth. At this point security made the leap from a relation between state and 
citizen, to a principle for the actions of the body-politic itself in the international system. 
I have tried to capture this leap with the term strategic imagination, a technology 
through which security can simultaneously construct 'national' images of community 
and identity and intervene in the flows and structure of international space-whether in 
a cultural, political, economic or strategic sense. The strategic imaginary works through 
the simultaneous deployment of metaphor, policy and technology, with the explicit aim 
of making spaces, bodies and populations more flexible, manipulable and productive. 
This argument contradicts the repeated belief-stated most clearly by Australian foreign 
minister Percy Spender in 1951, who argued that 'no nation can escape its 
geography'-that space has an irrefutable reality of its own. 
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The Hegelian schema has been strongly evident in Australian discourses of nation-
building, progress, and broader regional political and economic change, adding a 
seductive gloss to a complex of otherwise cynical strategies. The influence of Hegel 
reminds us of a crucial feature of security-which is that the ontological unities it 
constructs, and in turn protects, exist only in an enabling and generally hostile relation 
to the Other. The Other is not an essential reality, but a constructed image against which 
being defines itself and its project. The relation of the 'Australian subject' to the Other 
has exhibited dramatic surface change, while showing a stubborn underlying 
continuity. Australia's indigenous peoples have been the most enduring image of 
otherness, provoking warfare, hostility and deep ambivalence, while communism has 
had a more patchy (if no less significant) presence as a feared anchor of identity. 
Longstanding images of fear and threat from Asia have more recently been disavowed, 
yet the project of a unitary subjectivity has not. Whatever its changes, this study shows 
the perseverance through Australian life of a destructive and limiting structure of 
identity which has at its core a fearful and coercive relation to otherness-rather than a 
recognition of interdependence and ethical responsibility. This failure lies at the centre 
of many current dilemmas, from the attempt to develop adequate policy responses to the 
Asian political and economic crisis, to the destabilising force of Aboriginal claims for 
justice to elite efforts to maintain the fiction of an stable and unitary Australian identity. 
SECURITY: 
AN AUSTRALIAN GENEALOGY 
This study attempts to explore and elaborate these themes in the most systematic way 
possible. It has chosen to do this by combining a broad historiographic method with a 
theoretical inquiry which interrogates the founding assumptions (and political effects) 
of the material, concepts and discourse it encounters. With regard to security, I believe 
this to be the most useful way of grappling with its complexity, its historical force, and 
its sweeping material effects. In doing so, I have combined the two broad theoretical 
tendencies of genealogy and deconstruction. Deconstruction generates a scepticism 
about the claims of concepts (like security, certainty or the nation) to possess a unitary, 
self-evident and essential status, seeking instead to understand their philosophical 
structure and undermine their claim to be unproblematic descriptions of the real. In 
turn, genealogy analyses the historical development of such concepts (and the larger 
political and discursive apparatus which surrounds them), and traces their deployment 
into particular systems of being and of social, cultural and economic life. While this 
approach may seem somewhat painstaking, I have always believed that before security 
can be superseded or refigured, its sweeping and disturbingly stubborn cultural power 
must first be understood. This is why this study, after first analysing the philosophical 
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history of security's conceptual armature, then seeks to trace its deployment and 
operation through Australia's political history-using a method which seeks to bring 
rhetorics of national identity and economic, defence and foreign policy into an analytical 
whole. 
From another perspective, many may be sceptical of the breadth that characterises 
this study. More familar with a late-modern study of security which equates it with 
primarily strategic issues of defence and military stability, they might wonder whether a 
stable object of inquiry has not disappeared with this broader approach. While I 
acknowledge such concerns, I would argue this is primarily a political problem which is 
no fault of mine. Chapter One analyses this dilemma as it traces the development of 
security as an object of analysis through International Relations theory. Having 
undergone a mutation from a founding concept of liberal internationalism, to a central 
tenet of political realism, and then undergone a series of substantial revisions through 
the theoretical debates of the last thirty years, the chapter concludes that an agreed, 
discrete and unproblematic concept of security remains as remote as ever. Across a 
range of political positions, theoretical discourses and institutional contexts the object of 
security, the means of achieving it, and the set of priorities and needs it implies, remain 
diverse and at times in dramatic contradiction. Simon Dalby for instance demonstrates 
the contradictions between both 'environmental security' and 'economic security' based 
on liberal-capitalist modes of production and, given that states have so often been 
threats to their own citizens, between 'human security' and 'national security' based on 
military force and realpolitik. (1997: 6-18) In such a context, strategic analysts and 
policymakers remain wedded to (a highly political) illusion that they operate within a 
stable conceptual framework. 
It is also possible to demonstrate that, even within mainstream literatures and policy 
communities, security is being discussed in ways which suggests that there is a need to 
go beyond technical questions of defence and strategic guidance. A growing body of 
literature is seeking to understand the inter-relation of security with economics, or the 
shift to 'multi-dimensional' security policies. Official statements of Australian strategic 
policy also make such connections, while assuming stable ontological certainties. For 
instance the 1993 Strategic Review argued that the Australian Defence Force, by 
'contributing to regional resilience and security' could 'protect key trade and 
commercial interests, and thus our national way of life', while the 1994 White Paper, 
Defending Australia, argued that Australia's security is 'linked inextricably to the 
security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific.' (Ball and Kerr, 1996: 121; DoD, 1994: 
3) Likewise passages in the 1997 foreign policy white paper (which argues for 'a 
whole-of-nation approach which emphasises the linkages between domestic policies 
and foreign and trade policies') and the statements of Howard and Beazley, all suggest 
that security must be analysed at the intersection of domestic and international policy, 
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through a lens which takes questions of metaphor and identity seriously. (DFAT, 1997: 
vii) However it is acknowledged that the price of such breadth has been that a tighter 
focus on defence policy and regional strategic dynamics has been eschewed, which 
does not imply a judgement about their relative importance. 
Chapter one opens the thesis by engaging in some path-clearing, analysing how 
security has been thought within international theory and policymaking, from its 
beginnings in Wilsonianism and other forms of liberalism, to the development of 
'national security' within various strands of political realism, and then through a series 
of de- and re-centerings of security as a concept and a field of practice. It concludes 
with a survey of more contemporary and critical literatures which have opened up 
security to greater scrutiny and interrogation. The chapter then outlines more 
systematically the theoretical and methodological approach I take, in particular 
explaining how genealogy differs from more traditional forms of historiography, and 
how it transforms received ideas about knowledge, reality and power. It argues that a 
history of security should not be a mere chronicle of events but a chronicle of events in 
discourse, events in knowledge and power which make certain arrangements of the real 
possible-where only a few years before they might have been literally unthinkable. 
For this reason I analyse documents throughout the thesis not only for the events they 
might reveal or illuminate, but for what they can tell us about the aggregation of 
particular knowledges, institutional frameworks and structures of action. Bearing in 
mind their function as markers of larger discursive structures and conflicts, they are 
also analysed as texts with a particular metaphoric and rhetorical structure which is 
often of crucial political importance. As a result, the analysis often cuts across received 
historical accounts and political analyses. 
Chapter two begins the genealogy proper, through a pursuit of security into some 
of the founding texts of modern political thought. Using Foucault's work on 
governmentality as a template, the chapter traces the emergence of security as a 
generalised mediation between state and citizen-from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century doctrines of reason-of-state to the writing of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham and 
Hegel. Govemmentality here links the development of techniques for the government 
of selves with the government of human totalities, at which point sweeping cultural, 
strategic and economic techniques become of great importance. In particular the chapter 
demonstrates how, under the broad rubric of security, liberal modes of subjectivity and 
economic organisation were combined with a geopolitical mode of reason in which 
global economic flows, the strategic and administrative command of vast tracts of non-
European territory, and enormous efforts of social engineering came to seem natural. 
These are the forces which led to Australia's colonisation in the late eighteenth century, 
and which are still with us now, having taken on an unparalleled (and poorly 
understood and controlled) intensity through the twentieth century. 
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The remainder of the thesis, then, traces the further development and deployment of 
this technology through Australian political, economic and cultural history. It traces a 
reverse movement to that in chapter two, from the sweeping strategic imagination 
already present as Australia is first colonised, to the gradual creation and consolidation 
of an 'Australian' subjectivity which might conform to the kind of cohesive body-
politic imagined in the thought of Hobbes and Hegel. Chapter three traces the crucial 
early decades of this process, which began as Aborigines and competing European 
powers were perceived as the first threats to the security of the colonies. This 
introduced a strong theme for later history, in that threats to both the physical safety and 
the ontological integrity of the ideal community came both from beyond its borders, and 
from its very interior-what Manning Clark has called 'the enemy without and the 
enemy within.' ( 1981: 68) It then traces how these fears, in the last decades of the 
century, combined with efforts to increase British control over the South Pacific and 
growing fears of Asian immigration, social progress and military capability, into a 
movement for Federation at which many of the fundamental juridical, economic, 
political and cultural structures of Australian life were established. It also demonstrates, 
however, that many such structures were deployed as efforts to paper over and manage 
dramatic social and economic divisions. Federation also appeared to cement the 
ontological linkage between soil, sovereignty and identity which had been anxiously 
sought for decades-yet this is an anxiety which has continually reappeared, most 
recently in Kim Beazley's warnings against complacency over the claims of a small 
population to a large continent.9 (The Australian, 16.8.98) The chapter concludes as 
this process of subjectivity reaches its dark pinnacle in the deployment of hundreds of 
thousands of Australians to the Great War, after which the sacrificial myth of the 
'Anzac tradition' emerged as the culmination of a modem Australian identity-despite 
the enormously divisive political and religious conflicts which raged over the growing 
slaughter. 
Chapter four takes up with Australian Prime Minister Billy Hughes at the 1919 
Versailles conference, where in pushing for the Australian annexation of New 
Guinea-for 'our safety, security and freedom'-he told US President Woodrow 
Wilson that he spoke for sixty thousand dead. (Fitzhardinge, 1979: 396) Thus another 
potent historical theme-which linked Australian security and diplomatic influence with 
its participation in the wars of its great power allies-became visible. The chapter then 
9 Australian politicians have been making such statements since the 1880s, when the father of 
federation Henry Parkes expressed anxiety about the jealousy of emerging Asian powers over 
the Colonies' hold in the continent. They were repeated by Billy Hughes during the Great War, 
and by John Curtin at the outbreak of the Pacific War. Kim Beazley made his statements during 
the launch of his education policy in September 1998, and repeated them when he spoke on 
election night, saying: 'We are a nation of 18 million people trying to work out a justification for 
holding a continent, in which used to be called the Far East, a substantial proportion of this 
region's real estate. You will only do that if you are very, very smart.' (The Australian, 16.9.98) 
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traces two parallel developments which meet in the Pacific War. The first discusses 
how rhetorics of security and anti-communism were utilised during a time of rising 
class conflict, which only intensified as rash borrowing decisions (made in the rush for 
development of the continent) met the wall of global financial meltdown. The second 
traces Australia's responses to the regional economic and strategic tensions-
exacerbated by the depression-which culminated in the outbreak of the Pacific War 
and which seemed to bear out the decades-long fears of Japan. 
In particular the chapter suggests that it was in the crucible and rhetoric of war-in 
which Labor Prime Minister John Curtin utilised the language of the Anzac tradition to 
convince Australians to make sacrifices in the larger, urgent cause of their own 
survival-that the ontological purchase of the Australian subject was strengthened, in 
the face of the unprecedented threat of the Other. None other than the conservative 
politician and historian Sir Paul Hasluck has argued that the reconstruction of a strong 
image of national identity-which had been undermined by the division and suffering 
of the depression-was crucial to the war's outcome. (1952: 1) Chapter fiv,e concludes, 
as Australian leaders ponder the possibilities of the postwar international order, with a 
meditation on Labor's claim to have provided justice to Australian workers and security 
to the nation as a whole, an achievement which they thought could be mirrored in the 
new structures of the international system. This married one potent philosophical 
universal-security-with another-justice-in a rhetoric which would be echoed by 
the Labor governments which followed. My major concern is that the persistent 
overstatement of the gravity of the military threat, and a general demonisation of the 
Japanese people, only intensified a hostile image of otherness within the Australian 
identity-allowing it to be twisted into the service of a very different kind of politics in 
the subsequent twenty years. 
Chapter five examines this politics, by tracing the evolution of a rigid and 
increasingly violent set of discourses which would eventually serve to define the 
Australian identity and the global 'realities' of the Cold War. The terrible irony is that 
their success, played out as a response to the unprecedented challenge of anti-
colonialism, emerged as a victory over a very different vision of international life. This 
vision, which the Labor Governments of Curtin and Chifley supported, was laid out in 
the Atlantic charter signed by the western allies in 1942, which supported democracy, 
self-determination, fair trade and social security, and provided for a renunciation of 
territorial aggrandisement and the establishment of a system in which force might 
eventually be abandoned as an instrument of national policy. Labor hoped that the new 
United Nations Organisation (UN) would be the vehicle for such aspirations, and in 
194 7-8 used it to support the independence of Indonesia against the opposition of the 
Netherlands, Britain and the United States. 
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However in Labor's dispatch of arms to help the British fight the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP), their relief at the Nationalists defeat of an Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) rebellion in 1948, and their reluctance to confront the US over 
_its sabotage of Japanese reforms-which effectively buried hopes for a just political 
and economic order in Asia-were the seeds of the politics which followed the election 
of the Menzies Government in 1949. The chapter traces this politics through the attempt 
to ban the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), the establishment of a formal military 
alliance with the United States, Australian military deployments to Korea, Malaya, and 
South Vietnam, and the support for General Soeharto's murderous takeover in 
Indonesia in 1965. Successive Liberal-Country Party (LCP) Governments utilised the 
language of the 'political double-bind', intense secrecy and disinformation, and 
alarming images of fear and threat from Asia to coerce public support for their policies. 
The broad discursive architecture took the form of a quasi-Hegelian geopolitics, in 
which support for capitalist economic modernisation and consumerist subjectivities 
(which implied a gradual movement from Other to Same) combined with the violent 
suppression of movements designated threats to security. These forms of otherness 
were to be absolutely extinguished, whatever the human or social cost. 
Chapter six concludes the genealogy, by focussing on a period in which the 
geopolitical and ontological certitudes established over the previous decades came under 
increasing pressure. A constant theme through this time is how longstanding images of 
national identity were abrogated or transformed-yet never at the price of a singular 
image of identity itself-and how this was parallelled by a drive to recover lost 
certitudes, even if this meant the embrace of otherwise disturbing change. Thus the 
analysis cuts across claims of a radical reorientation of national identity and 
international policy after the Vietnam war, seeking instead to outline how the embrace 
of the New Order regime of President Soeharto, qualified support for ANZUS and the 
United States' global policies, or the acquiescence in a neo-imperial restructuring of the 
global political economy, betrayed deep-seated structural and discursive continuities 
with the past. Perhaps the most profound example of this failure is the case of East 
Timor-· here successive governments refused to support their legitimate claims to self-
determination or take up Indonesia's appalling and systematic record of human rights 
abuses, in the fear of alienating a power which had been designated essential to the 
security of Australia's very being. Even as the White Australia policy was buried by the 
discourse of multiculturalism and the declaration of a new sensitivity to Asia, and the 
terrible crimes against the continent's original owners finally addressed by a limited 
form of land rights, the drive for a unitary and progressive Australian identity 
remained, fundamentally undisturbed by the death which had gone on under its name. 
Yet the Howard Government has placed even this (problematic) legacy under attack, in 
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a drive to reconstitute an older and more stable image of being, with the ironic effect of 
matching an increasingly illusory unity with deepening fragmentation. 
Thus to questions about this politics of identity, which effaces social conflict and 
division under cliches such as 'the national interest' or 'the way-of-life', are added 
questions that undermine the moral claims of the Australian subject to represent a 
cohesive and ethical movement of historical progress. This is revealed as simply 
another rhetorical move, another exercise of the 'political double-bind', if one which 
retains a disturbing power. The hope which animates this study is this-that, 
confronted with the terrible historical violence of its realisation, and the limits of the 
politics which still claims to make it secure, this narrow vision of the Australian subject 
might lose its hold on our future. 
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Frameworks 
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise the ideological 
contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that [their] own scientific practice is 
accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting 
a new politics of truth ... of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, 
social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. 
Michel Foucault, 1984: 51. 
One 
Security as International Theory 
The first step is to ask whether the paramount value of security 
lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values. 
James Der Derian, The Value of Security, 1993: 94 
This chapter begins the genealogy through a study of how security has been thought in 
international relations theory. In parallel with the subsequent chapter, Security and 
Government, it does so to elucidate the theoretical development of concepts which 
would have an enormous effect on Australian history and the global processes in which 
it has been entangled. Chapter Two traces security's evolution through western political 
philosophy, to a point which largely precedes its twentieth century appearance in the 
discipline of international relations; this chapter traces its changing role as both an 
object, and a theoretical underpinning, of international policymaking. Many of the 
themes I isolate have had a pervasive, and continuing, influence on Australian defence 
and foreign policy. The IR theory is taken up first to hollow out the space in which this 
study can take place at all, tracing the theoretical debate over security to a point where 
my enquiry becomes both plausible and necessary-while also analysing some key 
events in security's solidification into a sweeping political discourse, which the 
following chapter then takes further. Having traced the debate to this point, the 
conclusion of this chapter will outline my own methodology, in particular the historical 
approach that is genealogy, in more detail. 
At the outset, I have taken a very different analytical orientation to the role and 
status of theory to that of the positivist tradition still dominant in International 
Relations. This tradition claims a transcendent epistemological authority for theory-
that it not only 'reflects' the real but, by deriving universal principles, laws and norms 
from it, functions as a form of knowledge which would bind, clarify and systematise 
the real, as if it could be made to reproduce the form of a perfect, autonomously 
functioning machine. In contrast, I argue that theory is a technological and 
programmatic production of the real, a discursive strategy for linking truth with reality 
according to an historically contingent, rather than universal, system of rules. We 
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cannot find the real in its finality, but are instead confronted with multiple and 
conflictual versions of the real, each with their implied social model. Thus theory is 
approached with both respect for the potential power of its systematising claims, and 
incredulity toward those claims. From this it can be gathered that in international theory 
I do not expect to find clues to the truth of security, or trace a process of its gradual 
refinement and consolidation; rather I am seeking to elaborate the hegemonic ideas and 
discursive forms within which it has been thought-as a practice, a goal and an object 
of study. 
REALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM: 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS' BINARY CODE 
Debates about security in the first half of the twentieth century centred around the 
\ 
respective merits of 'the balance of power' and 'collective security'; by the time writers 
such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr had developed power balancing into a full 
blown philosophy of Political Realism, they had been reified into two antithetical 
approaches to the study and practice of international relations. While there are 
substantial differences between the two approaches there are also large areas of 
common ground; together these form a powerful discursive field limiting the ways 
security can be conceived, thought and performed. 
In the first years of the twentieth century security was for European states a 
question of territorial 'integrity', and for imperial powers like France and Great Britain 
that of protecting their domains. The Monroe Doctrine or the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
showed that security spheres were already being defined well beyond national 
boundaries. Up to the first world war security was defined through calculations of 
'national interest', and systematised through a shifting system of military alliances-the 
'balance of power'. This combination of principles-whose ultimate objective 
ostensibly was 'equilibrium'-Kissinger called Realpolitik. Yet at this time European 
diplomatic and military machinations were being played out above massive 
subterranean shifts: the growth of Germany and Russia, the breakup of the Ottoman 
Empire, and a far-reaching acceleration in technological modernisation that would 
change the nature and consequences of warfare forever. Kissinger's analysis of the 
drift to war in 1914, however, asserted that 'it was not so much the balance of power 
as Europe's abdication of it that had caused ·the debacle': 
The leaders of pre-World War 1 Europe had neglected the historic balance of 
power and abandoned the periodic adjustments which had avoided final 
showdowns ... While paying lip service to equilibrium [they] had catered to the 
most nationalistic elements of their public opinion. Neither their political nor their 
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military arrangements allowed for any flexibility; there was no safety valve 
between the status quo and conflagration. This led to crises that could not be 
settled and to endless public posturing that, in the end, permitted no retreat. 
(Kissinger, 1994: 226) 
There is much that is insightful in Kissinger's account of the crisis; yet his conclusions 
are simplistic and self-serving. He does not explore what structural elements of the 
balance of power system contributed to the crisis, such as its reliance on military force 
and consequent tendency to arms racing, particularly as economic and technical 
capabilities increased; its vulnerability to personality and national hubris; its belief in the 
inevitability of power calculation; and its dependence, as a system, on ultimately 
arbitrary calculations of interest and rationality as if they were stable values. This last 
element saw a moral relativism invoked that would make British defence of its imperial 
interests 'rational' and German or Russian expansion 'irrational'. Similarly, the 
important role of national ideologies (at a time when powerful representational 
technologies of mass society were being developed) is not theorised; their irruption into 
the field of diplomacy, again, is simply irrational. Thus any detailed analysis of the 
interdependent production of international and domestic society is closed off, 
preserving the ideal relative autonomy of the two spheres. (1994: 200) 
It was to some of these problems that Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of 
international relations was addressed, a philosophy according to which international 
order would be based upon justice rather than power. Wilson attacked the balance of 
power as 'an unstable equilibrium of competitive interests'; peace would now be 
assured through a system of collective security which would be activated on moral, 
rather than geopolitical, grounds. Appearing before the US Senate in 1917 he argued 
that 
Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, 
of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory and 
resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in 
the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But 
no one asks of expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is 
looking now for freedom of life, not equipoises of power. (Cited in Kissinger, 
1994: 227) 
The fundamental categories of Wilsonianism would be the ideas of democracy, 
collective security and self-determination. In this view war too often resulted from the 
frustration of self-determination, and democracies would not be inclined to self-
aggrandisement or aggression. These precepts would be based on the idealism and 
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altruism of the United States, which would seek a new global role on the basis of its 
values rather than its national interests. 'This age', he stated, 'rejects the standards of 
national selfishness that once governed the councils of nations and demands that shall 
give way to a new order of things in which the only questions will be: Is it right? Is it 
just? Is it in the interest of mankind?'. Despite the extravagant liberal rhetoric Wilson 
employed, a close reading of some his statements does reveal power calculation. 
Stating that 'we insist upon security in prosecuting our chosen lines of national 
development' he asserted that the US demanded it also for others: thus national and 
global security were inseparable. On another occasion he argued that American power 
hinged on the spread of its values: 'We set this nation up to make men free, and we did 
not confine our conception and purpose to America, and now we will make men free. If 
we did not do that, all the fame of America would be gone, and all her power would be 
dissipated.' (Cited in Kissinger, 1994: 46-50) 
The institution that was to enforce Collective Security was the League of Nations, 
an idea to which Wilson was converted quite late. Its system of collective security was 
embodied in Article 10, which said that league members undertook to 'preserve' (rather 
than 'guarantee') the territorial integrity and political independence of all League 
members against aggression; in such a case the League council would 'advise' upon the 
means of countering it. As Roland Stromberg comments, 'exactly what sort of 
obligation this was became a vexed question; it was evidently something less than an 
automatic commitment to march whenever a frontier was crossed.' The US opposed 
French requests for an international standing army under League jurisdiction, and 
instead signed a supplemental three power treaty under which they and Britain 
guaranteed France's border with Germany. Article 10, with its application to all 
instances of war, appeared to contradict the more detailed Articles 12 through 17, 
which obliged member states not to resort to war without putting the dispute to the 
League, and if not, provided for automatic economic sanctions and recommended 
military actions. Other critics questioned the effect of Article 10, with its 'flat guarantee 
of existing frontiers', in preserving the status quo: anticolonial revolts remained outside 
League jurisdiction. The League Collective Security system disappointed purists on 
both sides: 'realists who favoured the guarantee treaty [of French borders] feared that 
Article 10 might smother it, while idealists deplored the guarantee as a betrayal of true 
internationalism.' The US Congress eventually thwarted American accession to the 
League, and thus any formal participation in its security guarantee beyond that involved 
in the French treaty. (Stromberg, 1963: 26-31) 
As Stromberg's comments suggest, the rhetoric and practice ofWilsonianism often 
diverged: fearing difficulties with the US Congress Wilson asked the Paris Conference 
for a number of amendments to the League Charter, including the exemption of the 
Monroe Doctrine and of other 'domestic questions' from League jurisdiction; similarly 
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the man who proclaimed the inviolability of 'territorial integrity' was the same as that 
who had sent US troops into Mexico in 1916 and provided American support for the 
White Russian forces attempting to overthrow the Bolsheviks. And only through the 
most ethnocentric lenses could American history be seen as a basis for universal ideals 
of freedom, progress and justice-lenses through which the systematic murder and 
dispossession of Indian tribes, or the annexations of New Mexico, Texas, California, 
Hawaii and the Philippines, were barely visible.1 Gabriel Kolko has also emphasised 
how American internationalists like Wilson 'in reality defined the tangible mechanisms 
of world organisations in such a way that they have principally served US national 
interests.' (Stromberg, 1963: 29; Buckley and Strong, 1987: 53; Chomsky, 1992: 14; 
Kolko, 1988: 13) 
Nevertheless, many of the underlying principles and ideals of internationalism were 
in stark contrast to those of an earlier realism, of which Kissinger took Theodore 
Roosevelt to be a paradigmatic figure. Rather than adhere to Liberal ideas of the 
essential rationality and perfectibility of human nature (which expressed in democracy 
would lead to increasing peace), realists clung to a more pessimistic, Augustinian view 
of human nature, which sought to 'place man's demonstrated selfishness in the cause 
of a higher good'. While both groups saw states as the fundamental units and objects of 
security, Wilson sought to think security on the basis of universal legal and moral 
principles that would advance the cause of peace rather than balance a system 
perpetually geared to war. Nevertheless the debates over the League of Nations showed 
that such universalism encountered its own set of problems, namely the particularism of 
the historical and political contexts in which those principles were to be implemented 
and were often found wanting. Also, by invoking justice and self-determination, 
internationalists unwittingly raised questions of human security: as Kissinger 
comments, faced with 'doctrines of self-determination and collective 
security ... European diplomats [were] on thoroughly unfamiliar terrain. The assumption 
behind all European settlements had been that borders could be adjusted to promote the 
balance of power, the requirements of which took precedence over the preferences of 
the affected populations.' ( 1994: 222) 
However imperfectly, Wilsonianism thus opened up questions of justice, right, 
peace and self-determination in the thought and practice of security, and in tum a series 
of (highly problematic and complex) questions of the relations between force, right and 
legal instrument as a basis of international order. It also had some far less benign 
1 For accounts of American policy during the second half of the nineteenth century see Dee 
Brown , Bury My Heart At Wounded Knee, London: Vintage, 1991; Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest 
Design: Anxious Aggrandisement in Late Jacksonian America, Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1985; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy And The 
Politics Of Identity, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992; and Anthony Burke, 
Someday This War's Gonna End: Vietnam Stories At The End Of History, (Unpublished Thesis), 
University Of Technology Sydney, 1994. 
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effects. Such American versions of internationalism cleaved well with established 
cultural mythologies of mission and ascendancy such as 'manifest destiny', which had 
not only legitimised the dispossession of Indian tribes and the acquisition of Pacific 
colonies, but buttressed the arguments of American economists and businessmen that 
the US economy needed increased overseas trade, resource and investment access if its 
growth was not to falter.2 The ideas of international economic co-operation, legal 
agreements and international institutions based on free trade and market access 
supported these objectives, though they were not to be realised until after the Second 
World War, when figures such as J.M. Keynes, Cordell Hull and Franklin Roosevelt 
took up these elements of Wilson's vision. (Brockway, 1968: 44-7) 
These elements of Wilsonianism were to become an enduring feature of US foreign 
policy, as was much of the rhetoric of freedom and American values: however the 
moral and legal ideas behind collective security were to be effectively subordinated to a 
hegemonic western security system based upon American military power and formal 
alliance structures. While collective security as an idea was enshrined in the UN 
Charter, the Cold War and the Soviet Union's use of its veto in the Security Council 
effectively buried efforts to revive security along Wilsonian lines, as politicians like 
Australia's postwar external affairs minister H.V. Evatt had hoped. In this context, 
liberal rhetorics would function as little more than propaganda. A thoroughly amoral 
realism governed attitudes to the use of force and questions of democracy and self-
determination-as another comment by Kissinger illustrates, whilst grateful for much 
of Wilson's legacy, later realists were wary of the limits to action which a 
thoroughgoing internationalism implied: 
Wilsonianism also accentuated another latent split in American thought on 
international affairs. Did America have any security interests it needed to defend 
regardless of the methods by which they were challenged? Or should America 
resist only challenges which could fairly be described as illegal? Was it the fact or 
the method of international transformation that concerned America? Did America 
reject the principles of geopolitics altogether? Or did they need to be reinterpreted 
through the filter of American values? And if these should clash, which would 
prevail? (1994: 53) 
2 American President John Tyler argued in 1842 that America needed to seize commercial 
opportunities in China because 'in some nations steady and industrious labor can hardly find the 
means of subsistence, the greatest evil we have to encounter is the surplus of production 
beyond the home demand, which seeks, and with difficulty finds, a partial market in other 
regions'. (Hietala, 1985: 55-60) Financial journalist Charles Arthur Conant also wrote in 1898 that 
America could not afford to adhere to a policy of isolation while other nations were reaching out 
to 'the new markets' of Africa and Asia. He called for infrastructure investment and 'free markets 
in all the old countries which are being opened to the surplus resources of the capitalistic 
countries and thereby given the benefits of modern civilisation.' (Brockway, 1968: 46) 
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The clear implication is that Kissinger would prefer-indeed as a policymaker he 
aggressively sought-the freedom to define security in terms of 'interests' and to 
intervene on that basis rather than legality; to go to war in the Persian Gulf, for 
instance, to 'defend vital oil supplies' rather than resist aggression. Indeed he laments 
that 'the implication of Wilsonianism has been that America resisted, above all, the 
method of change, and that it had no strategic interests worth defending if they were 
threatened by apparently legal methods.' (1994: 53) No doubt the election of the 
socialist Salvador Allende as President of Chile in 1971 was one example of this 
problem. 
While the League of Nations was thought of as a highly imperfect attempt to 
institute the principles of collective security, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 
Washington Conference were pre-World War Two examples of further efforts in that 
vein. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by fifteen nations in 1928 (the number later 
rising to sixty including Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union) renounced war as an 
instrument of national policy and pledged all signatories to resort to 'pacific means' to 
settle disputes. Earlier the 1921 Washington Conference on the Limitations of 
Armaments attempted to negotiate significant naval disarmament amongst the major 
powers, particularly Japan, Italy, France, Great Britain and the United States. The four 
treaties eventually signed provided for a ten year delay in the construction of capital 
ships (but no restrictions on smaller vessels) and the scrapping of seventy vessels either 
existing or under construction, all derived from proportional strength ratios between the 
fleets. Other elements included an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of China 
and the economic 'Open Door', a Japanese undertaking to withdraw from Shantung 
and Siberia, and US and Japanese undertakings not to fortify their bases in the Pacific. 
While both agreements did display evidence of idealist thinking, the Washington 
agreement in particular (with its proportional limits on arms acquisition and its 
agreements on China) would have also appealed to balance of power strategists. Nor 
did it include any limits on ground forces and technologies. While the London Naval 
Conference of 1930 extended parity controls among Britain, Japan and the USA to 
smaller vessels such as cruisers, destroyers and submarines, France and Italy did not 
accede to the treaty. Japan eventually withdrew in December 1934 after its demand for 
parity across all categories of naval armaments was rebuffed by the western powers. 
(Buckley and Strong, 1987: 65-89; Morgenthau, 1978: 397) 
These grand visions of peace faltered as economic tensions began to rise around a 
combination of German war reparations and the global retreat into rival trading blocs 
following the Wall Street crash. The flow of loans to the German economy faltered at 
the same time as the US began to close down its markets to European producers, and 
the resultant economic depression was clearly exploited by the Nazis in their rise to 
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power. At the same time Japan and the US entered into extended competition for 
resources on the Asian mainland and in the Dutch East Indies. As a new arms race 
began and Japan invaded Manchuria and China the linkages between resource access 
and strategic capability became entrenched: League-style sanctions became tainted with 
self-interest and were manifestly incapable of dealing with the underlying structural 
grievances. The rise of highly authoritarian governments in Japan, Germany and Italy, 
and the intransigence of western powers, particularly the United States, further 
deepened the schisms. The inability to think the economic imperatives to war was one 
of the most serious flaws in early liberal thinking about security; to this date the relation 
of economic processes and inequalities to security remains a destructive aporia in liberal 
internationalist policy and thinking. (Buckley and Strong, 1987: 86; McQueen, 1991: 
36-45) 
Thus liberal discourses of collective security were undermined by their inability to 
deal with economic disputes, their exclusive focus on (already existing) sovereign states 
as the primary object of protection and policy, their practical combination with the 
pursuit of national interests and power balancing which marked an earlier realism, and 
by their protection of the imperial interests of the great powers. Thus the universalist 
rhetoric deployed was too often marred by hypocrisy and self-interest, and obscured the 
concrete practices within which it would be effectively expressed. This marks a deeper 
problem, focused on liberalism's universal language, which more contemporary critics 
have sought to explore. Jim George in particular has located a powerful essentialism in 
early liberal internationalism, which links a modernist positivism with an Enlightenment 
universalism derived from Kantian rationality. In this way positivist claims to truth 
were linked with the imminent culmination of an Ideal in which the rational and the real 
would finally coincide. 'Their progressivist aim', he writes, 'was to intellectually and 
structurally reformulate the nature of modem relations between states in line with actual 
(rationally derived) 'reality', as opposed to the 'irrationality' of the past': 
In the inaugural address of the first chair of International Politics ... [Webster] 
bemoaned the lack of rational-scientific principles in the study of the state system, 
reflecting that if an 'ordered and scientific body of knowledge had existed in 
1914 ... the catastrophe might have been averted.' Understanding world history 
through this dominant modernist prism .. .International Relations was now set to 
enter the next stage of its rational development, in which the language and 
structural principles of the domestic (democratic) realm became directly 
appropriate. (George, 1994: 75) 
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This set the scene for a dangerous reification, in which the knowledge-forms produced 
by liberal internationalism became impervious to critique, given that they now claimed 
to embody not merely a particular, but an ideal and universal reality. What must be said 
in response is that however universal a principle-including widely accepted principles 
like human rights-they are always expressed through the particularity of a concrete 
historical practice; thus they must be interrogated at the level of those practices and at 
the limits of how such practices can be thought. This creates scope for understanding 
how such principles are historically defined, and how they can be compromised-the 
irruption of 'national interests' into Wilsonianism can perhaps be understood, in part, 
by acknowledging the enormous systemic (socio-economic, technological, military) 
forces which enter politics as 'interests' and whose aggregation generates sweeping 
processes which frustrate human attempts at intervention. As George points out, this 
positivist impulse was consistent with a general philosophical and scientific modernism 
which formed the fundamental epistemic ground for both realism and liberal 
internationalism. In particular the later realism of Morgenthau and Carr would still 
embody such a universalising claim to rationalism, though it would be one largely 
stripped of its moral idealism. It is to this we now tum. 
CARR AND MORGENTHAU: 
SECURITY, MORALITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
Realist frameworks for thinking security have been remarkably powerful; it would be 
no exaggeration to say that, notwithstanding the hopes that were raised by the end of 
the Cold War, they remain the cornerstone of defence policies around the globe. 
Military expenditures, strategic anxieties and levels of conflict remain high, whilst 
progress on disarmament is painfully slow. Force and military capability remain for 
many states the ultima ratio of their diplomacy. Whilst any genealogy which sought to 
explain this would need to refer to a range of broad international forces-such as the 
arms trade, the power of military bureaucracies, economic colonialism and transnational 
capitalism-what I wish to explore here is the way Realism's power has been founded 
upon not merely a material but a closely related discursive hegemony; a hegemony 
which is buttressed by a range of other (apparently unrelated) societal discourses which 
facilitate its production of space as real. Realism's power is founded not only on its 
world view, its account of the dynamics of international society, but on the way it has 
sought to ground this set of views in a rational theory of knowledge which would claim 
universal validity. This is to analyse how realism has come to constitute what Foucault 
would call a 'regime of truth', a social, political and economic 'ensemble of rules 
according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power 
attached to the true.' (Foucault, 1984: 74) 
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Both Morgenthau and Carr claimed to present not only a unifying theory of 
international politics, in the way I discussed earlier, but a science of international 
politics. Morgenthau in particular founded realism on a profound essentialism, opposed 
to idealist rationality, which found its ground in an ahistorical account of human nature. 
'The world,' he wrote, 'is the result of forces inherent in human nature.' From this 
flowed a set of assumptions about morality, conflict, legal principle and reality: 
To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them. This 
being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral 
principles can never be fully realised ... [Political realism] then, sees in a system of 
checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to 
historic precedent rather than abstract principles, and aims at the resolution of the 
lesser evil rather than the absolute good. (Morgenthau, 1978: 16) 
Morgenthau founded political realism on a theory of knowledge which has its roots 
deep in western culture, but drew its basic inspiration from the post-enlightenment 
period. In a formulation with strong Cartesian echoes, Morgenthau posited an 
ahistorical essence of the 'human' as the fundamental site of truth, 'the objective laws' 
of political society; this then would also form the basis for a rational theory of 
knowledge ('method') which would reflect and codify these laws: 
Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature ... the operation of these laws 
being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of 
failure. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, 
must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, 
however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also then 
in distinguishing between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively 
and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only 
a subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by 
prejudice and wishful thinking. (1978: 4) 
This epistemology was thus founded on a humanism which is also what Jacques 
Derrida has called a logocentrism: a version of reason (logos) whose certitude is 
founded on a relation of 'absolute self-presence', of the proximity of reason to self, 
thought to speech, knowledge to the real-in the form of a pure correspondence. 
Following the impact of Descartes, argues Derrida, 'this objectivity takes the form of 
representation, of the idea as the modification of a self-present substance, conscious 
and certain of itself at the moment of its relationship to itself .... ' (Derrida, 1978: 97-8) 
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Such forms of knowledge, which he calls 'metaphysics', are also organised by a 
'system of oppositions' in which concepts are constituted as essential and self-present 
by virtue of something they supersede or expel: rationality by irrationality, truth by 
opinion, facts by values, objectivity by subjectivity. Political realism, along with the 
ontological structure of security as a concept, is thoroughly organised by this series of 
dichotomies. And while there is also a strong universalism at work in political realism, 
it is of a different order to that in liberal internationalism; what is universal is struggle 
and agonism, the permanent clash of interests, or the mechanism of 'checks and 
balances', rather than moral or legal principles which are now relativised. 
Morgenthau's six principles of political realism were fundamentally an attempt to 
fix and codify a system of knowledge which would provide a guide to interpreting and 
acting on the real. The fundamental tenet of political realism, from which the rest of the 
theory flowed, was the concept of interest defined as power: this Morgenthau described 
as providing 'the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the 
facts to be understood .. [it] imposes intellectual discipline on the observer, infuses 
rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical 
understanding of politics possible.' For policymakers it provided 'rational discipline in 
action': in the terms of an endlessly circular and self-referential system of justification, 
interests are by definition rational and rationality flows from acting in one's interest. 
(1978: 5) 
Thus the fundamental dichotomy organising political realism (apart from its 
declared antipathy to utopianism) was that which subordinated the irrational to the 
rational. Linking utopianism with rationality, Morgenthau declared that whilst realism 
'does not condone indifference to political ideals and moral principles', it required 'a 
sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible'; in the same way, as political 
realism aimed to encourage a foreign policy that separates the rational from the irrational 
elements of 'experience', political transformation could be achieved 
only through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have 
shaped the past as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we 
can bring about this transformation by confronting a political reality that has its 
own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take those laws into account. 
(1978: 11) 
In this way the claim for a universal morality was subordinated to the real-the 
ahistorical law of contending forces-in terms of an apparently unarguable logic: the 
real itself provided a principle for rationality. From this realism derived a view of 
morality and its place in international life that was of great moment for the ways in 
which it would be possible to think security: affecting the ways security could be 
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defined, its geopolitical sphere and limits, the mechanisms that could be brought to bear 
in its achievement and the constraints on their operation, particularly in the conduct of 
war. While realism was 'aware of the moral significance of political action', wrote 
Morgenthau, it was 
also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the 
requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over and 
obliterate that tension ... universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions 
of states in their universal moral formulation, but ... must be filtered through the 
concrete circumstances of time and place. (1978: 10) 
This in tum generated a final principle, that of 'prudence-the weighing of the political 
consequences of alternative political actions' which he described as the 'supreme virtue' 
in politics. There can be no political morality without prudence, he declared, a prudence 
which would subordinate moral actions to the ultimate test of their 'political' 
consequences.(1978: 11) 
While there are also problems with moral absolutism, the human consequences of 
this subordination of morality to prudence have been disastrous. A disturbing example 
of this logic at work, in the self-conscious pursuit of security, was provided by George 
Kennan, head of the US State Department's Policy Planning Staff and architect of 
containment. In a 1948 memorandum he argued that in the immediate postwar period 
the United States held half the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population, a 
discrepancy which would make it the 'object of envy and resentment'. Our 'real task', 
he wrote, 
is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to retain this position 
of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will 
have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will 
have to concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives ... We 
should cease to talk about vague-and for the Far East-unreal objectives such as 
human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratisation. The day is 
not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. (cited in 
Chomsky, 1987: 48) 
In Morgenthau's text, however, there was a form of moral constraint which may have 
caused him to baulk at Kennan's mercenary ethic. This again was 'the concept of 
interest defined as power' which 'saves us from both moral excess and political folly': 
it demands that justice must be done to all nations in the pursuit of their interests; 
foreign policy should 'respect the interests of other nations ... moderation in policy 
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cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgement.' (1978: 11) Similarly E.H. 
Carr argued that while morality will always be 'entangled' with power, it would be 'an 
unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order' 
because 'mankind in the long run will always revolt against naked power.' In particular 
he made a strong argument that 'the recognition that what is economically good is not 
always morally good must be extended from the domestic to the international sphere.' 
(Carr, 1974: 238) 
The problem with Morgenthau's formulation was both its naivete (the belief that 
once interests were proclaimed as the basis for moral action they would be willingly 
subordinated to those of others) and the limitations of those considerations to states-
individuals, or smaller community groupings, could not have interests which do not 
coincide with those of the state. Similarly the notion of 'interest' is an almost infinitely 
malleable criterion: virtually anything could conceivably be shuttled in under its rubric 
and thus freed from judgement. Thus when security comes to be thought within this 
epistemic field, it can only be the security of states based upon the principle of interest 
defined as power. We can despair at the belated ethical vision of these men, and the 
insistent disavowal of the prescriptive and normative dimension of their theory, which 
refuses to admit that it does more than submit reluctantly to historical and political 
inevitability. Thus we confront a rationalism (no less essentialist than that underpinning 
liberalism) anchored to a powerful epistemological chain which first posits human 
nature as an essence which would ground history, reality and experience (which would 
in fact be their point of origin), and from this derives essential principles for rationality, 
truth and political conduct. 
Yet what a deconstructive strategy emphasises is that such absolute claims to truth 
are founded on little more than their own self-assertion, and are derived from a mythical 
origin: 'human nature', in particular, is not a universal, transhistorical essence as 
Morgenthau claims, but an historically constructed object of western science, medicine, 
philosophy and political theory. As Foucault has explained 'Man' in this sense did not 
exist prior to the eighteenth century: 'the world, its order and human beings existed, but 
man did not'. Man became a finite and conceivable unity as an object of modem 
economics, the human sciences and developing techniques of 'discipline' which created 
the conditions of possibility for 'man' as a living, speaking, labouring being on the 
basis of a 'political technology of the body'. Emphasising the epistemological status of 
this figure Foucault described how Man became-in a way central to Morgenthau-a 
'strange empirico-transcendental doublet, a being such that knowledge will be attained 
in him of what makes all knowledge possible.' And, he added, as merely 'a new 
wrinkle in our knowledge' we could hope that Man 'will disappear again as soon as 
that knowledge has discovered a new form.' (Foucault, 1973: 318-9, 1991: 24) 
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REALISM AND POWER: 
THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
In both Carr and Morgenthau 'security', as a term, was primarily associated with 
liberalism and collective security. Morgenthau contrasted collective security to an older 
approach which saw security as 'the concern of the nation, to be taken care of by 
armaments and other elements of national power.' Thus security within realism would 
fundamentally be thought as national security rather than 'international' or 'collective 
security', and would be derived from realism's account of the international system (as 
ungoverned or anarchic) and from its emphasis on power. Morgenthau declared that the 
struggle for power was universal in time and space, and that international politics was 
'of necessity' power politics. Power was thought as a finite, empirical category-not a 
general power to do things but as 'control over the actions and minds of other men'; 
political power, in particular, was 'a psychological relation between those who exercise 
it and those over whom it is exercised'. National power was something that could be 
sought, possessed and accumulated, and (in a significant modem development of 
raison d'etat )3 Morgenthau devoted considerable space to its limits and possibilities in 
terms of geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, 
population, national character and morale, and the 'quality' of diplomacy and 
government. Not limited to narrow notions of defence, national security would be 
thought increasingly on the basis of national power-a power not limited by national 
borders and which required the integration of all these elements into a co-ordinated 
systemic whole. Because national power was, however, 'uncertain' and difficult to 
quantify, this task would be driven by a permanent anxiety. Security would become 
increasingly subject to-and name-a complex task of sweeping societal and economic 
management. (Morgenthau, 1978: 35, 210) 
War-and foreign policy in general-would be closely tied to this conception of 
national power. In line with Clauswitz' dictum that war is the continuation of politics 
by other means, E.H. Carr stated that 'the ultima ratio of power in international 
relations is war'; thus military strength became 'a recognised bearer of political values'. 
For Carr war 'lurks in the background of international politics just as revolution lurks 
in the background of domestic politics' while for Morgenthau all nations were 
3 Raison d'etat is a reference to the 17th century doctrines of 'reason of state', which Foucault 
has described as the search for 'a rationality specific to the art of government'. He used reason 
of state to coin his neologism 'governmentality' which combines two levels of power-
'individualising' power by which individuals rule themselves, and 'macropower', the centralising 
and disciplinary forms of power exercised by the state in the administration and control of 
populations. Here there are no clear divisions between the international and domestic or state 
and society-'governmentality' is a generalised series of strategies which links all spheres. 
These themes are discussed in more detail in the following chapter, where I will argue 'security' 
emerges in western culture as a key term linking the government of society and individuals. 
(Foucault, 1988: 59-73 and Gordon, 1991) 
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'continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organised 
violence in the form of war'. Among all the elements of national power military 
strength was seen as the most fundamental: Carr argued the foreign policies of states 
were limited not only by their aims, but 'by the ratio of [their] military strength to that 
of other countries.' Military strength was thus a 'decisive' and 'determining' factor in 
foreign policy. In this way the power seeking tendencies of states tended towards war 
because military power, 'being an essential element in the life of the state, becomes not 
only an instrument, but an end in itself.' (Carr, 1974: 109-110) Nor did he see any 
practical distinction between security and aggression-war, in his mind, had its own 
unique rationality: 
It is necessary to dispel the current illusion that the policy of those states which 
are, broadly speaking, satisfied with the status quo and whose watchword is 
'security' is somehow less concerned with power than the policy of the satisfied 
states ... The pursuit of security by satisfied powers has often been the motive of 
flagrant examples of power politics ... Wars, begun for motives of security, 
quickly become wars of aggression and self-seeking ... territorial ambitions are 
just as likely to be the product as the cause of war. (Carr, 1978: 105-113) 
Here Carr presciently isolated a rhetorical phenomenon with which we will become all 
too familiar-the deployment of 'security' as a mask for aggression and intervention. 
However he did not explore this further; it merely formed an example which justified 
making power into a universal principle. 
Extended into the international system, these writers argued, the drive for national 
power generated 'the balance of power', in which power is ideally distributed amongst 
nations more or less equally. Although Morgenthau considered the concept to have 
many practical flaws (including what he calls its 'uncertainty, its unreality, and its 
inadequacy') he insisted that it was inevitable-' a particular manifestation of a general 
social principle'-and that it was 'an essential stabilising factor in a society of 
sovereign nations'. What this general social principle was is 'equilibrium' which 
'signifies stability in a system composed of a number of autonomous forces'. 
(Morgenthau, 1977: 173-227) 
Again making recourse to a grounding humanism, Morgenthau conceived the 
international system on the model of the body, with its organic laws. A healthy body 
possessed stability and equilibrium: disease or illness disturbed that stability and 
initiated the search for a new equilibrium. Writers such as Foucault, Elizabeth Grosz or 
Donna Haraway have challenged such accounts, arguing that the body is not so much a 
natural form as a cultural product-it is constructed by social, psychological, moral and 
disciplinary practices and can only be known through historically specific medical and 
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scientific metaphors.4 In Morgenthau, the body-as-nature metaphor serves to naturalise 
the (entirely historical) functioning of the international system and to conceive it as an 
imaginary harmonious whole-legitimating a global application of policy and effacing 
conflicts which challenge elite interpretations of stability. In this metaphor was also a 
global, homogenising image of Sameness, which has been particularly damaging and 
still constructs elite thinking about the nature of 'order' in the international system. 
(Morgenthau, 1977: 173-227) 
Guides for the ways realism would be able to think security were further contained 
in Morgenthau's nine concluding prescriptions (or 'rules') for the future conduct of 
diplomacy: 
Four fundamental rules: 
1. Diplomacy must be divested of its crusading spirit; 
2. The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and 
must be supported with adequate power; 
3. Diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations; 
4. Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them; 
Five prerequisites of compromise: 
5. Give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage; 
6. Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing face, 
and from which you cannot advance without grave risks; 
7. Never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you; 
8. The armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master; 
9. The government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave. 
(Morgenthau, 1978: 550-60) 
In his discussion of the second rule (the objectives of foreign policy) Morgenthau made 
a highly important linkage. Whereas he and Carr had heretofore associated security 
with liberalism, here he argued that security must now be central to a foreign policy 
based on a philosophy of political realism, that: 
... the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of 
national security, and national security must be defined as integrity of the national 
4 A further effect of this metaphor is indicated by the still pervasive conceptual separation of 
mind and body initiated by Descartes. Thus to conceive the international system as an organic 
body is to engender a panoptic global political gaze (analogous to the rational 'mind' of the 
statesman and the international policy machinery) which would survey and control its functioning 
and protect it from various 'threats' to its unity and equilibrium. An example of this thinking in 
practice is Kennan's 1946 comment that 'World communism is like a malignant parasite that 
feeds only on diseased tissue.' (cited in Campbell, 1992: 28) 
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territory and its institutions. National security, then, is the irreducible minimum 
that diplomacy must defend with adequate power without compromise. 
(Morgenthau, 1978: 553; emphasis added) 
However he adumbrated this by saying that with the advent of the nuclear age no state 
could purchase its security at the expense of another; now diplomacy must seek to make 
all nations equally secure. It is this consideration which required the third rule, which 
sought to avoid generating excessive security fears in any potential enemy in an attempt 
to avoid the classic 'security dilemma'. Yet Morgenthau avoided the complexities of 
this issue by limiting his discussion to a bipolar system in which the two sides would 
ideally first define their national interests in national security terms, and then step back 
from those 'outlying positions' and 'retreat into their respective spheres, each self-
contained within its orbit ... each bloc will be the more secure the wider it separates the 
distance that separates both spheres of national security.' And the definition of national 
security in terms of the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' is itself 
sweeping. If we consider that the economy is one of those institutions we can 
understand how American national security was effectively defined in near global terms 
after 1945. (1978: 553-5) 
Security's new primacy in political realism was thus one of the founding 
(theoretical) gestures of twentieth century geopolitics-although one whose ground 
was laid by the global political, diplomatic, military and economic machinery developed 
by the United States during and immediately after World War 2, and which would be 
formalised by the establishment of the US National Security Council (NSC). National 
security would be secured within the dynamics of the international system: it would be 
based upon the designation of vast 'security zones' which designate the outer limits of a 
state's security interests, yet must incorporate a buffer area (of both territory and 
interests) which is subject to compromise. The sheer imprecision of this prescription 
(How, after all, should the link between the security sphere and the national interest be 
defined?) has helped legitimate a series of destructive historical practices. Whilst 
Morgenthau was aware of the unique dangers inherent in the nuclear confrontation, his 
theory was silent on the broader arena of superpower competition-in third world 
conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, or South and Central America. What he would 
have made of the American doctrine of 'credibility' (which linked self-perceived 
obligations to its allies with the superpower struggle, grossly inflating the importance 
of local conflicts) we are not to know; nor are firm moral limits to intervention implied. 
We can only interpret this to mean, as Kissinger might suggest, that all is permitted. On 
the other hand there are passages in both Carr and Morgenthau's work which argue that 
moral considerations do have a place in diplomacy-for Morgenthau this is particularly 
strong in the conduct of war and for Carr in the need to ensure a fairer international 
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economic order.5 However we do not have to look far to understand why their 
arguments were forgotten: the realist doctrine of prudence, abstracted into a universal 
maxim, undermined any moral restraints or imperatives their work may have otherwise 
advocated. (Morgenthau, 1978: 553-5, 246-7; Kolko, 1988: 5, 293; Carr, 1974: 237) 
NEOREALISM: 
THE INTENSIFICATION OF SECURITY 
Neo- or 'structural' realism, as it emerged most strongly in the late 1970s, did not 
constitute a break with classical realism but a modification of some of its premises. The 
effect of this modification, for this study, has been to make a militarised and coercive 
security an even more central discourse (and problematic) of international policy. Jim 
George has argued this work arrives in a particular historical context, soon after the 
American defeats in Indochina, when mainstream international relations scholars were 
'recovering their sense of identity and analytical equilibrium, after a short period when 
ambiguity, ambivalence and difference threatened.' The virulence of this 'realist 
backlash' was demonstrated by his citation of Robert Tucker's book The Inequality Of 
Nations, which argued that political radicals did not understand the universality of 
anarchy, that this naturally generated inequality among states and that 'self-help' had to 
be the basic principle of national interest and security, being 'the right of the state to 
determine when its legitimate interests are threatened or violated, and to employ such 
coercive measures as it may deem necessary to vindicate those inte.rests.' (George, 
1994: 117-8) 
'Self-help'-with all its everyday connotations of masculine, suburban isolation-
was a major conceptual anchor for Kenneth Waltz's structural realism, particularly in 
his 1979 book Theory Of International Politics. His chapter on the international system 
('Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power') opens with a familar mantra: 'The State 
among states, it is often said, conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of violence. 
Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so-or 
live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbours. Among states, the state 
of nature is a state of war.' (Waltz, 1986: 98) What was perhaps unique about Waltz's 
realism was that national interest and power (and the questions of rationality and will 
5 Morgenthau was scathing about the Indochina war, which had 'obliterated the distinction 
between civilians and combatants', and denounced modern warfare as 'push button war, 
anonymously fought by people who have never seen their enemy alive or dead and who will never 
know whom they have killed ... such a technologically dehumanised war is bound to be morally 
dehumanised as well.' (1978: 246-7) Carr argued that 'conflict between nations like the conflict 
between classes cannot be resolved without real sacrifices, involving in all probability a 
substantial reduction of consumption by privileged groups and in privileged countries.' ( 197 4: 
237) He advocated Keynesian, New Deal style policies of economic reconstruction-while still 
consistent with the modernism of the time, they were sharply antithetical to the unholy alliance of 
Wilsonian economic liberalism and realism that Kennan was advocating in 1948. 
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that went with them) fell away in importance, in favour of an account of international 
dynamics which emphasised the very structure of the system as its fundamental 
determinant. The particular characteristics of states (and the thinking of those who 
govern them) became largely irrelevant; states were largely faceless entities which 
interact within 'anarchy' as 'like units'. The nature of anarchy, and the 'loose 
connection' among states, itself generates the working of the international system, 
elevating the potential for conflict and making the need for self-help even more central: 
When faced with the possibility of co-operating for mutual gain, states that feel 
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not 
"Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be 
divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate 
gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. .. the 
impediments to co-operation may not lie in the character and the immediate 
intentions of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity-at the least, the 
uncertainty of each about the other's future intentions and actions-works against 
their co-operation. (Waltz, 1986: 101-2) 
Thus not only was national security a primary element of the national interest, as 
Morgenthau asserted, but insecurity became a permanent and inescapable condition of 
the international system. This in turn generated other compromises. While aware that 
defence spending is unproductive, Waltz argued that it was necessary for the 
maintenance of autonomy: 'States do not willingly place themselves in situations of 
increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate 
economic gain to political interest.' Insecurity was further universalised through an 
argument that the 'self-help situation is one of high risk' and the bizarre argument that 
states 'are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, 
insecurity is accepted.' The self-help system meant that the national interest must be 
placed over the international interest and thus global problems and solutions must be 
subordinated in priority; this modified even those elements of classical realism which 
saw international co-operation and mutual regard as having some importance. (Waltz, 
1986: 106-110) 
It seems hard to understand why Waltz's theory has been so influential, given its 
extreme reductionism and abstraction, which was exacerbated by his constant recourse 
to the banal, homespun metaphors of microeconomic theory. His work, and this 
tendency within it, has been subject to exhaustive criticism-by writers such as Robert 
Cox and Richard Ashley (1986), R.B.J. Walker (1993) and Jim George (1994)-to 
which I can add little. What I would emphasise within this genealogy is that such work 
intensified the movement of security into a problem of primary significance for 
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international relations, that its reduction into a system condition made it appear 
universal, and that the questions of diplomatic practice and moral complexity present in 
Carr and Morgenthau were now of little or no relevance. This is in marked contrast to a 
'realist' scholar like Stanley Hoffmann, whose response to the challenges of the post-
Vietnam era was to take up the questions of ethics and morality with a genuine (if 
somewhat tortured) seriousness. One effect of this was that he specifically rebuked the 
kind of alarmist vision of renewed vigilance and structural insecurity which 
characterises Waltz or Tucker's work. This he saw as a 'gloomy', Weberian view 
which amounts to 'an abdication of moral judgement.' (Hoffmann, 1981: 14) 
I have emphasised the nuances of Carr and Morgenthau's work for good reason, so 
that the contrasts between it and the practical policy interpretations of realpolitik in the 
USA, Australia and elsewhere can appear, and the alleged unity and self-evidence of 
realism be placed under stress. Such policy discourses (rather than theory alone) are for 
me a more significant object of a genealogy; what I have sought to do here is to identify 
a series of underlying discursive frameworks in which security could come to be 
thought, and to suggest how-as texts-they might dictate their own interpretation. In 
general, I would argue that realism effected a significant subordination of moral 
principles to the results of political action, brought security into national policy as a 
central and over-riding goal, limited its application to actors called states, and 
suppressed (beyond arms control) avenues of international co-operation and 
disarmament. Later theoretical interpretations of security would question its order of 
priority, its field and object of application, and eventually its meaning. 
RETHINKING SECURITY: 
CENTERINGS AND DECENTERINGS 
This section traces the evolution of a more critical series of discourses on security, 
which I characterise as having effected a series of decenterings and recentreings of the 
concept and its practice. These range from work which, while accepting many realist 
precepts, challenges the primacy of military security as an objective, to work within the 
loose rubric of peace studies which-while retaining a vision of security's unity and 
making appeals to it as a legitimate goal-radically refashions its meaning, objects and 
field of operation so that they are virtually unrecognisable by any realist discourse. 
INTERDEPENDENCE AND REASON OF STATE 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's 1977 book Power and Interdependence, seen as a 
key text in 'interdependence theory', could be thought of as an early gesture in 
security's slow decentering-although it also powerfully recentered security in the 
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broader terms of a modem obsession with raison d'etat. Appearing at the same time as 
The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull's 'Grotian' compromise between classical realism 
and liberal internationalism, their account of 'complex interdependence' challenges 
realist assumptions that states are the only significant actors in world politics, that there 
is a clear hierarchy of issues headed by military security, and that force is at all times 
the most effective and determining instrument of policy. Criticising the division of 
international diplomacy into the 'high politics' of war, peace and domination and the 
'low politics' of trade, welfare and economics, they argue that there is now a higher 
level of complex interaction among nations which challenges the unity of states as 
actors, and elevates other transnational institutions (such as corporations, NGOs and 
international organisations) into significant players. Interstate relations are now 
organised around a multiplicity of issues which have no clear hierarchy, thus 'military 
security does not consistently dominate the agenda.' (1977: 24) They argue that the use 
of force among states declines as complex interdependence prevails, yet outside a bloc 
constituted by such interdependence (or on a different set of issues) force may still be 
relevant: 
Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on 
economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very 
important for that alliance's political and economic relations with a rival bloc. For 
the former relationship this condition of complex interdependence would be met; 
in the latter, it would not. (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 25) 
They argue that the use of force amongst industrialised, 'pluralised' countries has 
almost become unthinkable, and that force is not an appropriate strategy for resolving 
ecological or economic problems. While it would not be 'impossible to imagine 
dramatic conflict or revolutionary change in which the use or the threat of military force 
over an economic issue or among advanced industrial countries might become 
plausible', in general the 'effects of military force are both costly and uncertain.' 
Despite this caveat they go on to argue that force still has political uses-the deterrence 
value of US arms against the Soviet threat can be a bargaining chip with other allies, 
and force is wielded in North-South conflicts such as Soviet control over Eastern 
Europe or the US in Central America. Using the Indochina wars as an example they 
argue however that force as an instrument 'to control socially mobilised populations' is 
of 'limited use'; the use of force against a state with whom one has a variety of 
relationships can also have 'costly effects on non-security goals'. (Keohane and Nye, 
1977: 26-8) 
I would argue that their view is not a fundamental challenge to realist precepts or 
objectives, but an attempt to reinscribe that work within a more complex field. Citing 
40 
Security as International Theory 
Kissinger's 1975 comment that 'the problems of energy, resources, environment, 
population, the uses of space and the seas now rank with questions of military security, 
ideology and territorial rivalry' they argue that the multiplicity of issues, relationships 
and actors now makes determinations of the national interest and the co-ordination of 
policy more difficult. Similarly the increase in interdependence fractures the distribution 
of power among actors according to different issues (trade, shipping, oil), and the 
devaluation of military force makes it more difficult for militarily strong states 'to use 
their overall dominance to control outcomes on issues in which they are weak.' Power 
and interest are still key categories: it is their distribution and determination which is 
now more problematic. Nor do they manifest any significant moral qualms over the use 
of force-their criteria for critique appears to be efficiency rather than morality. 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977: 27-30) 
Thus their key preoccupation is with the same questions of raison d'etat and 
governmental rationality which preoccupied Morgenthau: they argue that the relative 
distribution of power on discrete issues becomes of key importance and that 'the 
politics of agenda formation and control' (the attention paid to issues by government 
officials) will become more salient as the ability to force linkages across issue areas 
declines. Another key problem is posed by the ambiguity of the national interest and the 
increasing propensity of bureaucracies to contact each other directly, which thwarts the 
'centralised control' of government and foreign policy: 
The state may prove to be multifaceted, even schizophrenic. National interests 
will be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by different 
governmental units. States that are better placed to maintain their coherence 
(because of a centralised political tradition such as France's) will be better able to 
manipulate uneven interdependence than fragmented states that at first glance 
seem to have more resources in an issue area. (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 37) 
This is enormously revealing, and of great significance. The key terms here are 
'coherence' and 'manipulation', signifying the desire to refine a technical rationality of 
government whose objective is still the maximisation of national power, in an historical 
context where that power is more diffuse and its exercise more problematic and 
precarious. While the critique of force as the ultima ratio of politics effects a small 
decentring of security, particularly as it was thought by the cruder forms of realism and 
by military bureaucracies, I would argue that their concern with raison d'etat in tum 
effects a powerful recentering of security in a way that is both central to our modernity 
and close to Morgenthau's idea of national security as synonymous with national 
interest and power. Their concerns closely reflect contemporary forms of foreign policy 
(motivated by the problem of combining force with other elements of national policy), 
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and are closer to the broad project of societal management with which national security 
has become synonymous. Such concerns also underpin recent rhetorics of 
'multidimensional' security in which military force is only one of an available series of 
policy techniques. 
In an American context their concerns reflect the elite anxieties produced by the 
defeat in Vietnam, associated structural problems in the US economy, and the effects of 
the oil shocks, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods financial system and the threats of 
broader third world commodity cartels. Also by the 1970s the US economy had 
become deeply dependent on a range of imported raw materials, of which 16 per cent 
(without which the US could not function militarily and would be severely damaged 
economically) came from the Soviet Union and Central and Southern Africa. As 
' Gabriel Kolko has commented 'the United States' objective need to exploit the world's 
poorer nations was greatest at that time after 1945 that its power to control them was 
relatively the weakest.' (Kolko, 1988: 228-33) 
AN UN STAB LE NEOR EALISM 
By the early 1990s security had become both a central concept linking international 
relations, strategic analysis and foreign policy studies, and a contested one. The 
geopolitical assumptions of neorealism and the practical terror of the second cold war 
were challenged by elite forums like the 1982 Palme Commission, which formulated 
the idea of common security (emphasising co-operative and interdependent security 
relationships) and by the global peace, human rights and environmental movements, 
whose academic wings began to question the form and status of the concept itself and 
press for the inclusion of other actors, objects and agendas-women, the environment 
and indigenous peoples. Closer to mainstream agendas, and more problematic, were 
calls to broaden security agendas to take in other issues and processes: environmental 
destruction, refugees, piracy, drug smuggling and crime. One intriguing (and deeply 
contradictory) attempt to theorise the concept itself came with the publication of Barry 
Buzan's 1991 book People, States and Fear, which sought to lay out the theoretical 
framework for a new discipline of 'international security studies.' His gesture was 
potentially far-reaching, but ultimately disappointing. 
Buzan opened the book with a series of questions addressed to security as both a 
stable concept and an achievable practice; questions which assume, from the outset, that 
security is itself 'an essentially contested concept': 
What does security mean, in a general sense? How is this general meaning 
transferred to specific entities such as people and states that must be the objects of 
security policy? What exactly is the referent object of security when one refers to 
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national security? If it is the state, what does that mean? .. how do individuals 
relate to an idea like national security in terms of their own interests? At the other 
extreme, what does international security mean? Does it apply to some higher 
entity than states, or is there some sense in which security among states is an 
indivisible phenomenon? (Buzan, 1991: 15) 
He also acknowledged that security's theoretical contradictions flowed into practical 
ones for policymaking and analysis. Identifying major contradictions between defence 
and security, individual and national security, national and international security and 
violent means and peaceful ends, Buzan added that any analytical exercise needed to be 
as much 'philosophical as empirical': 
Add to these the difficulty of identifying the referent object of security (ie. what it 
is that is to be made secure) and the pitfalls of applying the idea across a range of 
sectors (military, political, economic, environmental and societal) and the scope 
of the task becomes clear ... Are objective and subjective aspects of security 
separable in any meaningful way? Is war the only form of threat relevant to 
national security? How can relative security goals be defined? Is national security 
really national, or is it merely the expression of dominant groups? What right 
does a state have to define its security interests in terms which require it to extend 
its influence beyond its own territory .. ? (Buzan, 1991: 15) 
In what was a valuable contribution, Buzan here revealed a whole series of key 
conceptual aporias at the centre of security, which underlined its diffuse and 
contradictory practice. We were encouraged to ask about its diverse definitions, its 
organising role in a system of knowledge, and its political function as a weapon of 
particular societal groups. Yet having done this he rapidly, and almost imperceptibly, 
slid back into a closed logocentric space which would stabilise security's meaning, 
objectives and field and reinvigorate security as a key mediating term between the 
hitherto irreconcilable verities of 'peace' and 'power'. The policing function of this 
move was clear: 'international security studies' would ideally undermine the raison 
d'etre of peace and conflict studies, 'or at least confine it to a smaller and more radical 
constituency', and in the course of the transition peace studies would have to abandon 
'simple-minded anti-militarism' and accept 'anarchic structure as a framework of 
analysis.' (Buzan, 1991: 374) 
Thus Waltz's neorealism becomes his starting point, and with it security is 
powerfully recentred as a key concept to rival those of power, wealth and peace: 'the 
anarchic context sets the elemental political conditions in which all meanings of national 
and international security have to be constructed.' From this flowed the assertions that 
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states must be the 'principle referent object of security' despite the fact that 'there is no 
necessary harmony between individual and national security'. While he does nuance the 
idea of anarchy, saying that 'it does not merit the Hobbesian implications of disorder 
and chaos' and that it is merely a technical description for a 'decentralised form of 
political order', it remains a powerful constraint against thinking critically about 
security. In particular what this formulation does is to reify sovereignty as the central 
normative basis of the international order. (Buzan, 1991: 22, 50) 
While any international study needs to be aware of the limits to international 
organisation implied by sovereignty, it does not have to accept them; however under the 
assumptions of anarchy, sovereignty-· as a political practice, a form of identity and 
juridical effect-is effectively quarantined from deconstruction. Sovereignty's 
ontological, juridical or political claims cannot be opened to question, despite the fact 
that many conflicts and security problems arise from efforts to assert, challenge or 
extinguish claims to sovereignty. Anarchy, however minimally it is defined, is not a 
neutral or essential description of reality, but a highly loaded and reductionist way of 
representing international relations. It carries within it a whole series of normative 
assumptions about international conduct and process, and has an inbuilt logic which 
creates its own conditions of possibility, rather than responding to an essential set of 
pre-existing realities: which is to argue that, if states assume 'anarchy', they will begin 
to act in ways which engender 'anarchy'. Nor is there any natural correspondence, as 
neorealism would have us believe, between anarchy and 'self-help'-'anarchy' 
minimally defined could just as well produce efforts at co-operation and 
demilitarisation. 
Buzan' s relation to neo-realism is thus ambivalent: while he argues that security 
relations between states are 'highly relational and interdependent' this occurs in a global 
context in which states are reified as units and remain the 'principal referent object of 
security'; similarly the 'durability' of anarchy means that the 'practical meaning of 
security' can only be constructed within an environment in which 'competitive relations 
are inescapable.' These powerful acts of closure, though, jostle with other openings: 
arguments that the manifest contradictions between individual and national security 
undermine both the logic of deterrence (in the nuclear age, national security is bought at 
too high a price) and engender new struggles around human rights which make the 
individual the prime object of security. This leads to the ironic insight that 'security can 
only be relative, never absolute.' ( 1991: 22, 50) The conceptual and political spaces 
opened by Buzan's work are matched by a closure which retains force as a central 
factor, the state as primary object and actor, and entrenches the logocentrism of the 
epistemological tradition in which it grounds its claim to the real. 
Because, above all, Buzan makes the claim that security can be known, and known 
comprehensively and systematically. Security is, in its most general form, about the 
44 
Security as International Theory 
'pursuit of freedom from threat'-end of story. The dialectic of security and threat is 
thus universal and given, and derives from a much older western political discourse in 
which security is a generalised mediation between states and those they govern. 
Buzan-citing Hobbes, Waltz, Locke and Berki-sees security as a political and 
juridical overcoming of the 'state of nature' in which the modem state is born as 
individuals abrogate part of their freedom for the security it can provide. (1991: 38) 
While it may be difficult to temporally locate, we cannot overestimate the 
importance of this as an event in western culture-security must be placed alongside a 
range of other economic, political, technological, philosophical and scientific 
developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity. We can see, in 
embryo, security's close relation to the practice of raison d'etat and its key function as a 
promise made by the state to its subjects-a promise which underpins the state's 
legitimacy and provides strong clues to security's enormous societal power. A more 
detailed analysis of this event (as it unfolded through western political philosophy) is 
made in the following chapter; the balance of the thesis is then dedicated to a critical 
description of this formation as it has been deployed through Australian history. 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SECURITY 
A more interesting and potentially more open displacement than that of Buzan or 
Keohane is visible in a recent essay by Alan Dupont, entitled New Dimensions Of 
Security (1996b), which closely reflects contemporary mainstream policy shifts, and 
arises out of a specifically Asia-Pacific context.6 In many ways his thinking has strong 
analogies to Gareth Evans' later work, with its attempt to broaden security agendas and 
promote human security; taken together, their writing demonstrates the limits to 
mainstream policy discourse, whilst also suggesting (often problematic) ways in which 
they may further develop. Dupont begins by destabilising the self-evidence of security, 
arguing that it is 'one of the least understood and most contested concepts to enter the 
lexicon and discourse of international relations' and that particular dispute arises when 
attempting to designate the who (primary reference point) and what (nature and 
6 Another good essay is Muthiah Alagappa's Regionalism and Security: A Conceptual 
Investigation (1994), whose focus is developing patterns and rhetorics of regional economic and 
security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific. Despite adhering to a predominantly logocentric and 
state-centric definition of security, he pays serious attention to intra-state conflicts-which 
arise out of a 'dissonance between power and legitimate authority', particularly in states where 
there is 'a hegemonic attempt to forge a national political community' by suppressing claims to 
self-determination by minorities. Thus both the neo-realist assumption of the state as the single 
object of security and the sole legitimate bearer of sovereignty is undermined. He also 
challenges the positivism of the literature with his insight that 'the definition of the national 
interest.is embedded in norms and values and not endogenously given'-identities and 
understandings of self do affect security behaviour. He also makes a valuable critique of 
Southeast Asian patterns of regionalism which, by promoting 'stability', can create conditions for 
governments to eliminate domestic opposition and support repressive regimes like that in 
Burma. (1994: 163-5, 177) 
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hierarchy of threats) of security. Arguing this partial decentering Dupont cites the 
appearance of discourses about human security, particularly in organisations like the 
United Nations, of which its 1994 Human Development Report argued that 'the 
concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly ... forgotten were the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.' 
Nevertheless like Buzan he locates a stable ontological ground for security in its 
etymology (from the Latin, securus, to be free from danger), returning us to the 
essentialised dialectic of security and threat we locate in Hobbes. Whatever its 
uncertainties, security remains a locatable value and threat is universal. (1996b: 2) 
From here Dupont cites a definition (from Richard Ullman) which attempts to 'balance' 
the concerns of the state and individual with 'those of subnational and non-state actors.' 
In this definition, which appears to provide a starting point for Dupont's analysis, 
threats to national security are defined more broadly and diffusely as 
an action or sequence of events that ( 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively 
brief period of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 
(2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a state 
or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations within the 
state). (cited in Dupont, 1996b: 2) 
Here again we can see the simultaneous de- and recentering of security that I have 
argued is characteristic of this group of texts: security is still concerned with the scope 
and effectiveness of governmental rationality, can still be broadly interpreted ('quality 
of life') in ways synonymous with the national interest, yet admits other actors as 
having legitimate security interests: individuals, organisations, or smaller units of 
political identity. Similarly the definition creates scope for considering a range of other 
processes-such as the social and economic welfare of individuals or the global impact 
of environmental degradation-as security concerns. At the same time there appears 
little awareness of a history in which the security of states and corporations has been 
made to coincide, to the serious detriment of individuals and larger communities. 
Citing the Palme Commission's formulation of 'common security' and the notion 
of 'comprehensive security' developed by Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia (linking 
conventional military threats with concerns about economic well-being, resource and 
market access, and internal stability), Dupont argues that 'neither fully recognises 
import of an emerging range of new security issues which fundamentally challenge the 
norms and utility of both the Realist and Liberal concepts of security': 
These issues tend to be complex, multidimensional and transnational in form and 
impact. For the most part, they stretch the boundaries of traditional thinking about 
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security. Some are economic; others relate to the earth's physical environment; 
many are new manifestations of age old phenomena. They range from concerns 
about international financial flows and market access, to food scarcity, resource 
depletion, global warming, transnational crime, illegal migration, virulent new 
strains of diseases, and a host of other[s] not previously associated with security 
and foreign policy. Together they form a new security agenda. (1996b: 4) 
Of course the test of their challenge to existing paradigms comes when the new security 
agenda is fleshed out. Dupont criticises the realist concern with economic resilience as 
having underplayed the 'role of trade and resource issues as causes of conflict'; 
similarly 'disruptions to global commerce and financial transactions, economic 
coercion, trade sanctions, protectionism, resource disputes and arguments over market 
share and market access constitute a whole range of potential security challenges which 
may be just as serious as traditional politico-military threats.' (1996b: 5) Whilst this 
first point is incisive (and can be addressed to liberalism as well), the alarmist tone of 
the second bandages together an amorphous set of complex processes, whilst leaving 
their relationship and consequences unclear. They are also primarily elite, corporate and 
governmental concerns, ignoring the economic security concerns of individuals-
particularly those who are starving, landless or miserably poor-which must be linked 
to questions of democracy and corruption, debt, and the exploitative international 
division oflabour. 
Environmental security, he argues, is part of the new agenda because ecological 
destruction has 'the capacity to erode the very foundations of global order' and if 
unchecked 'threatens the security of humankind'. The environment interacts with 
security as a cause (or contributing element) of serious conflict and also constitutes a 
much greater threat to human well-being than military threats. Thus Dupont critiques 
realism's obsession with military security and insightfully observes that environmental 
security concerns 'are not amenable to resolution by military force or coercion.' 
Unregulated population flows are another issue, he argues, that interact with alleged 
threats from transnational crime in which drug smuggling, terrorism, illegal 
immigration, bank fraud, computer-crime, corruption and the traffic of nuclear material 
form what former CIA Director James Woolsey termed a 'poisonous brew-a mixture 
potentially as deadly as some of what we faced during the cold war.' ( 1996b: 6) Yet we 
should resist such alarmism, and ponder what self-interest motivates it, as large 
security bureaucracies try to preserve their funding and status after the cold war. We 
can also point to how elite policies have exacerbated such problems--citing capital 
flight from corrupt third world elites, the way debt and low commodity prices fuel the 
north American cocaine trade, or the CIA's own record in drug trafficking to fund the 
Nicaraguan contras or Afghani Muhajadeen. (S. George, 1992) 
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There is much of value in the Dupont essay, particularly his challenge to state-
centric, narrowly military interpretations of security-which further implies that the 
roles of defence forces will change to incorporate monitoring of the environment or 
assisting in the rehabilitation of damaged ecosystems. Yet this begs the question of 
whether other agencies and organisations are not more relevant; nor does it address the 
deeper systemic processes which contribute to such problems. I would argue that 
addressing them requires less a rearticulation of security concepts than a thoroughgoing 
rethink of both the unrestrained push for development which underpins dominant 
models of growth-insofar as it contributes to the resource depletion, pollution or 
widespread poverty, dispossession and economic dislocation-and of democracy and 
political participation, insofar as corruption contributes to the flouting of environmental 
standards and the perpetuation of severe inequities. Yet while arguing that ethnic or 
religious minorities may see the state as a threat to their well-being (thus depriving 
national security of 'any theoretical, let alone operational, utility'), Dupont also asserts 
that democratisation 'may actually assist centrifugal tendencies within states, 
particularly in developing countries .. .' (1996b: 11) 
Thus while I have few problems with asserting the importance and challenge of 
transnational processes as being of equal or greater importance than military security, I 
am suspicious of doing so by bringing them under the highly loaded rubric of security. 
In this case a whole range of highly complex processes, filtered through elite lenses, 
have been thrown together in a confusing melange which undermines attempts to 
further distinguish their priority or elucidate their causes. While I would endorse efforts 
to link environmental and poverty issues to conflict (in Bougainville, Papua New 
Guinea or Irian Jaya, for example), the question of what policy or societal responses 
are appropriate is not dealt with here, despite an implication that a range of non-military 
agencies and non-state actors would be relevant. There is a danger that underlying 
systemic causes will be neglected and misunderstood, policy responses militarised, and 
security (with its heightened notions of threat) reinvigorated as a viable political 
concept. While Dupont's essay is largely innocent of such charges, 'multidimensional' 
security as understood in Southeast Asia is not. What his essay does do, along with all 
these texts, is to cling to the illusion that security can be made whole. 
FEMINISM AND HUMAN SECURITY 
Pushing further, a range of recent scholarship has made a more radical challenge to 
mainstream discourses of security-questioning their objects, their underlying 
assumptions about the international system, their analogous policy responses, their 
ethical implications and, in its most exciting form, issuing a serious challenge to 
security's epistemological foundations and unity as a concept. This work has arisen out 
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of the peace movement and its academic arms in 'peace studies', global and critical 
theory approaches, feminist reinterpretations of international relations, and 
poststructuralism. One key early text was Rob Walker's 1988 book One World Many 
Worlds, which took the development of 'critical social movements' as a cue to develop 
a new agenda for thinking about international politics and processes which would 
escape the narrow boundaries and concerns of mainstream scholarship and, in 
particular, focus on marginalised groups and ways of thinking. Its fundamental 
concerns were grassroots rather than elite, its normative ideals peace, diversity and 
justice rather than interest and power, and its political project the development of 
grassroots forms of democracy and co-operation rather than the refinement of technical 
forms of governmental reason. This agenda implied, he argued, a critical engagement 
with 'what it means to be human' and a 'serious rethinking' of our 'dominant concepts' 
of security, development and democracy. These were all key elements in a 
'transformative assault on our inherited notions of authority, legitimacy and power': 
Only with a clearer sense of what it means to have security for all people rather 
than the national security that now renders everyone increasingly insecure; only 
with an empowering development for all rather than the mal-development of both 
rich and poor; only with more effective processes of democratisation everywhere 
rather than self-perpetuating structures of domination, bureaucratisation, and 
exclusion; and only with a clearer sense of how all these fit together can a just 
world peace cease to be a utopian dream and become an ongoing process to 
which ordinary people may contribute wherever they are. (Walker, 1988: 1-9) 
In Australia the work of the Secure Australia Project has been highly significant to 
efforts both to expanding the aporias in mainstream ideas of security and to rethinking 
security in terms of other agendas: women, the environment, human rights, indigenous 
peoples, conflict resolution, self-determination and sustainable development. This 
began as a critique of Australian defence and security policies with the publication of 
The New Australian Militarism (Cheeseman and Kettle ed. 1990), and a broader focus 
on security in Threats Without Enemies (Smith and Kettle ed. 1992). The critique of 
Australian defence and foreign policy continued in numerous publications by Graeme 
Cheeseman (1990, 1992, 1993), Peter King (1992) and St John Kettle (1989), and 
most recently in a volume of essays Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers 
(Cheeseman and Bruce ed. 1996) which made a more self-conscious use of 
poststructuralism and critical theory to question Australian policy after the cold war. 
Many of the authors in The New Australian Militarism cast a critical eye over 
developments in Australian defence policy during the 1980s, including the acquisition 
of potent new capabilities and weapons platforms, which they thought were potentially 
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destabilising and threatening to regional neighbours; the use of Australian naval forces 
to spy on Soviet forces in the North Pacific, and Australia's role in US nuclear strategy; 
a heightened willingness to deploy Australian forces overseas, particularly in the South 
Pacific; the diversion of funds from social expenditures to defence; and the 
inappropriateness of Australia's high-tech force posture to the real nature of the threats 
it faced. They argued for a 'non-offensive' and de-aligned defence policy and an 
Australian commitment to its region based on greater development aid rather than 
defence co-operation or arms exports. Somewhat problematically, Jo Vallentine and 
Peter Jones called this 'common security'. (Cheeseman and Kettle ed., 1990) 
Threats Without Enemies expanded this critique to take in questions of human 
rights, social and economic security, self-determination, the arms trade and 
demilitarisation. This security agenda was now framed in starkly opposed terms to that 
of both classical realism and liberal internationalism. Destabilising the (existing) state as 
the prime object of security, Peter King and Alan Smith argued that conflict resolution 
and self-determination were preconditions for human security, and explored 
peacemaking opportunities through the UN and in East Timor, West Papua (Irian Jaya) 
and Papua New Guinea. Gary Smith and Graeme Cheeseman explored options for 
demilitarising security, adopting affordable and non-provocative defence postures, and 
democratising policy processes. In one of the most thoughtful contributions, Janet 
Hunt explored the broad impacts of Australia's foreign policy on the economic security 
of third world populations. Examining the impacts of debt, structural adjustment and 
underdevelopment she made a powerful argument for a 'new vision of security [which] 
must be based on international co-operation to achieve more equitable and ecologically 
sound development.' She caustically criticised Australian aid and foreign economic 
policy for its adherence to an economic orthodoxy which is exacerbating economic 
insecurity for the world's millions of absolute poor. She also castigated Australia's 
push for economic security through arms exports and the signing of the East Timor 
Gap Treaty as buttressing injustice, repression and the exploitative development models 
that often go with it. (Hunt, 1992: 240-266) 
Such themes have also been explored by J. Ann Tickner, whose book Gender and 
International Relations attempts to forge a feminist approach to 'achieving global 
security'. This pathbreaking work critiqued the fundamentally masculine bias of 
dominant approaches to national security, economics and the environment, and 
explored how feminism might provide different models of international life based again 
on human rights and needs, the elimination of sexual exploitation and sustainable 
economic practices. After Sarah Brown, Tickner argues that 'a feminist theory of 
international relations is an act of political commitment to understanding the world from 
the perspective of the socially subjugated.' She shows how Realism's models of 
interest, rationality and power derive, in part, from a socially constructed 'hegemonic 
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masculinity' which is sustained though the subordination and devaluation of various 
feminities, including feminised masculinities like homosexuality. These characteristics 
are then 'projected onto the behaviour of states whose success as international actors is 
measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy.' 
(1992: 19, 7) 
In the realm of national security, she argues, hegemonic masculinity generates 
solutions based on force, amorality, aggression and control, along with a belief in the 
objective rationality of the policymaker; in economics, it results in the reduction of 
human needs and passions to the self-interested utilitarianism of 'rational economic 
man' and the incorporation of women into an exploitative sexual and international 
division of labour; in ecology, it underpins an historical shift from a view in which 
humans and the natural environment were deeply interdependent, to one in which 
'nature' is a passive resource to be tamed and exploited; and, in an overarching cultural 
effect, it generates a division of society between public and private realms which 
excludes women from the spaces (and forms of rationality) believed proper to public 
life. (1992: 45, 72, 101-4) 
What I find more problematic, as I do in all this literature, is the unself-conscious 
and essentialist deployment of security as a concept. Tickner argues for a 'genuine 
security' based upon 'the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal 
gender relations' and for a reformulation of international relations-'the discipline that 
analyses international insecurity and prescribes measures for its reformulation'-in 
terms of the 'multiple insecurities' represented by ecological destruction, poverty and 
(gendered) structural violence, rather than the abstract threats to the integrity of states, 
their interests and 'core values'. I am fully in accord with her agenda, and believe her 
insight that 'social justice, including gender justice, is necessary for an enduring peace' 
should be shouted from the rooftops. Yet I also believe there are real problems with a 
use of the concept-however radically refashioned-which assumes it can be 
'reformulated' as whole and self-present, in which the ideal and the real would finally 
coincide. This again is to remain trapped within a certain logocentrism. 
My own feelings about this problem are ambivalent. Given security's demonstrated 
cultural power, to be able to criticise elites for increasing insecurity, rather than the 
security they promise, and to lay claim to 'genuine' security around a radically different 
political agenda, can appropriate for this politics enormous rhetorical power. On the 
other hand, it is also to leave in place-and possibly even strengthen-a key structural 
feature of the elite strategy it opposes: its claim to truth and the real. Totalising and 
emotionally laden concepts like security, reason, and democracy work by obscuring 
their concrete historical embeddedness (in a network of institutions, knowledges and 
practices) by appealing to an ideal, absolute and unsurpassable state of affairs-a form 
of ontology central to modern enlightenment thought. Security remains a 
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metadiscursive given, and the particularity of the practices through which it operates is 
effectively removed from question and critique. At its worst, debate becomes confined 
to whether a certain program achieves the state of an abstract absolute like 'security', 
rather than focused on that particular (and thoroughly historical) network of practices 
and their material effects. If progressive and critical thought wishes to retain its integrity 
it ought to be willing to (self-reflexively) expose its own claims to a critique of the 
practices and mechanisms it would itself seek to engender. In tum, political strategies 
can be opened up and made more flexible, creative and democratic. 
In particular, in all this work the ontology of security/threat or security/insecurity-
which forms the basic condition of the real for mainstream discourses of international 
policy-remains powerfully in place, and security's broader function as a defining 
condition of human experience and modern political life remains invisible and 
unexamined. This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is able to question the 
very categories in which our thinking, our experience and actions remain confined. 
What if human experience could be reconfigured outside the terms of security and 
threat, into something radically other, a possibility floating unseen at the outer edges of 
our thought? What if security has a history, and thus could be laid open to change or 
escape? Thus my search, through deconstruction, for the possibility of this new 
thought; and, through genealogy, for a strategy which could question the very promise, 
structure and deployment of security as a concept. 
SECURITY AND IDENTITY: 
THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 
At this point I will briefly credit some recent theoretical work in international relations 
which has asked the most searching questions of security and suggested the most 
interesting lines of historical and methodological enquiry. In particular, the value of this 
work lies in its focus on the political function of rhetoric, representation and narrative in 
international life-on what Foucault has called the 'politics of truth'. (1984: 74). 
Alone among the Secure Australia group Jan Jindy Pettman explored this 
phenomenon in her essay 'National Identity and Security', in which she opens by 
arguing that 'the national interest', 'Australia' or even the pronoun 'us' are not stable 
but 'socially constructed' categories. Nation, race and ethnicity are not essential forms 
of identity but are contested and imagined; and the strategic use of language and 
metaphor is essential to the construction of such identities. In this process, she argues, 
'competing social interests, some more powerful, organised and visible than many 
others, get authenticated or authorised as public goods and goals.' The unity of the state 
and its claim to sovereignty is 'highly problematic'; the state is itself a highly contested 
site. She then pursues an incisive and far reaching analysis of the historical construction 
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of Australian identit(ies) through the exclusion and demonisation of 'others': women, 
asians, immigrants and aborigines. In the realm of security, this leads to the insight that 
'different rhetorics of security in themselves predispose us to identify different kinds of 
threat and policy option.' She argues that we should make explicit 'our mental maps, of 
Australia, of our region, of the West, and the world. This is an intriguing exercise in 
the politics of location which recognises many forms of connection and exclusion, and 
moves us beyond the simplistic countering of our history against our geography. It also 
helps problematise the identities, categories, definitions and values that inform political 
contests.' (1992: 53-66) 
Such an approach is also advanced by James Der Derian and David Campbell. Der 
Derian, in his 1993 essay The Value of Security, argues for a theoretical strategy which 
aims to 'make philosophically problematic what has been practically axiomatic in 
international relations'. Making an incisive reading of Hobbes he locates the cultural 
force of security in its mediation between state and citizen, and in the fact that 
within the concept of security there lurks the entire history of western 
metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida 'as a series of substitutions of 
center for center' in a perpetual search for the 'transcendental signified'. From 
God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to The People ... the 
security of the centre has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, 
order, and identity philosophically and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos and 
difference. (Der Derian, 1993: 95) 
This is to explore the operation of what Pettman aptly calls the 'politics of location', in 
which political communities are constructed and policed according to a mobile 
partitioning of security and otherness, sameness and difference. By tracing Nietzsche's 
critique of Hobbes, Der Derian questions the strategy which would make identity 
perpetually conditioned by a structure of fear and threat that is universal. He argues that 
any attempt to demonstrate that this structure is not universal, that it does in fact have a 
history, must be genealogical: 'to understand the discursive power of [security], to 
remember its· forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to 
reinterpret .. a late modem security comfortable with a plurality of centres, multiple 
meanings and fluid identities.' (Der Derian, 1993: 97) 
Campbell, in his 1992 book Writing Security: American Foreign Policy and the 
Politics of Identity, also makes such a reading of Hobbes, which both challenges 
Realism's appropriation of his writing and explains his appeal. This contributes to a 
more extensive and pathbreaking work which interweaves philosophy with an analysis 
of the historical construction of American national identity based upon the exclusion, 
dispossession and fear of the Other-from Indian tribes, Mexicans and Blacks to 
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Communists, Terrorists and Drug Traffickers. He argues that 'danger is not an 
objective condition' and that in American politics security has always reposed on 
otherness: 'the boundaries of the state's identity are secured by the representation of 
danger integral to foreign policy.' Through this insight, the analysis of many key 
foreign policy texts and rhetorics, and through his discussion of the 'war on drugs', he 
illuminates the general societal power and function of security. The power and 
contingency of truth-in its Foucauldian sense-is acknowledged through a form of 
analysis that considers 'the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of 
representation over another.' And in its form and movement the book is itself a 
genealogy-one of the very few in international relations-which traces the 
discontinuous and conflictual evolution, solidification and deployment of a power-
knowledge formation that dominates and structures American politics and national 
security policy. (Campbell, 1992: 1-4) 
This study draws much inspiration from these writers. It will retrace their readings 
of Hobbes, adding to them readings of Locke, Descartes, Bentham and Hegel, who 
absorb Hobbes' account of security as a mediation between state and citizen, and 
introduce it into a temporal movement which underpins pervasive modern discourses of 
historical progress, political identity and human subjectivity. Der Derian and 
Campbell's neglect of Hegel here is a gap in their work, rendering their account of the 
identity/otherness relation too static; elsewhere I have tried to show how such 
oppositions were central to powerful discourses of global mission and ascendancy 
which drove and legitimated both the United States geopolitical role and a more general 
project of liberal economic modernisation. (Burke, 1994: 39-66) Both Campbell 
Pettman' s work encourages a focus on how constructions of Australian national 
identity and security have historically engendered and produced one another, and thus 
laid the basis for a generalised Australian experience of self and other. Above all, what 
I find remarkable is how such work identifies elements of security's discursive 
operation which are not visible in mainstream international theory-thus paving the 
way for a far-reaching critique of security's operation as a general social principle. 
SECURITY AND GENEALOGY 
It should be clear that a major objective of this study is to cut through the mainstream 
view of security's naturalness-that security is a finite, knowable and achievable state, 
and bears almost universal status as a virtually organic human need. Yet it should be 
clear, even in this initial survey, that security has named vastly differing doctrines, 
objectives and visions of order-each of which claimed to be universal. Worse, such 
claims to universality rest on a constricting positivism: security becomes a monological 
narrative which closes off the ability to make judgements about international policy, 
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except within the most narrow of terms-so that the range of questions we can ask, and 
the solutions we can pose, are defined in advance. A major aim of this study is to open 
up this space of judgement, and to thwart the blackmail which says we must accept a 
given line of policy because it buttresses our security. This opens up space both for a 
broader agenda of reform and a more sweeping reassessment of some of the 
fundamental structures of Australian government, society and identity. It is to say that 
against this single concept of security there are other lines of policy, other ways of 
conceiving reality, and other groups and forms of society we should be defending and 
seeking to build. 
This type of 'realism' has been successfully challenged by a range of thinkers 
working in the areas of semiotics and the philosophy of language. Michel Foucault, in a 
series of histories and philosophical studies, built on this work to develop a far more 
useful account of the relations between language and power. A number of arguments he 
made are particularly crucial for this study. First, he argued that knowledge is 
irrevocably linked to power, that it is itself a practice: 'power and knowledge directly 
imply one another; there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge which does not presuppose and constitute at 
the same time power relations.' The form, space and order of knowledge, he argued, is 
specific to different cultures, times and political and social orders, and is closely 
enmeshed with the operations of particular social, technological, scientific and 
institutional deployments of power. (Foucault, 1991: 27; Rabinow ed. 1984) 
Second, he further traced how systems of knowledge, deployed in this way, have 
the ability to constitute powerful fields of reality-whether in the shape and character of 
institutions, the arrangement and flows of space, or the most private experiences of 
subjectivity, embodiment and being. Such fields will in tum be contested by differing 
power-knowledge formations which imply alternative forms of reality and being; 
between them ranges an endless conflict which is the very stuff of the modem social 
order. Thus he conceived power not as a static quantity which could be possessed, but 
as a set of relations which could only be exercised. In this sense power itself implies 
resistance and, however overwhelming it seems, is always at risk-not least because it 
' 
rests on a hegemony of ideas as much as force; on the ability of particular metaphors to 
be translated into force and achieve transformations of the real. In this way the political 
use and effectiveness of rhetoric-what Aristotle described as finding 'the available 
means of persuasion '-becomes important, given that rhetoric is the bridge between 
language and force. (Dixon, 1971: 14) 
Of most relevance for this study were Foucault's discoveries of the techniques for 
the management and production of disciplined (or what Toby Miller has called 'well-
tempered') selves, and the links between these and other techniques which aimed for 
the management of populations through government and economic policy. In his book 
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Discipline and Punish Foucault combined his analysis of how the human sciences 
developed 'man' as an object of knowledge, with an historical study of the 
development of new technologies of power which took the body and the self as their 
object. Foucault demonstrated how in workplaces, schools, bureaucracies and 
communities the body is a site crossed and recrossed by moral, medical, political and 
technical discourses which, in their aggregation (and in the individual's own struggle 
with them) give shape and form to subjectivity. (Foucault, 1991; Miller, 1993) 
This process involves the application of material techniques (forms of training, 
coercion, observation and management) and, most effectively of all, the application of a 
discourse which can tie the regulation of behaviours to the innermost core of the self. It 
is in the social, economic, cultural and political constitution of the individual subject 
that truth and power most effectively coalesce. This explains why discourses of 
security have emphasised representations of fear, threat and identity-representations 
which provoke immediate emotional responses and initiate a process where complex 
political abstractions can be easily assimilated into the structure of subjectivity and 
recalled as truths of the self. Thus the following chapter analyses security as a political 
technology which links such 'individualising' techniques to larger operations of power 
which seek to shape the nation-state .and the vast spaces and flows of geopolitics. In 
this movement from the individual to the total, security adds a seductive app~al to its 
rhetoric of fear and threat, imagining the nation and the international order as higher, 
progressive manifestations of our very being. 
Genealogy is the form of history which is able to work at this level, to get below 
the immediate threshold of events and representations to the underlying systems of 
knowledge and strategy which are in play. Thus this study is a history of events in truth 
and power-a history of discourses, seen not in terms of a long development towards 
perfection, but in terms of the complex emergence, development and inter-relation of 
knowledges, norms, institutions, techniques and subjectivities. (Foucault, 1977a) Its 
aim is to explore security's conditions of possibility-the political, cultural and 
discursive space in which it could emerge, and the space it would in turn enable and 
continue to transform. To explore how it is possible to think security in any particular 
time and place, and how security in turn makes it possible to think and act within a 
given political and cultural community. Only then, aware of security's cunning and 
limits, might it be genuinely possible to recast its terms in the way writers like Tickner 
have envisioned. Prior to that, this study's task is more modest-to seize security from 
its emotive rush into the future, its narration as a disciplinary task, and its dangerous 
call to being as a simultaneous blackmail of safety and realisation. It is not as if we can 
force time to stop, but we can slow it down, and reconfigure the present as a space of 
suspicion and displacement where accountability can be forced on institutions who 
conceal their operations behind the veil and ultimate promise of security. Yet security's 
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historical force, and its ontological rigidity, makes this a formidable challenge. This 
demands that we first pursue security into the depths of our political thought-we must 
understand its animating function at the very base of our culture. 
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Maybe the [task] nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refase what we are. We 
have to ... get rid of the political 'double-bind,' which is the simultaneous individualization 
and totalization of modem power structures. The conclusion could be that the political, 
ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual 
from the state and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and 
from the type of individualisation which is linked to the state. 
Michel Foucault, 1984: 22. 
This chapter turns on the assertion that security derives its enormous cultural power 
from its place at the centre of modem political thought-at the centre of a thought 
which, after first establishing the founding myths of modem political society (in its 
emergence from the state of nature), has further sought to think the juridical basis and 
function of the state, its enabling relation to a broader cultural and economic modernity, 
and to the imagination of modem forms of political subjectivity. Just as Foucault 
sought, through the study of govemmentality, to trace the emergence of simultaneously 
totalising and individualising forms of state power-a technique he called 'the political 
double-bind'-the chapter argues that security occupies a key enabling position at their 
junction; and furthermore, that it has been a key term in the historical emergence of this 
unique strategic combination. Thus security needs to be placed alongside a range of 
other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one 
of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and remains one of its essential 
underpinnings. 
Using Foucault's lectures on government and reason as a theoretical template, the 
chapter traces the emergence of security as a mediation between state and citizen, from 
the 16th and 17th century doctrines of raison d'etat, to the writing of Hobbes, Locke, 
Bentham and finally Hegel. This matches the development of new strategies for 
exercising state power with the arguments which laid its juridical and philosophical 
basis in modem understandings of sovereignty, right, international society and human 
progress. It is my contention that these thinkers form a continuum in which we can 
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trace a simultaneous essentialising and universalising of state, society and subject into 
an entirely rigid ontological form which can barely be called into question. Any attempt 
to critically rethink security must first deal with this rigidity-with not only security's 
embeddedness in this matrix, but its animating power for the whole machine. It is not 
to argue that such writings perfectly mirror the rhetorics of contemporary politics (their 
articulation would need to be described genealogically) but rather that they illuminate 
the deep-seated assumptions central to many contemporary state forms and political 
discourses. The chapter seeks to demonstrate how, through a prolonged act of 
forgetting, they form a political condition of the real and thus have come to appear 
essential; but also how as such, they are in fact thoroughly historical and contingent 
events of political imagination, albeit with momentous material consequences. 
THE EMERGENCE OF SECURITY: 
TERRITORY, DISCIPLINE, PO PU LA TION 
In a 1978 lecture at the College de France, Governmentality, Foucault traced the 
emergence of security within Western political thought through two linked 
developments: the first, during the 16th and 17th centuries, of the administrative and 
governmental apparatuses of the territorial monarchies, of mercantilism, statistics and 
the Cameralist's 'science of police'; and second, of what he called an 'anti-
Machiavellian literature' which sought to formulate an 'art of government' against that 
narrower focus on the Prince, his sovereignty and preservation. Security and its 
associated problems of 'government' lie, he argued, 
at the crossroads of two processes: the one which, shattering the structures of 
feudalism, leads to the establishment of the great territorial, administrative and 
colonial states; and that totally different movement which, with the Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation, raises the issue of how one must be spiritually ruled 
and led on this earth in order to achieve eternal salvation. (Foucault, 1991c: 87-
88) 
What he was implying here were two linked modes of 'government': a new set of 
understandings and techniques for the government of states, and for the government of 
individuals and smaller social units like families, workplaces, and schools. Foucault 
highlighted two key features of Machiavelli's famous study which formed a 
counterpoint for the new theories of 'government'. The first was that the book's central 
problematic, the link between the Prince, his subjects and territory, was a 'purely 
synthetic one .. there is no fundamental, essential, natural and juridical connection 
between the prince and his principality'. This link was thus eternally fragile, vulnerable 
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to both external enemies and from within, from 'subjects who have no a priori reason 
to accept his rule'. Second, this implied that the objective of the exercise of power was 
'to reinforce, strengthen and protect the principality, but with this last understood not to 
mean the objective ensemble of its subjects and territory, but rather the Prince's relation 
with what he owns'. (Foucault, 199 lc: 90) 
The art of government was thus distinguished from the drama of possession, and 
implied both the 'government' of individuals and social institutions and the designation 
of new techniques and objects of power that would emerge within the problem of 
'governing the state as a whole'. Between these realms was posed an essential 
continuity: the more discrete forms of governing were still 'internal to the state or 
society' and the task of the art of government was to establish them within a continuum 
which worked 'in both an upwards and a downwards direction.' The downwards line, 
which 'transmits to individual behaviour and the running of the family the same 
principles as the good government of the state', was at this time beginning to be called 
police.1 The upwards line meant the application of principles of self- and familial 
government to the conduct of the state's affairs; we can also locate it in the emergence 
of what Foucault elsewhere discussed as reason of state. Foucault cited three 17th 
century definitions, of which Botero' s was the most succinct: 'A perfect knowledge of 
the means through which states form, strengthen themselves, endure, and grow.' 
(199lc:91; 1988:75) 
This implied the development of specific forms of knowledge whose object was the 
state itself, rather than the uncertain relation between the prince and his realm. In a 
formulation echoed powerfully in Bentham, and which would be central to the general 
economic function of security, Foucault argued that reason of state implied a rationality 
of government which could ensure that the state be infinitely extended in time: 
The aim of such an art of governing is to reinforce the state itself ... This idea is a 
very important one. It is bound up with a new historical outlook. Indeed, it 
implies that states are realities which must hold out for an indefinite length of 
historical time-and in a disputed geographical area. [This] presupposes the 
constitution of certain type of knowledge. Government is only possible if the 
strength of the state is known; it can thus be sustained. (1988: 76-77) 
1 Police could be characterised as the meeting point of raison d'etat and discipline: as Colin 
Gordon explains, 'reason of state's problem of calculating detailed actions appropriate to an 
infinity of unforeseeable and contingent circumstances is met by the creation of an exhaustively 
detailed knowledge of the governed reality of the state itself, extending (at least in aspiration) to 
touch the existences of its individual members.' Also, foreshadowing political economy, police 
aims for prosperity which is 'the principle which identifies the state with its subjects': 'it 
emphasises that the real basis of the state's wealth and power lies in its population, in the 
strength and productivity of all and each.' (Gordon, 1991: 10) 
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An analogous development was the extension of the idea of economy and its 
introduction into a general political practice: the invention of 'political economy' as we 
now understand it. Here Foucault cited Rousseau, who sought to derive from economy 
(which to that point had signified 'the wise government of the family for the common 
welfare of all') a principle for the general organisation of society: 'To govern a state 
will therefore mean ... exercising towards all its inhabitants, and the wealth and 
behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the 
head of a family over his household and his goods.' (1991c: 92) Foucault related this 
to a shift, in the work of Guillaume de La Perriere, from a focus on sovereignty as a 
rule over territory to the government of things, or 'a sort of complex of men and 
things' which would incorporate territory into a set of economic relations: 
The things in which government is to be concerned with are in fact men, but men 
in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are 
wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, 
climate, irrigation, fertility etc.; men in their relation to customs, habits, ways of 
acting and thinking etc.; lastly, men in their relation to accidents and misfortunes 
such as famine, epidemics, death etc. (1991c: 93) 
Foucault argued that in order to fully realise this objective the art of government had 
had, through a difficult and lengthy historical process, to substantially recast its ties to 
the model of sovereignty and its basis in the narrow economic model of the family, 
which 'was unlikely to be able to respond adequately to the importance of territorial 
acquisitions and royal finance.' Thus an important new object of politics emerged: 
population. 
Statistics, the science that sought knowledge about the state in all its elements and 
sweep, now discovered that population had its own 'regularities .. rate of death and 
diseases, cycles of scarcity etc'; that with population came new objects of medicine, 
labour and wealth; and that population had analogous economic effects through its 
movements, customs and activities. The family was thus recast as 'an element internal 
to population, and as a fundamental instrument in its government.' We can see here the 
convergence with the phenomenon Foucault has elsewhere described, the linked 
development of the human sciences and the social technologies of discipline which 
enabled a more detailed and flexible production of subjectivity: 'Discipline was never 
more important or more valorised than at the moment when it become important to 
manage a population.' (1991c: 98-102) 
Political economy, then, 'arises out of the perception of new networks of 
continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth' and out of 
the development of new techniques of intervention which, I would argue, become by 
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the twentieth century a field encompassing the whole task of government-linking 
welfare, defence, economics, health, immigration, communications, science, education 
and law. Sovereignty is then rearticulated in the terms of Rousseau's attempt, in The 
Social Contract, to divine 'a general principle of government which allows room both 
for a juridical principle of sovereignty and for the elements through which an art of 
government can be defined and characterized.' What forms is a triangle of rationalities 
linking sovereignty, discipline and government, which together is governmentality-a 
powerful 'ensemble' 
formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of 
power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
(Foucault, 1991c: 101-2) 
Foucault's College de France lecture on Security, which preceded the lecture on 
Governmentality discussed here, is not ·available in English translation, but brief 
sections are quoted in Colin Gordon's introduction to the 1991 collection subtitled 
Studies in Governmentality. There Gordon emphasises the significance of security as a 
development in Foucault's work, which he thought was 'one of the most important 
subsequent extensions to the framework of analysis he uses in Discipline and Punish. 
Gordon argues that in this lecture Foucault treats security not merely as a self-evident 
object of political power, but 'as a specific principle of political method and practice, 
distinct alike from those of law, sovereignty and discipline, and capable of various 
modes of combination with these other principles and practices within diverse 
governmental configurations.' He goes onto argue that for Foucault security, from the 
18th century on, 'tends increasingly to become the dominant component of modem 
governmental rationality: we live today not so much in a Rechtsstaat or disciplinary 
society as in a society of security.' (Gordon, 1991: 20) 
A significant source for Foucault appears to be Jeremy Bentham, which justifies 
resuming this discussion of security and govemmentality alongside that of Bentham's 
Principles of Civil Life, which powerfully links the idea of security with reason of 
state, the 'science of police' and, most significantly, with the perpetuation of capitalism 
as a modem social form. This will be preceded by a discussion of Hobbes and Locke, 
whose work establishes security as a key signifier in the myth of the emergence of the 
modem state form (the Commonwealth) from the state of nature, and thus makes 
security indispensable to modem practices of liberalism and sovereignty. These would 
in tum feed into that triangular relation of governmentality which aimed for the general 
government of the state as a regime of prosperity. 
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HOBBES AND LOCKE: 
THE BIRTH OF THE ARTIFICIAL MAN 
If Foucault emphasised the intense problematisation of sovereignty within the 
emergence of an 'art of government', I believe that the work of Hobbes and Locke 
countered this problem exactly in the terms posed by Rousseau (of reconciling a 
juridical model of sovereignty with the new rationalities of 'government') and in so 
doing achieved a more powerful fusion of both. What they anticipated was the kind of 
triple articulation Foucault sought to highlight-between the juridical basis of the state 
and civil society expressed by sovereignty, the detailed tactics of individualisation 
represented by discipline, and the regulation of the economic phenomena of population. 
If we resist the tendency in Foucault's lecture to draw such strict lines between legally 
codified and uncodified power ('sovereignty' and 'government'), we might suggest 
that sovereignty now had discursive effects which extend to subjectivity and enhance 
governmentality's more diffuse model of power. In particular Hobbes and Locke, 
through their narrative of the emergence of the modern political society, laid out the 
discursive limits and conditions for the citizen as a form of subjectivity and bound it to 
the state as an essential figure. Sovereignty became not merely a juridical basis for the 
state as a concept and set of institutions, but a rhetorical trope which persuades the 
'citizen' of the state's inevitability, necessity, and superiority. Security was a key 
figure in this trope-addressed to subjectivity as a promise of protection and 
adjudication, and to population as a trans-societal task of multiplying prosperity. All 
this reposed on a powerful political humanism, centred on the body, in which state and 
citizen find their identity and ontological ground-a circular movement which begins 
with the liberty and reason of men in their singularity, imagines the state as the 
common body politic of men in their collectivity, and returns as an enhanced promise 
of individual freedom within the now safer bounds of the state's supreme rationality. 
While it is clear that, of the two, Locke's was a more powerful and contemporary 
version of liberalism (containing as it does a trenchant critique of absolute power, 
which can be compared to Hobbes' ambiguous view of democracy and extensive 
defence of the rights of the sovereign) they both began from the same founding myth- . 
the emergence of political society from the state of nature. This demands both a price, 
and brings with a greater reward: in his Second Treatise of Government Locke asked, 
if in the state of nature man is 'absolute Lord of his own person and possessions, equal 
to the greatest, and subject to no Body, why will he part with his freedom?' The short 
answer is security: 
although in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very 
uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others. For all being Kings 
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as much as he, every Man his Equal, and the greater part no strict Observers of 
Equity and Justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very 
unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a Condition, which, 
however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: And 'tis not without reason 
that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others who are already 
united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their Lives, 
Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general name property. (Locke, 1960: 
368) 
For Locke the state of nature, which is defined by the lack of any overarching authority 
able to adjudicate disputes, as rapidly descends into a 'state of war' in which force is 
the only means of arbitration and in which there are no agreed and universal standards 
of justice. The great appeal of the political society is that 'every one of the Members 
hath quitted this natural power' and 'resigned it up into the hands of the Community'; 
thus they become 'one People, one Body Politick', which 'puts Men out of a state of 
nature into that of a Commonwealth ... '. (Locke, 1960: 342-3) 
Hobbes' description of this process in Leviathan, whilst virtually identical, was 
considerably more theatrical. For him the state of nature was by definition a state of 
war-because there is no single concept of right 'every man has a right to everything, 
even to one anothers body'; because there is no common power, 'there is no Law: 
where no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are in warre the two Cardinali 
virtues ... as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can 
be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time 
which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.' The equality of men in the state of 
nature led only to a perpetual cycle of insecurity: ' .. where an invader hath no more to 
feare, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a 
convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, 
to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life, 
or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.' (1985: 184-8) From 
this flowed the famous conclusion that 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention will 
furnish them withall. In such condition there is no place for Industry; because the 
fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation 
nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious 
Building; no instruments of moving and removing of things as require much 
force; no Knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no 
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Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 
(1985: 186) 
Aside from the infamous closing lines, this passage is highly important, providing a 
link from the myth of the state of nature to the fundamental promise and objectives of 
the state, which are not only to provide a means of protection for individuals but to 
enable a new kind of society to flourish. Here we can see security's function at the 
threshold and fulcrum of our modernity-the birth of the Artificial Man, Leviathan, 
enables not merely the development of more efficient forms of governmental reason but 
new industrial and cultural possibilities in which the idea of a great and progressive 
civilisation-of the modem itself-can become real. In an echo of the continental 
theorists of reason of state, we hear the same themes of the strength and felicity of the 
state as a whole, the multiplication of its powers, allied to a founding myth of 
sovereignty as the higher unity of men in civil society. The Commonwealth is a 
'multitude united in one Person'; more than 'Consent, or Concord' but 'a reall Unitie 
of them all': 
The only way to erect such a common power. . .is to conferre all their power and 
strength upon one man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their 
Wills, by plurality of voices, into one Will: which is as much to say, to appoint 
one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their person; and every one to own, and 
acknowledge himselfe to be the Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their 
Person ... and therein to submit their Wills, everyone to his Will, and their 
judgements, to his Judgement. (Hobbes, 1985: 227) 
All their power and strength-here was the imaginary of not merely a new 
'productivity' of power but an enormous quantitative revolution, expressed in the cover 
image of the book's first edition in the British Museum: the crowned sovereign rising 
over his territories, head piercing the clouds, his body formed from the thousands of 
bodies subsumed within his own; the Mortall God to whom all are subject and of 
whom all Others are in awe. In this metaphor of the body politic was the problem of 
Machiavelli's prince resolved: no longer a 'synthetic', vulnerable link between 
sovereign and subject but their absolute fusion and identity, in a chilling prophecy of 
Hegel's merging of the subject with the unity of the One. 2 
2 Sovereignty secures the political rule of the One through the rules which regulate passage 
between the Sovereign's acts and his role as the collective body politic of subjects. Hobbes 
emphasises that each man is Author of the Sovereign's acts, which express his own will; he thus 
cannot complain about acts he himself has authored: 'because to do Injury to oneselfe, is 
impossible.' A more detailed mechanism is the rule of the majority, of which Locke writes: 'For 
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The enormous political closure this achieves is demonstrated most powerfully in 
Hobbes' introduction to Leviathan, in which the state is imagined as an immense 
natural machine, an 'Artificiall Man' for whom to be torn apart is tantamount to 
annihilation: 
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEAL TH, or 
STATE .. which is but an Artificial! Man . .in which the Soveraignty is an artificial 
Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The Magistrates, and other 
officers of Judicature and Execution, artificial! Joynts; Reward and Punishment 
(by which fastened to the seate of the soveraignty, every joynt and member is 
moved to perform his duty) are the Nerves, that do they same in the Body 
Natural!; the Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; 
Salus Populi (the people's safety) is Business; Counsellors, by whom all things 
needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, 
an artificial Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sickness; and Civill 
war, Death. (Hobbes, 1985: 81) 
Here, in embryo, was the philosophical basis of the modern nationalisms whose 
darkest manifestations would be fascism, imperialism and genocide, and of the 
rhetorics and narratives of national identity which gave them signifying force. Here too 
was the basis for the state repression of critics and reformers (as seditious) and, most 
violently, for the elimination of minorities whose claims appear to threaten the state's 
bodily integrity. Of course many nationalisms have been more benign, even a focus of 
identification for dispossessed or colonised peoples; yet what is common to all these 
experiences is an (unequal) exchange between security and difference, the imaginary of 
a greater collective power, or the need to conform with a demand for a single 
representative. 
In cases such as the colonisation of Australia or the Americas the inability of 
indigenous peoples to conform with such a model of sovereignty was taken as a sign of 
backwardness and legitimated dispossession, as an image of security's outside; while 
in various instances of decolonisation 'freedom' has been achieved only to yield to 
problems caused by the ethnic makeup of states or the abuse of power by the new 
elites. What becomes clear is that the constitution of sovereignty subsumes rather than 
that which acts any Community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being 
necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the Body should move that 
way whither the greater force carries it...'. While Locke, in denying the sovereign any arbitrary 
exercise of power or 'to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects', differs from 
Hobbes in the extent to which the sovereign can be immune from challenge or censure, they both 
retain a vision of the essential unity of state and subject and the necessary sacrifice of freedom 
for security. (Hobbes, 1985: 232; Locke, 1967: 350) 
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liberates (cultural, linguistic and political) differences, and that such unities would 
already be secured through the negative imagination of the Other. This economy is 
central to both this thought and the whole history of the West: the expansion, 
refinement and modernity of its civilisation. As the image of conflict is seemingly 
eliminated from the inside of the sovereign body, it is reconstituted as its essential and 
threatening outside, its very condition of possibility and thus its interior. Its function is 
one of self-definition, as Foucault wrote of madness for reason: 'the way in which a 
culture can determine in a massive, general form the difference that limits it.' (Foucault, 
1973: xxiv) 
This image of the Other was already present in Hobbes and Locke: first in the idea 
of the state of nature itself, as an essential realm of conflict where passions rule reason 
and insecurity is perpetual; second, in the division between reason and unreason, in 
which 'Children, Fooles and Mad-men' cannot be the authors of their own or the 
sovereign's actions, and thus not whole subjects; third, in the division between 
criminal and society, strictly established by the Law which conforms to reason and 
embodies the will of the people3; and finally, in the division between savage and 
civilised. Hobbes wrote that whilst he did not believe that the state of war was always a 
general condition of life, the exception was 'the savage people in many places of 
America' who, 'except the government of small Families, the concord of which 
dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish 
manner..'. (Hobbes, 1985: 187-219; emphasis added) 
Similarly Locke echoed that 'in many parts of America there was no Government at 
all' and, in an argument essential for the security-political economy relation evident in 
Bentham, developed an image of Indian backwardness on the basis of their imperfect 
use of labour. For Locke Labour (which was the ontological basis of property as the 
productive use of land) pivoted on an image of waste and impoverishment in the 
Indian's failure to exploit the earth: 
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the 
Americans are in this, who are rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life; 
whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the 
materials of Plenty, i.e .. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might 
serve for food, rayment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have 
3 Hobbes argues that 'the names of Just, and Unjust, when they are attributed to men .. signifie 
Conformity, or inconformity of manners, to Reason.' Similarly robbery and violence are 'Injuries 
to the Person of the Commonwealth' and that the men who so refuse to 'accommodate 
themselves to the rest' should 'be cast out of Society . .' (1985: 206-9) Locke writes that 'in 
transgressing the law of nature, the Offender declares himselfe to live by another rule, than that 
of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their 
mutual security: and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them 
from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.' (1967: 290) 
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not one-hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy: And a King of a large and 
fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in 
England. (Locke, 1967: 314-5) 
For Locke a claim to property was only secured by land's exploitation through labour: 
'As much Land as a man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product 
of, so much is his Property. He by his Labour does, as it were enclose the common.' 
He further argued, in a crucial formulation, that the preservation of Property was itself 
the 'chief end' of 'mens uniting into Commonwealths', and was thus the prime object 
of security. Property included mens' 'lives, liberties and estates'; all such possessions 
found their origins in a man's 'property in his own person' which is brought out of the 
state of nature through the 'Labour of his body'. This was in turn secured via the 
Other, within the boundary between reason and unreason: 'God gave the world to men 
in Common; but since he gave it them for their own benefit, and the greatest 
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant 
it should always remain uncommon and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the 
Industrious and Rational.' (1967: 305-9; emphasis added) 
Thus we can see, in embryo, the idea of subjectivity as realisation upon which 
Hegel would base a philosophy; what Locke also achieved was a new ontological 
condition for subjectivity in work. Subjectivity was now an economic category, 
subsumed within a movement of progress and overcoming which would be 
quintessentially modern. This was also true for his discussion of money (an invention 
which allowed men to enlarge upon their property and conceive the economic as an idea 
of the future) which again reposed on the backward Other of the non-economic Indian: 
' . .in the beginning of the World was America, and more so than that is now: for no 
such thing as money was anywhere known.' (1967: 319) 
The temporal possibility for the economy was thus secured by a long chain of 
oppositions-between the commonwealth and state of nature, the criminal and society, 
the economic and non-economic, and the savage and civilised. As Pierre Clastres has 
argued this was to establish the modern within a founding ethnocentrism: within 'the 
complementary conviction that history is a one way progression, that every society is 
condemned to enter into that history and pass through the stages which lead from 
savagery to civilisation.' (1989: 190) Security was what would make this history 
possible, in all its promise and horror, having already achieved an indivisible sovereign 
in the metaphor of the body-politic, an essential link between sovereign and subject in 
security, a new ontological ground for subjectivity in work and for property in 
subjectivity. From here political economy-and modernity as an inexorable historical 
progression-became thinkable. Closely anticipating the phenomenon of 
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govemmentality, security was emerging as a form of reason which aimed to liberate the 
economic as the goal of a general government of men. 
SECURITY AND THE FUTURE: 
BENTHAM, LIBERALISM, GEOPOLITICS 
Jeremy Bentham's Principles Of The Civil Code could be said to straddle this historical 
moment, within a context where the centrality of raison d'etat was giving way to a form 
of liberalism in which the linkages between reason of state, the art of government and 
political economy were more problematic, yet no less necessary. The Cameralists' 
'science of police' had already formulated a relation between totalising and 
individualising power which had as its objective a general prosperity-alongside the 
developments of mercantilism and political arithmetic, government as a system of 
'economic sovereignty' was emerging. At this point, Gordon argues, 'the economy 
was a specific but not yet (as for liberalism) an autonomous form of rationality.' 
Foucau~t sees Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations as then marking out the point at 
which the Cameralists' notion of an equivalence between state and economy is placed 
under stress. Political economy becomes a knowledge which is 'lateral to' the art of 
governing but cannot itself constitute government: as a discourse which proclaims its 
objective knowledge of commercial processes, political economy 'inaugurates a new 
mode of objectification of governed reality, whose effect is to resituate governmental 
reason within a newly complicated, open and unstable politico-epistemic 
configuration.' (Gordon, 1991: 11-16; emphasis added) 
As I will argue later in relation to more contemporary policy formations, this new 
strategic complexity led to a resuscitation of Cartesian approaches which would first 
acknowledge such instabilities yet attempt to control them through the certitude of 
method; and second, in a further ironic twist, would emphasise instability to buttress 
established practices of state. Instability and objectivity-in both a political and 
epistemological sense-would become dangerous twins in the political refusal to accept 
uncertainty. These dilemmas would also re-emerge in the crisis of Keynesianism and 
the rise of economic rationalism in the 1970s, and in a related crisis in foreign policy 
practice and the global political economy which was a focus for theorists like Keohane 
and Nye. Yet neither Keynesianism nor monetarism would constitute an absolute break 
from Smith, but were rather competing attempts at economic regulation within the 
complex space he had outlined. 
Smith's 'invisible hand' marked a shift from reason of state in that it sought to 
place limits on governmental intervention in contrast to an earlier emphasis on its 
expansion, and conceived the economy as an autonomous realm with its own laws 
which worked, ostensibly, for the public good. Laissez-faire then, writes Foucault, 
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was an injunction 'not to impede the course of things, but to ensure the course of 
natural and necessary modes of regulation, to make regulations which permit natural 
regulation to operate.' (Gordon, 1991: 17) In twentieth century foreign economic 
policy we can then see the combination of two modes: a kind of soft mercantilism 
wherein governments use aid programs and diplomacy to promote trade and contracts 
for the corporations domiciled within their state, and a form of 'regulation of natural 
regulation' which takes as its focus infrastructure, labor and foreign investment law, 
cost structures and trade regimes which have a more general effect on business activity 
and profits. Nor should we forget that western governments, most notably the US, 
have used military intervention and sponsored coups in order to improve the business 
climate in third world states. Governmental rhetoric would then portray such policies, 
not as a narrow intervention on behalf of powerful private interests, but as in the 
'national interest'; for the welfare of all, the good of the 'economy' as a whole. 
Bentham's Civil Code appeared in the space Smith carved out, resuscitating 
security as a fundamental societal objective within the openness and uncertainty of this 
new political configuration. It began from the same premises as Hobbes and Locke, 
which posited a founding contractual relation between state and subject in the exchange 
of freedom for security: 'It is impossible to create rights, to impose obligations, to 
protect the person, life, reputation, property, subsistence, or liberty itself, but at the 
expense of liberty.' This was attenuated by the new, lassaiz-faire liberalism which 
demanded that any law must meet a dual test: that 'not only is there a specific reason in 
favour of this law, but also that this reason is more weighty than the general reason 
against any law.' Similarly liberty, as an ontological given and a general basis for 
subjectivity, reposed on the same system of exclusion: 'Do we not say that liberty 
should be taken away from fools, and wicked persons, because they abuse it?' (1837: 
301) 
Bentham began The Civil Code by asserting that the principle object of the 
legislator ought to be the 'happiness of the body politic.' This happiness consists of 
four objects-subsistence, abundance, equality, and security-of which security was 
the most important. Security guaranteed all the others, contained them, and as such 
designated acts and persons dangerous to them: 'actions hurtful to security, when 
prohibited by the laws, receive the character of crimes.' Either security or crime-it 
may be surprising to consider that within this brief, claustrophobic formula lay the 
basis of a whole system of order. Furthermore Bentham made the crucial and far-
reaching argument that, as a guarantee of all the objects of government, security 
ensured their survival through time: 
Among these objects of the law, security is the only one which necessarily 
embraces the future: subsistence, abundance, equality, may be regarded for a 
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moment only; but security implies extension in point of time, with respect to all 
the benefits to which it is applied. Security is therefore the principal object. 
(Bentham, 1873: 302; emphasis added) 
In a prophetic convergence of enlightenment thought with economic liberalism, 
government now took on a temporal dimension: the future was now a thinkable space 
in political discourse, and a general progressive movement could be imagined as an 
essential condition of human society. Security itself, as a promise of continuing safety 
and abundance, was the principle which would make the future possible. In particular, 
Bentham argued, security protects Man's expectation of the future: 
It is by means of this we are enabled to form a general plan of conduct; it is by 
means of this, that the successive moments which compose the duration of life 
are not like insulated and independent points, but become parts of a continuous 
whole. Expectation is a chain which unites our present and our future existence, 
and passes beyond ourselves to the generations which follow us. The sensibility 
of the individual is prolonged through all the links of this chain. The principle of 
security comprehends the maintenance of all these hopes ... (1837: 308) 
Above all, as expectation the future was an economic principle, linking the construction 
of subjectivity as interest and desire with the general increase in prosperity modern 
economics calls growth. In a similar way to Smith's 'invisible hand', and in 
accordance with the new model of liberal governmentality as the regulation of nature, 
expectation became 'a new principle of action': 
The attractions of pleasure, the succession of wants, the active desire of adding to 
our happiness, will, under the protection of security, incessantly produce new 
efforts after new acquisitions. Wants and enjoyments, those universal agents in 
society, after having raised the first ears of corn, will by degrees erect the 
granaries of abundance, always increasing and always full. Desires extend 
themselves with the means of gratification; the horizon is enlarged in proportion 
as we advance ... (1837: 304; emphasis added) 
This in turn effected new modes of government which linked discipline with 
population, individualising with totalising power-a power which, seemingly without 
coercion, could produce individuals as subjects of their own desire while integrating 
them into a much broader system of regulation. Elsewhere Bentham contrasted 'the 
doleful motive of punishment' with the 'gentle motive of reward', the apparatus of law 
with 'the gentle liberty of choice', and argued that labour (itself a condition of 
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economic subjectivity in Locke) is 'so easy and so light when animated by hope . .'. 
(Bentham, 1873: 312) 
This 'uncoerced', economic form of liberal individualism generated what Foucault 
has called 'the subject of interest', and introduced a contradiction into governmental 
reason: while it made individuals more accessible to power, it also distanced them from 
it; forming a rhetoric in which, as Bentham pointed out, security also guarantees 
'political liberty' against 'the injustice of the members of the government.' This 
introduced what Foucault described as a 'dissonance of rationalities' between the 
juridical form of government implied by sovereignty and the more diffuse and 
accidental (i.e. allegedly natural) reconciliation of individual and societal interests in 
liberalism. Liberalism as an art of government began, he argues, when it could 
formulate the 'incompatibility between the non-totalisable multiplicity which 
characterises subjects of interest, and the totalising unity of the juridical sovereign.' 
This entailed, according to Gordon, a new practice of government which neither 
'excis[es] the market from the field of sovereignty, [n]or downgrad[es] the economic 
sovereign into a mere functionary of political economy ... What liberalism undertakes is 
the construction of a complex domain of governmentality, within which economic and 
juridical subjectivity can alike be situated as relative moments, partial aspects of a more 
englobing element.' (Gordon, 1991: 21-3; Bentham, 1873: 302) This domain Foucault 
locates in the concept of civil society, which he understands as 'an instrument or 
correlate of a technology of government' in which economic man is 
the abstract, ideal, purely economic point which populates the real density, 
fullness and complexity of civil society; or alternatively, civil society is the 
concrete ensemble within which these abstract points, economic men, need to be 
positioned in order to be made adequately manageable. (cited in Gordon, 1991: 
23) 
This generated a political problem: to discover a form of government which, 
recognising that no sovereignty can fully comprehend the totality of the economy, or 
regulate every act which may have an economic effect, must still seek to.4 It was at the 
appearance of this problem that Foucault sited the junction of security, discipline and 
4 Here we must resist liberalism's claim to have discovered principles for regulating a 'natural' 
and 'autonomous' economic field: while liberalism may have understood its complexity, the 
strategic difference between 'public' and 'private' economic decisions, and the need to refine a 
mode of state regulation which enables them, it is still a mode of regulation without which the 
economy cannot function. Casting aside the propaganda of economic rationalism we can instead 
understand the state as providing an enabling regulatory and juridical basis for economic 
transactions, corporate structures and capital raising, along with crucial material infrastructure 
such as roads, ports, communications and energy. Further, as Foucault's discussion of 'the 
subject of interest' makes clear, liberalism was seeking to produce an ideal economic subject, 
rather than discover a hidden and essential propensity in men. 
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population; a mix of rationalities which might more fully grasp this uncertain political 
space. The basic object of governmental rationality became to establish 'modes of state 
intervention whose function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, 
economic processes and the intrinsic phenomena of population ... hence liberty is 
registered not only as a right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the 
abuses and usurpations of the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of 
governmental rationality itself.' This perfectly describes the function of the subject of 
interest, whose 'choice' and desire for acquisition becomes at once an economic motor 
and a strategic handhold for power.5 Foucault argues that Bentham's economic man, 
who seeks happiness and avoids pain, is an example par excellence of an applied 
rationality of security, 'a theme for political inventiveness.' (Gordon, 1991: 20) 
With inventiveness came a drive for flexibility, mobility and vigilance: security, 
suggests Foucault, addresses itself to a series of possible and probable events; it 
calculates the comparative costs of actions and means; and does not absolutely 
prescribe between the permitted and forbidden, 'but by the specification of an optimal 
mean within a tolerable bandwidth of variation.' This last element may well be more 
utopian than real, the dream of a flexibility power simply has not had. A twentieth 
century survey might emphasise, rather, the great binary divisions with which states 
have sought to secure their identities and manipulate the hearts of their citizens-
whether in the history of race, economics, or dying imperialisms, the defence of 
absolutes and the dream of purification has washed the earth in blood many times over. 
(Gordon, 1991: 20) Instead, what becomes overwhelming in security is vigilance. This 
is already apparent in The Civil Code, in which Bentham declared 'Economy 
has .. many enemies': 
Cunning and Injustice underhandedly conspire to appropriate its fruits; Insolence 
and Audacity plot to seize them by open force. Hence Security, always tottering, 
always threatened, never at rest, lives in the midst of snares. It requires in the 
legislator, vigilance continually sustained, and power always in action, to defend 
it against his constantly reviving crowd of adversaries. (Bentham, 1837: 307) 
5 Within this idea of liberal subjectivity as a theme for political inventiveness, discipline 
combines the increasing visibility of 'population' with the privatisation of control-to factory 
owners, churches and schools-along with even more subtle mechanisms which work at the 
level of the soul, interpolating subjects as simultaneously desiring consumers, moral individuals 
and fearful citizens. (See Gordon, 1991: 26-29) In liberalism this requires a difficult management 
of liberty so that it neither frustrates economic freedom nor generates threats to societal order: 
Bentham glosses the problem by splitting liberty between rights and obligations: rights are not 
extended unless obligations to the state are met. Kant's essay What Is Enlightenment?, with its 
themes of political 'maturity', also addresses the same set of dilemmas. (Bentham, 1837: 301; 
Kant, 1784; see also Foucault's essay on Kant (1984a) and Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1986) 
73 
Security and Government 
One might suggest that the new, open space of liberalism had engendered a new 
paranoia: power, always under threat, always at risk, must now be constantly in action; 
striving for the absolute-for perfect security, perfect economy, perfect happiness-it 
is seized with restlessness and fear. This is the theme of a new productivity of political 
power which simultaneously reaches into the heart of the citizen and multiplies its own 
spatial reach-it seems no accident that both Bentham and Smith write at the height of 
the European imperialisms, within which the discursive imagination of the twentieth 
century (global trade, geopolitics, war, and technological progress) was born. 
In describing this productivity Foucault emphasises the simultaneous 
individualisation and totalisation of governmental power: discipline and desire 
addressed to individuals, bio-power addressed to populations&, in a perpetual feedback 
and combination. To these, however, we must add geopolitics as the form of power 
which combined these rationalities with the vast lusts of modem imperialism. By the 
mid-twentieth century geopolitics had become the practice of security par excellence: a 
spatialising rationality of power which sought the control of territories and populations 
(as both economic resources and strategic possessions) within a perpetually dangerous 
and contested arena, through the interdependent production of domestic and 
transnational political space. Not withstanding the fascist imperialisms of the 1930s, 
we could thus characterise geopolitics as a liberal philosophy of global intervention, 
which links increasingly global issues of economic management with domestic policy 
formations across the whole of government. The domestic and international become 
fused spaces through a whole series of interlinked processes: of domestic and foreign 
economic policy, transnational business and trade, or the raising of armies for imperial 
operations with images of fear and otherness which simultaneously secure and rigidify 
domestic identities. As global influence becomes conceivable, the inter-relation of 
political economy, nationalism and the Other become central to security as a vector and 
rationality of power, within a time that is firmly our own. 
Thus in security vigilance, paranoia and absolutism coalesce: the postwar American 
national security state, with its ferocious anticommunism, its vast military deployments 
and its endeavour to build and strengthen a 'global' economy (at least outside the 
communist bloc), is perhaps the most powerful example. Australia shared these 
assumptions and sought close integration with the United States' geopolitical strategy, 
6 Foucault outlined bio-power in 'The Right of Death and Power Over Life', the final chapter of 
The History of Sexuality (Vol. 1 ). He characterises its emergence, from the seventeenth 
century, as a shift from the sovereign's right to kill treasonous persons to 'the calculated 
management of life' focused around two poles: discipline and the body as machine, and the body 
of the species-all the opaque processes of public health and population. With it came a 
mutation in power, echoed in Bentham: 'the growing importance assumed by the action of the 
norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law ... a power whose task is to take charge of 
life requires continuous corrective and regulatory mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of 
bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of 
value and utility.' (1987: 144) 
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particularly in Asia. The combination of such absolutism with the rigid demarcations of 
anticommunism was already visible in The Civil Code, in which a hostility to socialism 
was posited as an ineradicable principle of security as prosperity. Even though equality 
was listed as a goal of legislation, Bentham wrote, it must not be favoured 'except in 
cases in which it does not injure security': 
.. .if property were overthrown with the direct intention of establishing equality of 
fortune, the evil would be irreparable: no more security, no more industry, no 
more abundance; society would relapse into the savage state from which it has 
arisen. (Bentham, 1837: 312) 
These are strong words, which lie at the heart of the liberal philosophy of government. 
A reconciliation of security and equality can only be achieved gradually, and without 
coercion, through the natural processes of growth and prosperity.7 To do otherwise is 
to exchange 'the gentle motive of reward' for 'the doleful motive of punishment', and 
thus abandon the search for less coercive-and thus more effective-modes of 
subjectification; to ensure that the 'prospects of benevolence and concord, which have 
seduced so many ardent minds .. are only the chimeras of the imagination'. The 
passage, perhaps unsurprisingly, also repeated the Lockean formulation which posited 
economic progress on the movement away from a 'savage', non-economic Other.a 
(1837: 307-12) 
Thus by the beginning of the nineteenth century the political and ontological 
architecture of security was firmly established, and was being slowly refined. All its 
elements-sovereignty, the other, geopolitics, economic man-were in place, finding 
productive new articulations, and must be considered essential to the vast industrial, 
economic and technological changes that were gathering pace under the aegis of the 
modem. The work of Hegel, close in time to Bentham's, refined such liberalism by 
developing a philosophy which self-consciously understood the future as an entry into 
the radically new temporal space of the modem. Taking up the idea of security 
7 In an early version of the idea of trickle-down growth, Bentham argued that 'in a nation which 
prospers by agriculture, manufactures and commerce, there is a continual progress towards 
equality. If the laws do not oppose it, if they do not maintain monopolies, if they do not restrain 
trade and its exchanges, if they do not permit entails, large properties will be seen, without 
effort, without revolutions, without shocks, to subdivide themselves little by little, and a much 
greater number of individuals will participate in the advantage of moderate fortunes.' A further 
mechanism for equality was a levy on property after death or restrictions on its distribution. 
(Bentham, 1837: 312-3) 
8 At the outset of his discussion of security, Bentham wrote that 'this inestimable good is the 
distinctive mark of civilization: it is entirely the work of the laws .. .ln order rightly to consider this 
great benefit of the Laws, it is only necessary to consider the condition of savages. They 
struggle without ceasing against famine, which sometimes cuts off in a few days whole nations; 
rivalry with respect to the means of subsistence, produces among them most cruel wars; and, 
like the most ferocious beasts, men pursue men, that they may feed on one another.' (1837: 
307-12) 
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maintaining economic subjectivity-and thus prosperity-infinitely in time, Hegel 
would develop it into a general principle of human progress. 
HEGEL: 
SECURITY AS REALISATION 
Hegel drew upon and expanded the range of this thought by capturing a range of 
influential discursive currents flowing around the industrial revolution and the political 
and philosophical events of the European enlightenment. His work intervened, in a 
political sense, at the point where enlightenment rationalism and the liberal problem of 
government coincide: lifting liberal ideas of freedom and right into a philosophical 
universalism which-for our purposes-powerfully illuminates the ontological 
structure of modem nationalisms, the forms of subjectivity they engender, and the 
essential and negative role of the Other for their thought. In particular he developed a 
formal model for discourses which would attempt to reconcile liberal political economy 
with a strong image of the nation-state. 
His influential contribution was to understand the uncertain liberal political space 
between state and economy as uniquely and self-consciously modem. The modem was 
both a radically new space and, paradoxically, one which drew upon the past if only to 
supersede it-what characterised modernity was the idea of the future, as Bentham 
anticipated, the acceleration of change and events, of time over space. In his preface to 
the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel wrote that 
it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth time and a transition to a new era. Spirit 
has broken with the world it has hitherto inhabited and imagined, and is of a 
mind to submerge it in the past, and in the labour of its own transformation ... The 
frivolity and boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding 
of something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The gradual 
crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a sunburst 
which in one flash illuminates the features the new world. (Hegel, 1977: 6) 
The persuasive power of this thinking cannot be underestimated: it underlies powerful 
contemporary ideas of technological and scientific change as advance, of economic 
change as development, of political rights and values as universal, and of a generalised 
movement of human progress and culmination which is driven by and unites them all. 
Hegel combined metaphors of organic growth (Spirit proceeded like the growth of a 
tree or a child) with a grand religiosity in which Spirit demanded 
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the strenuous, almost over-zealous and frenzied effort to tear men away from 
their pre-occupation with the sensuous, from their ordinary, private affairs, and 
to direct their gaze to the stars; as if they had forgotten all about the divine, and 
were ready like worms to content themselves with dirt and water. (1977: 5) 
He argued that this idea of modernity as a break with the past created, along with new 
possibilities and horizons, uncertainty and loss-having sundered its foundations and 
'the immediacy of faith', and having gone 'beyond the satisfaction and security of the 
certainty that consciousness then had, of its reconciliation with the essential being', 
Spirit had 'lost its essential life.' Philosophy's task then was to recover 'through its 
agency that lost sense of solid and essential being.' (1977: 4) 
This was echoed in Reinhart Koselleck's argument that modernity is characterised 
by an increasing separation of the 'space of experience' from 'the horizon of 
expectation': 'modernity is first understood as a new age from the time that 
expectations have distanced themselves from the space of all previous experience.' This 
meant that older forms of traditional life (the peasant or the craftsman) are replaced by 
an experience of progress that lends expectation a 'historically new quality, constantly 
subject to being overlaid with utopian conceptions.' (cited in Habermas, 1993: 12) 
Expectation begins to take over, and thus engenders an idea of the future which 
subjectivity will experience as desire, as lack, as an always postponed drive for 
fulfilment. This alone constitutes an enormously powerful technology of subjectivity 
for any system which can appropriate it: of economic subjectivity as individual 
consumption or corporate acquisition, or political subjectivity as a malleable yearning 
for the infinite. 
As Hegel recognised, however, the increasing distance of expectation from 
experience generated uncertainty and instability: Koselleck describes it as a loss of 
political clarity, quoting de Tocqueville's remark that 'As the past ceases to illuminate 
the future, the mind moves forward in darkness.' Gesturing towards Hegel's attempt to 
limit this problem, Habermas points out that 'expectation' in this way served not only 
to open up utopia but 'to close off the future as a source of disruption with the aid of 
teleological constructions of history .. '. As if to reconcile liberalism with conservatism, 
Hegel sought to liberate the restless energies of modem subjectivity while controlling 
them, retaining a vision of stability and order in which progress takes the form, not of 
an irruption, but a slow and rational design. It was again security, refracted through the 
liberal problematic of Smith and Bentham, which would provide the framework for this 
difficult calibration. It would be in the harnessing and management of uncertainty that 
security and spirit would coincide: security manages change and peers into the cloudy 
future; History strives to illuminate its promise and ,strengthen the resolve of the present 
to move on. (Gordon, 1991: 31; Habermas, 1993: 12) 
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Hegel here developed a thematic of certitude earlier visible in Descartes, which has 
become central to modem statecraft. Cartesian thought posits less a world which is 
stable prior to its cognition, than one which begins as disordered-to obtain truth it 
was first necessary to postulate absolute doubt and uncertainty beyond the boundaries 
of the Subject's own existence and cognition, then to move, via the correct method, to 
stable and universal truths. (Anscombe, 1966: 153) This enters our contemporary 
modernity as the foundation of both a dangerous empiricism by which policymakers 
(stable cognitive minds) feel that policy can be made to correspond with a verifiable and 
accessible external reality, and as the foundation of a continual projection of uncertainty 
as the discourse's own condition of possibility. In the midst of a modernity whose 
imagination of the future paradoxically opens up a space of darkness and 
unpredictability, the Cartesian model has had a potent appeal as a formal and procedural 
solution. From the first encounter with Aboriginal populations in New South Wales, to 
the post-cold war attempts to construct a foreign and strategic policy fit for an era of 
'globalisation', the drive to manage uncertainty-whilst also exacerbating images of 
it-has been a potent theme of Australian 'governmental' strategy, affecting the 
economic and political management of populations, spaces and identities. 9 
Hegel enacted a philosophical system in which security and expectation would be 
paired, much as they were in Bentham, forming a principle which unites men's present 
and future existence, passes them to the generations that follow, and merges all the 
moments of life into a continuous rational chain. Hegel's account of subjectivity, which 
was central to his whole system, would be powerfully prefigured in Bentham's 
comment that 'the sensibility of the individual is prolonged through all the links of this 
chain.' Hegel raised this movement into the culmination of the Idea, into a general 
temporal principle for subject, society and state-their lives, their exchanges, their 
rights, their goals. Taking up all the previous themes of security-sovereignty, the 
state of nature, familial government, and economic man-they would be integrated into 
a universal codification of order, progress and realisation. (Bentham, 1837: 308) 
Just as subjectivity was a key achievement for Hobbes, Locke and Bentham-
formed into a principle for citizenship, the body-politic, and economic man-it 
provided a central overarching principle for Hegel's thought. Hegel replayed the levels 
of subjectivity present in their work-the individual as a subject of freedom and labour, 
rights and obligations, desire and acquisition, within the protective armature of a state 
9 "Uncertainty" has become a visibly significant motif in Australia's defence and foreign policy 
during the 1990s. It was a prominent theme in the 1994 Defence White Paper, while the Howard 
Government's Foreign Policy White Paper-already framed by an overarching objective of 
security-speaks of globalisation bringing 'in its wake challenges for political and economic 
management.' (1997: v) Richard Leaver cautions that 'It would be wrong .. to think of post-war 
uncertainty as in some sense unusual, let alone necessarily disturbing ... there are many issues 
about whose permanence and immediacy it is quite proper to remain agnostic.' (1996: 177) 
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which is a kind of meta-subject-introducing them into a temporal movement which 
will constitute subjectivity itself and merge it with the restless labour of the age. 
Subjectivity will mirror and express the epoch-at once divided, uncertain and future-
directed, the basis for a shimmering realisation of its own possibilities. As seductive as 
this has been for generations of theorists and politicians, my attempt will be to show 
how gravely limiting it has in fact been. 
Hegel began The Philosophy of Right by asserting that the basis of right is mind, 
whose 'precise place and point of origin is the will'. Yet at the outset the will was 
divided, both within itself and temporally: first as indeterminate, the uncontrolled 
freedom of impulse and desire, then determined; in total, he explained, the will 'is the 
unity of both these moments': 
It is particularity reflected into itself and so brought back to universality, i.e. it is 
individuality. It is the self-determination of the ego, which means that at one and 
the same time the ego posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as restricted and 
determinate, and yet remains by itself, i.e. in its own self-identity and 
universality. It determines itself and yet at the same time binds itself with itself. 
The ego determines itself insofar as it is the relating of negativity to itself. ( 1967: 
23) 
This was Hegel's definition of free subjectivity: self-determination, the bizarre formula 
which allowed him to reconcile freedom with social law, and in turn, to argue that 
freedom could only experienced under the conditions of that law. Here the sacrifice of 
freedom for security which formed the basis of the Lockean social contract no longer 
applied: effaced in a rule which argued subjectivity began as incomplete, and could 
only be achieved within the evolution of a greater unity. This is clear in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, in which Spirit is posited as the movement of subjectivity's 
full achievement. The Subject is divided between itself and an Other, which Hegel 
argues is merely a moment of its own self-knowledge. They must be reconciled: 
Subject.. .is the movement of positing itself, the mediation of its self-othering 
with itself. This substance is, as subject, pure, simple negativity, and it is for this 
very reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up 
opposition, and then the negation of this indifferent diversity and its 
antithesis ... Only this self-restoring sameness, of this reflection of otherness 
within itself--not an original or immediate unity as such-is the True. It is the 
process of its own becoming ... (1977: 10; emphasis added) 
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Elsewhere Hegel explained this process as one in which the will posits itself as an 
object, through 'the use of its own activity and some external means'; until it does so it 
is 'implicitly rational' but 'poured out in this way into the mould of immediacy, still 
lacks the form ofrationality.' The will's activity 'consists in annulling the contradiction 
between subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims an objective instead of a 
subjective character, while at the same time remaining by itself even in objectivity.' 
When it has done so, will passes from merely being free in itself and 'for an external 
observer' to free for-itself. This in tum liberates the temporal imagination: 'in itself the 
abstract reciprocal extemality characteristic of nature is space, but for itself it is time.' 
(1967: 25-33) 
This account of subjectivity, however abstract, was not far removed from the 
liberals' 'subject of interest' and their concern to discover less coercive ways of 
producing ethical, self-regulating individuals whose particular desires would 
nonetheless combine into the motor of an ideal socio-economic order. Hegel asserted 
that his 'science of right' was an attempt to grasp how subjective and contingent 
impulses 'should become the rational system of the will's volitions.' In a formulation 
that closely echoed Bentham and the more 'productive' objectives of discipline, Hegel 
argued that this was achieved through reflection: 
When reflection is brought to bear on impulses, they are imaged, estimated, 
compared with one-another, with their means of satisfaction and their 
consequences, and with a sum of satisfaction (i.e. with happiness). In this way 
reflection invests this material with abstract universality and in this external 
manner purifies it from crudity and barbarity. This growth of the universality of 
thought is the absolute value in education. (1967: 29) 
Elsewhere he wrote that 'the final purpose of education' was 'liberation and the 
struggle for a higher liberation still...the hard struggle against demeanor, against the 
immediacy of desire, against the empty subjectivity of feeling and the caprice of 
inclination.' (1967: 125) Thus Hegel's formal model for subjectivity was the 
achievement of full self-consciousness which began as bifurcated (between itself and 
its other, between subjective and objective will) and was then resolved into a higher 
unity through the overcoming of this 'negativity', the dissolution of the particular in the 
universal, the extinction of that originating difference. He described this principle as 
dialectic, which 'consists not simply in determination as a contrary and a restriction, 
but in producing and seizing upon the positive content and outcome of the 
determination, because it is this which makes it solely a development and an immanent 
progress ... here it is mind in its freedom, the culmination of self-conscious reason, 
which gives itself actuality and engenders itself as an existing world.' (1967: 34-5) 
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The full, claustrophobic effect of this unity was described in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, where an unanswerable universalism was derived from the original division of 
the subject, and where-importantly-negativity was itself the motor of progress: 
... although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the 'I' and its 
object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what 
seems to happen outside it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own 
doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. When it has shown 
this comp(etely, Spirit has made its existence identical with its essence; it has 
itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy and of the 
separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely 
mediated ... the moments of Spirit now spread out in that form of simplicity which 
knows its object as its true self. (1977: 21-22; emphasis added) 
The political implications of this schema became visible in the Philosophy of Right and 
in the posthumously published Lectures on the Philosophy of History, which formed 
the starting point for Francis Fukuyama's 1989 essay The End of History? 
For in the Philosophy of Right this culmination of subjectivity was made hostage to 
its immersion in the greater identity represented by the nation-state. The drive for self-
consciousness, he argued, proceeds dialectically through a series of moments-the 
individual, the family, civil society-yet cannot be fully realised in any of them.10 
Subjectivity was only realised in the form of ethical life, which was the State, 'the 
actuality of the ethical idea'. Not merely was the state the ultimate aim of rationality, but 
the ground for all the earlier phases: 'it exists immediately in custom, mediately in 
individual self-consciousness, knowledge and activity, while self-consciousness in 
virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence and the end and 
product of its activity, its substantive freedom.' (1967: 155) 
The potentially dangerous division immanent in liberalism-between state and civil 
society-was here controlled by a system which, allowing for the diffusion of nodes 
and mechanisms of power conceived by the 'art of government', sought to seize 
subjectivity at its very centre, through its effacement in the greater identity of the One. 
Let there be no mistake: membership of the state was not optional, but the individual's 
very condition of being: 
10 Hegel argues that the 'ethical mind' evolved through a series of phases. Its 'natural or 
immediate phase' was the family, which passed into civil society, which was still merely an 
'abstract' universality because its members were self-subsistent. Yet their association, which 
was 'brought about by their needs, by the legal system-the means to security of person and 
property-and by an external organisation for attaining their particular and common interests', 
was 'welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of both the 
substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereunto.' (1967: 110) 
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If the state is confused with civil society, and if its specific end is laid down as 
the security and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of 
individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and it follows 
that membership of the state is something optional. But the state's relation to the 
individual is quite different from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only 
as one of its members that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine 
individuality, and an ethical life. Unification pure and simple is the true aim and 
content of the individual, and the individual's destiny is the living of a universal 
life. (1967: 156) 
The state was clearly not something separate from the people, a discrete and 
autonomous set of institutions which act on society in a wholly external way. Drawing 
on Hobbes' image of the Leviathan as a general Will, and closely shadowing the 
emergence of population as a category, the state was a meta-subject, the sum and 
culmination of all the individuals and moments which preceded it. In this way Hegel 
intensified the logocentric closure of the system I have elaborated in Hobbes and 
Locke. He clarified and intensified the necessity of the other for security, for prosperity 
and for progress in general, incorporating it into a wholly restricted economy in which 
the Other was always subsumed within a return to the higher unity of the Same. In this 
sense security, economic prosperity and a central organising racism powerfully 
coalesce. This can be seen more clearly in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 
delivered in 1822, and in Francis Fukuyama's 1992 reinterpretation of that work in the 
light of twentieth century economic and political developments. This text also further 
illuminates Hegel's relationship to economic liberalism, and particularly how security, 
economics and progress have combined in twentieth century political discourse. 
In these lectures Hegel sought to show the progress of Spirit through World 
History, which was 'none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom' 
that, in a movement much like Smith's invisible hand or Bentham's principle of utility, 
both transcended and was driven by the 'passions', 'interests', 'self-seeking designs' 
and 'will' of men. History proceeded through a series of stages, from Africa (which 
was merely on the 'threshold of the world's history'), to China (which, with its 
undeveloped states and insufficiently western forms of thought, was at the 'childhood 
of History') and finally Europe, which was at the most advanced stages of 
development. Bonaparte and the French Revolution, he felt, had put into practice the 
Idea of Freedom, which the Germans (like Kant) had only been able to theorise. 'The 
History of the World,' he wrote, 'travels from East To West, for Europe is absolutely 
the end of History, Asia the beginning'. North America, with its republican 
constitution, political unity, 'increase of industry and population' and 'civil order and 
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firm freedom', had an even more exalted place: it was 'the land of the future ... a land of 
desire for all those who are weary of the historical lumber-room of old Europe . .It is for 
America to abandon the ground on which hitherto the History of the World has 
developed itself.' (1990: 23-26, 104-5, 443, 86-7) 
Yet what was palpably obvious was that this practical forward movement of Spirit 
turned on the opposition to-and negation of-a backward Other, much as it did in 
Hobbes, Locke and Bentham. Africa was still 'enveloped in the dark mantle of night', 
here wrote, it was 'the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the 
conditions of mere nature .. .it has no movement or development to exhibit'. In his 
description of North America the essentially ethnocidal nature of this enterprise, which 
reposed on the physical destruction of Indian societies and customs as a new 
civilisation took their place, became depressingly clear: 'the original nation having 
vanished, or nearly so ... [America] has the outlet of colonization constantly and widely 
open, and the multitudes are continually streaming into the plains of the Mississippi.' 11 
In passages that took the implications of liberal political theory to their final, implicit 
conclusion, praise for the 'subjective unity' of the republican constitution, the 
'universal protection for property' and the 'endeavor of the individual after acquisition, 
commercial profit, and gain' mingled with descriptions of the 'mild and passionless 
disposition', 'want of spirit', 'crouching submissiveness', and 'inferiority in all 
respects' of the 'native Americans'. (1990: 91-99, 80-87) 
The Other also provided the ontological ground for humanism, that great ethical 
substrate for the 'rights of man'. The system in which 'the principle of right, morality, 
and all ethical life' was to liberate a 'self-consciousness which apprehends itself 
through thinking as essentially human' was itself utterly dependent on the negative 
image of those whom it could barely recognise as human: 'The Negro, as already 
observed, exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We must 
lay aside all thought of reverence and morality-all that we call feeling-if we would 
rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this 
type of character.' It is no surprise that Pierre Clastres was driven to the bitter 
conclusion that the 'spirituality of ethnocide is the ethic of humanism.' (Hegel, 1967: 
30, 1990: 93; Clastres, 1988: 53) 
11 The anthropologist Pierre Clastres, in his essay On Ethnocide, which attempted to theorise 
the destruction of the indigenous peoples of America after 1492, described 'ethnocide' as 
sharing with 'genocide an identical vision of the Other': 'the Other is difference, certainly, but 
above all it is a bad difference. Both attitudes divide on the nature of the treatment which is to be 
reserved for this difference ... The genocidal mind ... wants purely and simply to deny difference; 
the others are exterminated because they are absolutely bad. Ethnocide, on the other hand, 
admits a relativity of evil in difference; the others are bad, but they can be improved, by obliging 
them to transform themselves to the point of total identification, if possible, with the model 
proposed to or imposed on them. Ethnocidal negation of the Other leads to an identification with 
self.' (Clastres, 1988: 52) 
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Hegel returned to the linkage of liberal economics and the theme of 'government' in 
a section of the Philosophy of Right entitled, unsurprisingly, 'Police'. Hegel was well 
aware of the disturbing implications for social order represented by mass poverty, and 
suggested something approaching modern ideas of 'welfare' which as we know, have 
now become major technologies of security. Yet though he considered direct grants to 
the poor funded from taxes on the wealthy or endowments from public institutions, he 
rejected this option because it entailed no work and would thus 'violate the principle of 
civil society and the feeling of individual independence and self-respect in its individual 
members'-that is, the very basis of liberal subjectivity. He in turn rejected work 
because this would lead to an excess of production which lacked a market at home; 
thus, he argued, it 'becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth civil society is 
not rich enough, i.e. its own resources are not sufficient enough to check excessive 
poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble.' (1967: 150) 
The answer to this problem was, in short, imperialism: 'the inner dialectic of civil 
society thus drives it ... to push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its 
necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are deficient in the goods it has 
overproduced .. '. This would be a common and potent historical theme, echoed in the 
imperialisms of the European powers, in the colonisation of North America, South 
Africa, and Australasia, and in the United States' push for control of the Pacific and 
trade with Japan and China in the mid-nineteenth century. Indeed Hegel argued that 
sea-borne communication afforded 'the means for the colonising activity-. sporadic or 
systematic-to which the mature civil society is driven and by which it supplies to a 
part of its population a return to life on the family basis in a new land and so also 
supplies itself with a new demand and field for its industry.' (1967: 151-2) 
At this point the relation between the art of government and political economy-as a 
network 'of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and 
wealth' --came into its own. It was then that security made the leap from a principle for 
the production and management of the nation-state, to one which simultaneously 
directed the policies of states within an inter-national system. The historic gap had been 
bridged; the modern, in an important sense, could now become possible. Hegel's fable 
of this was remarkably similar to that which described the progress of Spirit; trade and 
colonisation would be essential to the liberation of modernity's restless energies, 
unbounded possibilities, and inevitable dangers: 
The principle of family life is dependence on the soil, on land, terra firma. The 
natural element for industry, animating its outward movement, is the sea. Since 
the passion for gain involves risk, industry though bent on gain yet lifts itself 
above it; instead of remaining rooted to the soil and the limited circle of civil life 
with its pleasures and desires, it embraces the element of danger, flux, and 
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destruction. Further, the sea is the greatest means of communication, and trade 
by sea creates commercial connexions between distant countries and so relations 
involving contractual rights. At the same time, commerce of this kind is the most 
potent instrument of culture, and through it trade acquires its significance in the 
history of the world. (1967: 151) 
If Hegel, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was self-consciously writing at the 
'birth-time' of the modem, in 1989 Francis Fukuyama took him up once more, as if to 
close the circle. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, he published an article which 
asserted that 'we may be witnessing the end of history as such ... the end-point of 
mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.' Liberal democracy as an idea, he argued, had 
triumphed over its powerful ideological competitors--communism, fascism and 
authoritarianism; it was 'free from the contradictions that characterised earlier forms of 
social organisation and would therefore bring the historical dialectic to a close.' (1989: 
15) 
Yet as if to re-emphasise Hegelianism' s imbrication with liberal political economy, 
a crucial platform for his argument was that democracy had triumphed through its 
pairing with economic liberalism, which was itself the fundamental universalising 
force. The superior 'rationality' of global free market capitalism was the motor of a 
natural and inevitable historical progress, unfolding through the 'logic of modem 
natural science' which 'establishes a uniform horizon of economic production 
possibilities' and 'an increasing homogenisation of all human societies, regardless of 
their historical origins or cultural inheritances.' Western political theory's dependence 
on the image of a backward, non-economic other was here perfectly reproduced, within 
the passage of the Other into the Same. While the Third World, due to the 'relatively 
late arrival of nationalism and industrialism' would be still 'stuck in history', he 
argued, it was the advanced democracies of the 'post-historical' world which will 
provide an exemplary model of the future. (Fukuyama, 1992: xiv, 276) 
Fukuyama thus trumpeted the same cultural convergences that Hegel had 
anticipated-and which Pierre Clastres had denounced as ethnocidal. At the time his 
thesis was very popular, and mirrored increasingly powerful discourses of economic 
and cultural integration that underpin many new global structures and institutions, from 
NAFTA, APEC and the European Union, to the World Bank and the IMF. Security 
provides the architectonic guarantee for the evolution of these economic structures, 
which in turn provide a promise of its enhancement for states and the subjects they 
supposedly protect. This global articulation of security and economy-though 
powerfully prefigured in 18th and 19th century imperialism-was really only possible 
after the second world war, when the United States combined a dominance of military 
85 
Security and Government 
security arrangements with the supremacy of its own currency, the strength of its own 
economy and the rules for global trade and money which it had instituted at Bretton 
Woods in 1944. American writers at the time, such as Henry Luce, portrayed the 
general benefit to mankind of this spread of markets and American values in spiritual 
terms, and it is this kind of triumphalism Fukuyama echoed. Yet the problem Hegel 
and other liberals had recognised--of seeking to both liberate and control the social 
energies modernity unleashed-was also central. This goes a long way to explaining 
why anticommunism was such a strong political force in the post-war era: confronting 
not merely a key ideological competitor and practical barrier to business activity, but-
in the forms of marxism and socialism-an alternative path from the same 
enlightenment rationalism which liberalism made its ground. Security thus sought to 
liberate and accelerate flows of capital, trade and resources while controlling and 
limiting others--of people, technology, drugs and political ideologies. Within the 
strategic and military guarantee of prosperity, and in tracing a continual movement of 
power between the individual and the meta-subjects of state, population and economy, 
security would bring fear and desire, promise and threat, into an intense umbilical 
relation-within an experience which is still our own. 
CONCLUSION: 
SECURITY AND REFUSAL 
This chapter has traced security's emergence and evolution as both an architectonic and 
ever more flexible mode of 'governmental' power which stretches from the smallest 
individual to the vast spaces of geopolitics, with their massive articulations of 
resources, populations, economic flows and military deployments. In particular, what I 
have tried to do is draw out the practical linkages between the juridical basis of the state 
expressed in sovereignty and the apparently autonomous processes of political 
economy, showing how they in fact derive from the same ontological imaginary. Here, 
the enabling principle of both sovereignty and political economy was subjectivity, 
which over time fashioned economic subjects of desire and acquisition within the meta-
subjectivities represented by the state, population and economy. True to Foucault's 
account of the breathtakingly efficient modality which combined an individualising with 
a totalising power, security could regulate and control ever vaster arenas of commerce 
and strategic competition, whilst trusting that individuals would act in ways which 
enhanced the general system of prosperity. 
On the one hand, however, this is to grant security too much power, effacing a 
historical context in which elites have faced serious competition and sought their 
'prosperity' and order within a field of constant conflict. The imagery of crisis and its 
attendant rhetorics of fear and threat have then had both a real basis in elite anxieties 
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and served to mobilise and control populations. On the other hand, we need to confront 
the fact that security, in its efficiency and tactical flexibility, constitutes a mobile 
rationality of power that can seem suffocating. While I don't want to underestimate the 
difficulties in escaping it, it is not impossible. Unmasking security's claims to 
naturalness and truth, and exposing its mythical historical contours, is a useful first 
step. What liberal forms of government assume, though, is that power is most effective 
when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired: as we have seen, security has 
played a significant role in the formation and management of this subjectivity, which 
nonetheless creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, 'Foucault 
seems to think that the very possibility of an activity or way of governing can be 
conditional on the availability of a certain notion of its rationality, which may in tum 
need, in order to be operable, to be credible to the governed as well as the 
goveming ... the relation between government and the governed passes, to a perhaps 
ever-increasing extent, through the manner in which governed individuals are willing to 
exist as subjects.' (1991: 48) 
This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of 
subjectivity, and particularly its dependence upon representation in doing so. It is to 
take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement 
of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who we are so much as to refuse who 
we are. Just as security enters subjectivity as both a totalising and individualising 
blackmail and promise, it is at these levels we too can intervene. We can critique the 
vast machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic 
regulation and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language 
to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. At the simultaneous levels of 
individual identity, social order and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another 
kind of work on 'ourselves': a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an Other 
that never returns to the Same. 
87 
PART II 
An Australian Genealogy 
For Australia there has been no single act of creation. 
Neville Meaney, 1976: vii. 
Three 
The Australian Subject 
... here is the irony. If Australianness is elusive as a centre, an essence, a destiny, it 
is everywhere to be found as a refracting perspective, a melange, a quirk. The 
baffling circumstances that defeat the search for a centre may well prove to be the 
thing itself. .. 
Nicholas Jose, Cultural Identity, 1985: 315. 
As Lieutenant James Cook, commander of His Majesty's Ship Endeavour, began his 
voyage to Tahiti in 1768, the modern political technology of security-linking 
sovereignty, societal order, economic prosperity and geopolitics-was rapidly coming 
into its own. Although the Dutch were already firmly established at Batavia, and the 
British themselves in India, the Endeavour's voyage would initiate a far-reaching 
process in which a 'geographic' space incorporating Australasia and the broader South 
Pacific was transformed and incorporated into the 'geopolitical' space we associate with 
security. Although commissioned by the Royal Society for the purpose of observing 
the sun transit across the face of Venus on the 3rd of June 1769, the expedition was 
dispatched with a larger, secret imperial purpose: to sail south from Tahiti to latitude 
40°S in search of the southern continent previously encountered by Dampier and Abel 
Tasman, and to claim it for the British Crown. The nature of the Endeavour's encounter 
with New Holland confirms Cook's narrow purpose: despite the presence of the 
botanist Joseph Banks and the naturalist Charles Solander, they landed only five times, 
the longest forced on them after the ship was holed on the Great Barrier Reef. With the 
meticulous care for which he had been chosen, Cook mapped the east coast-naming 
many of its bays, harbours, islands and observable land features and finally, on the 22 
August 1770, after reaching the eponymous Possession island off Cape York, hoisted 
the Union Jack and formally proclaimed the sovereignty of King George III over the 
whole of the eastern coast from Point Hicks under the name 'New South Wales'. The 
many encounters of the ship's crew with Aboriginal tribes, some of whom displayed 
great hostility, did not discourage this founding act of dispossession, which effectively 
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gave birth to an new geopolitical space in the southern hemisphere and began the 
process of obliterating the very different space imagined and lived by a much older 
civilisation.1 His task thus completed, the Endeavour sailed onto Batavia. The 
ambiguity of Cook's status as a founder-Paul Carter cites accusations of his 'culpable 
indifference ... his descriptions of the Australian coast were less than fulsome and, much 
worse, he never came back'-seems irrelevant given the discrete task he had been set. 
His aim, as the means of a much greater political technology, was first to establish that 
such a place existed, to map and claim it, and thus to bring it firmly within a European 
political horizon. The term discovery, with all its imperial overtones, has rightfully 
been rejected; but its reverse may be more useful. We can argue that, in a very crucial 
sense, this was a space that had been invented where none had existed before: a new 
space conceived within the cartographic and naval technologies of the time, whose 
possibilities would now be hostage to England's political and economic vicissitudes. 
As Cook began the return voyage its contours remained shadowy, its potential uses as 
yet unknown. (Ward, 1987: 163; Williams, 1988: 141-56; Carter, 1987: 1) 
This second part of the thesis continues to explore the themes raised in the previous 
chapters, tracing them now through their irruption into Australian political history. It 
analyses the construction of subjectivity, space and cultural life through the constitutive 
interactions between citizens, the Australian state and the larger world-interwoven by 
a leitmotiv that might be contained within the question, Who is Australia? Yet this study 
does not intend to provide a single, all-encompassing answer-instead, it aims at a 
genealogy of the question itself as a powerful genre of political discourse. In particular, 
it questions the terrible politics which has flowed from such a powerful and coercive 
construction of identity. By doing so, it demonstrates how the philosophical structure I 
outlined in 'Security and Government' provided the broad ontological underpinnings of 
the history to follow, with its obsessive search for security and certitude. The 
genealogy traces a reverse movement to that in the last chapter, from the geopolitical 
imagination already present as Australia is first colonised, to the gradual creation of an 
'Australian' subjectivity (at once individual, collective and juridical) which might 
conform to the indivisible body-politic of Hobbes' Leviathan. Of course, even as this 
process appeared to become more entrenched, after Federation or Gallipoli, it remained 
as much a political illusion deployed to strengthen the position of dominant societal 
forces and efface the social conflicts in which they were engaged. Indeed, the drive to 
1 Many writers have noted that Cook also disregarded explicit instructions from the King to only 
take possession of the country 'with the consent of the natives'. Glyndwr Williams makes the 
point that Cook had long since disregarded this section of the instructions, taking possession of 
New Zealand at Queen Charlotte Sound 'without reference to the inhabitants-unless the 
handing to an old man present at the ceremony of an empty wine bottle once the toasts had been 
drunk can be taken as evidence of negotiation.' {1988: 154) However it must be said that on 
Cook's return to England the King showed no desire to renounce the new possession. 
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imagine a unified Australian identity remains a potent locus of political conflict to this 
day; an aporia which cannot, to the chagrin of some, ever be closed off. 
A particularly strong theme is the development and refinement of a 'strategic 
imagination', which has been central to security's extension from a relation between 
state and citizen to a principle for the actions of the body-politic itself in the world of 
nations. This imagination is primarily spatial, but not exclusively so, becoming 
powerfully linked with temporal discourses of racial superiority, political 
enlightenment, or cultural and economic progress. With the fundamental objectives of 
security-political sameness, economic prosperity, and societal order-in mind, 
strategy implies an attitude toward space which seeks to make it more flexible, 
manipulable and productive. As I have suggested with Cook's voyage, the strategic 
imagination is not so much an entry into a pre-existing space as the production of a new 
one by a detailed political technology which seeks to make it meaningful as it orders 
and partitions it into the vehicle, effect and arena of an industrial, political and cultural 
economy. Through the mapping and traversal of this space by transport, its 
appropriation through sovereignty, its defence by acts and means of war, and its 
cultivation and exploitation by industry, agriculture and commerce, the strategic 
imagination thus seeks to engender economically and politically useful arrangements of 
bodies, communities and social institutions. In this sense its space is never static and 
unchanging, but itself has a history-changes in technology introduce changes in its 
extent and permeability, changes in political doctrine change its meaning, and in tum 
affect not only the economic and social possibilities of individuals but their psychic 
interiors. Its sites become written over with events, names, and narratives: assembled 
into a mythology which eventually becomes a nationalist (or shameful) history. Space 
becomes not merely an economic and political problem, but the anchor and contested 
site of our identity. Thus its representation is crucial: is this space threatening or safe, 
familar or alien, productive or necessary? What are its flows and boundaries? And 
above all, what is our capacity for action within its geopolitical and psychic contours? 
COLONISATION AND 
THE STRATEGIC IMAGINARY 
It would be over seventeen years before Europeans visited the southern continent again, 
this time as the advance guard of a thoroughgoing colonisation. The fleet of eleven 
vessels, led by Captain Arthur Phillip's Sirius, entered Botany Bay during the day and 
night of 19 January 1788 carrying 1030 people, 736 of them convicts. New South 
Wales was to be a gaol, and remained fundamentally so for over fifty years, within the 
strategic context of a larger imperial enterprise. The choice of Phillip, a naval officer, as 
the colony's first governor suggests as much, as do the military origins of his seven 
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successors to 1821. In short security-in the forms it then took in the British polity-
dictated the Pitt government's motives for the settlement, and provided an enabling 
philosophical rationale. The juridical illusion of sovereignty, seemingly made real by 
Cook's ceremony on Possession island in 1770, had made of it a space for the British 
general will; while the assumed backwardness, docility and sparseness of the 
continent's Aboriginal peoples, along with their juridical invisibility, conjured 
legitimacy for the colonisation. Similarly the British government's desire to rid their 
island of an entire criminal class, to cocoon their society behind an apartheid of sea and 
unfathomable distance, conformed to the liberal ontology of Hobbes, Locke and 
Bentham which posited a healthy Commonwealth upon the virulent other of the 
criminal, which could seemingly be excised from the social body like a cancer.2 
Whether it be in the figure of the non-economic savage or the morally debased, criminal 
poor, the Other was already a vast, enabling shadow across Australia's future. 
(Hughes, 1986: 2) 
More conventionally geopolitical considerations were also significant and, in 
particular, were to influence later decisions to establish settlements and extend British 
sovereignty to Norfolk Island, Port Phillip Bay, Van Diemen's Land and the western 
coast of New Holland. The extent to which strategic arguments influenced the original 
decision to settle Botany Bay is a matter of considerable controversy, with historians 
like Blainey and Alan Frost arguing that they were in fact paramount, while others-
such as Robert Hughes-arguing that 'New South Wales was too far out on the 
geopolitical periphery'. (1986: 66) Frost and Blainey argued that the decision to 
colonise Australia came as England-half bankrupted from war with France and 
seeking to increase its eastern trade after costly setbacks such as the loss of North 
America-sought to preclude French gains in India and the East while heading off any 
' French alliance with Holland, who held the East Indies and were the key to strategic 
power there and around the Cape. A settlement in New South Wales appealed because 
it would deny the coast to any other European power, and be in reach of the highly 
strategic materials (pine for masts and flax for sailcloth) which were believed to exist in 
abundance on Norfolk Island. In addition, argued Frost, 
2 Robert Hughes, in The Fatal Shore, makes of this a persuasive account of the social origins of 
transportation. He argues that within a context in which unemployment and poverty were 
growing, as the unforeseen effects of rapid industrialisation, a soaring birthrate and the growth 
of towns, 'the belief in a swelling wave of crime was one of the great social facts of Georgian 
England. It shaped the laws, and the colonisation of Australia was its partial result.' As one writer 
commented in 1854, this group 'constitutes a new estate, in utter estrangement from all the rest.' 
Hughes argues, however, that the existence of an organised criminal class was chimerical: 
'Crime was still a cottage industry, the jumble of individual acts of desperation. The failure of 
language-the tyranny of moral generalisation over social inspection-fed the ruling class's 
belief that it was threatened from below.' (1986: 167, 21) 
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[Pitt and his advisers] had the more general aim of creating a port which in 
wartime would be self-sufficient in food and naval stores, one to which the 
nation's shipping could retire to refresh and refit, and from which squadrons 
might sail to attack French, Dutch and Spanish bases and shipping. To these 
profound motives, that of the removal of the convicts from the realm was 
secondary-an accompaniment, but not a cause. (Frost, 1980: xv) 
There seems little doubt that strategic arguments were a factor-and indeed, Das Voltas 
Bay in southwest Africa had earlier been preferred for its strategic location astride the 
sea-route to the Far East-yet what Hughes takes issue with is Frost and Blainey's 
view that such considerations were paramount. Indeed Frost went further, seeking to 
make of it a tendentious argument about the meaning of Australia's origins: 'the rag and 
bone shop of Australia's beginning', he wrote, 'was perhaps not so foul as we have for 
so long supposed.' While tracing these early strategic perspectives is important for this 
study, I incline to Hughes' view that they were of significantly lesser importance than 
the evacuation of the disease-ridden prison hulks moored on the Thames and the 
southern ports of England. The huge numbers sentenced to transportation (more than 
160,000 over 80 years) and the vast administrative effort expended in maintaining the 
system stand against a bizarre argument that sees the strategic rationale as somehow 
making Australia's origins less abject, and would shoe-horn the events into a 
teleological narrative which demands the civilisation must begin with proud and noble 
ideals. (Frost, 1980: 135; Hughes, 1986) 
Nonetheless, strategic imperatives were present, and were a prophetic echo of later 
policy frameworks which seized upon the South Pacific, the East Indies and Asia as 
spaces essential to Australia's security. After moving the fleet to Port Jackson, Phillip 
wrote to Lord Sydney that 'We .. had the satisfaction of finding the finest harbour in the 
world, in which a thousand sail of the line may ride with the most perfect security'-
imagining perhaps the day when this harbour might be a strategic outpost for a British 
lake in the Pacific, and prefiguring a future in which the cove most adjacent to that they 
chose to settle, Woolloomooloo Bay, would become a key South Pacific port, 
sheltering the warships of Australia and her allies, most notably the United States. A 
few days earlier the fleet had encountered two vessels commanded by the French 
explorer La Perouse, which stung Phillip into dispatching an expedition to colonise 
Norfolk Island, directing the Sirius's second lieutenant Philip Gidley King to begin 
sowing crops and retting flax as soon as they were established there. However the 
strategic promise of Norfolk turned out to be a chimera: its pines, short-grained and 
lacking in resin, were no good for masts, and the production of sailcloth languished for 
want of trained flax-dressers and sufficient labour. After two decades as a cruel outpost 
of punishment, which rose to notorious heights of viciousnessness under King and his 
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successor Joseph Foveaux, it was abandoned in 1813. Yet even now the British strove 
to prevent claims by other European powers: they destroyed all vestiges of settlement 
and left behind a dozen dogs to tum into a hunting pack that might attack any visitor. 
(Hughes, 1986: 87, 120) 
Strategic imperatives also influenced both the timing of later decisions to colonise 
other parts of the continent, and the sites chosen. Bass Strait was discovered in 1797-8, 
and the decisions to establish settlements at Port Phillip Bay and Van Diemen's Land 
were motivated by a recognition of its strategic importance-the use of the passage took 
weeks off the voyage from Sydney to Portsmouth. In response to Mathew Flinders' 
encounter with two French ships near the present site of Adelaide in 1802, New South 
Wales' Governor King sent an appeal to London for a settlement at Port Phillip Bay. 
He had been alarmed when, after they put into Sydney, he was shown charts of the 
southern coast bearing French names-with the southern part of the mainland termed 
'Terre Napoleon'. Dismayed by the scandalous possibility of having to share the 
continent with Napoleon's France, King sent an armed schooner to shadow Baudin as 
he returned south, and immediately moved to put a settlement on the Derwent river in 
Van Diemen's Land. At the same time the British Government responded to King's 
request by sending a mission-including 308 convicts-to colonise Port Phillip Bay, 
which landed in October 1803. However they found the site-chosen more for its 
strategic importance than its proximity to supplies of fresh water-so inhospitable that 
the outpost was abandoned after a few months, and moved to Hobart. In doing so the 
Port Phillip commander Collins ignored King's request that they resettle on the north of 
Van Diemen's Land or on King Island. A settlement was eventually placed at the mouth 
of the Tamar river in 1804, from where it was hoped strategic control of the strait could 
be asserted. (Hughes, 1986: 120-3: Day, 1996: 45-6) 
The distant observer of this period is struck both by the aggressive colonial effort to 
name, control and utilise this new space, and its instability and intransigence: an 
'Australia' swaying unsteadily on the threshold of its realisation. In succession Norfolk 
Island, Port Phillip Bay, and Melville Island (in the Arafura Sea near Darwin)-all 
coveted for their strategic location and importance-were colonised and abandoned. 
Whatever their emotional significance as sites of ambition, cruelty and abject failure, 
they would be now forever contained within the spatial and juridical realm of the British 
Crown. In 1826 the Crown extended claim to the whole of New Holland and Van 
Diemen' s Land, and further settlements were made at Westernport in Victoria and 
Albany on the west coast, and in 1829 on the Swan River (now Perth). Albany in 
particular promised control of the southern sea-route around Australia to China. By this 
time NSW Governor Macquarie had begun addressing his dispatches to London under 
the name 'Australia', after it had appeared on Flinders' charts. This and the 1826 claim 
effectively extinguished the claims of any other European power to the continent, 
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building on the vast dispossession already taking place. While political federation was 
not to occur for another 75 years, a crucial enabling correspondence-between soil, 
sovereignty, and identity-had been achieved. (Day, 1996: 47) 
A now familiar image of the Other was also appearing, raising both physical and 
psychological challenges to the sense of 'self the new colonies were attempting to 
cultivate. In New South Wales, murderous conflict between whites and local tribes 
broke out soon after the initial settlement in 1788, and in September 1790 Phillip was 
himself speared through the shoulder during a confrontation. In response to the 
spearing of his gamekeeper by the famous warrior Pemulway in December, Phillip 
ordered the first punitive expedition of 40 marines, which was instructed to kill ten 
adult males and return with their heads to Sydney. The expedition failed, and 
Pemulway survived to conduct another ten years of guerilla warfare against the colony. 
It was in this context of rising armed conflict that local tribes were being decimated by 
smallpox, brought to the colony as a jar of variolous material for inoculations. David 
Day has argued that there is 'considerable circumstantial evidence to suggest that 
officers other than Phillip, or perhaps convicts and soldiers angered by Aboriginal 
attacks on their fellows, deliberately spread smallpox among the Aborigines.' (1996: 
61-5) 
Conflict with Aborigines lay at the centre of both the swift, sweeping juridical 
claims to various parts of the continent, and the slower effort to render the land 
productive (and therefore meaningful) within a European politico-economic ontology. 
Aborigines were murdered at Port Phillip Bay by Lt. John Murray's party which 
claimed the area for the British Crown in 1802, and armed confrontation-whether 
between organised groups of blacks and soldiers or police, or more haphazardly in 
countless instances of murder or revenge-would become a constant feature of colonial 
politics for the next hundred and thirty years, with devastating effect to the local 
cultures and populations.3 Thus the colony's first serious strategic threats, and its first 
attempts to assert a strategic control of space and economic resources, were made and 
encountered within the struggle for the nation's very interior-in a simultaneously 
material, economic and ontological sense. Aboriginal peoples could never be allowed to 
3 The interplay between the strategic imagination, Aboriginal resistance and European cultural 
identity was particularly visible in Van Diemen's Land. There, as the white population increased 
and agriculture spread inland from the banks of the Derwent and Tamar rivers, persistent conflict 
saw Aboriginal populations reduced from 8000 to 1000 in the two decades after 1800. Conflict 
escalated in the third decade, reaching a peak between 1827-31, when large military-style 
operations were mounted to capture and remove Aborigines from their lands. In 1828 Governor 
Sir George Arthur established a line of military posts to defend those areas already cleared of 
blacks and forbade them from entering. When this failed, he declared martial law, giving soldiers, 
settlers and convicts license to shoot and kill Aborigines found within the area. This was followed 
by the offer of rewards for captured adults and children, and at one point Arthur organised a 
moving line of 2200 people, stretched out in sight of one another across the island, in a futile 
attempt to capture the Aboriginals still at large. (Day, 1996: 99-105) Similar tactics (named this 
time the ''fence of legs") would be used by the Indonesian military in the late 1970s to gain control 
of East Timar. 
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inhabit (or disrupt) that interior, either in the form of the juridical and psychological 
unity of the state, its hold on the soil or its economic progress. The prophetic 
psychological image of the Other-as sub-human and threatening to securiry, no less-
was captured in colonial historian the Reverend John West's account of the colonial 
attitude to the Aborigines of Van Diemen's Land: 
Passing from censure to hatred, they speak of them as improvident, importunate, 
and intrusive; as rapacious and mischievous; then as treacherous and blood-
thirsty; finally as devils and beasts of prey. Their appearance is offensive, their 
proximity obstructive: their presence renders everything insecure. Thus the 
muskets of the soldier, and of the bandit, are equally useful; they clear the land of 
a detested incubus. (cited in Day, 1996: 101; emphasis added) 
EARLY PACIFIC FEARS 
As a juridical and physical boundary was established around Britain's Australian 
possessions, the strategic imagination was also gradually turned outwards, fuelled by 
religious, economic and ethnocentric imperatives. The Pacific islands were the first 
focus of attention. As before, 'Australian' interest was also driven by (the often 
groundless) fears of competition from other European powers. In 1840 the NSW 
parliament and press lauded the British decision to formally annex New Zealand4, even 
as they protested at being asked to finance the growing colony there. Also in 1839 there 
was premonition of both Australia's future involvement in British wars and a strategic 
involvement in Asia when NSW Governor Sir George Gipps urged the dispatch of 
three British ships, then at anchor in Sydney harbour, to China to protect the British 
Trade Superintendent. He argued that, in this case, Australia's interests lay with Britain 
as the 'power responsible for. .. Australia's security'. (Thompson, 1980: 13) 
Perhaps unsurprisingly France was seen as the primary threat to British-Australian 
interests in the Pacific at this time. The 1844 announcement of a French protectorate 
over Tahiti and the 1853 annexation of New Caledonia was bitterly resented by New 
South Wales, which viewed Tahiti, Fiji and the New Hebrides as being of great 
strategic importance due to the trade in sandalwood, beche-de-mer, pigs and later 
labour. After the annexation of New Caledonia The Sydney Morning Herald lamented 
that 'the opportunity of colonizing that fine group had been lost'. Imperial rivalry 
4 Roger Thompson cites the Sydney Morning Herald, The Gazette and the Monitor as journals 
which praised the colonisation of New Zealand while protesting the impost. Since 1832 NSW had 
paid the salary of the British Resident Commissioner, and calls for annexation were being made 
as early as 1830. Trade underpinned both the drive for annexation, and the ambivalence about 
its cost. In 1831 NZ-Australian commerce was worth £65,000, and by 1839 had 'boomed' to an 
annual value of £167,000. Yet its proportion of NSW's total trade had fallen from a high of 8% in 
1831 to only 5% in 1839. (1980: 13) 
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between Russia and Britain flowed into perceptions of insecurity, with an 1862 visit by 
a Russian naval contingent fuelling fears of a possible invasion. The construction of 
Fort Denison in Sydney Harbour in 1854 was publicly justified by the fear of Russian 
attack, although concerns over American and French activities in the South Pacific were 
probably uppermost. The first detailed analysis of Australia's strategic environment 
came in 1877 with the report by Sir William Jervois, a British military engineer who 
later became Governor of South Australia. While he discounted the possibility of major 
attack, he thought that danger came in the possibility of small scale naval raids from the 
French port of Saigon, or from Russian and American Pacific bases. Yet earlier others 
had argued that, as war could come to the colonies only as a result of the British 
connection, Australia should seek a neutral status similar to that Hanover had claimed 
between 1714 and 1857. (Millar, 1978: 57; Dupont, 1991: 2-3; Meaney, 1976: 15-16) 
During the 1870s colonial concern about British influence in the South Pacific led to 
the assertion of an 'Australasian Monroe Doctrine' for the South Pacific. It was aimed, 
like its North American namesake, at the exclusion of other powers from the area. 
Betraying an early obsession with certitude, a theme which dominates Australia's 
modem history, colonial leaders would settle for little less than full sovereignty-
annexation. According to Neville Meaney, 'by taking possession of the island groups 
which stretched in an arc from New Guinea in the North through the Solomons to the 
New Hebrides and, more distantly, Fiji and Samoa in the east they hoped to erect a 
natural barrier or 'rampart', as Hughes was later to call it, against potential enemies. 
(1976: 16) 
In 1874 they succeeded in convincing Britain to annex the Fijian islands, and the 
next year requested the annexation of New Guinea, with New South Wales also 
requesting the annexation of the New Hebrides and the Solomon, Marshall, Ellice and 
Gilbert Islands.5 In 1883 the Queensland Premier, with the support of New South 
Wales, Victoria and South Australia, announced his government was taking possession 
of the eastern half of New Guinea, on the strength of reports that German newspapers 
were urging its seizure. The British again refused to support the claim. In a settlement 
of 1886 Germany gained the Bismarck archipelago and the north Solomons, while 
Britain claimed the southern Solomons and the Ellice and Gilbert groups further east. In 
return for contributing to the expense of New Guinea's administration the colonies 
were given a shared role, which was exercised by Queensland until Federation. Over 
the next fifteen years the colonies also urged British to force the French from New 
5 Another proposal (rejected by Premier Sir James Martin) was that New South Wales itself 
should annex Fiji, to protect a trade worth as much as £150,000 in 1871 alone. As an example of 
the tenor of the 'Australasian Monroe Doctrine' thinking, The Age in 1869 argued that 'The 
manifest destiny of Australia, to employ an Americanism, is to colonise and subdue the islands 
of Melanesia ... since England can rule India, why should not Victoria make the experiment of 
trying to govern Fiji?' (Thompson, 1980: 25) 
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Caledonia and the New Hebrides, to take over German Samoa and the Philippines. 
Victorian Premier Sir George Turner asked his agent-general to press upon the British 
the importance 'on strategical grounds [that] the Philippine Islands should be in 
possession of friendly power; also, in interest of trade, being on route China and 
Japan.' The colonies were thus reassured by the US annexation of both the Philippines 
and Hawaii in 1898, and of Tutuila in Samoa in 1899. The enormous violence the 
Americans deployed, killing some 20,000 Filipinos, appeared to make no difference to 
them. (Meaney, 1976: 17-22; McQueen, 1991: 13) 
By the end of the century, then, a potent strategic theme in Australian history had 
been established: the south Pacific would perform the function of a secure passage to 
the Americas, a protective zone around the Australian north and east coasts, and an area 
of overwhelming Australasian cultural, economic and political influence. Strategic fears 
would reappear as the Japanese took control of the Philippines, the Solomon Islands 
and parts of New Guinea in 1941, and even more bizarrely during the late 1980s with 
scares about Soviet and Libyan influence in Vanuatu. (Ross, 1993) Presaging a time 
when Australia would be PNG's biggest aid donor and its corporations the largest 
investors, Australians opened up the Papuan inland, established the first missions and 
schools and, with the granting of independence in 1975, accelerated the incorporation 
of the area's myriad tribal peoples into a difficult (and in many ways deeply destructive) 
modernity. Overt paternalism receded in favour of a mutually reinforcing systemic 
determinism which asserted-to both 'Australian' and 'Papua New Guinean' 
subjects-that in this mode of socio-economic order lay the keys to the future. As they 
sought to meld ancient traditions and local allegiances into a national polity based on a 
Benthamite liberal ontology, Papua New Guineans would begin their own struggle 
with the aporias of security. 6 
FEDERATION, 
SEC UR I TY AND THE OTHER 
The aggressive assertion of Australian interest in the Pacific Islands, and its first 
(external) imperial acquisitions, saw Australian elites striving to influence a process in 
6 The problems involved in marrying a liberal political ontology with capitalist forms of 
development were dangerously visible by the early 1990s. Particular flashpoints were disputes 
between indigenous landowners and mining companies. The most intense conflict came on 
Bougainville in 1989, where a group of locals closed down the Panguna copper mine with their 
attacks, and then fought a guerilla war for secession with the PNG defence forces. This conflict, 
which in 1997 is still far from over, has seen the deaths of 10,000 Bougainvilleans on all sides, 
bitterly divided the Island's peoples, and placed enormous stress on the national budget through 
loss of mine revenues and the cost of military operations. (Roberts, 1996) In 1997 it also played 
out into the most serious threat to PNG's democracy since independence, when the armed 
forces head General Singirok threatened to force Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan's resignation 
over his government's recruitment of foreign mercenaries for use on Bougainville. (See Dorney, 
1990; May and Spriggs, 1990; Spriggs and Denoon 1991; May, 1995) 
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which the Pacific and Asia were being spatially constructed in ever more complex 
'geopolitical' terms. Added to shifting alignments and intensifying imperial 
competition, the process of modernisation was itself inducing anxiety: travel times fell 
rapidly as sail gave way to coal, and timber hulls to steel; the invention of the telegraph 
enabled faster communications; the increase in trade extended areas of interest and 
created new relationships; and the industrialisation of nations like Japan created new 
centres of power, military capabilities and claims to material progress and civilisational 
superiority which had hitherto been the preserve of the white nations of Europe. All of 
these developments and anxieties would find their way into the complex political 
currents flowing around Federation and into the Great War, and from there into a chain 
of events, policies and cultural memories extending well into the future. 
The strategic gaze outwards-at a space at once opportune and alien--crucially 
involved the emergence of an anxious political self-consciousness, in the terms of a 
highly complex (and often ironic) play of self and other. This could be seen in a more 
assertive foreign policy with Britain 7, the emergence of republicanism and nationalism, 
and complex debates about national identity in relation to the Empire, the British 
cultural and racial inheritance, political obligations to London, and the racial 
homogeneity of the colonial community. At the same time the growth and 
industrialisation of the economy, along with the import of radical ideas and the crises of 
the 1890s, would lead to increasingly bitter class conflict. While the adoption of an 
Australian constitution and the establishment of a Federal Parliament in 1901 would fix 
and solidify this process of self-imagination-particularly in juridical terms-many of 
its other features would remain highly contested. And with Aboriginal populations 
having fallen from as many as one and a half million in 1788 to sixty thousand by 
18888, and the violence of colonisation and removal still underway, a corrosive moral 
aporia was opening up in the very foundations of the Australian national identity-
which would be framed, in part, to continue and intensify these processes. 
7 Graham Berry, a Victorian politician and delegate to the 1881-83 colonial conferences, argued 
that it was at the time of New Guinea dispute that 'the idea of federation took a real and 
substantial hold upon the people-that the colonies began to understand that in order to speak 
with a united voice, which would be heard in Downing Street, in regard to what were then called 
'our foreign relations', it was necessary that we should have a central representative body.' 
(Meaney, 1976: 30) 
8 The figure of 60,000 is David Day's estimate; of the Aboriginal population in 1788 he writes that 
estimates 'vary from 300,000, which was the accepted figure for many years, to the more recent 
estimates of between 750,000 and 1,500,000. To suggest that, of this dramatic drop in 
population, only 20,000 were killed by Europeans seems to stretch credulity to its limits. A more 
reasonable, even conservative, 'guesstimate' would be a somewhat more than 50,000 
Aborigines killed during 150 years of sporadic conflict. This is taking the low estimate of ten 
Aborigines killed in retaliation for every white casualty. Such a figure would approach that of 
Australians killed in the first world war.' (1996: 130} Manning Clark (1981: 1) using estimates 
provided by F. Lancaster Jones in The Structure and Growth of Australia's Aboriginal Population, 
cites a figure of 67,000 in 1888. 
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An early catalyst was the presence of Chinese immigrants who had been coming to 
the New South Wales and Victorian goldfields since the late 1840s, and by the later 
presence of Japanese immigrants and labourers from the Pacific Islands. The 1854 
Eureka rebellion, perceived to have been fuelled by the presence of Americans with 
seditious republican values, had already alerted the colonial authorities to the threat to 
law and order from foreigners. Attention then focused on the Chinese, with the 1855 
report into the rebellion warning of 'an unpleasant possibility of the future, that a 
comparative handful of colonists could be buried in a countless throng of Chinamen.' 
Despite restrictions in Victoria and South Australia, by 1857 their numbers had reached 
35,000. Violent conflict in many goldfields (the most notorious being at Lambing Flat 
in 1860) was matched with increasing press and public hysteria. R. D. Lang's views 
were particularly revealing: fearful of unlimited migration and miscegenation he warned 
that, left unchecked, it 'could swamp the whole European community of these colonies' 
and 'obliterate every trace of British progress and civilisation.' By 1888, all the 
colonies had enacted laws to prevent further Chinese immigration. Speaking before the 
bill presented to the New South Wales Parliament in 1888, Premier Henry Parkes 
justified the action on the 'philosophical' grounds that it was 'our duty to preserve the 
type of the British nation, and that we ought not, for any consideration whatever, to 
admit any element that would detract from, or in any appreciable degree lower, that 
admirable type of nationality .. '. (Day, 1996: 149; Meaney, 1985: 100) 
Added to their status as immediate threats to the racial and cultural homogeneity of 
the colonial community, the Chinese were projected as presaging future strategic 
threats. These fears in tum played into the drive for federation, for which the search for 
national security was a fundamental imperative. Parkes, now commemorated on coins 
as the 'father of federation', begin his campaign for an Australian government with the 
1889 report on Australia's defence by British Major-General J. Bevan Edwards, which 
argued that an effective defence could only be ensured by 'a federation of the military 
forces of the colonies' and that, in the absence of political union, the colonies should 
pass a uniform defence act which would enable the use of each colony's forces in any 
other. (Meaney, 1976: 28) In Parkes' speeches it became clear he sought to found the 
new Australian political identity upon a symbiotic relation to an inferior, threatening and 
barbarous Other. In one he spoke of the threat posed by 'the countless millions of 
inferior members of the human family who are within easy sail of these shores', and at 
Wagga Wagga in April 1888 he warned of the menace of China, 'a barbarous power, 
which is so rapidly creating armies and a formidable navy, that it is sufficient all events 
to awaken the intelligent attention of reflecting men.' Perhaps there was irony in the 
logic which argued that although 'in some respects they are a superior set of people, 
and we know they belong to a nation of old and deep rooted civilisation', it was 'our 
first duty, the duty of the working man and capitalist, the duty of the illiterate and the 
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most cultivated, the duty, in fact, of all classes to preserve in these colonies the British 
type against all other nations .. .'. (9 April 1888, Collected in Meaney, 1985: 96-8) 
There was a sinister elegance to Parkes' rhetorical strategy, which sought to forge a 
unity among his audience through the effacement of class differences, in confrontation 
with the greater difference founded on race and culture. As a performance, the speech 
used the simultaneously totalising and individualising strategy Foucault has noted, and 
which I argue has been central to security as a mode and vector of power. In this case 
Parkes sought to advance the realisation of a psychological and juridical totality-an 
'Australian' state-by appealing to the most interior subjectivities of his listeners as 
individuals with larger fears, identities and obligations: 'I intend in the few words 
which I shall address to you this aftemoon ... to direct your attention to your relations as 
part of this great colony with the rest of the world ... to assist you to realise the position 
you occupy as citizens of a rapidly rising Empire (hear, hear).' (SMH, 9 April 1888) 
And if there were any doubts that these were strategic questions, they would be 
erased by his speech to the 1891 National Convention to lay down the basis of the new 
federal constitution: 
I think it is more than likely, more than probable, that forms of aggression will 
appear in these seas which are entirely new ... We have evidence abundant on all 
hands that the Chinese nation and other Asiatic nations ... are awakening to all the 
powers which their immense population gives them in the art of war, in the art of 
acquisition, and all the other arts known to European civilisation, and it seems to 
me ... that if we suffer in this direction at any time .. .it will be stealthily, so far as 
movements of this kind can be made stealthily, effecting a lodgement in some 
thinly-peopled portion of the country, where it would take immense loss of life 
and immense loss of wealth to dislodge the invader. (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 
105) 
This final comment elucidated a prophetic strategic paranoia that would echo through 
Australian history, almost always with Asian invaders in mind, and voiced an anxiety 
that the crucial correspondence between soil, sovereignty and identity-still in many 
ways under question-might be threatened. 9 Moreover the repetition of such fears-by 
9 Day traces this theme as a complement to the white Australia policy, in concern about white 
birth-rates during the 1890s, a drive for white immigration, and the post-WW1 push for 
industrialisation beneath the catchcry of 'Australia Unlimited'. For instance in 1925 the 
Australian-made Preference League hired a train to tour NSW country towns promoting 
Australian products, arguing that 'the path to self-reliance is along the track of secondary 
industries', which promised 'the shortest cut to national wealth and security.' The geographer 
Griffith Taylor was vilified when he maintained-against popular predictions of a possible 
population of up to 500 million-that Australia's soil and climate would not support more than 20 
million by the end of the century. (1996: 220, 253) See also William J. Lines, Taming The Great 
South Land, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991: 164-195. 
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cultivating a sense of urgency and silencing dissent by equating it with sedition-
helped legitimate the achievement of that correspondence through colonisation and 
dispossession. The statement also contained a view, persuasive in Australia until well 
after the second world war, that to decisively secure-and secure a claim to-the 
continent required its population and cultivation: that it become 'productive' in terms of 
a liberal economic ontology. 
The importance of strategic questions to federation was underlined also when, 
among the four principles adopted by the 1891 Convention was the objective that 'the 
military and naval defence of Australia shall be entrusted to federal forces under one 
command.' The draft constitutions drawn up at the 1891 convention and amended at the 
1897-8 convention included broad Commonwealth powers over 'external affairs', 
defence and 'the relation of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific' .1 o 
Neville Meaney argues that whilst diplomacy and defence were not at the centre of 
controversies surrounding the Constitution, it is important not to underestimate their 
significance: 'The issue of national security, unlike the problems of small versus large 
states and protection versus free trade, had been determined by a common experience 
and spoke to an assured consensus. There was thus little to discuss.' (1976: 34) 
But as true as it may have seemed, and as crucial as it no doubt was, this 'common 
experience' did not occur naturally, as the expression of some inevitable pre-existing 
unity. Rather it had to be imagined, spoken and entrenched, to be made the very 
vehicle-rather than the product-of that unity. Alfred Deakin's speech to the 
Australian Natives Association in March 1898, when the Victorian Parliament was 
wavering, makes this startlingly clear: 
Let us recognise that we live in an unstable era, and that if we fail in the hour of 
crisis we may never be able to recall our lost national opportunities. At no period 
during the first hundred years has the situation of the great Empire to which we 
belong been more serious. From the far east and the far west alike we behold 
menaces and contagion ... Happily your voice is for immediate and absolute 
union. (Collected in Meaney, 1976: 34) 
The invocation of an unproblematic 'we' in such texts activated both a political appeal 
and effaced a profound anxiety: about the security of both an Australian sense of self, 
and how the nation might develop as a form of political and economic order. Aware 
10 Meaney comments that under "external affairs' the Australian founding fathers claimed 
powers for which there were no precedents in imperial constitutional history', and that the Pacific 
clause was 'a direct expression of the Australia's anxiety for security in its own geographical 
sphere' and 'derived directly from the colonies diplomatic struggles with the British government 
in the 1870s and 1880s.' (1976: 34) 
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there was no 'assured consensus' it assumes a subject that, in many crucial ways, had 
yet to come into being. 
At this time visions of white Australian identity were divided between loyalties to 
Britain and the more aggressive republican stances of The Bulletin and other radical 
journals, and complicated by intensifying class conflict. Rhetorics of national and racial 
identity were less attempts to resolve such conflicts than exercises in mastery, not only 
of Whites over Asians, Islanders or Aborigines, but of Capital over Labour, and white 
labour over coloured. Already in 1885 Henry Parkes, an avowed servant of the Crown, 
believed there were limits to patriotism: in a letter to the Sydney Morning Herald he 
opposed NSW Premier William Dalley's decision to send 750 men to help restore 
British authority in the Sudan. The logic Parkes employed revealed both the emerging 
complexities in nationalist rhetorics, and their common ground. He made no quarrel 
with British motives, which were to 'establish a government of purity and order out of 
elements or corruption and disorder, and then to retire from the soil of Egypt.' Rather, 
he argued, white Australians had more urgent tasks: 
I assert that there can be no greater folly than to foster a spurious spirit of military 
ardour in a country like ours, where every man is wanted to take his part, in some 
form or other, in colonising work .... with the right hand we are expending our 
revenues to import able-bodied men to subjugate the soil, while with the left hand 
we propose to squander our revenues to deport men to subjugate Sir Edward 
Strickland's 'saracens'. (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 77; emphasis added) 
It seems that in the 'sad task' of subjugation-whether of nature or the other-there 
were harsh choices to be made. But they were not to be made, whether in the Sudan, 
South Africa, or in the even more terrible wars to come; and Parkes' words, however 
impoverished, would echo through the debates over Australia's role in future conflicts. 
Later-and presaging the mythology built around the slaughter at Gallipoli-he argued 
that in the Sudan 'our Australian heroes will have little chance of distinguishing 
themselves on the field of battle', and he closed the letter by saying that 'if a time 
should come when England shall be engaged in a great conflict with a Great Power, 
even then .. our first duty will be to hold inviolate the part of the Empire where our lot is 
cast; and, this sacred trust secured, to give life and fortune freely, if we have them to 
spare, beyond our own shores.' (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 78) 
Already, as Parkes asserted the gathering unity of an Australian subject against 
Dalley's compliant response to the tug on the crimson thread11, there was both the 
11 The reference here is to a phrase Parkes himself used in his address to the 1890 Federal 
Conference, in which he sought to reconcile a gathering Australian nationalism with the British 
tie. White Australians formed a unity on the basis of their British origins, he argued: 'The crimson 
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appearance of ambiguity and opening, and a swift move to shut it off. There would be a 
time, Parkes suggested, when both could be reconciled-when the recalcitrant 
Aboriginal nature of the continent had been subdued, and the civilisation had more 
effectively secured its physical basis, its juridical unity and its ontological stability. 
Edmund Barton, himself a firm proponent of an Australian federation, certainly 
believed that that time had come sooner rather than later. As debate raged over the 
question of committing colonial troops to the war against the Boers in 1899, Barton 
argued for an expedition on the basis of an irreducible colonial immersion in the 
imperial body-politic: 
.. we have arrived at a point when British territory has been invaded, when the 
empire is at war ... We are part of that empire ... and for my part, as long as we are 
a part of that empire, when our empire is at war with any other power 
whatsoever, it becomes our turn to declare the motto, 'The empire, right or 
wrong.' (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 117) 
That this language was being deployed as a political 'double-bind'-which sought to 
dissolve opposition through the blackmail that merged subject with meta-subject-was 
unmistakable in his reply to Griffith's retort that he could agree if only 'the empire were 
in danger, certainly!' Barton snapped back: 'Is it for any one citizen to decide? No it is 
for the empire itself to decide, and the empire having decided that it is sufficiently in 
danger. .it is a decision, I think, which we should respect and follow . .'. Perhaps 
predictably his final appeal was to a shared embodiment-blood: 'the wisdom and the 
intelligence of the Imperial Government and Parliament may be relied upon by those of 
the same blood who belong to the same race.' (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 118) 
Such tensions were in tum complicated by more radical strands of nationalism, in 
which opposition to Britain was more uncompromising. The Bulletin 12 of the mid-
1890s, for instance, favoured a united Australia with a republican government, the 
abolition of titles, and attacked the brutalities of British rule in Ireland. For a time it 
also-most alarmingly for liberals-advocated the abolition of private ownership of 
land and a democracy based on universal suffrage and the direct election of Ministers 
thread of kinship runs through us all... We know we represent a race ... for the purpose of settling 
colonies, which never had its equal on the face of the earth.' (cited in Clark, 1981 : 32) 
12 The Bulletin, established by J. F. Archibald in 1880, holds a special place in Australia's 
political and cultural history-mouthpiece of a complex range of radical and nationalist views, 
traversed by racism and anti-semitism, publisher of the stories and journalism of Henry Lawson, 
and for many years a lively counterpoint to the official journalism of the Sydney Morning Herald, 
the Age and Argus. Its masthead still exists, although in the 1990s it has been transformed into 
a conservative journal of politics and business, published by Australian Consolidated Press, 
owned by Kerry Packer, Australia's richest man. For discussions of its role and journalism see 
John Docker (1991), The Nervous Nineties, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, and Sylvia 
Lawson (1983) The Archibald Paradox, Melbourne: Allen Lane. 
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by Parliament. An editorial from April 1895 contained an extraordinary attack on 
British imperial hubris which would be integral to imagining a very different 
nationalism to that of Parkes, Barton or Deakin: 
The British character has many inestimiable sides, and many that are odious. The 
side that has been turned to Australia is an incarnation of calculating selfishness. 
The modem John Bull regards the world as his oyster. .. he truckles to the strong 
and bullies the weak; sends Ambassadors to Russia and armies to Egypt; 
everywhere grasping all and giving nothing in retum ... His idea of an ally is 
somebody to squeeze; of an enemy, somebody who refuses to be squeezed ... We 
owe him convicts, institutions, and some 400 millions sterling-as much as he 
can squeeze per cent. When Australians began to show resentment at being 
squeezed,· except indirectly, he sheared off, and is now busy squeezing South 
Africa with the aid of his Christian principles and the MAXIM gun ... (cited in 
Docker, 1991: 35) 
Yet the crimson thread of kinship, while tom now from the political blackmail of 
imperial federation, would still remain powerful, and the racist appeal to blood identity 
a significant area of common ground. The Bulletin also wanted an 'Australia for the 
Australians-the cheap Chinaman, the cheap nigger, and the cheap European pauper to 
be absolutely excluded,' and anti-British attitudes were motivated often by fears that 
Australia might be forced to accept coloured immigrants from England's 'nigger 
empire', which were opposed both because of concern about cheap labour and a deeper 
revulsion based on physical and cultural difference. (Docker, 1991: 34; McQueen, 
1978: 36) 
Also emerging, in the Bulletin and in the rhetoric of Labor leaders, were self-
conscious borrowings from the European Enlightenment and their convergence with an 
Australian nationalism. As John Docker has demonstrated, the Bulletin's view that the 
movement of history was bringing a new spirit of rationality and logic to culture fed 
and reposed upon an older racism in which the 'Chinaman' was 'a barbarous, medieval 
sort .of person', frozen in his own culture's middle ages. In a close paraphrase 
Docker13 suggests 'that is why a forward-looking, liberal society like the Australian 
promises to be, a society that is progressive, democratic, secular, reasoning, has to 
exclude other races like the Chinese or Japanese.' ( 1991: 40) In a similar vein the 1905 
Federal Labor Conference voted for a resolution that urged 'the cultivation of an 
13 To balance the picture, Docker emphasised that Enlightenment sentiment also drove a fierce 
Bulletin opposition to capital punishment, its criticism of church conservatism and missionary 
zeal, its push for greater democracy-whether in the election of politicians, JP's or judges-and 
its critique of British imperialism. (1991: 41-45) 
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Australian sentiment, based upon the maintenance of racial purity and the development 
in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community.'14 Perhaps one of the 
clearest notes was sounded by Sir Charles Kingston-a conservative-on the occasion 
of the adoption of the final draft of the Constitution in March 1898. He declared it 
would be 'the most magnificent constitution into which the chosen representatives of a 
free and enlightened people have ever breathed the life of popular sentiment and 
national hope.' (Clark, 1981: 263, 155) 
The broad ontological accord between Capital and Labour-around a vision of 
secular possibility, blood identity and racialised strategic fear-both masked and played 
into a bitter economic and political struggle with far-reaching historic effects. In this 
context historians have located the formation of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), the 
development of an early defence and foreign policy and the establishment of the 
institutions of the Commonwealth and the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission-
with the continuing destruction of Aboriginal tribes and the gathering geopolitical storm 
in Europe as a dark backdrop. 
The rapid development of the Australian economy in the last two decades of the 
19th century, much of it with borrowed British capital, was accompanied by increasing 
worker unrest. In 1888 Parkes had repressed striking coalminers and wharfies at 
Newcastle with troops, while in August 1890 huge crowds turned out in Sydney and 
Melbourne to offer support for maritime workers striking in defence of their right to be 
represented by trade unions. Strikes had also broken out among shearers, and in the 
mines at Broken Hill, Illawarra and Kalgoorlie. In Victoria the government swore in 
thousands of special constables and deployed mounted police to disperse gas workers; 
in Sydney troops and police were used to clear crowds attempting to prevent the 
loading of wool onto ships by volunteer labour. At the same time the credit squeeze of 
1890 had brought great hardships: public works ceased and unemployment leapt to 
unprecedented levels. Shearers again struck across Queensland in 1891 against 
pastoralists' demands for freedom of contract. Parkes thought these upheavals-which 
came close to the capitalist nightmare of a general strike-had shaken 'the whole fabric 
of commercial industry'; as Manning Clark saw it, 'Bourgeois society was like a city 
feeling the first effects of an earth tremor and fearful that the tremor might erupt into a 
destructive quake.' (1981: 44-85) 
Clark argues that the Constitution-and the series of federal institutions that 
accompanied it-were specifically designed to thwart the possibility of social 
14 The conference also debated a resolution regarding the role of the state in the battle between 
Capital and Labour. The Queensland and Victorian delegates pressed for a socialist declaration, 
with one Victorian urging the conference to affirm that Labor would seek 'to obtain control of all 
the means of production, distribution and exchange.' However the moderates prevailed, with the 
second part of the resolution being the 'securing of the full results of their industry to all 
producers by the collective ownership of monopolies, and the extension of the industrial and 
economic functions of the state and municipality.' (Clark, 1981: 263) 
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revolution. The more nuanced liberal problematic of 'government' was crucial here. 
While the political allegiance of the middle classes through their ownership of property 
and their partnership in prosperity was assured, that of workers and their movement 
was not. While some conservatives felt they had no need to make any compromise with 
Labour, liberals like Deakin and Reid saw that acceding to limited labour demands15 
could split the moderates from the radicals: 'Liberalism in politics could rob labour of 
its revolutionary fervour, and rid the bourgeoisie of the charge that they were 
indifferent to the well-being of the masses. Though a free trader by conviction [Reid] 
was not opposed to the use of the state to protect the weak, and to effect conciliation in 
disputes between Capital and Labour.' Likewise, Deakin 'advocated the use of the state 
to ensure that the base of the social pyramid was not composed of men and women 
who had no ties to the existing social order.' (Clark, 1981: 76-7) 
These concerns underpinned the desire of the founding fathers for a constitution 
which, while allowing for popular election to the lower house would also ensure a 
conservative upper house and, by dividing power between the Federal government and 
several Colonial parliaments, would 'prevent any radical change in the ownership or 
distribution of property by constitutional means': 
They were men who were looking for political institutions which could handle 
strikes, lockouts, industrial anarchy, commercial depression with more facility, 
indeed agility, than six or seven colonial governments or parliaments. They were 
looking for political institutions that would solve the dilemma of the bourgeoisie: 
how to reconcile a colonial political democracy, with its approximation to political 
equality, with the survival of the institutions of private property and of the profit 
incentive. They were men who were reaching for what their political teachers, 
Alexander Hamilton, Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill, had fussed over 
during their lifetime-how to preserve what they understood by the liberty of the 
individual in a society with what de Tocqueville had harshly labelled as the 
'depraved taste' of the masses for equality. (Clark, 1981: 67) 
It was in this context that the liberal problematic of 'government'-and thus of 
security-was developing, at a crucial period in the construction of a unified Australian 
sense of self and the effort to place firm imaginative and juridical limits around it. The 
drive to imagine an Australian body-politic here converged with the problem of 
15 Political labour, for reas·ons both of personal belief and political strategy, was close to the 
liberal problematic. Not wishing to frighten off voters, moderate Labor men like Frank Cotton 
(Electoral Labor Leagues candidate for East Sydney in 1891) declared they were committed to 'a 
slow process of evolution' with the aim of 'a juster distribution of wealth in the colony' through 
labour legislation, political democracy, and a willingness 'to leave wealth in the hands of people 
who made it'. (Clark, 1981: 78) 
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'liberating' a political and economic modernity while controlling its social energies-the 
radical forms of dissent which threatened both the existing and potential social order. In 
this, the search for less coercive forms of governmental reason by liberals like Deakin 
and Barton combined with a strategic imagination of geopolitical space which could 
bear on the most interior fears and desires of individuals and play into a more general 
management of the socio-economic totality. Thus the strategic fears and imperial 
ambitions that drove Federation cannot be divorced from the class conflict of the 1890s. 
Although some in the Labour movement scoffed at invasion fears16, and could see 
that the constitution was weighted against them, others like Hughes or O'Sullivan were 
willing to accept it because it promised a defence guarantee and the means to 
consolidate a white Australia. (McQueen, 1978: 31) Factories Acts (passed by NSW in 
and Victoria in 1896) and a Conciliation and Arbitration Act (in NSW) were other key 
planks in moderating potentially explosive class conflict. While there was broad 
agreement between laborites, liberals and conservatives· on the establishment of a 
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Court, the actual passage of the Bill was drawn out 
and bitter. Radicals understood how the politics of federation-monopolised by the 
conservative colonial premiers and barely democratic-had been used to muzzle 
organised labour.17 Further, racism and strategic paranoia had been used to buy the 
acquiescence of some of their leaders. As Clark so ascerbically observed, for the ruling 
classes the new federal constitution would act as 'a fortress both against the enemy 
without and the enemy within'. (1981: 240-256, 68) 
The ghost of the long dead Hegel was present at the ceremony in Sydney's 
Centennial Park to inaugurate an Australian Commonwealth on 1 January 1901. It's 
slogan, coined by Parkes and displayed on a large banner draped across a car carrying 
his bust, was: 'One People, One Destiny'. An Australian subject, contained within the 
protective juridical and strategic armature of the British Crown, had now been imagined 
as a totalising 'governmental' principle with an inexorable forward progress. The 
ceremony, attended by thousands and marked by a festival atmosphere, gave visible 
semiotic form to the new nation, which might otherwise have remained an abstract 
16 Hank Morgan wrote in the Hummer(Wagga) of 19 March 1892 that the workers of Australia 
should not 'take any heed of appeals to their patriotism. If an enemy should invade our shores, 
we have a brilliant chance. Let us say to the capitalists: "This is not our country at present; you 
own it nearly all in times of peace, so you can fight for it now-we wont." GO ON STRIKE BOYS! 
Make terms; it wouldn't take long. Demand nationalisation of the land, coalmines, and all 
minerals, and machinery; the only compensation would be our assistance to fight for their 
retention.' (cited in Clark, 1975: 496) Notwithstanding such views, the first planks of the Federal 
Labor Party included white Australia and a citizens army. 
17 While the June 1899 referendums on the Constitution were 'formalities' in Victoria, South 
Australia and Victoria, in NSW the vote was 107 ,420 for and 82, 7 41 against, and in Queensland 
it was particularly close: 38,488 Yes and 30,996 No. 'In no colony,' writes Clark, 'did more than 
46.63% of qualified voters cast a vote.' Clark also cites a bitter editorial in the Tocsin of 10 
January 1901 which attacked federation as 'the high priest of Mammon ... [it] had given new life to 
a patrician caste, to nobility and to royalty. Federation would foster militarism. Federation under 
the Crown was the price Australians paid for belonging to 'a piebald empire'.' (1981: 167, 183) 
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juridical idea. Perhaps ironically, it also displayed the limits to its new identity. A literal 
parade of signs through Sydney's streets-bushmen, shearers, miners, imperial troops 
just returned from South Africa-showed 'Australians' who they now were. At 
Centennial Park they listened as an official read the Queen's proclamation and swore in 
the Earl of Hopetoun, an Englishman, as the first Governor-General. The Catholic 
Cardinal Moran was not present; nor were any representatives of the true owners of the 
land on which this performance took place. As if to underline the intensifying 
ontological correspondence of soil, sovereignty and identity, many remarked that it was 
'the first time in the history of the world ... that the boundaries of a nation-state had 
coincided with those of a whole continent.' (Ward, 1977: 12) A pivotal image of the 
Other was cemented into the foundations of the Australian identity with the passage of 
the Immigration Restriction Act later that year, and the 'dialectical' movement of 
overcoming symbolised in the continuing task of colonisation: the long war to seize the 
land from its original peoples. Deakin argued that in the securing of a White Australia 
'the national manhood', the 'national character' and the 'national future' were at stake. 
Addressing another issue close to the labour movement's heart, the Pacific Islands 
Labourers Act was passed by Barton's government, banning the entry of black 
labourers after March 1904 and providing for their deportation after December 1906. 
(Clark, 1981: 177-180, 201) 
In a premonition of another ~rucial element of the Australian identity-its blooding 
through sacrifice in war-the new Commonwealth took over the recruitment and 
dispatch of Australian troops for South Africa, and in February 1902 Barton farewelled 
the first federal contingent to sail from Circular Quay to fight the Boers.18 The 
occasion was not lost on him: for the first time it was Australia-rather than any one 
state or colony-that was going to war. Australia did not stand for militarism, he told 
the troops, but truth and justice. Once there, they encountered an enemy that fought 
with guerilla-style tactics, which the British countered with techniques that would 
reappear sixty years later in south Vietnam: massacring prisoners of war, burning 
villages and herding the survivors into concentration camps where they died at eighteen 
times the rate in New South Wales. 'Civilisation,' lamented Clark famously, 'was 
perhaps only a thin veneer over savagery'. (1981: 213, 196) 
The Constitution specifically failed to recognise the continent's Aboriginal peoples, 
who by 1900 numbered only sixty thousand. This was perhaps unsurprising, given its 
origins in a thoroughly racist liberal ontology and, more specifically, in Benthamite 
utilitarianism, along with the general white belief that the Aborigines were dying away 
in the face of a more aggressive and superior form of civilisation. Section 127, later 
repealed, seemed to confirm this, providing for the exclusion of Aborigines from any 
18 In total 16,632 Australians served in the British contingent, and took 1400 casualties 
including 518 deaths. (Bean, 1948: 12) 
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census of the population. Clarifying Section 41, the 1902 Commonwealth Electoral Act 
excluded Aborigines from voting in federal elections, as they had previously been 
excluded from voting at elections in the colonies.19 At the same time, in a precedent for 
which Australia has been praised, suffrage was granted by the masculine state to white 
women, not without some resistance from conservatives such Sir Edward Braddon.20 
Labor leader Chris Watson argued that he did not want to see the 'savages and slaves' 
in the north and west of the country able to run the electorates covering their territories, 
and King O'Malley declared there was no scientific evidence to link the Aborigines with 
humanity. (LaNauze, 1972: 326; Clark, 1981: 217-8) 
Thus under the terms of a profound juridical fiction, the continent's indigenous 
peoples did-not exist, even as the states retained their power to make laws concerning 
them. Lacking status as citizens-for some even as humans-they bore the mark of 
negative subjects, even as their land, bodies and struggle were utterly bound up with 
the myriad historical processes that had made an allegedly 'whole' Australian subject 
possible. Objects of a power which would be used over, against and through them, but 
never by them: a complex and terrible in-visibility. Drawing out the Hegelian structure 
of the new national imaginary, I would suggest that indigenous peoples-among many 
others-were the 'negative' moment which the upward 'Australian' movement of Spirit 
would overcome, subsume and negate. An antipodean Idea of self, of progress, of the 
future itself, here-as elsewhere throughout the New World-pivoted on ethnocide. 
IDENTITY, GEOPOLITICS 
AND 'THE ANZAC TRADITION' 
Parallelling the bitter parliamentary debates over the terms of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act and the efforts to cement the white Australia policy, were debates over 
an Australian foreign and defence policy, and the evolving geopolitical space in which 
the new nation would seek its 'security'. While Australian foreign policy (and formal 
diplomatic representation) was still formally subordinated to London, and its naval 
19 Hugh Collins (1985) makes a detailed argument that the historically dominant legal structures 
and political ideologies in Australia derive from a Benthamite utilitarianism, which privileges the 
rational calculation of majority interests over a differing enlightenment tradition of natural rights. 
In terms of the Constitution-which contains no reference to rights-this insight is profound; this 
state of affairs has, arguably, impeded crucial legal and political reforms in the area of human 
rights over the past three decades. As discourses of universal human rights or Aboriginal land 
rights have found their way into Australian politics, they have both troubled basic legal 
categories and foundered on them. It is notable that legal recognition for Aborigines in the Mabo 
decision centred not on rights but on land title, and its codification into legislation followed a 
thoroughly utilitarian trade-off of competing 'interests'. 
20 Reproducing the classic gender division between public and private Braddon declared that 
'women belonged in the home and not on the hustings.' The Electoral Act decreed that no 
Aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or the Pacific islands should have their name placed 
on the electoral roll. This clause was repealed by referendum in 1967. {Clark, 1981: 217-8) 
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defence guaranteed by the Royal Navy, the Barton government took the view that they 
could press the British on Australian 'interests' in the Pacific and carry out negotiations 
with foreign powers; in short, the British should 'make the Australasian view the basis 
of imperial policy in the region.' Australia sought to take over the administration of 
British New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and complained to Germany about 
discrimination in the Marianas and Carolinas against the trading firm Bums Philp. 
Under pressure from missionaries, settlers and traders in competition with the French 
New Hebrides Company Australia also sought-and failed-to persuade Britain to 
annex the islands. (Meaney, 1976: 91-107) 
Early defence debates were strongly polarised. While some saw threats from 
powers as diverse as Russia, Japan and France, others felt secure in the embrace of the 
Royal Navy and resisted calls for higher levels of defence spending. The first defence 
bill failed in deadlock,21 and in 1902 Parliament forced the government to cut back the 
defence estimates, reducing Australian land forces from 29,550 to 25,000 by 1903. 
The Defence Act was only passed in 1904 with a clause relating to overseas service 
having been excised. Henry Bournes Higgins opposed the formation of an 
expeditionary force, saying that: 'We do not want our men to join in an opium war. We 
do not want our men to be dragged into a war that may be against their conscience.' 
Earlier he had criticised the dispatch of troops to South Africa, and in 1901 had 
warned-like the Tocsin of a few years earlier-against establishing 'a military system 
in grotesque imitation of the military system on the continent of Europe ... We must 
keep this country from the ghastly bane of militarism.' In 1902 the Australian military 
commander W. B. Hutton-in a prescient echo of future Australian policy-pressed 
for a 30,000 strong garrison and a field force (which could be deployed overseas) 
because the Indian Ocean, the Northern Pacific and the China Sea would become 'the 
probable scene of the future struggle for commercial supremacy.' If so, Australia 
would have not only to 'defend her own soil' but 'take steps also to defend those vast 
interests beyond her shores upon the maintainance of which her present existence and 
her future prosperity must so largely depend.' (Meaney, 1976: 43-68; 1985: 130-1) 
Despite the reassurance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed in 1902, a steadily 
industrialising Japan quickly became the locus of Australian strategic fears. With Japan 
in mind the Labor leader J. C. Watson said in 1903 that 'the feasibility of an invasion is 
21 Problems had arisen over the creation of an imperial reserve and the circumstances under 
which it might serve overseas (which the government had sought to 'protect Australian interests 
in the South Pacific', and which the Labor party strongly opposed) and over the 'undemocratic' 
organisation of the army. Australian military commander Major-General Hutton supported the 
imperial reserve idea arguing that Australia's 'common frontiers' with Germany and Holland in 
New Guinea, and France's control of New Caledonia, placed it in 'a perilous position'. If the South 
Pacific Monroe Doctrine was to be realised the house would have to accept the proposals for 
troops to serve overseas. At the 1902 Colonial Conference the British sought to have such a 
force available to them in the event of European conflicts. Barton opposed them, asserting that 
it sounded like 'taxation without representation.' (Meaney, 1976: 57-68) 
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such that we ought to make adequate provision to repel it', that Australian troop 
numbers were 'preposterously low' and that he was willing to vote £500,000 for the 
purchase of 100,000 rifles. Another member, T.T. Ewing, who in 1907 became 
Defence Minister, spoke in 1903 of the possibility that, having taken 'a few more steps 
up the ladder of civilization', the White Australia Policy might provoke Asian peoples 
to seek 'revenge'. He thought it inevitable that between 'the white and the yellow man 
there is racial hatred ... They are destined to be enemies for all time.' While there was no 
imminent danger, the next generation would experience the 'greatest storm which the 
world has ever seen when the white man eventually in these latitudes faces the yellow 
man in deadly war'. (Collected in Meaney, 1976: 52) 
Japan's crushing 1905 defeat of the Russian Navy in the Tsushima straits aroused 
even greater anxieties. Not wanting to seek increased defence expenditures nor raise the 
divisive issue of compulsory training, Deakin urged that harbour defences be attended 
to and suggested that Australia develop its own navy to protect its coasts and trade. 
Also, fearing invasion, he argued that it was 'the duty of able bodied men to fit 
themselves for defence work.' Fear of Japan had widespread parliamentary and public 
purchase, as shown by the establishment of the National Defence League and the 
Immigration League in 1905; such fears were not mollified by the renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in August of that year. Race, strategy and the anxious claim of 
whites to the continent merged in the thoughts of Joseph Page, who argued 'Australia 
is now coveted by the overcrowded races of the east,' and that Japan was 'equal to any 
white race on sea or land, and a very few years may make the Chinese the same.' 
(Meaney, 1976: 124) 
Others scoffed at invasion fears. Joseph Cook, now a conservative free trader, 
thought that 'the balance of power is so even among the nations that none of them could 
afford to send a marauding army' and that even Japan was fully occupied with nations 
closer to it. (Meaney, 1976: 52) And King O'Malley, the American-born Labor member 
from Tasmania, brought a sorely-needed wit to the issue: 
Really I must confess that for thirty years I heard the same cry in the United 
States. 'We are going to have an invasion.' When I lived in Mexico, I heard the 
same cry that I hear now in Australia, 'Somebody is going to invade us. We 
cannot tell which nation it is, but surely some nation is coming.' Ever since I 
have been in Australia .. .! have heard the same cry of 'an invasion', but the only 
invasions that I ever read of are invasions of rabbits. (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 
12) 
The anxious linkage between the Australian identity, Aboriginal dispossession and fear 
of Asia was made clear in March 1913, as the foundation stone of Canberra-the new 
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national capital-was being laid. The problem, once again, was the security of the 
correspondence between sovereignty, soil and identity: the security of the national 
subject itself. While O'Malley spoke of his belief that 'according to the divine plans and 
specifications, God commanded the English-speaking people to secure control of, and 
constitutionally govern, the earth in the interests of civilisation', Billy Hughes added: 
We were destined to have our own way from the beginning and America-two 
nations that have always had their way, for they killed everybody to get it. I 
declare to you that in no other way shall we be able to come to our own except by 
preparing to hold that which we have now ... The people are incapable of 
nourishing abstract ideals. They must have a symbol. Here we have a symbol of 
nationality ... The first historic event in the history of the Commonwealth we are 
engaged in today without the slightest trace of that race we have banished from 
the face of the earth.22 We must not be too proud lest we should, too, in time 
disappear. (Meaney, 1976: 241; emphasis added) 
Prophetic concerns about maritime security were raised in a 1907 analysis by Director 
of Naval Forces Captain W.R. Creswell, which coincided with heightened concern 
about Japan and the efforts of the Australian government, against Admiralty wishes, to 
establish a separate Australian navy. He concluded that 'uninterrupted sea 
communication is a sine qua non ... Australia, whenever her coast routes are closed, 
must stop work.' The isolation which may have protected Australia from attack was 
'rapidly diminishing' with the development of coaling stations and the growth of 
foreign navies. He feared future collusion between Japan or China and a European 
power: 'The very immensity of our lands opens up the chances of co-operation. 
German, Jap, and Chinese colonies could be carved out of the North and West of 
Australia ... ' (cited in Dupont, 1991: 14) 
Australian resentments about the British refusal to listen to its Pacific and Japanese 
concerns drove Deakin's invitation for Roosevelt's 'Great White Fleet' to visit Sydney 
harbour in 1908 on its Pacific voyage. The next year Deakin proposed a formal 
extension of the Monroe doctrine to the Pacific, which was again resisted by Britain. 
Anxieties persisted through the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911, and 
fed considerable friction in the early years of the decade, as the Admiralty sought to 
meet a German naval buildup in the North Sea by backing away from its Pacific 
22 The traditional landowners of the Canberra region are the Ngunnawal people, who like the 
myriad other Aboriginal tribes of inland New South Wales fought police and squatters during the 
19th century, endured dispossession and the insidious policies of assimilation. In the 1990s 
they initiated a native title claim over vacant crown lands in the ACT region and were also 
recognised-in one of the more perversely ironic political gestures of our times-with the name 
of a new suburb in the new residential district of Gungahlin. 
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commitments and entrusting the Far East to Japan. These ironies came to the fore 
during the Great War, when the presence of a German naval squadron in the Pacific 
saw Britain ask the Japanese navy to occupy the German North Pacific territories and 
patrol the waters of the Dutch East Indies. As well as having responsibility for 
Australian sealane security, the Japanese navy also provided escort for Anzacs to 
Gallipoli. (McQueen, 1991: 27) Having always been suspicious of Germany's Pacific 
presence, the Australian government leapt at the chance to occupy its bases in New 
Guinea and phosphate-rich Nauru. In August 1914 Australian forces took Rabaul, and 
by 17 September had obtained a German surrender of all its possessions North and 
South of the equator. However these sweeping claims were bitter fruit for Australia 
which was forced to accept the award of a mandate to Japan over the German north 
Pacific territories at the Paris peace conference. (Meaney, 1976: 146-195, 225, 248; 
Dupont, 1991: 18) 
The Great War would be a dark milestone in the imagination of a modem Australian 
identity. Indeed, others have gone further: in 1943 official historian Sir Ernest Scott 
asserted that it 'is beyond dispute' that 'the war was the pivotal event in the history of 
Australia.' (1943: 858) While it was certainly an enormous tragedy, we should not 
accept such claims at face value. A sense of proportion could be gained by considering 
that the number of Australians killed-almost sixty thousand-while still a horrifying 
total, was well below the loss of Aboriginal life since white settlement. Rather, we 
might suspect that the overdetermined narration of the war's historical importance bears 
a politics of its own. Once again, this politics was underpinned by the drive to 
imagine-and utilise-a unified Australian subject, within a context which saw over 
three hundred thousand men thrust into the jaws of a 'giant mincing machine' amid a 
domestic background of bitter division and renewed class conflict, and in which 
powerful discourses of race and gender would also be deployed and further entrenched. 
As if by some bizarre, terrible magic, potent and far-reaching myths of Australian 
character, realisation and purpose would be spun from the war's awful destruction. 
In an echo of the deployments to the Sudan and South Africa, the decision to 
commit Australian forces was explained by Australia's ontological fusion with the 
British general will, and the obligation of men to enlist argued through the potent chain 
which-in perfect accord with Hobbes' and Hegel's fusion of state and subject-linked 
the abstract machinery of Empire with the very interior of the individual self. Like 
Barton-or twenty five years later, Sir Robert Menzies-Joseph Cook declared that 
'when the Empire is at war, so is Australia at war'; Prime Minister Fisher vowed to 
help defend the 'mother country' to 'our last man and our last shilling'; and Hughes 
declared this was 'a time when none shall be for the party, but all be for the state.' 
Almost alone among the elite New South Wales Premier William Holman protested that 
Australians could 'not be plunged into calamities merely at the bidding of some 
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irresponsible ruler'-but as Clark so eloquently remarked, 'he was a voice shouting 
into a gale.' (Scott, 1943: 22-4; Clark, 1981: 374-5) For Sir Ernest Scott the expedition 
drew on a much deeper heritage, in which the juridical form of the state merged 
completely with its subjects' historical conditions of possibility: 
Their entire endowment of soil, freedom, tradition, language, nurture and 
protection came to them as a heritage from the empire to which they belonged. A 
menace to that imperial integrity threatened their life; and they took up arms to 
bear their share, not in refurbishing some antique grudge, or chastising some 
historic enemy, or acquiring more territory, but in vindicating obligations which 
were theirs because they were those of the sovereignty under which they had 
acquired and maintained their national existence. (1943: vii; emphasis added) 
To fully be a citizen within this discourse was to enter into a space of pain, fear and 
sacrifice which traced, at least in its form, an Hegelian movement of realisation at 
whose end both the individual-masculine, disciplined, courageous-and national 
subjects would reach their full maturity and take their place among the great of history. 
Invoking a complex image of birth, spiritual passage and transfiguration the Sydney 
Morning Herald described the war as 'a baptism', and in 1915, on the first anniversary 
of the landing at Gallipoli the Anglican Archbishop of Sydney declared that 'April 25 
was the date on which Australia suddenly found herself lifted to a place among the 
peoples.' At the Hotel Cecil in London Hughes told Australian soldiers their deeds had 
won them 'a place in the Temple of the Immortals' and that they had 'inspired 
generations yet unborn with 'pride of race, courage, tenacity of purpose, endurance, 
and that casting out of fear without which men, though boasting themselves free, are 
but wretched slaves.' They had, he said, taught that through 'sacrifice alone can men or 
nations be saved.' (Clark, 1981: 380 and 1987: 16) 
The price of such ontological realisation was high, and many who survived the 
trenches found they could not recognise their experience in its public meaning. 23 
Between the landing at Gallipoli in April and the end of the Dardanelles Campaign in 
December 7 ,818 Australians died, forty per cent of those who fought, and in the attacks 
on Lone Pine alone 800 were killed or wounded, four out of five who were involved. 
Turkish casualties were even greater. (Bean, 1948: 157; Clark, 1981: 424) During the 
British Offensive on the Somme in 1916 the Australians took 22,826 casualties in six 
weeks. After watching them trying to survive the German bombardment C. E. W. Bean 
wrote in his diary that the men 'are simply turned in there as into some ghastly giant 
23 See Alistair Thompson (1988) for an account, based on extensive interviews with Great War 
veterans, which emphasises how their experiences and memories contradict the retrospective 
myths of the Anzac legend. 
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mincing machine.' After the fighting the British poet John Masefield walked the 
battlefield: 'There was a cat eating a man's brain ... they were shovelling parts of men 
into blankets.' In April 1917 Britain's General Haig sent the fourth Australian Division 
against the German line at Bullecourt, where they took ten thousand casualties. Despite 
being brought to tears by the destruction, the Australian Commander General Birdwood 
again wrote home for more men. Between July 1917 and the assault on Passchendale in 
November the AIF in France took another 38,093 casualties, sixty per cent of their 
strength. By the war's end 215,585 Australians had become victims of the fighting, 
59,342 of them killed in action or later dying of wounds. Australia's proportionate 
losses, sixty-five per cent of their total in the field, were the highest of any allied 
country. (Clark, 1987: 24-27; Scott, 1943: 874) 
Even as casualties reached horrifying proportions the British and Australian 
commands, supported by Prime Minister Hughes, sought to throw more men into the 
cauldron. Splitting the Labour movement and exacerbating deep social divisions over 
the war, Hughes put two referenda before the people seeking a mandate to conscript 
enough men. Both times, in October 1916 and December 1917, he failed.24 His 
arguments that Australians 'were only free as long as Australia remained part and parcel 
of the British empire' failed to convince. Labor, the radicals and the Catholic Church 
consistently opposed conscription, though often for differing (and ironic) reasons. In 
1916 the Labor Call argued that while Europeans were butchering each other in Europe, 
Asia 'was waiting and grinning.' White Australia was being undermined: the future 
brought a prospect of millions of Asians invading a war-weakened Australia. Earlier, in 
1914, the Freeman's Journal had worried that the Japanese Navy would seize Australia 
and New Zealand if war broke out in Europe. More telling were warnings that a 
pernicious militarism was being woven into the societal fabric: Labor warned against 
the Universal Service League as an effort to 'Prussionise democracy', and radicals 
pointed to the convergence of militarism and Capital in the profits to be made from 
increased production of iron and stee12s for armaments, and wool for the uniforms so 
many would proudly wear into the afterlife. (Clark, 1981: 371, 380) 
24 The October 1916 result was Yes 1,087,332, No 1, 151,881 (64,549 majority for No) and the 
December 1917 result Yes 568,670,. No 718,465 (149,795 majority for No). After the first 
referendum Hughes and his followers were expelled from the Labor Party; he then formed a 
coalition government with Cook's liberals under the rubric of the 'National Party'. At the election 
of May 1917 the Nationalists won a decisive victory over Labor. Clark interpreted the result as a 
victory for the liberal mode of subjectivity, the patriotic 'subject of interest': 'Once again,' he 
wrote, 'Australians had voted conservative-to be chained to their past, rather than take the 
way forward. [They] believed the Australian dream of getting on, of owning a block of land and a 
house, could be achieved in a capitalist society .. .' Two days before the election the Australians 
had fought a second battle at Bullecourt, losing 7482 men. (Clark, 1987: 40, 77, 57) 
25 Between 1914 and 1919 annual steel production rose from 130,000 to nearly a million tons, 
almost all of it by the already giant BHP. During the war it established the steelworks at 
Newcastle and began to integrate it with its Australia-wide network of mining, smelting and 
shipbuilding facilities. (Ward, 1977: 110) 
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There were many signs that the war could be a threat to Australia's already flawed 
democracy. As the Trades Hall Council directed all unionists in December 1915 to 
ignore recruiting cards, the NSW police banned the sale of anti-war newspapers in the 
Sydney domain. Soldiers broke up anti-war meetings, and in response to a short anti-
conscription strike in October 1916 Hughes ordered all government servants who 
struck to be prosecuted. Issues of the Socialist containing the Interstate Trade Union 
Congress's manifesto on conscription were suppressed, and the song '!didn't raise my 
son to be a soldier' (sung at the beginning of Women's Peace Army meetings) was 
outlawed. In Perth nine IWW members were tried and convicted of attempting to 'raise 
discontent and disaffection among subjects of the King', and in October 1916 twelve 
members of the IWW were arrested in connection with a series of Sydney fires, 
receiving gaol terms of between ten and fifteen years. A 1920 Royal Commission later 
found six had been wrongfully convicted. Under the War Precautions Act German 
residents-whom Ernest Scott called 'the enemy within the gates '-were interned and 
many others deported, licences to publish German newspapers were revoked and the 
use of German in Churches prohibited. Their shares were seized by the public trustee 
and later credited to the reparations account, and many others lost their jobs. Also under 
the Act anti-war meetings were closed and their speakers arrested and fined. During the 
course of the huge NSW railways strike of 1917-which saw the loss of some two and 
a half million working days-the Hughes Government applied to the Industrial 
Commission for the de-registration of over twenty unions. Further evidence of Hughes 
culpability emerged in November 1920, when he was presented with a cheque for 
£25,000-raised from business interests in Australia and Britain-for his services to 
the Empire and Australia during the war and at Versailles. (Clark, 1987: 34-39, 53; 
Grimshaw et al, 1994: 213; Scott, 1943: 105, 689, 679; Fitzhardinge, 1979: 456) 
Yet even as the war increased a whole series of dramatic divisions in Australian 
society, it was being appropriated for the task of manufacturing a monolithic Australian 
subject: the 'Anzac tradition' was being born. The slaughter at Gallipoli had shown the 
mettle of the Australian character, and blooded the young nation into an adulthood fit 
for the twentieth century. The Argus wrote that 'It was there that our young and untried 
troops ... quitted themselves as men,' and Banjo Paterson, in his poem We're all 
Australians now, declared: 
The mettle that a race can show 
Is proved with shot and steel, 
And now we know what nations know 
And feel what nations feel. (Day, 1996: 240) 
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This view was retrospectively reinforced, in 1948, by the official historian and founder 
of the Australian War Memorial C. E.W. Bean, who at the end of Anzac to Amiens 
argued that the real significance of the Australians' sacrifice 
was to help materially in winning a prolongation of the security of the Victorian 
era for at least a part of the free world, including their own. But for Australia in 
particular they achieved something more. First they won her a recognised place 
among the nations; her seat on the League was given in direct acknowledgment of 
the part played by her forces. Second, though less commonly realised, was the 
bringing of a new confidence into Australia's national undertakings. (Bean, 1948: 
535) 
His chapter, entitled 'The Anzac Legend', linked security, sovereignty and identity into 
a potent subjective and historical unity: 'If the cause that led Australians to enlist can be 
reduced to a single principle, it is the principle of protecting their homes and their 
freedom by sustaining a system of law and order between nations.' These words, 
activating the exchange between individualising and totalising power, linked the 
minutiae of domestic security to ~he immense clashes of geopolitics, sustaining a potent 
emotional appeal across a vast, abstract space of reason. 26 The blackmail was 
overwhelming: while Bean admitted the war failed to achieve a lasting peace he argued 
that its prevention of a German victory was crucial to Australia's own security: 'If the 
struggle .. had resulted in German victory, the first term in the peace treaty would have 
been the abolition of the British Navy; and for the Australian nation this meant either 
subservience to Germany or extinction at the hands of the Japanese.' (Bean, 1948: 534; 
emphasis added) 
He concluded by asserting a general ontology of human progress and freedom-
and thus of a fully realised Australian subject-which hinged on sacrifice in war: 
' .. only in conditions ensuring freedom of thought and communication can mankind 
progress ... such freedom can be maintained only by the qualities which from Grecian 
times it has been won ... the readiness at any time to die for freedom, if necessary, and 
the virility to struggle for it.' In fact, with the vast tragedy of the war now a memory, 
eclipsed in scale by the horrors of World War 2 and the atom bomb, 
26 Discipline, unsurprisingly, also was a source of pride for him. Just as Hughes praised the 
troops as 'a glorious and inspiring sight..fit..magnificent of physique' and General Monash 
revelled in the complex preparations for the twelve thousand strong attack on Messines in 1917, 
Bean saw the AIF's discipline as national characteristic which reinforced state and subject in a 
powerful feedback loop: '..it was discipline-firmly based on the national habit of facing facts 
and going straight for the objective-that was responsible for the astonishing success which 
first gave to other nations confidence in Australia, and to the Australian nation confidence in 
itself.' (Bean, 1948: 538; Clark, 1979; see also White, 1981: 133-5) 
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we have passed through the test which until now, unfortunately, has necessarily 
been judged by mankind as the supreme one for men fit to be free; and we have 
emerged from that test with the Anzac tradition. In the Second World War that 
tradition has nobly served humanity. (1948: 539; emphasis added) 
In the dark dreams of such men Australia was now realised, more fully a nation among 
nations, more fully a Subject that could enter into the progress and unity that would 
drive it onward, yet be somehow always beyond it. Its foundations and being were 
now more secure; as US President Woodrow Wilson was asserting self-determination 
as a new principle of human affairs, 'Australia' had achieved its own, through an 
ontology in which murder and pain and death took their piece and would not be denied. 
CONCLUSION: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE FUTURE 
This chapter has sought to trace the course of a momentous event: the establishment-
through the deployment of a complex historical technology of security-of a western 
civilisation and an overarching political, economic and juridical subject on a hitherto 
unknown continent in the southern ocean. With it came the construction of this space 
by an anxious cultural and strategic imagination marked by the overwhelming presence 
of the Other: a presence that enabled a political subjectivity in which the individual and 
collective might be fused into a potent psychological totality. From the Colony's very 
beginnings as Aborigines were fought, dispossessed and murdered, to the fears of 
black and Asian immigration that underpinned Federation, to the demonisation of 
Germany and Japan through the Great War, a backward and threatening other was 
essential to the Hegelian path of realisation that the new civilisation sought to tread. 
While the philosophical structure I outlined in chapter two provided the broad 
ontological underpinnings of this system, I have also sought to show how a series of 
bitter conflicts were played out over what otherwise appeared to be common ground. 
Intense class conflict was central to the politics of both Federation and the Great War 
and, for conservatives and liberals, rhetorics of race and strategies of industrial 
management were integral to the politics of security that so preoccupied them. Here 
sovereignty, racism and political sameness combined as the means and appeal of a 
technology which sought to contain, co-opt and weaken the labour movement. If the 
political limits of the Constitution, the disabling splits in the Labor Party and the deaths 
of tens of thousands of unionists on the battlefields of Europe were any guide, by 1918 
these tactics had been a dramatic success. Worse, with the establishment of Anzac Day 
on the anniversary of the Gallipoli landing by the newly formed Returned Sailors and 
Soldiers Imperial League, a retrospective construction of the meaning of their deaths 
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would play into conservative hands. A special day of remembrance was obviously due 
them, and for Australians ever since it has become a potent symbol of unity and debt in 
a nation apparently lacking unequivocal symbols of its own meaning. 27 Yet as 
controversy has been bled from their memory by the disciplinary rhetoric of respect, the 
'governmental' chain linking sacrifice, nationalism and subjectivity has been 
strengthened. To recall the dispute and bitterness surrounding the Diggers' struggle is 
not to disrespect them, but to rescue their experience from mythmaking and cynicism; 
to think that they might deserve more than a circular, self-justifying narrative that does 
little more than laud the necessity of their deaths. 
Manning Clark concluded the fifth volume of his history with a reflection on the 
public meaning of Gallipoli and Anzac, concluding bitterly that 'Australia's day of 
glory had made her a prisoner of her past, rather than the architect of a new future for 
humanity.' (1981: 426) While echoing the way the carnage of the war would disturb 
the West's conviction of its own enlightenment, the statement also underlined the 
significance of the war-and the war's narration-for the future. The grafting of the 
myth onto a day of remembrance guaranteed its annual repetition, as its significance 
increased with each successive conflict and the lengthening roll of the dead. As the 
retrospective constructions of the Official History show, such repetition ensured that 
the events of the war-from all their confusion, dispute and abjection-became ossified 
into a terrible weight of tradition. In turn future policies and representations, when 
linked with the Anzac tradition, took on a heavy air of inevitability. Who could argue, 
when it was the nation's very being that was at stake? 
Yet the very obsession with narrating the past as tradition betrays the instability of 
the whole enterprise, the way the narrative effacement of social conflict can be 
undermined by that conflict's retelling, and thus allow the re-emergence of modes and 
moments of subjectivity which don't conform with the monolithic imaginary of the 
unified body-politic. It is this anxiety that underpins later political attempts to link this 
founding period with new manipulations of the collective subject. Almost eighty years 
later, Paul Keating thought 'the spirit of Anzac' could be retained, but not stifle the 
need for change; he thought that Australia's founding identity, formed at Federation, 
could be 'reshaped' into a form 'consistent with the multicultural reality' of 1990s 
Australia and 'the final passing of the vestiges of our colonial past'. His successor John 
Howard, in a deliberate rebuke, maintained that Australians did not face a choice 
between their history and their geography. As the centenary of Australian Federation 
27 An example of such thinking-that the Australian identity was essentially weak, porous and 
unformed-was Manning Clark's remark in his 1979 address, The Quest for an Australian 
Identity. 'Apart from Anzac day there was no common experience.' On the other hand we could 
read it differently-as a mark of the occasion's narrative power-and fear that in the myth of 
transfiguration and national realisation lay the very meaning of such a 'common experience'. 
(Clark 1980: 12) 
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approaches in 2001 we may yet see new political conflicts over the shape of the events 
that surrounded it, driven by rhetoric painfully aware of the aporia that separates the 
future from the past, and the past from its meaning. (Keating 1995a: 279, 1992a: 4; 
Gordon and Walters, 1996: 1) Yet in 1948 Charles Bean thought the Anzac Tradition 
was very much alive, and that its meaning and purpose were clear: 'it had nobly served 
humanity' in the Second World War. It is to that 'story' we now tum. 
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Have those who think Australia remote from the world which hatches dangers and wars 
ever looked at the map ? .. So far from being removed from the busy hive of men we live 
almost within hail of its greatest populations. We have nailed 'White Australia' to the 
top of the mast. Yet we are but a tiny drop in a coloured ocean. We are five million of 
white people claiming to hold inviolate a great continent which would maintain a 
hundred million and we live almost within co-ee of a thousand millions of coloured 
people ... lt is well that we should remember this and comfort ourselves accordingly. 
W. M. Hughes, 14 August 1916. 
(Meaney, 1985: 236) 
At the close of the Great War a powerful myth of Australian character and realisation 
had been achieved, at the price of tens of thousands of lives and unprecedented 
upheaval and division. In addition, 'Australia' had new international status-not as a 
'great power', but as an internationally recognised subject whose claims on Pacific 
territory and international norms would demand, and find, a hearing. The Anzac 
Tradition was already at work: when his status was challenged by Woodrow Wilson at 
Versailles, Hughes replied that he spoke for sixty thousand dead.1 Were they to see 
this moment they would learn they had endured the cold and filth of the trenches, the 
lice and poison gas, thrown their bodies before machine-gun fire and shrapnel until 
they were stopped, so that the old things could continue: a white Australia, a defensive 
buffer of Pacific territory, the crimson thread of kinship. The diggers' sacrifices won 
Australia independent representation at the Peace Conference, and Hughes much 
influence within the British delegation. He chaired the British committee on reparations, 
backing the desire of Lloyd George and Clemenceau for a punishing bill, regardless of 
Germany's ability to pay; he successfully fought Japan, with quiet support from Britain 
and the US, to keep a clause entrenching racial equality out of the League of Nations 
1 The exchange had taken place during the arguments over Australia's desire to annex New 
Guinea and Samoa, which Wilson opposed. According to Fitzhardinge, Wilson had asked 
Hughes 'whether he would set the five million people he represented against the twelve hundred 
million represented at the conference.' (1979: 396) 
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charter. Yet Australia was now saddled with a further £350 million in war induced 
debt, eighty-three per cent of its total in 1920, and would recover just £5 million from 
the settlement. (Fitzhardinge, 1979: 396; Macintyre, 1986: 242) 
With the historic fear of Japan in mind, Hughes had gone to Versailles with direct 
orders from the Nationalist Cabinet to seek the permanent annexation of New Guinea, 
New Britain and the other German Pacific colonies. At the conference he unrolled a 
large map, declaring that the islands 'encompassed Australia like fortresses' and 
contained potential coaling stations and submarine bases. He repeated the argument he 
made in London that they were 'necessary for our security, safety and freedom.' In 
New York in 1918 he had claimed that 'in this we do not desire empire', but a more 
revealing opinion came from the chairman of Bums Philp-which had long coveted the 
Islands' copra plantations and trade potential-who declared that their 'natural destiny' 
was 'that they should come under the control of Australia.' Blocked by Wilson's belief 
in self-determination, Hughes failed to achieve annexation, but accepted the British 
proposal for a 'C-class mandate' which gave Australia control of the South Pacific 
territories under weak League supervision. By extending the Navigation Act Japanese 
shipping could be excluded, while the mandate system prevented the Japanese from 
building new fortifications in the North Pacific. The economic motives driving 
Australian policy became clear in the case of Nauru, when Hughes negotiated a 
compromise in which Australia administered a British mandate and the UK, New 
Zealand and Australian Governments bought out the phosphate mining interests and 
shared the ensuing bounty between them. Hughes' treasurer W. A. Watt had told him 
the phosphates were essential for the development of Australian productivity. 
(Fitzhardinge, 1979: 389, 372, 399; Macintyre, 1986: 178; Fry, 1991: 3) 
As well as an enhanced geopolitical purchase, the new Australian subjectivity was 
gathering real ontological depth. On his return to Australia Hughes was mobbed by 
crowds of diggers, and by 1919 the membership of the Returned Sailors and Soldiers 
Imperial League had reached 150,000. A new conservative consensus was being 
rapidly forged around a war-inspired nationalism: Keith Murdoch argued that only an 
independent 'Australianism' could counter the 'anti-Australian' forces of Bolshevism 
and Sinn-Feinism, while Hughes opened the 1919 federal election-which the 
Nationalists won by a landslide-by questioning the loyalty of the ALP. 'Let our 
watchword be Australia,' he intoned, 'as our splendid boys have fought for it and 
saved it, let us all live and work for it.' On Empire Day in 1921 a crowd of a hundred 
and fifty thousand gathered in Sydney to affirm their loyalty to the Union Jack and their 
abhorrence of all those that would fly the 'red flag' instead. As Stuart Macintyre 
argues, nationalism had ceased to be a force for change, but 'was increasingly 
identified with the status quo.' In tum the formula which linked the sacrifice and valour 
of the Anzacs to a claim for international status would be repeated, twenty years later, 
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by Labor Prime Minister John Curtin at the outset of the Pacific War. (Macintyre, 1986: 
181-91; Clark, 1987: 171; Hasluck, 1970: 55) 
Yet for all its depth and force, its roots in an apparently immovable historical soil, 
the Australian subject was still an illusion-a product of political and cultural 
imagination. It's claim to unity and culmination papered over bitter religious, industrial 
and political conflicts that would only worsen as the nation drifted towards the great 
depression and the second world war. As class warfare intensified and governments 
wrestled with an increasingly complex and unforgiving international economy, 
politicians and business leaders would invoke images of collective identity as they also 
resorted to a language of division and accusation. Stripped of its pretence of inclusion, 
this was a language of battle and mastery-not of consensus. It had its own policing 
objectives. True to the ontology of security they had inherited from Bentham, Pitt and 
the founding fathers, men like Hughes, Bruce and Latham sought to excise unwelcome 
social currents from the body proper-as if to achieve an immense binary ordering of 
reality, between order and chaos, good and evil, democrat and communist, patriot and 
traitor, the living and the dead. 
Surveying the two-and-a-half decades to 1945, one is struck by a paradox: a 
general strengthening of the ontological purchase of the Australian subject, through a 
period when its bodily integrity was shattered by unprecedented industrial upheaval and 
social animosity. The experience-and narration--0f war with Japan fulfilled fears that 
had surged through the Australian identity since the 1890s, in tum elevating a shadowy 
image of the Other to the status of an ontological truth-an event with far-reaching 
cultural and strategic consequences. Similarly the war-led recovery in the economy, the 
constant political demands for patriotism in the face of a threatening and alien enemy, 
and the Labor government's management of industrial conflict may have mitigated 
social resentments and divisions. Sovereignty-as both a locus of identity and an 
operative structure of political and juridical machinery-would be tested and further 
transformed. The pre-war consensus on the crimson thread of kinship would come 
under stress as early as the 1920s, and be irrevocably tom by the experience of the 
1940s--even as the image of white Australia was strengthened by war with an Asian 
power. Significant new domestic and foreign policy machinery would be developed as 
Australian elites grappled with a radically new global politico-economic landscape, and 
the discursive architecture for Australia's role in the Cold War was unwittingly set in 
place. As the crises of the 1920s and 30s made starkly clear, and Labor's post-war 
diplomacy underlined, the 'domestic' management of industrial workforces and 
macroeconomic pressures-that is, 'individuals', 'populations' and economic flows-
simultaneously became pressing 'international' questions. As the statements of men like 
foreign minister H. V. Evatt suggest, post-war enlightenment visions of Australian 
destiny-and thus a renewed path of realisation-would be utterly bound up with the 
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fierce new geopolitics of the time, and leavened by a seemingly universal politics of 
fear and dread.2 As much of the world lay in ruins, discipline, bio-power and 
subjectivity were taking on a new 'global' intensity. 
SECURITY AND ITS ENEMIES 
Hughes returned home in 1919, to a terrible influenza epidemic and massive industrial 
turmoil. In April two thousand men and women had clashed violently with armed 
police on the wharves in Perth. Thirty-three were injured, one man killed and another 
speared with a bayonet, while Western Australia Premier Hal Colbatch-who had 
assembled and armed the police with rifles and batons-was pelted with road metal and 
old iron. By the end of the year 6.3 million days had been lost in strikes and lockouts.3 
The miners' strike at Broken Hill lasted eighteen months, from May 1919 to November 
1920, and a seamen's strike forced the introduction ofrationing in some areas. (Clark, 
1987: 120; Macintyre, 1986: 183) Speaking in the House in September, to a motion 
that the Australian Parliament accept the Treaty of Versailles, Hughes would interpret 
the vast sacrifice of Australians in this new industrial context. Just as the diggers had 
given Australia 'liberty', 'safety' and 'a name that will not die', the path to salvation lay 
in political sameness and the productive compliance of liberal subjectivity: 
Industrially, socially, politically, we cannot escape the consequences of the war. 
The whole world lies bleeding and exhausted from the frightful struggle. There is 
no way of salvation, save by the gospel of work. Those who endeavour to set 
class against class, or to destroy wealth, are counsellors of destruction. There is 
hope for this free Australia of ours only if we put aside our differences, strive to 
emulate the deeds of those who by their valour and sacrifice have given us liberty 
and safety, and resolve to be worthy of them and the cause for which they 
fought. (CPD, 10 September 1919: 12179) 
This appeal to unity came as the class war in Australia took on an appearance of 
unrelenting permanence, and political leaders spoke more and more in terms that would 
partition reality into stark, irreconcilable polarities. Hughes himself had set a precedent 
during the conscription campaigns, when he cast an unholy alliance of Bolsheviks, 
socialists, the IWW, Sinn-Fein and Bishop Mannix against White Australia, liberty and 
2 In 1945 Evatt, pushing for greater Australian and American co-operation during a speech in 
San Francisco, argued that 'The destiny of our countries is bound up with the future Pacific 
order.' (1945: 120) 
3 The total days lost in 1919 exceeded the previous peak of 5 million in 1917-other turbulent 
years included 1914 with 1.1 million, 1916 with 1. 7 million and 1920 with 1.9 million days lost. 
Intervening years fluctuated between 580,000 and 960,000 days lost. (Macintyre, 1986: 194) 
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the Empire. In June 1920 the Chairman of the Collins House Group's Zinc 
Corporation-then embroiled iri the strike at Broken Hill-declared that 'No-one can 
"settle" a dispute with an insane man who has got you by the throat.' The company 
faced not a conflict over wages and conditions but 'a social struggle which pervades the 
world'-that between the capitalist and the revolutionary socialist. (Clark, 1987: 68; 
Macintyre, 1986: 184, 194) 
Reaction became national policy under the new Nationalist-Country Party Coalition 
of S. M. Bruce and Earle Page. By 1920 the economy was in recession by virtue of its 
dependence on export sales to a war-sapped Britain. While different sectors of capital 
were divided on the virtues of protection, they were united in their desire to drive down 
wages and increase the hours of work. In tum the system of conciliation and 
arbitration-which Manning Clark called one of the sacred Australian 'tablets of the 
law' -came under tremendous stress. Reaction was also accompanied by grander 
visions of national development to match Australia's new geopolitical subjectivity. 
Prior to the 1923 Imperial Conference Bruce began to outline his vision. Here the 
traditional anxieties about the correspondence between sovereignty, soil and identity 
became allied to the more ambitious spatial and transformative project of security: the 
economic management of populations, industries and subjects, the conquering of 
distance, the cultivation of new lands. 
Defence he marked as the State's first priority, to which end he intended to raise an 
Imperial naval defence scheme: 'we can only defend this country,' he argued, 'if we are 
inside the empire.' While the tug of the crimson thread remained strong, it was no 
longer so binding: 'we cannot blindly submit to a policy which may involve us in war.' 
This change had become visible in September 1922, when the Hughes government 
refused Lloyd George's request for an Australian contingent to defend Constantinople 
from attack by the Turks. 4 In addition to defence Bruce spoke of the need-if Australia 
was 'to be a progressive country'-to accelerate the application of science to industry, 
secure uniform rail gauges, develop the Murray river valley, improve transport and 
communications, and resolve 'the Northern Territory problem' .5 This last dilemma had 
haunted Australians for decades: 'We have to hold this gateway into Australia from the 
4 After first cabling that Australia would consider a contingent, Hughes refused to become 
associated with the action. He deplored the lack of consultation with the dominions prior to the 
British decision, and refused to have Australia associated 'with the ambitious projects of King 
Constantine' or 'be dragged behind the chariots of French ambitions and intrigues in the near 
East.' He urged that the dispute be taken before the League of Nations and declared, ironically 
enough, that 'The Australian people are sick of war. They regard war except in defence of vital 
interests as not only a blunder but a crime.' (Collected in Meaney, 1975: 330-7) 
5 The University of Melbourne's Professor William Osborne-pivotal to efforts to establish the 
Council for Scientific Research (CSIR} in 1915-had argued, in an uncanny echo of the 
multivalent project of security, that the Great War itself had provoked 'a mighty awakening in 
England as to the value of science in all its aspects of citizenship-the effects on production, on 
defence, on health and on morality. If we cannot be in the van of this great movement, let us not 
at least be found blundering in the rear.' (Cited in Lines, 1991: 165) 
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north. We must attempt to populate it and try to develop it.' This in tum would require 
the development of Australia's pastoral and mining industries, highlighting the way in 
which dispossession-and the need to make the land productive within a liberal 
economic ontology-was driven by an ongoing security obsession. (CPD, 1 March 
1923: 81-83) 
The great slogan became 'Men, Money and Markets', which in Bruce's mind drew 
the nation ever closer to the imperial bosom. While protection was a central plank, 
Australia must look to England for markets for the vast surplus of agricultural 
production, and for capital and white immigrants to help develop the nation's industry 
and interior. The umbilical cord of mutual history and the sacrifices of the war gave 
Australians special claims: he pointed out that 'we expect from the Motherland some 
additional consideration for what we have done', and in London later that year told a 
business audience: 'You brought us into existence. You have some responsibility for us 
and you cannot shirk it.' The idea that immigration was essential for Australia's future 
security and prosperity owed much to the vision of E. J. Brady, whose 1918 book 
Australia Unlimited predicted the possibility of an eventual Australian population of up 
to 500 million: 'A sufficient population must be established in the Northern Territory, 
in South Australia, and in Western Australia to ensure permanent, effective occupation, 
and a realisation of the white Australia policy . .'. Japan, as it was for Hughes at the 
dedication of Canberra in 1913, was the unspoken shadow giving emotional form to 
his words. (CPD, 1.3.23: 81-83; Clark, 1987: 217; Brady cited in Lines, 1991: 168) 
During 1923 Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia signed agreements 
with the British and Commonwealth Governments to join the Imperial Land Settlement 
scheme-Western Australia alone announced it would take seventy-five thousand 
migrants. Upon arriving at their blocks-again allotted with no regard for their 
indigenous ownership-they found none of the familar comforts of civilisation, and 
backbreaking work trying to bring the land into production. In June 1924 group 
settlement in WA was suspended and a Royal Commission appointed-thirty-two per 
cent of the immigrants and forty-two per cent of the white Australians had abandoned 
their blocks. The scheme was a vast failure: by 1936 more than eighty per cent of all 
State, Commonwealth and British settlement loans had been written off. Forty 
thousand hectares of forest had been destroyed. (Clark, 1987: 225; Lines, 1991: 170) 
Similar heartbreak ensued for many diggers who took to the land under postwar 
soldier-settlement schemes. Many farms were undercapitalised, and those lucky enough 
to produce decent crops saw their hard work founder on falling commodity prices 
through the 1920s. By 1930 ten thousand had abandoned the land, with accumulated 
losses of £23.5 million, and more were to leave in despair during the great depression. 
In part the immigration schemes worked in British self-interest: they were accompanied 
by vast new government borrowings from London and increasing levels of British 
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investment in both public and private capital. During the 1920s state and federal 
governments borrowed enormous sums for settlement schemes and infrastructure such 
as railways, roads, sewerage, electricity and communications. In tum the earnings from 
Australia's agricultural trade surplus financed repayments. While export markets had 
diversified, the level of British loans and investments in Australia materially reinforced 
the Imperial tie. Given the enormous level of borrowing-which reached £672 million 
by 1927-and the dependence on commodity markets this phase of growth was built 
on highly unstable foundations. The introduction of scientific management practices, 
the development of mass markets by the new advertising firms and the advent of radio 
and cinema entranced many with the promise of a new cultural and economic 
modernity, even as its conditions-the industrial expansion of the Great War-and its 
illusory stability demanded a more sober view. (Cochrane, 1980: 37-41; Macintyre, 
1986: 235, 219). 
Yet as British money and Bruce's faith in imperial defence added new strength to 
the crimson thread of kinship, it was being questioned as a material and symbolic locus 
of Australian security and identity. In his 1921 book Money Power Labor's Frank 
Anstey claimed that Australia would one day face 'terrible retribution' as its debts to the 
money men of London piled higher. Bruce's policy of borrowing for development, he 
warned, was leading the nation into the abyss. (Clark, 1987: 245) In tum Federal 
Labor Leader James Scullin-in debate with Bruce before the Prime Minister's 
departure for London in August 1923-made an unprecedented attack on the imperial 
assumptions of Australian foreign policy. The bipartisan patriotism that existed in 1914 
was now a mirage: after chiding Bruce for travelling twelve thousand miles 'in search 
of a foreign policy' Scullin questioned the conduct of the Great War by the Allied 
governments. He railed against the 'marvellous hypocrisy of secret diplomacy' revealed 
in the collection of documents, the British White Book, and 'the atrocious 
conspiracy ... to impose upon Australia Prussian militarism in the form of conscription.' 
(CPD, 31.7.23: 1878) 
He then defended the 1917 resolution of the Federal Labor conference which called 
for peace by negotiation, in a formula remarkably similar to Wilson's fourteen points. 
Yet in the eighteen months between the conference and the settlement-made allegedly 
on the basis of those points-four million had been added to the dead and fifteen 
million to 'the maimed, broken and maddened.' They died because of the secret treaties 
'entered into before war was declared-treaties which were not made known even to 
the British Cabinet': 
Those treaties provided that the war must continue even after overtures came from 
Germany and Austria, until Italy could be given Trentino, France Alsace-
Lorraine, Russia a warm port in ·the south, and Britain certain influence in 
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Mesopotamia. All that while the men of Australia were being told from recruiting 
platforms all over the country that they were to go across the seas to defend little 
bleeding Belgium, and that they were fighting for principles which would make 
the world safe for democracy .. .! believe that the Versailles Treaty which followed 
will go down in history as one of the worst huckstering, haggling, sordid pieces 
of bargaining ever made in the history of the world. (CPD, 31.7.23: 1879) 
It was a devastating critique, and after it few things could remain the same. However 
slowly it would occur, the first shudderings of a tectonic shift of discursive ground 
were being felt. Yet Scullin also feared an earthquake: he wanted the 'silken ties of 
kinship' to endure and grow, merely to be free of the blackmail that offered a choice 
between leaving the Empire or being 'dragged at its heels in every European war .. .I 
warn the Prime Minister and other swashbuckling Imperialists that the Australian 
Democracy will stand by the silken ties of kinship which have endured for so long but 
will not consent to the cast-iron bonds of imperialism which such people attempt to 
place upon her.' (CPD, 31.7.23: 1879-80) 
Speaking a few days before, Bruce shared Scullin's concerns about Empire unity 
and had his own anxieties about the lack of consultation which preceded Australia's 
entry into the conflagration. Yet he accepted the constitutional fact that Imperial 
membership involved being at war when Britain was; this dilemma he now sought to 
manage through the development of mechanisms in which the dominions might be 
consulted before Britain made its policy. Imperial integrity required new machinery: 
'We have to try to maintain unity of the whole and complete autonomy of the different 
parts.' While Bruce now sought more discretion-following the Turkish crisis of 
1922-over the deployment of Australian forces abroad, the crux for him was 
Australian defence, which was neither assured by the League of Nations or the 
Washington Agreement. 6 Whereas Scullin suggested it would be possible for Australia 
to prepare for its own defence and advocated a greater faith in the League, Bruce argued 
only a naval force would provide security.7 The Imperial conference voted to allow the 
6 The 1921 Washington naval conference saw three agreements: a four-power treaty between 
the British Empire, France, Japan and the USA, in which they agreed to respect each other's 
possessions in the Pacific Ocean and to consult on Pacific events for a period of ten years; a 
five-power treaty between these nations plus Italy, restricting the size of naval vessels above 
10,000 tons to proportions: US 10, UK 10, Japan 6, France 3.5 and Italy 3.5. (While Japan 
resented the differential this effectively gave it naval superiority in the Western Pacific). Nor-in 
an effort to ensure the security of each in its own waters-were new bases, fortifications or 
military expansions to be undertaken outside areas adjacent to the USA, the Panama Canal 
Zone, Hawaii, British Dominions or west of Long. 11 OE (which exempted Singapore); and third a 
nine-power treaty-between Belgium, Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the USA-which attempted to preserve the independence of China, and the non-
discriminatory open door on trade. (Millar, 1978: 98-99) 
1 Bruce drew attention to the continent's twelve thousand miles of coastline where 'every one of 
our great capital cities' and 'our great manufacturing centres is located.' He asserted safety 
required at least one modern battleship, probably more, each of which cost from £7-10 million. 
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dominions to choose their own diplomatic staff and negotiate treaties, and Bruce 
appointed an Australian liason officer, R. G. Casey, to the Foreign Office in London. 
Naval security would hinge on the promise of a British fleet base at Singapore. (CPD, 
24.7.23: 1480-7, 31.7.23: 1882; Macintyre, 1986: 205) 
As ever, Japan was the unspoken fear. In 1920 a conference of Australia's most 
senior military officers had prepared a strategic appreciation which argued that Japan 
remained 'the only potential and probable enemy.' Even as they conceded their lack of 
knowledge as to Japan's actual policies-this being 'the proper study of the 
statesman'-they asserted Japan's naval superiority could 'delay almost vitally the 
arrival of help in Australia. So advantaged, it is probable she could land troops at 
almost any place desired on the Australian coast, continue to reinforce them, and supply 
them with fresh munitions .. '. Australians should feel particularly vulnerable because 
the White Australia policy could 'be made a casus belli apart from all other 
considerations'. They went on to argue that 'successful defence against Japan' was 'an 
Imperial problem ... the sea is our main line of defence,' and recommended an annual 
expenditure of £12.5 million. The Council of Defence approved spending for 1920-21 
of £8.25 million, almost twice that of 1913-14. (Meaney, 1985: 293-9, 348-51) 
Ensuring the security of White Australia meant that the control of Aborigines 
remained a priority. Having achieved the general submission of the indigenous 
population through counter-insurgency in the previous century, this period saw a 
massive intensification of control through a disciplinary and coercive machinery applied 
to enforce their separation from the white society and genetic pool.8 Under the guise of 
'protection' various provisions of state and commonwealth law prevented Aborigines 
from working for wages, or marrying or living with a non-Aborigip.al without 
permission of the State. Others enabled the prosecution of non-Aboriginals cohabiting 
with Aborigines and of Aborigines found with firearms. It was during this period that 
the enforced removals of children from Aboriginal families began. It was nothing less 
than an attempt at genocide: Bruce urged South Australia to accept babies as 'they 
would not know in later life that they had Aboriginal blood and would probably be 
absorbed into the white population and become useful citizens.' Less controlled forms 
of violence also continued: in August 1928 a Northern Territory police party led by 
Without that, defence would require 'a great fleet of submarines and destroyers, a tremendous 
air force and .. a certain number of cruisers to guard trade routes ... The financial burden involved 
in making such provision would arrest the whole of our development for years to come.' (CPD, 
24.7.23: 1485; emphasis added) 
8 A good account of twentieth century policy towards Aborigines is contained in the two volumes 
of C. D. Rowley, Aboriginal Policy and Practice, ANU Press, 1970-1. In Volume II he argues that 
during this period, 'Governments with large 'full-blood' populations tried by means of segregation 
to limit further part-Aboriginal births. At the same time they came to formulate policies which 
involved the disappearance of part-Aborigines through miscegenation. Conveniently the 'full-
bloods' seemed to be dying out; the part-Aborigines were to be placed in such situations that 
there would eventually be no traces of them.' (1971: 4) 
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William Murray massacred as many as 100 men, women and children near Coniston in 
revenge for the killing of a white settler, but was exonerated by a Federal Board of 
Enquiry. At this time William Cooper, an elder from Echuca in Victoria, formed the 
Australian Aborigines League to fight for the franchise, parliamentary representation 
and land rights. (Clark, 1987: 158, 299, 427; Day, 1996: 266) 
As these historic images of the Other were being solidified in Australia's cultural 
lexicon, disciplinary machinery and strategic planning, another was being conjured 
from the deepening crisis in industrial and economic management. Previously a vague 
outline, this 'enemy within' was taking on a solid mythical form, in a premonition of its 
future presence at the very core of the Australian identity. Its name was Communism-
and in its spectre conservatives found a threat to social order, morality, progress and 
the sacred institutions of property and entrepreneurial risk. Earlier Bruce had worried 
that 'Bolsheviks' might thwart efforts to force down wages to make Australian industry 
more internationally competitive. Again the liberal problematic of 'government' 
appeared: the radicals might utilise the freedoms of a democratic society and the 
resentment of workers to foment revolution. (Clark, 1987: 285) Yet in the angry mood 
of the time, his 'businessmen's government' eschewed the co-optive liberal strategy 
which had previously sought to moderate class antagonisms. 
In June 1925 Bruce tried to amend the Immigration Act, to create powers that 
would enable the deportation of industrial militants. His language-and the Bill's 
whole conceptual framework-brought into play the totalising and individualising 
technology of subjectivity that was central to security as a modem vector of power. One 
clause enabled the deportation of any immigrant convicted of 'an offence against the 
laws of the Commonwealth relating to trade and commerce or conciliation and 
arbitration', particularly if the Minister felt their actions hindered the transport industry 
or were 'injurious to the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth.' 
Another enabled the deportation of anyone who advocated the overthrow by force of 
'the established government of the Commonwealth' or preached 'the unlawful 
destruction of property', and even extended to anyone who was 'a member of or 
affiliated with' an organisation with such goals. (CPD, 25.6.25: 460-1) 
Bruce claimed they were merely emergency measures which could 'only be applied 
in times of great industrial turmoil.' Declaring that the 'amendments are designed 
entirely to benefit the community as a whole', he pitted a harmonious collective identity 
against a pernicious and alien otherness: 
... among those coming into Australia are a number of persons of alien race and 
blood who, although we offer to them the opportunity to enjoy our citizenship, 
refuse to become Australians, do not recognise our ideals, and are not absorbed 
into our national life ... they voice here false doctrines and ideas and refer to social 
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conditions in a language that is absolutely inapplicable to any that exist in 
Australia. Being thus prejudiced, they carry on a propaganda of a most insidious 
nature .. .it is absolutely dangerous to the national life of our country. (CPD, 
25.6.25: 460) 
Although Bruce's words were deliberately vague, he was clearly speaking of 
communism. The Bill was a brazen attempt to set tight juridical limits to subjectivity-
as citizenship-and trigger the use of force against those deemed to exist outside its 
boundaries. They and their 'poisonous propaganda' could be excised from the social 
body, much as 160,000 convicts were removed from Britain and sent to Australia 
during its first hundred years. A month after the assent to the new Act George Pearce, 
Minister of State for Home and Territories, invoked its powers during a waterfront 
strike. In November two officials of the Seamens' Union were marked for deportation. 
Ironically enough, given the Government's rhetoric of citizenship and commonwealth 
security, the High Court ruled that the legislation was unconstitutional. Undeterred, 
Bruce fought the 1925 election on a law-and-order platform and sought 'to prove that 
Labor was tarred with the Communist brush.' He was rewarded with a majority of 
twenty-eight seats. (Clark, 1987: 242) 
Angered by the High Court decision, at the opening of Parliament in January 1926 
Bruce's Attorney General J. G. Latham introduced another bill-this time to amend the 
Crimes Act.9 It too provided for the deportation of seditious aliens or, if Australian-
bom, their imprisonment for up to two years. Proscribed were organisations which 
advocated the violent overthrow of any state or commonwealth government, the 'injury 
of property of the Commonwealth or of property used in trade or commerce with other 
countries or among the states'. Most alarming was a fantastically sweeping clause 
which provided-in the event of a proclamation of a 'serious industrial disturbance' by 
the Governor General-for the deportation or imprisonment for up to a year of anyone 
involved in a lock-out or strike 'in connexion with' the transport of goods or 
passengers in overseas or interstate trade or in 'the provision of any public service by 
the Commonwealth.' Labor's Matthew Charlton, after hearing this clause read, rightly 
protested that 'every trade union leader can be brought in under that section.' Latham, 
well aware of the unions' power to block the very lifelines of capital, trade and wealth, 
retorted that 'In Australia transport is vital; it is of fundamental importance to the well-
being of the Commonwealth.' (CPD, 28.1.26: 467-8) 
9 In order to get around the High Court decision Latham explained that: 'This Parliament has no 
authority to enact a general criminal law; it can deal only with matters submitted to it by the 
Constitution. Therefore the bill applies only to the protection of the established government, 
interstate and foreign trade and commerce, and the public services of the Commonwealth.' 
(CPD, 28.1.26: 467) 
1 31 
The Pacific War 1918-1945 
There was more to come. In June 1928 Bruce-in a measure named by unions 
'The Bludgeon Act'-sought to introduce compulsory arbitration as new strikes broke 
out on the Sydney and Melbourne waterfronts. As the strikes wore on he threatened 
union leaders with the Crimes Act. Anxious for still greater powers, in September the 
Government rushed through a new bill with punitive provisions enabling the licensing 
of transport workers. Scullin called the new law-nicknamed the 'dog-collar Act' after 
the demeaning system of daily pick-ups it sought to enforce-a 'proclamation of 
industrial martial law'. Disputes escalated in response to the efforts to force down 
wages and strengthen the penal powers of the Arbitration Court. Between 1924 and 
1927 the number of working days lost annually rose from 900,000 to 1.2 million, and 
reached a phenomenal 4.5 million in 1929. With the support of the Communist party a 
timberworkers strike-in protest at a new award which cut wages, increased the 
working week and the use of juvenile labour-spread to other sectors. It lasted ten 
months. In NSW coal-miners struck when threatened with dismissal if they refused a 
wage cut.1 o At Rothbury in 1929 another unionist was murdered by police as they 
escorted strikebreakers to the pit. (Clark 1987: 286-7; Macintyre, 1986: 245-7) 
For all the state violence and activism there was an air of desperation about the 
measures, as the liberal consensus was swept away and the labour movement 
responded with greater and greater militancy. Security-as an effective management of 
industrial populations, social order and economic prosperity-was beginning to look 
like a chimera. Rising unemployment was paralleled by a steady fall in commodity 
prices which, coupled with the vast loan obligations, put untenable pressure on the 
nation's foreign reserves. Public works had been drastically scaled back and London 
financiers were recommending a wholesale assault on production costs. In 1929, as the 
destructive wave built and stood ready to break, Bruce proposed to remove the 
Commonwealth entirely from the realm of Conciliation and Arbitration, only retaining 
jurisdiction over the maritime industry and public service. Despite his hope that it might 
strengthen the hand of employers, the measure split his party and was defeated on the 
floor. Labor-now able to portray itself as the defender of living standards, sound 
finance and industrial peace-won the ensuing election. (Macintyre, 1986: 250; Clark, 
1987:315) 
Yet Labor's day in the sun was short-lived. With the economy already in grave 
trouble, the Wall Street Crash heralded a storm from which no society could hope to 
take shelter. Wheat and wool markets plunged by fifty per cent-export incomes fell 
thirty per cent between 1929 and 1930 alone. Multiplier effects surged through the 
10 The coal strike too was drawn out and bitter, lasting a year. It was NSW Premier Thomas 
Bavin who directed police to ensure the mine at Rothbury continued production with non-union 
labour. He refused to pay the dole to any family which received money from the Scullin 
government's £3 million Christmas fund for the unemployed, and in February refused to pay dole 
to miners involved in the lock-out. (Clark, 1987: 326-40) 
132 
.1 
The Pacific War 1918-1945 
economy causing job losses, business failures and a vast contraction in demand. 
Unemployment exploded to over thirty per cent by the middle of 1932. Between 1929 
and 1930 GDP fell ten per cent, and by August 1930 short term debt had ballooned to 
£38 million, with long term overseas debt at £567 million. Reserves were pitifully low. 
(Macintyre, 1986: 253-4) Australia's level of borrowing and its exposure to 
international commodity markets had made it particularly vulnerable, and as the crisis 
wore on it became bitterly clear that security-whether that of the daily welfare of 
individuals or the 'economy' as a whole-lay hostage to the whims of foreign bankers 
and the vicissitudes of global economic forces. In Australia the class conflict only 
deepened as British and domestic capital fought to stem its losses, while internationally 
the depression slid inexorably into global war. 
In the ensuing years Australia's political life became paralysed by a bitter struggle 
over the direction of economic policy. Here the Labor government confronted a 
conservative Commonwealth Bank board, a hostile Senate, and eventually its own 
organisation. While few resisted the massive raising of tariffs, the Senate blocked a 
new Transport Workers Bill which would have abolished licensing and reinstated union 
members, a Wheat Marketing Bill and the Reserve Bank Bill. The conservatives, led by 
Commonwealth bank governor Sir Robert Gibson and bolstered by the report of the 
Bank of London's Sir Otto Niemeyer, argued for the full honouring of loans and the 
balancing of budgets-a programme accepted by the Premiers and formalised as the 
Melbourne Agreement. In January 1931 the Arbitration Court reduced all award wages 
by ten per cent. Other economists, fearing a threat to social order, pushed 'a judicious 
mixture of deflation and reflation' that might mitigate the severity of the depression. 
Professor L. F. Giblin told Scullin's Treasurer Joe Lyons he feared 'a bad smash with 
a chance of revolution and chaos' if the Niemeyer medicine were applied too harshly. 
Lyons' replacement E. G. Theodore drew up a plan to take Australia off the gold 
standard and begin an expansionary monetary policy which might stimulate production, 
but met Gibson's fierce opposition. NSW Premier Jack Lang struck out by declaring 
his government would suspend interest payments to London. (Macintyre, 1986: 256-
62) 
The resulting confrontation would blow the ALP apart. The NSW branch, 
dominated by Lang, was expelled, and he himself was sacked by NSW Governor Sir 
Philip Game in May 1932. Lyons resigned to form a new coalition with other 
conservative Labor members, and took the new United Australia Party (UAP) to a 
crushing win at the December 1931 election. At the Premiers Conference in May that 
year further deflation had been agreed, which combined the conversion of existing 
loans with drastic cuts in public expenditure-twenty per cent across all programs and 
twelve-and-a-half per cent for pensions. By that time as few as half the workforce had 
full-time jobs and two-thirds of all breadwinners received an income smaller than the 
133 
The Pacific War 1918-1945 
basic wage. Unemployed families lived on half a basic wage-already pegged at their 
'minimum essential requirements'-made up largely of ration coupons. Unemployed 
men were forced into unpaid labour, and eviction riots became a regular feature of the 
next decade. Still the ontology of liberal subjectivity remained strong-the common 
slogan of unemployed demonstrators was: 'We want work, not charity!' (Macintyre, 
1986: 270-80; Clark, 1987: 333) 
As the Lyons government continued to implement the harsh deflationary medicine 
of the Premiers' Plan and use the Crimes Act11 against communist activists, it sought a 
solution to the nation's trade problems in the imperial tie. At the Imperial Economic 
Conference in Ottowa in 1932 the Government agreed to the lowering of tariffs on 
British goods (mainly capital goods)-the quid pro quo being an increased possibility 
of debt conversions in London and larger Commonwealth markets for Australian 
exports. This plus the fall in wages, imports and increased tariffs led in tum to growing 
import substitution and domestic manufacturing capacity-which did not prevent 
Australian manufacturers from protesting the bargains struck at the conference. 
(Cochrane, 1980: 48) However the resentment of other trading partners led to a loss of 
wool markets, and the 1936 policy of trade diversion (which penalised imports which 
sold better than similar British lines) particularly angered the US and Japan. Here 
Australian policies cleaved with the global tendency, during the depression, of the 
industrial powers to withdraw into restrictive trade and currency blocs. Such actions 
exacerbated geopolitical tensions and were a major element in the passions which led to 
the second world war. While the economy was technically in recovery by 1932, vast 
levels of unemployment and social misery continued for the rest of the decade. At 
Ottowa and in London12 the State's managers had had to beg for new markets and the 
conversion of loans, while at home the new millions of poor remained at the mercy of 
the same wolves. While debt had obviously given British capital enormous leverage, 
more extended lines of class affinity-or 'governmental' strategy-were by no means 
clear, as the desperate conflicts over economic policy had shown. More and more, 
'security' seemed to hinge on the caprice of a vast, opaque and systemic impersonality 
which mocked the Age's Cartesian pretense at mastery. 
11 In 1932 the Crimes Act was again amended to enable the de-registration of any newspaper, 
or the withdrawal of any broadcasting licence, from organs which advocated the overthrow of 
government by violent means, and to disqualify all members of 'unlawful associations' from 
voting! {Clark, 1987: 419) Communists would now join Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders as 
political non-subjects, boundary markers for an officially sanctioned 'Australian' subjectivity. 
12 Bruce, now resident minister in London, was entrusted with the negotiations over loan 
conversions with the City of London, and also handled negotiations at Ottowa. Part of his task 
was to circumvent the efforts of the NSW Agent-General A. C. Willis to achieve a moratorium of 
repayments on behalf of Lang. (Clark, 1987: 399) Peter Cochrane also argues Bruce and the 
British bankers had common interests in keeping Labor from power: if Lyons could not deliver the 
conversions he had promised at the 1932 election, 'most members of the Lyons cabinet believed 
the people would turn to the Labor Party and Lang's repudiationism would gain widespread 
approval.' (1980: 46) 
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THE 'RIDDLE OF THE SPHINX': 
APPEASEMENT AND THE DRIFT TO WAR 
The economic disasters of the 1930s were parallelled by a steady drift to war. In 
Australia this focused attention on Japan-provoking intense debates over defence and 
foreign policy, imperial constitutional machinery, the nature of the international order 
and how the state might intervene in and control it. Although by 1945 it appeared 
Australia had assisted in securing a more ideal arrangement of geopolitical and 
economic space, the period was marked by constant frustration and anxiety over the 
Australian subject's geopolitical voice and status. This-allied with an intensification of 
the Other within the national identity-would become a major theme of the next 
decades. 
As the Chiefs' of Staff 1920 appreciation showed, Japan had early emerged as 
Australia's foremost potential antagonist. Yet by the time Australians were fighting and 
dying on the Asian mainland, Papua New Guinea or their own borders, few would 
appreciate the systemic forces which drove Japan to colonisation-the very same desire 
for economic progress and security which Australian elites had marked out as their 
own. Ironically enough, it was Hughes who issued a prescient early warning, after his 
return from the 1921 Imperial Conference: 
[Japan] wants both room ... and markets for her manufactured goods. And she 
wants these very badly indeed. America and Australia say to her millions "Ye 
cannot enter in". Japan, then, is faced with the great problem which has bred 
wars since time began ... [she] sees across a narrow strip of water 400 million 
Chinese gradually wakening to an appreciation of western methods, and she sees 
in China the natural market for her goods ... But other countries want the market 
too, and so comes the demand for the "Open Door" ... This is the problem of the 
Pacific-the modem riddle of the Sphinx, for which we must find an answer. 
(Cited in Wigmore, 1957: 1-2) 
Prescient enough, if stubborn in its refusal to pose a solution to its own 'riddle', 
betraying the general western inflexibility which, by 1941, would bear as much 
responsibility for the outbreak of war as the millennial fascism of Japan's military 
rulers. The causal chain in the drift to war is a complex one, and is further complicated 
by the desperate struggle for economic survival unleashed by the depression. Yet by the 
time western countries were seriously seeking to restrain Japanese militarism after the 
invasions of China, Korea and Indochina, the League-style sanctions on strategic 
materials appeared indistinguishable from economic self-interest. 
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While Japan was never far below the surface of strategic fears, during the 1920s 
many felt Japan was safely contained within the League, the Washington Agreements 
and the Kellogg pact. In 1930, at the League of Nations Scullin's Attorney-General 
Frank Brennan spoke of Labor's confidence in the League and the prospects for peace 
symbolised in the Washington treaties and the Kellogg Pact. He remarked that 'peace 
and security' were 'good words' but 'have both been often employed for the 
perpetuation of much folly and not a little wrong.' Showing how far debates on 
international relations had moved, Brennan enunciated a strong idealism in which he 
called for the final acceptance of a Disarmament Convention and offered Labor's 
decisions to cut military spending and cease compulsory military training as evidence of 
Australia's good faith. 'The greatest victory in history,' he declared, 'will be the 
conquest of war ... we reject the theory that preparedness for war is the best guarantee 
of peace: it may be a strong incentive to war.' Not that idealism had spilled over into 
optimism-he made special pleading for Australia's need to protect its fledgling 
manufacturing sector for 'considerations of defence', and felt that a window of 
opportunity to disarm was quickly passing, saying that 'Security, it has been said, 
must precede disarmament, but it is also true that there can be no real security as long 
as the present scale of armaments constitutes a standing provocation to war. (Meaney, 
1985: 378) 
By 1934, when Japan had taken control of Manchuria, Jehol and Shanghai and 
withdrawn from the League and the Washington agreements, that moment had clearly 
passed. Even though construction of the base at Singapore began in 1931, Hughes 
argued in his 1935 book Australia and War Today that Australia could not be defended 
or the Royal Navy relied upon to 'ensure her security'. That same year, Director of the 
Prime Minister's Department Pacific branch E. L. Piesse agreed the Royal Navy would 
be inadequate and advocated greater defence preparations-particularly land and air 
forces-but remained calm about Japan's intentions towards Australia. While it was 
likely Japan would 'extend her Empire towards Australia' that was 'far short of saying 
that she plans to annex Australia. For that there is scarcely any evidence; and in our 
view of her needs it would seem most unlikely that she has any such plan.' (Meaney, 
1985:400) 
By 1935-36 Australia's trade surplus with Japan funded over a third of Australia's 
interest payments. This growth put strain on relations with Britain, whose 
manufacturers complained when in 1935 Japan passed the UK as Australia's largest 
overseas supplier of textiles. The 1936 Trade Diversion policy could not have failed to 
annoy Japan, and was implemented at a time, according to C. A. Hawker, when 'credit 
difficulties had filled the public mind of Japan with an almost feverish sense of the 
urgency of making overseas sales ... such that they could brook no curb in markets 
where the size of their purchases appeared to give the commanding word.' Likewise 
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Lionel Wigmore has argued that: 'Australia had contributed to the fear on which 
Japan's expansionists were able to play that she was being excluded from the world's 
markets, and might be deprived of means of existence as an industrial nation.' (1957: 
5-6) 
The Lyons government responded to Japanese imperialism in Manchuria with 
appeasement. According to T. B. Millar, it did so because they were 'relieved that 
Japan had struck north-west rather than south. Subsequently the Lyons government 
assured a visiting Japanese mission that Japan had carte blanche in Manchuria.' Britain 
too made little protest beyond supporting the US decision not to recognise Japanese 
sovereignty in Manchuria. In 1933, in response to Japan's pressure for a treaty of 
commerce and navigation, Latham travelled to Japan where he tried to clarify the 
Ottowa agreement, assured the government of Australia's desire for trade, and even 
suggested Australia would help Japan gain re-admission to the League of Nations. 
(Millar, 1978: 99-100) 
In a similar vein Pearce, now Minister for External Affairs, complained in 1935 to 
US Consul-General in Sydney Jay Pierrepont Moffatt about US actions which were 
prejudicing Pacific security. These included America's refusal to join the League, the 
insistence in the five-power treaty of parity in cruisers with Britain when the Empire's 
needs were greater, and the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 under which the US would 
withdraw from the Philippines within ten years. As Moffatt recounts, Pearce felt that 
This had led Australia at large to feel that she could not count on American help in 
case of Japanese attack ... The Government remained suspicious of her ultimate 
intentions, but with British naval strength below the safety point, and with 
American aid discounted, there was no policy open to her but other than trying to 
be friendly with Japan, to give her no excuse to adopt an aggressive policy vis-a-
vis the Commonwealth, and to rejoice (irrespective of the moral aspect) every 
time Japan advanced more deeply into Manchukuo and North China. He hoped 
that her energies would be absorbed there for a generation ... (Meaney, 1985: 397) 
Diplomatic appeasement did not silence Australian fears about the likely extension of 
Japan's campaign to secure raw materials and markets throughout Asia. Lyons 
proposed to the 1937 Imperial Conference a new 'regional understanding and pact of 
non-aggression in the Pacific' along the lines of the lapsed four-power treaty, but the 
idea was never realised. In July Japan invaded China in force-Australia supported 
League resolutions condemning Japan, and in November attended a conference in 
Brussels of the Nine-Power Treaty signatories. Japan did not go, and the conference 
issued a weak declaration merely urging China and Japan to suspend hostilities. Fear 
was also driving appeasement, with one Australian memorandum prepared for the 1937 
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Imperial Conference advocating improved British relations with Japan 'to guard against 
the possibility of the British Commonwealth being faced simultaneously with the 
hostility of Germany, Italy and Japan.' (Millar, 1978: 101) 
When war broke out in Europe, the enduring fact of the imperial tie was 
underlined. It was his melancholy duty, Menzies told Australians on the 4th September 
1939, 'to inform you officially that in consequence of the persistence of Germany in 
her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her, and that as a result, 
Australia is also at war.' Labor while reaffirming 'its traditional horror of war' stated 
that it would 'do its utmost to maintain the integrity of the British Commonwealth.' 
Menzies' action derived from no personal revulsion at the Nazi regime.13 Both he and 
Lyons had supported appeasement of Germany, and after visiting Berlin in 1938 he 
wrote to Lyons of his fears that 'Czechoslovakian President Edward Benes, egged on 
by France, will refuse to do the fair thing and trouble may ensue.' (Meaney, 1985: 455, 
438) 
Strategic anxieties about the Pacific and Indian ocean areas immediately affected 
Australian decisions on its commitment to the war in Europe. Two RAN cruisers and 
five destroyers were placed under control of the Royal Navy, despite anxieties about 
Japan using the opportunity to launch attacks on Australian Pacific dependencies. 
Australia believed that Singapore would be at risk should Britain not reinforce, and the 
Netherlands East Indies (NEI) would be an attractive target for Japan should Germany 
invade Holland. These fears seemed confirmed when the Japanese Foreign Minister 
announced that Japan would be concerned by any European developments that affected 
the status of the NEI, provoking the US to issue a declaration that they would consider 
any alteration of the NEI's status 'by other than peaceful means' to be prejudicial to the 
'stability, peace and security' of the Pacific. The Japanese Foreign Ministry feared that 
Britain would occupy the NEI, with US support, while the US was concerned for its 
supplies of tin and rubber should Japan take over. In this light Germany's invasion of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on the 10th May made war with Japan 
seem inevitable. (Cited in Millar, 1978: 138; McQueen, 1991: 40) 
By 1940 Australia had already decided to declare war on Japan should they invade 
the NEI, but in view of their uncertainty about the intentions of the USA, made no 
advance commitment to the Dutch. Australia had also allocated some of its expanding 
war production to New Zealand and the NEI. On 8 February 1941 Roosevelt told the 
13 Menzies wrote to Bruce in London in September 1939 of his fears that 'both Italy and Japan 
may very well decide to carve up Great and Greater Britain.' Then speaking of the likelihood of 
war with Germany following the invasion of Poland, he speculated on the rationale that might be 
offered for its prosecution: 'How is this war to be sustained? Not by the cry of 'Protect Poland' 
because, ex hypothesi, Poland will have been defeated; not by the cry of 'Revenge Poland', for 
nobody really cares a damn about Poland as such; not by the cry of 'Down with the Nazi 
Government' for it is really quite indefensible for us to be dictating to the German people what 
sort of Government they shall have. The cry then must be, in effect, 'law and order and an end of 
terrorism in Europe'. (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 459) 
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British that the US would be unlikely to enter the war if Japan attacked only British or 
Dutch possessions, and that even if they did become involved they would only fight a 
'holding war' in the Pacific while sending forces and materiel to the Atlantic theatre. 
US plans were to hold naval forces in reserve at Hawaii, rather than send them to 
defend Singapore, Malaya or the Philippines. Soon after the US transferred part of its 
Pacific fleet to the Atlantic. This move was made in consultation with Britain, but 
exacerbated Australian fears. Australian commitments to the Atlantic theatre were also 
dictated by British strategic interest. Three Australian divisions were deployed to the 
Middle East to reinforce the Mediterranean-Suez-Indian Ocean route, and to assist 
Britain maintain its control over Palestine, the Iranian oilfields and the northwest 
frontier of India. In the Pacific, Australia considered occupying French colonial 
territory to pre-empt Japan, and in September 1940 sent a cruiser to New Caledonia to 
facilitate the assumption of power by supporters of the Free French movement. 
Australian troops were reluctantly deployed to Malaya and Singapore in late 1940. 
(Millar, 1978: 137-140; McQueen, 1991: 44) 
As 1941 wore on Japan-obsessed with access to oil supplies as a guarantee of its 
naval power-became antagonised by the US tactic of 'using appeasement to mask 
slow strangulation', backed by an oil embargo and restrictions on shipping which 
would limit its ability to import oil. Japan sought guarantees of access to supplies from 
the NEI, serving notice on the NEI administration in September 1940 that it would need 
three million tons of oil per year over the next five years, and concessions so it could 
remove its dependence on Stanvac and Royal-Dutch Shell. The attacks on Pearl 
Harbor, and later on Darwin and Broome, were designed to neutralise threats to the 
Japanese navy and provide 'six months to secure the oil and refineries of the 
Netherlands East Indies.' Japanese forces landed in Borneo on 21 January 1942 and in 
Sumatra on 15 February, only to find that workers at the Stanvac refinery in Palembang 
had burned the plant, sealed the wells and cut pipelines, setting back production by up 
to a year. (McQueen, 1991: 39-46) 
THE PACIFIC WAR: 
SECURITY, IDENTITY AND THE OTHER 
The automatic declaration of war in 1939, the faith in the Royal Navy and the swift 
dispatch of forces to protect the lifelines of Imperial trade and capital, suggest that 
Australia's immersion in the greater subjectivity of the Imperial body-politic was still an 
overwhelming fact. Once again, Australians had been sent to defend 'peace and order' 
in Europe, even as Menzies feared that 'millions of French and British lives will be 
lost, and .. the economic force which will be our ultimate weapon will tend to affect us 
as severely as it does Germany.' As he had made clear in his correspondence to Lyons 
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earlier that year, the conflict was not a moral one: 'it is really quite indefensible for us to 
be dictating to the German people what sort of government they shall have.' (Meaney, 
1985: 459) Labor supported the declaration of war, yet opposition leader John Curtin 
opposed the immediate dispatch of the AIF for Europe, with a major element of his 
concern being Australia's own defence, particularly if the Netherlands was invaded and 
a vacuum appeared in the East Indies. As ever, Japan was the shadow falling across 
such words. (Lloyd-Ross, 1977: 184) 
Memories of the Great War and its effect on the labour movement also weighed on 
his mind. He was concerned by the possible impact of the new National Security Act-
under which the Government was already deciding which meetings could be held-and 
in November 1939 he warned: 
The paramount thing in this war is that, however the war ends, its termination 
must see in Australia a united, well-organised, clear-thinking labor movement, so 
that the trophies of victory won'tjust be for non-workers ... war might smash this 
party again-conscription would tear us apart as before-we may get our political 
opportunity and wedges will be driven in our ranks by every militant, every 
militarist, every politician, every opportunist. We-Australia-you-the party-
me-the Movement-we're all threatened. (Cited in Lloyd-Ross, 1977: 184) 
Earlier that month he spoke of his concerns about the effects of the war on the class 
structure, both internationally and in Australia. Aware of the potential of war and 
nationalism to strengthen the hand of Capital, he outlined Labor's vision of the post-
war political and economic order, at least as it stood in 1939: 
It is not the reshaping of maps and territories that is our concern. Our concern is 
for peace, security and safety, and economic order of the type that Labor believes 
is the foundation upon which peace is practicable ... Our conception of national 
unity, which we regard as imperative in ensuring the maximum strength in time 
of war, does not imply that we condone profiteering and exploitation, or any 
violation of the civic liberties of the people ... we must not allow the instruments 
of production and exchange to be used to build up economic power for a 
privileged class in our own country. (Cited in Lloyd-Ross, 1977: 186) 
This discourse-with its rhetoric of unity, its concern for governmental reason and 
strength, and its belief in a war for freedom-is clearly recognisable as a vision of 
security, but it was one with important differences from that harboured by the 
conservatives. It will worth recalling later, when the government led by Curtin's 
successor, Joseph Benedict Chifley, was in a position to influence the post-war 
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order-with the objective of realising just this vision of security. Then Australia would 
still struggle to assert its voice and autonomy in international affairs, whether in their 
diplomatic, economic or strategic dimensions. As they had in 1919, the 'symbolic' 
dimensions of identity affected its ability to speak, the nature of that speech, and the 
actions it drove and explained. In particular the ontological anchor of that identity-the 
fear and revulsion of Japan, intensified by the experience and language of war-helped 
to lay the basis for Australia's entry into the Cold War. This discursive paving 
parallelled the nuclear annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which would be at once 
the closing atrocities of the Pacific war and the opening salvoes of the one to follow. 
A revealing account of what was at stake in 1939 has been provided by official 
historian (later Liberal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Governor-General) Sir Paul 
Hasluck. Opening the first of his two volumes, The Government and the People, he 
argued that as security had now become so crucial, national identity-rather than being 
some kind of cultural ephemera-was a paramount political consideration. The major 
significance of the war, he declared, was that 'it made Australia face up to the double 
challenge of national survival': 
the two great practical tests of economic and social responsibility and of national 
security, and the far more searching test of the strength of those spiritual forces 
which hold a people together as a nation, giving the nation a reason for its being, 
an identity and purpose .. .Its people had to come together as one people in one 
effort. It came to understand in more brutal terms what its claim to nationhood 
meant and to meet the stark and single issue of survival. (Hasluck, 1952: 1) 
In 1939, he argued, 'Australia' stood on the edge of the conflict as a problematic unity. 
While nationalism had been 'fervent' in 1914, 'nationhood was still the bold outline of 
an idea rather than a completed structure, a manifesto rather than a fact.' Twenty-five 
years later, the depression had dramatically weakened the sense of 'pride' and 
'accomplishment' achieved by the spirit of Anzac: the ideal of 'mateship' was dimmed 
by the new meaning given to the 'class struggle', while the punishing interest paid to 
London made Australians see 'the overseas investor, usually a British investor, as 
unfriendly ... '. Of particular concern was the new class-consciousness which, 'when 
carried to the point of class antagonism, tends to undermine mutual trust, to set the 
claims of class above the claims of all the people, and thus to weaken the identity of 
common interests and purposes on which national loyalties are nurtured.' (1952: 6-7) 
Nationalism was above all a political technology, with implications both for the 
conduct of the war and a future societal order. In tum the way in which the war was 
conducted, experienced and narrated could affect the character of national unity. The 
anxiety was over class and national power, and over a task of administration which 
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stretched from the vast mobilisation of national populations and resources to the inner 
beliefs of individuals-beliefs which now, aggravated by the 'personal hardship and 
disappointment' of the depression, were poisoned by 'bitterness, resentment, and a 
cynical lack of enthusiasm.' How was such a population to be roused? How could such 
a disparate array of interests and subjectivities-not to mention their leaders-be 
convinced of their responsibilities to 'the precarious existence of a small nation in a 
world of power'? (1952: 5-6) 
While there appeared to be a broad political consensus on the potential demands of 
war, Curtin's suspicions showed that such anxieties had a strong basis in reality. With 
the stakes so high, the war would constitute a defining experience of security in which 
the limits and possibilities of the Australian subject would be clarified. Of particular 
moment would be the fate and nature of this wartime politics of identity-its links to 
older narratives like Anzac, its ability to formulate new problems and fields of action, 
and the nature of the order which would be its result. Would this order resemble the 
completed ideal of the Labor vision, or something more problematic again? What would 
be its conditions-historical, political, ontological, economic? In considering these 
questions, the way in which the events and experiences of the war were narrated, both 
retrospectively and as they were experienced, would be crucial. 
This narrative-in which a sense of insecurity and moral grievance would 
coalesce-hinged on an account of the war's origins, its conduct, and the question of 
whether Australia in fact faced the threat of Japanese invasion. Much subsequent 
Australian policy-most significantly the ANZUS alliance-has drawn on this story, 
and its importance for the Australian identity and its deployment into a whole series of 
subsequent cultural, economic and strategic formations cannot be underestimated. 
Official wartime rhetoric often overlooked a measured assessment of Japanese actions 
(in terms of their strategic and economic objectives) in favour of demonising them, 
enforcing a perception that the West confronted a militaristic and alien civilisation with 
fundamentally different values. While Australians did have a real basis for much of 
their anxiety or revulsion-arising out of the fear of invasion in early 1942 and the 
experience of prisoners of war-this projection is not self-evident, and helped to 
legitimate the firebombings of Japanese cities and the atomic destruction of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. One can also speculate upon how such projections fed the deeper 
cultural assumptions underlying later strategic assessments of Asian threat, and thus 
eased consciences over the consequent bloodshed. Thus this period raises significant 
questions in which narrative unity and moral certitude can no longer be assumed. 
Japan's invasion of Indochina in 1940, and its attack on Pearl Harbor and landings 
in Malaya in December 1941, were particularly disturbing to the Australian strategic 
imagination. Prior to that, a sense of security had hinged both on the promise of the 
British fleet base in Singapore and the continuity of French control in Indochina, 
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Britain in Malaya, the US in the Philippines and the Netherlands in the Indonesian 
archipelago. Imperialism represented both political stability and the natural order of 
things, in which the brutalities meted out by colonial powers were of little moment. 
Thus the long-feared rise of an Asian power was as much a potent psychological shock 
as a geopolitical setback. 
Australia's constitutional immersion in the imperial body-politic, and its 
identification of security with the western imperial status quo, coalesced in the 
declaration of war with Japan on 9 December 1941. It was made, Curtin said, because 
'Japanese naval and air forces launched an unprovoked attack on British and United 
States territory'. Further reasons were, he added without irony, 'because our vital 
interests are imperilled and because the rights of free people in the Pacific are assailed.' 
(emphasis added) The psychological trauma became even more acute after the fall of 
Singapore on 15 February 1942, with the accompanying loss of 18,000 troops as 
prisoners of war, and the consolidation of Japan's hold on the NEI.14 It had long been 
a belief-confirmed in a strategic appreciation of 11December1941-that the capture 
of both territories would 'enable the Japanese to invade Australia.' As if to emphasise 
that crucial questions of identity hinged on the confrontation, Curtin declared that: 'The 
fall of Singapore opens up the battle for Australia. On its issue depends not merely the 
fate of this Commonwealth but the frontier of the United States of America and, indeed, 
all of the Americas, and therefore in large measure the fate of the English-speaking 
world.' (Wigmore, 1952: 382; Hasluck, 1970: 13, 71, 102) 
In response 2,500 AIF were dispatched to Koepang (West Timor) and Ambon, 
including an Independent Company of 250, which was landed in Dili on the 17th 
December 1941 against the express wishes of the Portugese Government. The Japanese 
landed 1500 troops a month later. The Australians remained on the island for twelve 
months, carrying out guerilla style-raids on the Japanese with the crucial aid of local 
tribes. The consequences of the Australian presence were devastating. With their NEI 
perimeter breached at its very centre, a 20,000 strong Japanese occupation force fought 
ongoing Timorese and Portugese resistance for the next four years, carrying out terrible 
reprisals in areas where the Australians had been active. At least forty thousand 
Timorese died from the combined effects of Japanese violence, famine induced by crop 
destruction, and devastating allied bombing from bases near Darwin. In his book 
Timor: A People Betrayed, James Dunn speculates that had the Australians not landed 
the Japanese may have deployed only a token force, or none at alI.15 This experience 
14 A total of 130,000 allied prisoners of war were captured, among them 38,000 Britons, 67,000 
Indians and 14,000 Malay and Chinese. During the campaign Australia lost 1,789 killed and 
1,306 wounded. (Wigmore, 1957: 382) 
15 Dunn writes: 'First, because of the Salazar regime's fascist inclinations, the colony would 
most certainly have escaped the more serious effects of the war had the allies not intruded. 
After all, Macau was never occupied. Second, by actively soliciting the support of both 
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was to initiate a long history-felt most intensely again with the Indonesian invasion of 
197 5-in which the fate of the Timorese became hostage to an interpretation of how the 
tiny island was crucial to Australia's security.16 After the Australian commandos left in 
January 1943, leaflets were dropped over the island saying: 'We will never forget you.' 
(Hasluck, 1970: 102; Dunn, 1983: 22) 
Even two months before the fall of Singapore, as news from Malaya worsened and 
the Japanese expanded their perimeter east by capturing Rabaul, there were intense 
anxieties in Australia about invasion. American troops en-route to the Philippines 
during the Pearl Harbor attack were diverted to Australia and Curtin asked Churchill for 
the return of a division from the Middle East to reinforce either the NEI or the 
Australian mainland. At the end of December Curtin made his famous broadcast-
which some have read as a 'strategic tum' to the USA-in which he appealed for a 
'solid and impregnable barrier of democracies', including the Soviet Union, 'against 
the three axis powers': 
... we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a 
subordinate segment of the general conflict. .. the United States and Australia must 
have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies fighting plan. Without any 
inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free 
of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom. We 
know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat 
of invasion. We know the dangers of the dispersal of strength. But we know, 
too, that Australia can go but Britain can still hold on. (Cited in Hasluck, 1970: 
39; emphasis added) 
The anxiety in the statement was palpable, and at its heart was the claim for the fullest 
participation in the higher direction of the war. During this period the Australian 
government struggled to gain access to the highest allied councils, with a particular 
anxiety being the agreement reached between Churchill and Roosevelt that the European 
Portugese and Timorese, and by conducting an effective guerilla campaign, the commandos 
brought the territory into the front line of the war, and then withdrew after only twelve months, in 
effect abandoning an almost defenceless population to the whims of a vengeful and oppressive 
invader.' (1982: 23-4) Another crucial factor was the fear of the Japanese High Command, in late 
1942, that the Allies were planning an all-out attack into the Indies, which provoked the decision 
to reinforce so heavily. (Long, 1973: 223) 
16 An Australian Chiefs' of Staff appreciation, dated 29 January 1942, stated that 'Timor and 
Ambon guard the eastern approaches to Darwin, an important naval and air operating base, and 
the eastern terminal of the Malay barrier. With the encirclement of the Philippines, Ambon is now 
virtually in the front line, while the threat to Timor is no less direct though perhaps further 
removed in point of time.' (Cited in Hasluck, 1970: 37) 
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and Atlantic theatres would be first priority, and that substantial resources would not be 
committed to the Pacific until Germany was defeated.17 (Hasluck, 1970: 44-53) 
These concerns were also the theme of an extraordinary national broadcast by 
Curtin on Australia Day 1942, which drew on the whole panoply of national myths in 
an effort to rouse his people and assert Australia's claim to international subjectivity: 
The whole philosophy of the way of life for which we are fighting means that in 
wartime it is more important even than in peacetime that consultation as equals 
should mark the activities, firstly of those charged with the government of a 
democracy, and secondly those jointly representing the several democracies ... Our 
men have shown the stuff of which we are made on many a death-charged 
battlefield ... We, therefore, claim the right to bring to the collaborating council 
table the same fighting calibre, the same passionate determination which is our 
heritage from the past and our possession in the present. (Hasluck, 1970: 55) . 
Here Curtin, the man gaoled as a conscientious objector for five days in 1917, 
shamelessly invoked the terms of the Anzac Tradition-without a shudder of irony. In 
turn he introduced it into a mythic patchwork which might bind the present moment into 
a seamless narrative ideal: 
The flame of freedom lit in this land by our first settlers, and kept aglow by the 
generations which followed, is not extinguishable by any enemy .. .I pay tribute to 
intrepid explorers, hardy pioneers, great citizens, statesmen, industrialists, men 
and women of the land, heroic warriors, and all those nation-building spirits 
whose works have come down to us. We dedicate ourselves to their noble 
aspirations. (Cited in Hasluck, 1970: 55) 
He could not be accused of lacking a sense of occasion. On a day marking the 
anniversary of Phillip's establishment of a British colony at Port Jackson in 1788, 
Curtin sought to draw together all the narrative threads of Australian identity and 
subjectivity, and bring them to bear with all the force of a noble and irrefutable 
17 During December 1941 Australia sought the establishment of a combined Allied council to 
make strategic decisions about the Pacific war effort, but was forced to accept a division of 
command between a Pacific War Council in London-upon which New Zealand, Australia, the UK 
and the Netherlands were represented-and a Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in 
Washington. Until General Douglas Macarthur was established in Australia as Supreme 
Commander of all forces in the south-west Pacific area, representations to the US were made 
through Britain. Similar anxieties, and Australia's historic construction of Pacific strategic 
space, drove the resistance to British plans to divide the areas to Australia's north and 
northwest into two separate commands. They were eventually unified as the South-West Pacific 
Area (SWPA) under Macarthur in March 1942. Curtin also obtained Australian representation on 
the British War Cabinet, later cabling Churchill to request that Australia be given prior warning of 
all policy developments, and time in which to formulate and submit its own views before 
decisions were taken. (Hasluck, 1970: 53; Horner, 1978: 60-1) 
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tradition-past, present and future welded into an organic unity, in which prior acts of 
work and colonisation might inspire others to secure the anxious linkage between soil, 
sovereignty and identity against its gravest ever danger. In turn their example would be 
the basis for a future vision of progress when the crisis was over. The speech was itself 
a significant landmark. With its emphasis on freedom, colonisation, citizenship and 
productivity, it was a potent culmination of the 'political double-bind', the linked 
images of individual, national and international subjectivity which had been central to 
the 150 year-old Australian politics of security. It marked a point when the war, via its 
integration into a larger mythic trajectory, might be able to reunify an atomised 
community: identity secured by a defining structure of otherness in which the Asian 
enemy threatened the anxious claim of British civilisation to the continent, while the 
land's true owners-absent from the breathless list of 'nation-building spirits'-
functioned yet again as a silence at the heart of the idealist movement of 'nationhood'. 
Of note too was the appearance of a phrase which would become commonplace as a 
signifier of identity: the 'way of life.' Richard White suggests that, from the 1940s on, 
it replaced the idea of a racial or national type as the basis of the Australian identity. 
While this account may be too stark-Curtin's address suggests that it was being 
combined with older 'types' rather than abolishing them-it may have been effective by 
imagining identity as a process rather than an achieved state, as a series of everyday 
practices that included the most humble persons and tasks, rather than restricting 
Australianness to a pantheon of unattainable myths. In turn individuals might be made 
more accessible to power, and their immersion in the collective identity more natural. In 
the language which spoke of 'the way of life for which we are fighting' the smallest 
daily activity-the preparation of a meal, a game of backyard cricket-could be linked 
with the terrible abstraction and responsibilities of a global war. (White, 1981: 158) 
In using this language Curtin was aware of the vast challenges of administration 
posed by the need to re-orient industry to war production, control movements of capital 
and investment, direct and manage labour and build up the defence forces. Curtin 
defended the Economic Organisation Regulations-under which prices, interest rates 
and capital movements were controlled and profits limited to a four per cent return on 
capital-by arguing that they would 'impart strength and stability to the economic 
structure' and 'establish a basis for attaining unity of effort' which 'demands a common 
belief that we are not only fighting for our existence as a nation but also for new ideals 
of community life worthy of the great struggle.' Control of the industrial system was 
also intensified: absenteeism was outlawed and wages pegged to cost-of-living rises. 
Under these and other laws contained in the National Security Regulations government 
took vast new powers to prohibit the manufacture of goods, shift labour from industry 
to industry (or to the services), assume the use of property and force citizens to carry 
out any war-related task it directed. To facilitate the more efficient control of population 
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a national system of identity cards was established. And in early 1943, after months of 
debate, Curtin succeeded in introducing conscription for overseas service within the 
South West Pacific Area. In doing so he overcame the opposition of members like 
Calwell and Ward, but found an ally in the communist leadership of the Federated 
ironworkers. The Australian Worker declared the Bill contravened the policy of the 
labour movement and 'violated a cardinal article of Australia' s .. faith in the unforced 
heroism of her sons.' (Hasluck, 1970: 116, 341) 
In December 1941 Curtin urged the people to accept government direction without 
question. Again the language referred to a familiar ontology: 
Having regard to the present necessity I say that, as the very integrity of this 
nation is at stake; as the security of its people is involved; as the whole future 
sovereignty as a territory for Australian people is an issue; there can be no 
subordinating of these paramount...considerations to the satisfying of individual 
or sectional grievances .. .I shall be accused of trespassing on the rights and 
privileges of the people of Australia. On the contrary ... by conduct of this nature, 
their rights and liberties can best be secured to them. (Cited in Hasluck, 1970: 56) 
Particularly crucial industries were transport and energy. In January 1942 Curtin 
brought a waterside strike to an end by telling workers he would revoke their 
exemptions from military service. 'The men who are not in the fighting forces,' he 
said, 'and will not work are as much the enemies of this country as the enlisted legions 
of the enemy.' The Government sought to control unrest in the coal industry by 
appealing to the Coal Employees Federation, and invoking regulations which penalised 
miners who refused to work against the advice of their union.18 Curtin sought to 
assure workers that Labor wanted 'justice for the workers and victory in the war. The 
first, even if we get it now, would only be temporary if the other were not 
accomplished.' Addressing wharf labourers in Fremantle he warned them, in the 
starkest terms possible: 'We have to concentrate on the one supreme task which the 
enemy has imposed upon us. We have to defeat him or die.' (Hasluck, 1970: 56-60) 
Defeat him or die-it was phrased as a choice, but offered none. As Curtin had 
already sought to impress, Australia's very survival hinged on the confrontation, and 
during 1942 the stark image of vulnerability it contained would be emblazoned on the 
collective imagination. The repetition of these fears endured long after any real moment 
of crisis had passed and eventually passed into popular memory-in the face of later 
18 The Labor Government appeared to manage industrial relations more effectively than the 
Menzies and Fadden governments, but working days lost were still high (if far below the peaks of 
the early 1920s). In the six quarters between January 1942 and June 1943 there were 1,032 
disputes with a loss of 939,433 days. Comparable figures for the six quarters March 1940-June 
1941 were 592 disputes and 1, 763,075 days lost. (Hasluck, 1971: 262) 
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knowledge of Japan's wartime intentions. The success of this image of danger 
depended first on establishing that Australia would die if it did not prevail, and second, 
on a narrative of the conditions under which it would eventually do so. 
The period between the attack on Pearl Harbour and June 1942 was a genuinely 
frightening one. Japan's intentions were unknown, and its successes alarmingly swift. 
At the fall of Singapore Australia lost one of its four AIF divisions-the equivalent of a 
loss of 100,000 men to the USA-and felt utterly unable to repel any concerted attack. 
It watched as Japan bombed Darwin, Wyndham and Broome, causing hundreds of 
casualties, took Rabaul, Lae and Salamanua in PNG, and consolidated control over 
Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and the North Pacific Islands. In 
February 1942, immediately after the fall of Singapore, the Australian and New 
Zealand COS argued that Australasia was 'in danger of attack..not so much from the 
aspect of economic exploitation as from a desire to deny these territories to us as bases 
for future Allied counter-offensive action.' Possible lines of attack were from the NEI 
to northern Australia or down the west coast, or through PNG to eastern Australia. 
Such views fed later beliefs that the Japanese drive on Port Moresby-thwarted in the 
Coral Sea and on the Kokoda track-were preludes to an invasion of the mainland. 
(Hasluck, 1970: 71) 
Yet while later strategic appreciations-whether of the British, the Australian 
Chiefs of Staff or Macarthur-tended to play down the danger of invasion in force, 
political leaders consistently placed this prospect before the public as an impending fact. 
In late February Curtin warned Australians their country was 'in imminent peril'; a 
month later MacArthur's first strategic appreciation suggested that a general invasion, 
beyond raids or an attempt to secure air bases, was unlikely. Neither Washington nor 
London ever saw invasion as probable-they thought Japan would seek to isolate 
Australia by occupying a chain of bases from PNG to Samoa. While the occupation of 
Darwin and raids on the coast were possible (to neutralise strategic threats and divert 
Allied forces), it was thought Russia would be the next major offensive if Japan's 
position improved. While Curtin accepted such analysis, at the end of April he 
continued to assert that 'an outright attack on Australia remains a constant and 
undiminished danger.' (Hasluck, 1970: 162; Homer, 1982: 183) 
Even after the naval battle in the Coral Sea-which seemed an indecisive 
engagement at the time, but was later interpreted as crucial to finally securing the 
Australian mainland-Curtin expressed fears about invasion: 
If Japan should move in force against Australia and obtain a foothold, as 
threatened to occur last week with the Coral Sea action, it may be too late to send 
assistance. Possibly in the long run the territory might be recovered but the 
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country may have been ravished and the people largely decimated. (Hasluck, 
1970: 164) 
At the battle of the Coral Sea in May the Japanese were thwarted from a seaborne drive 
on Port Moresby (not Australia), losing one carrier and sustaining damage to another; 
the Allies lost a carrier, a destroyer and an oiler. Yet the battle of Midway Island (4-7 
June) when Japan lost four carriers and a cruiser, was a more decisive blow to the 
Japanese Navy-it had lost the majority of its carrier fleet and would never recover. 
These two actions, and the arrival of twelve US divisions, had made a Japanese 
invasion of Australia impossible. Yet on the 17th June, in a radio broadcast appealing 
for subscriptions to the second liberty loan, Curtin again spoke of 'the menace that 
Japan presents at our very threshold .. .! say it flatly that Australia can be lost ... Had the 
outcome of the Coral Sea battle been adverse who could give guarantees as to the 
consequences for Australia? That battle was crucial with fate.' (Hasluck, 1970: 168) 
Out of such untruths myths are made. In this case, the Battle of the Coral Sea 
would be abstracted from the chaos of the war as a defining moment in Australian 
history-used by conservatives ever since as a legitimising narrative for Australian 
adherence to the ANZUS Alliance. Much of this centred on the Australian American 
Association's sponsorship of the annual Coral Sea Week celebrations.19 Ironically, 
Evatt could have contributed: in a March 1945 speech he said that had 'the Japanese 
triumphed in the battle of the Coral Sea either Australia would have been heavily 
invaded, or at least the key islands commanding the southern Pacific sea and air routes 
would have been occupied by the enemy.' As Humphrey Mc Queen suggests, by 
repeating the fiction that the Japanese had been intent on taking Australia, and 
emphasising an event in which the RAN played little role, the battle became 'the ideal 
clash of arms through which to demonstrate how dependent Australia had to be on the 
US military.' (Evatt, 1945: 118; McQueen, 1991: 285-91) 
To this narrative was added a series of emotional declarations about the fraternity 
between Australians and Americans in which mutual interest, shared values and cultural 
affinity converged. Yet the US decision to defend Australia was coldly strategic. In 
December 1941, soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Marshall had asked 
Eisenhower (then a Brigadier on his staff) to recommend a course of action if the US 
was driven from the Philippines. Eisenhower replied that Australia was 
19 This author was present at a Coral Sea Week dinner, organised by the Australian American 
Association, at the Sheraton Wentworth Hotel in Sydney in 1988. The importance of the battle for 
Australian security, and the great fraternity between Australia and the US, was emphasised by 
the guest of honour, US Vice-President Dan Quayle, visiting Australia for the Bicentennial 
celebrations which also included a port visit by the battleship USS Missouri. See McQueen 
(1991: 285-95) for an account of the Cold-War politics behind the celebrations. 
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the base nearest to the Philippines that we could hope to establish and maintain, 
and the necessary line of air communications would therefore follow along the 
islands intervening between that continent and the Philippines. If we were to use 
Australia as a base it was mandatory that we procure a line of communications 
leading to it. This meant that we must instantly move to save Hawaii, Fiji, New 
Zealand and New Caledonia, and we had to make certain of the safety of 
Australia itself. (Cited in Watt, 1967: 68) 
Having failed to take Port Moresby by sea, the Japanese sought to do so by land, 
launching an ultimately abortive drive across the Owen Stanley ranges in July 1942. 
They managed to drive the Australians to within 30 miles of the coast before 
withdrawing their starving and exhausted troops. An Australian counterattack, assisted 
by the US airforce and army units, then drove the remaining Japanese from the Papuan 
mainland-with the loss of 625 Australians killed and 1,055 wounded. This was the 
fabled four-month Kokoda campaign, which has since passed into mythology. In his 
history of the campaign, Blood and Iron, Lex McAulay argues that it 'has taken its 
place in Australian history alongside the landing at Gallipoli, the charge at Beersheba, 
and the siege of Tobruk ... [It] marked a pivotal point in Australian awareness. It was 
that occasion when, for the first time, Australians were fighting for their own homeland 
without the protection of large and powerful friends.' (McAulay, 1991: 1) 
The mythic significance of the Kokoda campaign-which occurred at the same time 
as Australians repelled a force attacking Milne Bay near Port Moresby, and the US 
Navy inflicted a grave defeat on the Japanese at Guadalcanal-turns on a combination 
of strategic perception and potent imagery. The first hinges on the way the campaign 
was interpreted, then and since, as narrowly thwarting a Japanese takeover of Port 
Moresby and then Australia. In September Curtin, in a national broadcast to open his 
campaign for austerity, argued that: 'Our fate is in the balance as I speak to you. The 
battle of the Solomons is not only vital in itself, but.represents a phase of the Japanese 
drive in which is wrapped up invasion of Australia.' If Port Moresby and Darwin fell 
Australia would be faced with 'a bloody struggle on our soil, a struggle in which we 
would be forced to fight grimly, city by city, village by village, until our fair land might 
become a blackened ruin.' If Curtin should have known Japan had no plans to invade 
Australia by this time-US communications intercepts had revealed this as early as 
April-later historians have been just as culpable. Even though he acknowledges that it 
was later known Japan never planned an invasion of Australia, McAulay's wording still 
suggests the Australians were protecting their 'homeland', while the military historian 
David Homer argued in 1996 that 'in retrospect it is clear' that the campaign 'was of 
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crucial importance to the security of Australia. •20 This despite having written, over 
twenty years earlier, that 'The Japanese High Command never really agreed to invade 
Australia.' (McAulay, 1991: 2; Homer, 1996: 139-49 and 1978: 46) 
Curtin's colorful and alarming imagery, cutting through the fog of censorship 
which limited Australians' knowledge of the war, would have seized the public 
imagination and enforced the significance of the later victory. In this Kokoda had 
something over Gallipoli, while sharing its images of bravery and hardship, the 
struggle to prevail against the great odds posed by not merely a fanatical enemy but the 
steep terrain, the heat and jungle, the difficulties in obtaining supplies and evacuating 
wounded. Historians like McAulay have also invoked older images of youth, courage 
and ingenuity in the unseen challenges of the Owen Stanley Ranges, crowning them 
with a stark and enduring image of the Other: 'the great physical hardships to be 
endured in the cruel terrain and climate .. the relentless mental strain of close combat in 
jungle .. a merciless and barbaric enemy who had stepped from the Dark Ages, and who 
had to be exterminated rather than simply defeated.' (1991: 413) 
The campaign also gave Australia some moving images, among them Damien 
Parer's film of a blinded digger being helped along the track by a mate.21 In this, one 
of the most' repeated and enduring images of the Pacific War, Australians saw not 
merely a portrait of victory and heroism but of suffering and pain; its impact was not to 
encourage militarism, but rather a sense of vulnerability in the face of an implacable and 
alien enemy. In this way Kokoda, like Gallipoli, formed a crucial event in the 
progressive reinterpretation of the national identity.22 Kokoda appeared as evidence of 
direct Asian threat, fulfilling fears which had coursed through the Australian identity for 
decades-an identity in tum strengthened around the scene of its bloody confrontation 
and narrow defeat. What was left however was a residue of vulnerability, and a 
20 Homer's record here is rather odd. In the introduction to his edited volume The Battles that 
Shaped Australia-prefaced by journalist Paul Kelly as an uncritical lesson in the significance of 
war to 'our history, our progress and our identity as a people'-he argues that the period between 
Pearl Harbor and the end of 1942 'marked a turning point in Australian history .. .for the first time, 
modern Australia faced the direct threat of invasion.' An identical claim opens his 1996 book The 
War Cabinet. Yet in the 1994 volume he writes a thoughtful chapter debunking the myth that the 
Coral Sea battle saved Australia from invasion, referencing both Japan's strategic decisions and 
the knowledge Australian leaders could have been assumed to have had available to them. He 
concludes that while it is unfair to accuse the Government of manufacturing a threat in February 
and March 1942, by the end of April communications intercepts had clearly revealed an invasion 
of Australia was ruled out. (1994: xiii, 161) 
21 The image formed part of a sequence in Parer's Academy Award winning film Kokoda Front 
Line. His work is discussed by Peter Luck in the historical popularisation (first a TV series and 
then a book) This Fabulous Century. (142) 
22 In his essay Gallipoli to Petrov, Humphrey McQueen argues that 'In place of the Anzac 
legend' the Australian nation was born on the Kokoda track; or at least Kokoda formed 'the focal 
point in a decade of rebirth.' (McQueen, 1984: 4) It should be clear that my own narrative is less 
stark than this-his point however is that Kokoda formed a focal point for an 'enormous upsurge 
of race patriotism' and had a unifying potential which was lacking in the class war of the 1920s 
and the heartbreak of the depression. In this sense his argument is not far removed from that of 
Hasluck. 
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consequent strategic dependency. The binary structure of (vulnerable) identity versus 
threatening otherness thus took on enormous force-as historically true-which 
enabled it to be later emptied out and replaced with new actors and threat scenarios. 
Insecurity, as much as national pride, would be the event's enduring legacy. 
Thus the debates over Japan's intentions and the significance of the campaign are of 
some moment. While acknowledging Japan had no invasion plans, David Horner 
argues that 'the security of Australia' depended 'on the battle for Port Moresby'-if it 
were captured the Japanese could strike at North Queensland, and if Fiji were also 
taken, the communications line between Australia and the US would be cut, hampering 
the buildup of forces for a counterattack. From there, he speculates the Japanese 
command may have changed its mind and landed in North Queensland. Thus he has it 
both ways-there were no intentions to invade Australia but it may still have been 
possible-preserving the link with Curtin's outrageous alarmism. While his 
scholarship is accurate, the speculation ignores the problems the Japanese faced in their 
attempts to take Port Moresby. The extension of supply lines and the lack of 
reinforcements was a major decision in the Japanese Army's success in ruling out an 
invasion of Australia itself in March. Whilst the Navy believed Australia could be held 
with five divisions, the Army argued that twelve divisions would be needed, as well as 
1.5 million tons of shipping to transport the invasion force, and that providing effective 
air cover would be difficult. Nor were these plans backed by assessments of the direct 
economic interest that had motivated the takeovers of the NEI, China or Malaya. 
Australia did not appear in schemas of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
except as an independent nation with which trade would be required for economic 
survival. By Midway in June Japan's Pacific fleet was crippled, and the US fleet 
expanding rapidly to give it overwhelming superiority. Yet Horner argued that the 
battles in August were crucial. 23 Instead the Japanese Commander Admiral Inoue 
found that his attempts to secure his NEI-Rabaul perimeter by taking Moresby or 
Guadalcanal foundered on the inability to supply his men or transport sufficient forces. 
The starvation faced by the withdrawing Japanese troops, reduced to eating roots and 
grasses, presaged no future threat to Australia. (Homer, 1994: 208-9; McQueen, 1991: 
269-88; McAulay, 1991: 412) 
As the tide of battle turned against the Japanese at the end of 1942, the minds of 
Australian leaders became focused on the post-war period. Here the question of 
Australia's international subjectivity would bear on anxieties about it's future influence 
on Pacific affairs, the terms of peace and the post-war system of global military and 
economic order. These anxieties would influence both Australia's military deployments 
23 In contrast, the official historian Gavin Long argues that 'after the Midway battle there was 
no danger of a large-scale Japanese offensive.' He suggests that while it required eleven 
Japanese divisions to attain all its objectives in 1941 and early 1942, by January 1943 'fifteen 
were proving not enough to hold them.' (1973: 215, 248) 
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and diplomacy to the end of 1945. During 1943 and 1944 Australian units fought on 
Wewak and New Britain, and relieved US forces on Bougainville and the Solomon 
Islands-forces then diverted to the main axis of the US drive against Japan across the 
north Pacific. In June 1945 the Australian Government made a formal request to the US 
Chiefs of Staff to associate Australian forces with 'the forward movement against Japan 
under General Macarthur', but met with firm US opposition. Australia's submission 
argued that 'from the aspect of prestige and participation in the Pacific peace settlement 
and control machinery, the government considers that it is of great importance for 
Australia to be associated with the drive to defeat Japan.' (Roger Bell, 1977: 181) 
Australia's limitation to a South Pacific role was determined by its subordination to an 
American Commander, its strategic obsession with the area, and its post-war 
ambitions. Coral Bell argues that, having accepted Macarthur's leadership in 1941, the 
Government lost 'leverage on the strategic control of the Pacific war, and on the choice 
of role for Australian troops. That in turn meant loss of..control of campaigns in 
Bougainville and elsewhere, which .. seems to have entailed many pointless deaths by 
battle and disease.' She also quotes John Dedman, a member of the war cabinet, as 
saying that Evatt 'kept reminding his colleagues that if Australia was to have a say in 
the peace negotiations, its troops must take the offensive in some major operation.' 
(Bell, 1988: 26) 
Australian post-war anxieties were also aroused by their exclusion from the Cairo 
Conferences of 1943, which included China, the US and Great Britain, and settled the 
terms for peace with Japan and discussed the disposal of the territories under its 
control. Evatt said in Parliament in October 1943 that 'Australia has done her fair share 
in putting out the fire that was kindled in Europe', and spoke of a proposal to call a 
conference of governments interested in the Southwest Pacific to consider defence, 
native welfare, post-war development, trade, air routes and communications. He also 
protested directly to Truman at Australia's exclusion from the peace settlements with 
Germany and Italy, despite its 'effective and at times decisive role in portions of the 
campaign against both Germany and Italy.' The Chifley Government was concerned 
both about the precedent for Japan, and at the exclusion of small powers from the 
conferences at Yalta and Dunbarton Oaks which established the framework for the new 
UN organisation. By now it was clear the western powers were all self-consciously 
jockeying for position. Curtin had acknowledged this in 1944 when, wanting to 
involve British and Australian forces in moves on the Philippines and Borneo, he 
cabled Churchill asking for the dispatch of British naval forces to the Pacific. While 
MacArthur supported the request, Curtin betrayed more antipodean anxieties when he 
wrote of his concern 'at the position that would arise in our Far Eastern Empire if any 
considerable American opinion were to hold that America fought a war on principle in 
the Far East and won it relatively unaided while the other allies including ourselves did 
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very little towards recovering our lost property.' In a similar vein MacArthur opposed 
British command structure proposals associated with the force by telling General 
Marshall that 'any form of appeasement will be followed in due course by deterioration 
not only of British-American relationships, but of American prestige and commercial 
prospects throughout the Far East.' (Bell, 1977: 183; Millar, 1978: 153; Homer, 1982: 
339) 
Australia's response to Cairo was to meet with the NZ Government in January 
1944 to discuss the post-war Pacific order. The text published at the end of the 
meeting, the ANZAC Agreement, asserted that as the two governments had 'vital 
interests' in the armistice they should share in its planning, and that 'as a matter of 
cardinal importance' they should be involved in the planning and establishment of the 
'general international organisation' referred to in the 1943 Moscow declaration. The US 
was deeply annoyed by an article which asserted that the construction of bases did not 
'afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the 
conclusion of hostilities.' To remove any ambiguity, the text also declared that the 
'ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific .. should be affected only with 
[Australia and New Zealand's] agreement.' The attitudes to the Pacific islands in the 
Agreement seemed an odd mixture of imperialism, paternalism and idealism-there 
were clauses asserting the need to encourage missionary work, health and education, 
and 'material development including production, finance, communications and 
marketing'. While suggesting that trusteeship should be the most suitable form of 
control, the Agreement also recommended increasing native participation in 
decisionmaking with a view to eventual self-government. The Pacific was also seen as 
crucial to regional security, with a clause promoting 'within the framework of a general 
system of world security, a regional zone of defence .. based on Australia and New 
Zealand stretching through the arc of islands north and northwest of Australia, to 
Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.' Greg Fry has commented that this proposal, 
strongly pushed by Evatt elsewhere, was a reappearance 'in all but name' of the 
Australasian Monroe Doctrine. (Watt, 1967: 74; Millar, 1978: 444-5; Fry, 1991: 3) 
It might be described as a kind of modernist security-minded benevolence which 
asserted overwhelming Australasian interest and influence in the Pacific, would accept a 
US presence as ultimate security guarantee, and sought to promote economic 
'development' and eventual decolonisation within those binding frameworks. Tensions 
over multilateralism aside, this policy appears broadly consonant with US postwar 
plans to reorganise the Asia-Pacific economies around Japan after 1947, and which the 
1950 Colombo Plan was designed to initiate. Further efforts to influence post-war 
outcomes saw Australian troops participate in the Allied occupation of Japan, and 
General Blarney-after early US opposition-signed the surrender instrument on 
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behalf of Australia during the ceremony held on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 
September 1945. (Homer, 1982: 413; Bell, 1977: 191) 
Australian troops also took Japanese surrenders at Morotai in the Halmaheras, 
Dutch and British Borneo, Rabaul, Torokina and Wewak in New Guinea, and in 
Timor, Nauru and the Ocean Islands. (Millar, 1978: 159) The strong language of the 
ANZAC Agreement, though, worked against Australian efforts, with US naval 
commanders resisting the use of Australasian forces in the recapture of the Marshall and 
Caroline islands, both of which were coveted by the US Navy. (Watt, 1967: 77) Much 
was also made of Australian command of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
(BCOF) in Japan, and the appointment of W. McMahon Ball as the Commonwealth 
representative in the Allied Council for Japan. (Homer, 1982: 430) 
The Chifley government also took this activism to the San Francisco conference 
which established the United Nations in 1945. Australia's delegation-nominally led 
by Deputy PM Francis Forde but effectively by Evatt-was intensely prepared and 
lobbied for 38 amendments to the draft agreed upon by the great powers at Dunbarton 
Oaks in August 1944. The amendments were 'idealistic' on both security and economic 
questions, but nevertheless implied a subservience to dominant meanings of security. 
While Australia wanted 'a pledge from all members to respect the territorial integrity 
and political independence of other members' and a declaration that 'justice and the rule 
of law shall be the principles guiding the action of the Security Council', it also sought 
to see that the Security Council is in fact composed of 'security' powers i.e. 
powers which by their past military contribution to the cause of world security 
have proved able and willing to assume substantial security responsibilities, or 
which are willing, and by virtue of their geographical position in relation to 
regions of primary strategic importance are able to make a substantial contribution 
to the maintenance of international peace and security. (Watt, 1967: 83) 
This implied that, whatever the projected role of the UN in resolving international 
disputes, realist military frameworks and territorial coverage would provide an ultimate 
security guarantee, and that the strategic control of space and its denial to 'hostile' 
powers was a necessary operation. While the Labor government tended to resist the 
demonisation of communism that came with the cold war, they seemed to defer to this 
more general strategic principle when they compromised their initial plans for the 
BCOF in Japan out of sensitivity to the US, which feared that offering a separate 
command to the British Commonwealth might provoke a similar request from the 
Soviet Union. The statement also reflected Evatt' s desire for the security council to be 
configured in a way that would allow Australia to participate-notwithstanding the 
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claims of the 'Big Four', Australia was, in his mind, clearly such a 'security power'. 
(Horner, 1982: 424; Bell, 1977: 185) 
The conventional nature of Evatt' s thinking here stood in contrast to his prescient 
desire to democratise, in however small a way, the voting and membership structures 
of the new international organisation. Such results of Australian advocacy . were 
embodied in Article 73-which required colonial powers to report to the Secretary 
General on the conditions of their territories-but Evatt's efforts to have full 
employment included as an obligation failed. While Australia also failed to prevent 
permanent members of the security council having a veto power-the very power 
which paralysed the organisation until the late 1980s-it was able to prevent great 
powers using their veto to stifle discussion. The White Australia policy was protected, 
much as it was by Hughes in 1919, by modifying Article 2 so that the UN could not 
intervene with force over an issue within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. (Watt, 
1967: 87-92) Although John Curtin was now dead, struck down by a lung illness in 
July, the ambition he declared in 1941 had been achieved: 'We shall hold this country 
and keep it as a citadel for the British-speaking race and as a place where civilisation 
will persist.' (Hasluck, 1970: 635) 
CONCLUSION: 
WAR, JUSTICE AND SUBJECTIVITY 
This chapter has sought to trace a second crucial period in the imagination of a unified 
and progressive Australian subject-from its dark post-war achievement in the Anzac 
tradition, through the failed vision of 'Australia Unlimited', the terrible division and 
hardship of the depression, to its reconsolidation in the patriotic struggle against Japan 
in the Pacific War. While previously conservatives had sought to deploy its force 
against the labour movement, between 1942 and 1945 its consolidation would occur 
under a Labor administration which sought to ameliorate social division in a common 
cause, and proclaimed its dual objective as bringing justice to the workers and security 
to the nation as a whole-a vision in which, as Curtin's biographer Lloyd Ross has 
pointed out, 'social security and national security were indivisible.' (1977: 386) As the 
rhetoric and conduct of the war showed only too starkly, it was thus a vision in which 
the 'political double-bind' was the fundamental operative principle. It would be 
accompanied, however, by a potent new claim: that in the Labor vision, and in the 
achievement of victory over Japan, security and justice would coalesce. Henceforth this 
would be a crucial element of Labor's 'governmental' rhetoric, revived by the 
governments of Gough Whitlam, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating, and in the revised 
platform developed in 1997 by the federal opposition of Kim Beazley. 
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Thus to the claims of one philosophical universal-security-were added those of 
another-justice. Together they provoke some disturbing questions, which undermine 
the promise of their idealist unity. Much of what Labor had sought to preserve-a 
white Australia, economic progress, the correspondence between soil, sovereignty and 
identity-had its roots in an older system of discourse with a deeply problematic 
history. The understandable anger at the treatment of the allied POW s, the narrations of 
Kokoda and Coral Sea, and the fraudulent repetition of invasion fears well into 1943 
had entrenched a fear and revulsion of Japan with crucial future effects. In this way the 
ontological purchase of the Australian subject had been strengthened, but only through 
an intensification of the historic image of the Other that lay at its centre. Aborigines 
remained a silence in the story of progress and heroism that Curtin evoked in 1942, 
without status as citizens and still subject to a sinister machinery of slow annihilation. 
Yet some had even sought to defend the subject that dispossessed them, in the face of 
Army regulations restricting enlistment to those 'substantially of European origin or 
descent' .24 (Day, 1996: 303) 
Ignoring this continuing history, and the sufferings of those who had endured the 
full force of Japanese occupation, many Australians drew from the war a sense of 
unique moral injury. Although over seven thousand Australian POW s-a third of their 
number-had perished in the camps at Changi, Sandakan and on the Thai-Burma 
railway, it was by no means the worst experience or the most terrible atrocity of the 
war. Japan had made victims all through Asia, and on the Allied side Indians and 
Timorese had also surrendered thousands of lives in the defence of imperial territory. 
The murder of over four hundred thousand Japanese civilians, during the firebombings 
of Tokyo and the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were cruel acts of 
terror with no strategic rationale-yet, told by their leaders the atrocities were necessary 
to bring about surrender, few in the West questioned the war's shocking final acts. 
Out of these fears and ambiguities Labor proposed to bring Australians into an 
order in which domestic reconstruction would merge with the international 'creation of 
a permanent system of general security.' Invoking a seductive vision of human 
enlightenment Curtin told Australians in 1943 that 'the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter, on which the hopes for a new international order are based, are a pledge that 
national policies will be directed to the betterment of mankind.' The next decades would 
24 For example, 26 Aborigines from the Lake Tyres reserve in Victoria enlisted in July 1940, 
most to be discharged within a year. 50 entered the militia in Darwin, and historian Robert Hall 
identified 22 indigenous Australians enlisted in the second AIF by 1939. Though the army 
regulations were moderated in practice to allow for the 'general suitability' of the recruit, general 
opinion held that their enlistment would be unacceptable to the 'normal Australian' serviceman. 
William Cooper, who had lost a son in the Great War, had complained to the federal government 
about Aboriginal soldiers being 'pushed back to the bush to resume the status of aboriginals.' In 
1939 Cooper urged Aborigines to boycott the war until they received status as citizens. The 
Aborigine, he argued, has 'nothing to fight for but the privilege of defending the land which was 
taken from him by the white race without even compensation or kindness.' (Day, 1996: 302-3) 
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fall far short of such ideals. In seeking to understand why, my analysis will consider 
the political and discursive conditions under which governments would seek to realise 
them. Domestically, Labor's visions of social justice, full employment and economic 
prosperity would hinge on political and ideological struggles over the respective roles 
of public and private capital, while internationally Australia would seek to trade into a 
system ravaged by war and in which far more powerful actors were now laying down 
the rules. Similarly Evatt' s dreams of an international order based on law and justice 
were hostage to the same 'Big Four' whose armed strength Curtin hoped would 'be 
used as a trust for all mankind.' (Hasluck, 1970: 449) While an Australian subjectivity 
had been reworked and strengthened, its history and its ontological structure would 
leave a dark legacy; the thirty thousand lives it had sacrificed, in virtually every theatre 
of the war, would be of little assistance in the difficult task of asserting an independent 
voice in post-war diplomacy. Poised between the carnage of the first truly global war 
and the unknown promise of a new international order, security more than ever hinged 
on the bleak continuum linking the individual, national and geopolitical-a monstrous 
calculus of being, seemingly without escape. 
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A fearsome power in the term because it makes you separate from the 
others. You flee the tag, the telling touch. But once you're iL name shorn, 
neither boy nor girl, you're the one who must be feared. You're the dark 
power in the street. And you feel a kind of demonry, chasing the players, 
trying to put your skelly-bone hand on them, to spread your taint, your 
curse. Speak the syllable slowly if you can. A whisper of death perhaps. 
Don DeLillo, Underworld, 1997: 677. 
By the end of 1945, after six years of a war which consumed more space, more 
technology and more human beings than any in history, eighty-five million were 
dead-twenty million combatants and sixty-five million civilians. They included some 
six million Jews brought from all over Europe to German extermination camps, five 
million more Gipsies, dissidents and homosexuals, and hundreds of thousands of 
victims of Japanese brutality and of Allied firebombing in the closing stages of the war 
against German and Japanese cities. Twenty-five million more were refugees. The 
Soviet Union alone lost as many as fifty million people. The conflict had seen the 
development of terrifying new weapons and techniques of warfare and, in a terrible 
evolution of the total organisation of resources and populations inherent in security, the 
obliteration of any distinction between combatant and civilian. Further, in the War's 
sickening denouement, the United States had demonstrated a weapon which appeared to 
unlock the very laws of nature, and which Secretary of War Henry Stimson later feared 
would utterly transform the rules of the international system and destroy the Earth. 
(Snyder, 1962:519-24;Ponting, 1995:294;Alperovitz, 1995b:430) 
Taken as a whole, this historical moment seemed to hold together the irreconcilable: 
an experience of carnage, murder and fear played out on an unprecedented scale, and 
fantastic new dreams of human destiny and material progress. At San Francisco a new 
international organisation had been formed, promising co-operative efforts to ensure 
universal security, prosperity and welfare. A Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
had been made, and institutions established to eliminate poverty, ignorance and disease. 
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In the United States, publisher Henry Luce had already outlined his postwar vision of a 
'vital international economy' and an 'international moral order' in which America would 
provide the capital, technical expertise and cultural model for a new global order based 
on freedom, justice and progress. In similar fashion, at the Japanese surrender 
ceremony on the USS Missouri MacArthur spoke of his hope that 'a better world shall 
emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past, a world founded upon faith and 
understanding, a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfilment of his most 
cherished wish-for freedom, tolerance and justice.' (Luce, 1941: 61-5; Snyder, 1962: 
513) In such visions, which many Australians shared, the War appeared as a trial, even 
a close call, but was also an enabling, ground-clearing event, which could not be 
allowed to sully their image of a future without contradictions.1 Rightly enough, many 
argued the Allies had saved humanity from enslavement and terror; yet looking back 
through another half-century, we may wonder if they were ever banished at all-simply 
given new names and forms, of which our own security was one. 
Standing on the threshold of a new global order, the Australian subject breathed 
these contradictions like a harsh wind. While the destruction wrought in Europe, the 
USSR and Asia may have made Australia's experiences seem trivial in comparison, this 
is to underestimate the vast cultural, political and economic transformations on whose 
edge it stood and in which it would be a major actor-less in terms of the volumes of 
capital, aid, or force it could deploy than the ideas, activism and paranoia it would bring 
to the process. As the final stages of the Pacific War and Evatt' s diplomacy in San 
Francisco had shown, this activism was already a marked feature of Australian 
statecraft and strategy. Speaking in March 1945 of the need for post..:war US and 
Australian co-operation to realise the idealist vision of the Atlantic Charter, Evatt argued 
that 'The destiny of our countries is bound up with the future Pacific Order.' (1945: 
120) 
Labor's own visions of security and justice hinged on how it could achieve both a 
reconstruction of Australian society and intervene in the new strategic, economic and 
cultural spaces being formed around the globe and particularly in its region. In these 
exceptionally mobile contexts Australian foreign and defence policy took on a new 
sweep and intensity, with Evatt continually seeking to assert 'disproportionate' 
influence as new hegemonic formations took shape. Over the next twenty years 
Australian policy became conscious of operating over larger fields of action and 
influence, and strategic appraisals became more detailed and encompassing, prefiguring 
the later development (and projection) of more detailed and mobile administrative and 
security formations into the region. Thus this period saw a vast expansion of the 
1 An example was Evatt's address to the Paris Peace Conference in July 1946. 'By united 
efforts and common sacrifices,' he told the delegates, 'we have overthrown great tyrannies and 
won a new birth of liberty.' (DFAT, 1993: 83) 
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'strategic imagination'-which married new institutional techniques with new 
technologies of communication, surveillance, transport and warfare-to match that 
being extended by other powers. 
As the political and economic landscape of the Pacific changed, difficult and 
morally profound problems for policy emerged. Old assumptions were challenged, 
while others were strengthened or transformed. The two most weighty issues were the 
reconstruction of Japan, and the challenge posed by the movements which now 
confronted the European powers attempting to return to their colonies after the Japanese 
withdrawal. Up to this point Australian governments had associated certitude and 
stability with the continuity of colonial power, and the post-war decades would see 
them attempting to recover this lost sense of security in difficult new contexts-which 
required adding the claims of new nationalisms for justice to their calculations. The 
struggles in the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and Indochina, and the way in which 
Japan was rebuilt and integrated into a new Asian economy, would have enormous and 
far-reaching effects which are still with us today. They include the future of Indonesia, 
a thirty-year war in Vietnam and the modern tragedy of Cambodia. Here fantastic and 
barely foreseeable levels of economic growth and prosperity, along with profound 
cultural changes, were paralleled by crises involving the death and dislocation of 
millions, with flow-on effects which transformed the global political economy. 
Australia would be deeply involved, over decades, in all these events. 
Important principles had already been set out, by both the major global powers and 
the Labor governments of Curtin and Chifley. The Atlantic Charter, drafted by 
Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1942 and later signed by a further 29 states, 
committed the Allies to renounce territorial aggrandisement, to the principles of 
democracy and self-determination, to the achievement of fair trade and economic 
prosperity, and to economic and social security. The final principle projected, 'pending 
the establishment of a wider and general system of general security', the 'abandonment 
of the use of force' and a lightening of the 'crushing burden of armaments.' Labor 
consistently invoked the Charter as both an underpinning for its war aims and a 
blueprint for the future, with Evatt stating in 1943 that 'the declaration is universal in its 
scope and application'-its principles should underpin a post-war Pacific order which 
allowed for 'the legitimate aspirations of the peoples' and formed 'a basis for economic 
development which will provide improving standards for all the peoples of the Pacific.' 
(Snyder, 1962: 196-7; Evatt, 1945b: 114-5) 
Yet within a few months of Japan's surrender many of the Charter's ideals had 
been abandoned. Preoccupied by its interests in Europe, the United States acquiesced in 
the British return to Malaya and Burma, the Netherlands' return to the East Indies, the 
French return to Indochina, and had itself retaken the Philippines and staked a claim to 
a chain of islands stretching from Hawaii to the east coast of Japan. The Soviets were 
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determined to control those nations it occupied. Cold War tensions were already in play 
with the US efforts to exclude the Soviet Union from Japan, in which the use of the 
two atomic bombs-just as the USSR entered the Pacific War-had been crucial. 
Similarly the Truman administration's decision, against the advice of retiring Secretary 
of War Stimson, to further develop and refine the Bomb shattered forever the Charter's 
final dream of a world without arms. 2 Those who died, either in the terrible heat of the 
blast or later, in the slow agony of radiation poisoning, were the Cold War's first 
victims, and occupied Japan was a crucial space in which its economic and strategic 
dimensions converged. Contrary to myth, during 1945 the US knew of Japanese 
efforts to surrender on terms which preserved the Emperor, that clarifying the surrender 
terms or Soviet entry into the war might bring it about, and that an important factor in 
Truman's decision was the desire to brandish the terrifying new weapons at the USSR. 
Stimson wrote, 'let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them 
better than anything else', while Secretary of State Byrnes told Truman that 'the atomic 
bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war.' 
The US wanted leverage against the Soviets in Europe, and to prevent them making 
territorial claims on China or having any effective role in the occupation of Japan. 
(Alperovitz, 1995: 15-35; Feis, 1966: 101; Schaller, 1985: 11-15) 
This was a function of the United States' broader strategic objectives: to build an 
integrated capitalist world economy subject to the rules of multilateralism-currency 
convertibility and free trade, investment and resource access-in which the US dollar 
would be the pre-eminent currency. American policy in Asia became. directed toward 
the military and economic strengthening of a 'Great Crescent' from India to Japan, with 
Indonesia as its 'southern anchor', with Japan's economic recovery underwritten by a 
trade and investment triangle between itself, the US and (a non-communist) Southeast 
Asia. In tum, under the influence of Cold War intellectuals like George Kennan the US 
abandoned many Japanese reforms in order to speed its economic recovery and 
integrate it into a global system of 'containment'. Australia's economic, foreign and 
strategic policies, and its possible forms of identity, would now evolve within these 
constraints. Yet whatever their weight and inertia, many dramatic choices were still 
available. (Borden, 1984: 4, Schaller, 1985: ix) 
In this context the same questions of security, identity and ontology which have 
pre-occupied this study were still of great significance. By the war's close the 
2 Stimson was worried by the approach being taken by Truman's Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes, who wanted to travel to the coming meeting of foreign ministers (which discussed post-
armistice Europe) with the Bomb in 'his hip pocket'. Stimson wrote to Truman that the US should 
head off an arms race by 'voluntarily' inviting Russia 'into the partnership on a basis of co-
operation and trust' with the eventual aim of achieving 'an international arrangement respecting 
the control of this new force'-a force which he feared was 'merely a first step in a new control by 
man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts.' 
(Alperovitz, 1995: 427-32) 
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Australian subject had realised an unprecedented ontological unity of which the 
founding fathers could only have dreamed, and which had seemed so distant only a few 
years earlier. Yet however complete this unity seemed, it would never be finalised-the 
question now was how it would be further used, deployed and transformed. The 
strategic imagination now took on a more forceful and sweeping character, integrating 
'national' forms of identity into a 'global' movement of reason of which Americanism 
and economic integration were the hallmarks. Within this evolving structure, 
'communism'-at once a nameable ideology, political force, and endlessly mutable 
signifier of western anxiety, fear and disgust-would gain a rarefied rhetorical privilege 
and status. In an appalling exercise in reduction myriad movements and political forms 
would be fused, in the western mind, into a monolithic unity-a global image of the 
Other to match the new global movement of universalism. This theme would also 
transform Australia's domestic politics, cripple the labour movement and obsess and 
dominate its defence and foreign policy. 
LABOR, RECONSTRUCTION 
AND COLD WAR BEGINNINGS 
Labor's vision of post-war justice, played out in a context of international ruin and 
upheaval, and in which many historic cleavages in Australian society were merely 
papered over by wartime unity, would strike real difficulties. With Asian and European 
markets in chaos and its foreign reserves at a low ebb, the Government feared a 
renewed depression, and with it further political setbacks of the kind which had split its 
ranks during the 1930s. Memories of the depression-chief among them how the 
Australian economy had foundered on its overseas dependence-drove its fundamental 
commitment to full employment and its suspicion of banking capital, along with a 
conviction that the key to 'security' lay in effective macroeconomic management-in 
finding a combination in which the productivity and price of labour, the control of 
investment and consumption, and new techniques of state intervention into both the 
domestic economy and the evolution of the international system, could coalesce into the 
engine of a broadly based prosperity in which contradictions between private capital and 
public interest could be virtually eliminated. It was a vision, according to Carol 
Johnson, of 'social harmony', a 'humanised capitalist society rather than a radical 
socialist one'-which sought to give systemic form to the unity of a collective subject. 
(Lee, 1995: 12; Johnson, 1989: 16) Given the sweep of such claims, much would be at 
stake. Could capitalism be humanised as they hoped, and the historic divisions between 
classes mitigated and resolved? Could the new international order be moulded into a 
medium for universal justice and prosperity? 
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The first efforts to establish an effective rationality of Government intervention 
came in 1944, with Curtin's efforts to extend its enhanced wartime powers for a further 
five years by referendum, in order to smooth the transition to a peace-time economy. 
Portrayed by the opposition as a recipe for 'industrial conscription' and the 
'perpetuation of policies which have struck at the whole root of freedom in Australia', 
the referendum failed. Undeterred, in 1945 the Government released its White Paper On 
Full Employment. This document marked a new ascendancy of Keynesian economic 
thought which would remain unchallenged until the early 1970s, and while sympathetic 
to moral concerns about social justice, made its fundamental arguments in the more 
abstract terms of economic management and efficiency. Its key arguments maintained 
that full employment could only be guaranteed by matching production with 
consumption expenditure, and that fluctuations could be countered by public capital 
spending. (Johnson, 1986: 41) 
While claiming to produce benefits for all classes, the paper hid the way in which 
its vision of collaboration between government, business and unions would work as a 
mechanism for controlling Labour. While the Chifley Government substituted economic 
management for class warfare as a rationale for its refusal to encourage post-war 
increases in wages and conditions, it faced a period of industrial upheaval nearly as 
great as that faced by Hughes or Bruce and Page. Five-and-a-half million days were 
lost between 1945 and 1947, including major strikes amongst metalworkers, at the 
BHP plant in Port Kembla, and rail and tramways workers in Victoria. During the 1949 
Coal Strike-when the government gaoled union officials and sent troops to work open 
cut mines-Chifley accused the communists of orchestrating the dispute: 'Either you 
forsake the law of the people,' he told the miners, 'which is the government creed, and 
return to the proper and lawful arbitration authority, or you ally yourselves with a 
world-wide movement that seeks to wreck the democratic way of life.' While the idea 
that policy could harmonise opposed interests was central to Labor ideology, Chifley's 
language conjured an image of otherness that would become a punishing rod for 
Labor's own back.3 Instead we might suggest that, rather than harmonising competing 
needs for a greater general good Labor had, in the words of Carol Johnson, come 'face 
to face with the real contradictions between capital and labour that exist in a capitalist 
economy'-and found that it could not resolve them. (Bolton, 1990: 60-2; Johnson, 
1989: 28-35) 
In many ways Labor's vision of security-linking sovereignty, economy and 
population-was similar to those harboured by previous governments, and confronted 
3 Another rod proved to be the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), established 
by Chifley and Evatt in 1948, which spent the next fifty years compiling dossiers on leftists and 
other progressives. Elsewhere Labor also took up the anti-communist crusade: in Queensland 
the Hanlon Government used police against striking railwaymen, injuring many, and gaoled 
several union leaders. (Bolton, 1990: 69) 
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many of the same historic problems. Like the ideals of 'Australia Unlimited' Labor 
wanted to develop Australia's resources and industries, and populate its empty spaces 
both to increase its domestic market and make the still tenuous link between 
sovereignty, soil and identity more secure. Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell 
predicted that, within 25 years, there would be another challenge 'to our right to hold 
this land'. In 1943 Curtin announced the goal of a population of 30 million which, 
while less ambitious than the earlier figure of over 100 million, would still be a vast 
expansion over the gloomy predictions of a peak of 7.5 million by 1973.4 The 
government promoted an increased birth rate, and sought the immigration of east 
European refugees, British settlers and southern Europeans. White Australia remained 
firmly in place: Asian refugees in Australia were deported, without exception-in 
protest at Labor's rigidity the Philippines consulate in Sydney was closed and the 
national legislature in Manila considered expelling all Australians. Turning the moral 
complacencies of the Australian identity neatly on their head, the Manila Evening 
Chronicle argued the policies drew on 'the natural sadism that springs from Australia's 
penal origins.' Curtin, maintaining Asians harboured an essential 'antagonism to the 
white man', had assured the 1943 Labor Conference that Australia would not look to 
Asia to build its population, while warning that Australian industries would strike 
problems finding Asian markets 'while strenuously refusing them access to an empty 
Australia.' (Bolton, 1990: 53-8; Day, 1996: 338, 341) 
The problems inherent in Labor's drive for security and justice were compounded at 
the interface between the domestic and international, where policies of race, 
development and economics merged with the constraints imposed by the international 
political economy, western strategic policy and the related dilemmas of decolonisation. 
The grand visions of international co-operation, universal values and general prosperity 
soon struck demoralising obstacles. Other problems lay in the very limits of Labor's 
own thinking. Its vision of international economic justice, and an economically secure 
Australia within it, hinged on the possibility of being able to trade into a system which 
was growing steadily and in which full employment was an agreed objective. 5 Yet the 
Government had failed to have a commitment to full employment included in the UN 
Charter, and delayed joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because the US 
resisted a full employment clause. Chifley convinced his party to join the IMF in 1947, 
declaring that: 'I have been an ardent advocate of all international organisations because 
I believe that through them, we are engaging in a great human experiment, which is 
4 Brian Penton made this prognosis in his 1943 book Advance Australia Where?, arguing that 
after 1973 this figure would again decline. (Day, 1996: 338) 
5 For a detailed discussion of these arguments, made by an interdepartmental committee which 
reported in August 1942 and included the economists Copeland and Giblin, see David Lee's 
excellent account of Australia's postwar economic policy, Search For Security: The Political 
Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy (1995: 10-12). 
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designed to prevent the catastrophes that result from wars and financial and economic 
depressions.' However anxious about its loss of autonomy,6 Labor would stake its 
future on the development of a multilateral economic order. Yet by the end of the year, 
because of a massive dollar shortage caused by the US refusal to run trade deficits to 
speed European recovery, multilateralism was dying. Australians had been reminded 
once again of their precarious dependence on the international economy and on 
decisions over which they had little influence. There was also some naivete in Labor's 
approach-however hard they had had to fight for Australian 'interests', they too easily 
spoke as if capitalism was a politically neutral form which, once deployed for the 
growth in employment and prosperity, could benefit all equally. As the crisis ground on 
through 1949 the Government found itself arguing that the US should reduce tariffs and 
'increase investment in backward areas, especially Asia.' (Lee, 1995: 18-26, 67) 
Likewise Labor struck enormous obstacles to its vision of international order as the 
US sought to remake Japan. There the·· Australians were locked out of occupation 
decisionmaking, which was monopolised firstly by Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur and, after 1947, by cold-war conservatives in the 
US Department of State. Australian desires for sweeping political reform, welfare 
measures and the dissolution of the Zaibatsu-driven by fears of a future Japanese 
military resurgence-foundered on the US Government's Cold War priorities. While 
MacArthur accepted the land reform7 proposed by Commonwealth representative W. 
Macmahon Ball, he largely ignored the four-power Allied Council for Japan (ACJ). 
Post-war Japanese Governments successfully resisted SCAP's Zaibatsu reforms, and 
after 1947 the US Administration dismantled the anti-monopoly and reparations 
programs, and advocated the strengthening of the Japanese police and the establishment 
of a small defense force to resist 'subversion.' (Schaller, 1985: 122-40) 
America's objectives now were to rebuild Japan as a military and economic bulwark 
against Soviet 'penetration' of northeast Asia, even if it meant retarding Japanese 
democratisation. 8 In 1948 SCAP began encouraging the Japanese government to arrest 
6 Lee writes that Australia 'was worried that a depression overseas would cause a decline in 
Australia's export income at a time when domestic policies were keeping wages and prices 
steady. The resulting balance of payments deficit might force Australia to follow a deflationary 
policy at home because the IMF would prevent the Australians controlling the deficit through 
exchange controls. And if the Australians had to depreciate the pound more than ten per cent, 
they would need to concurrence of the fund that a 'fundamental disequilibrium' had occurred.' 
(1995: 20) 
7 The land reform too had important anti-communist objectives. According to Michael Schaller, 
'more than one-third of farmland changed hands, which affected 30 per cent of all Japanese. Not 
only did the program accomplish many of its economic goals, but it also created a mass of small 
landowners loyal to the conservative parties who first opposed the reform. As MacArthur 
anticipated, Japan avoided the types of rural insurgencies that engulfed China and Southeast 
Asia during the following decade.' (1985: 43) 
8 In April 1947 Evatt cabled New Zealand External Affairs Minister Fraser admitting Ball had 
informed him 'that political control is gradually going back to reactionary groups.' In order to 
counter the way in which 'major decisions' were being 'made piecemeal' without the input of other 
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unionists and strip workers of their right to organise-reacting to criticism from Ball's 
successor on the ACJ, Sir Alvary Gasgoine, MacArthur accused the Commonwealth of 
'siding with the Kremlin' and 'betraying' the US. Yet presumably anxious to preserve 
relations with the US, which it was endeavouring to draw into a Pacific security pact, 
the Chifley government declined to directly confront them over Japan. Ball resigned 
from the ACJ in 1947 in protest at Evatt's refusal to support him against MacArthur, 
who had been using the Soviet delegate as an excuse to obstruct the whole council. In 
May 1948 Chifley signalled Australia's accord with the new American industrial 
strategy in Japan, and signed a new agreement allowing trade between Japan and the 
sterling area countries. Australia reaped ten per cent, some £6 million, of the total share 
to June 1949. At the same time no protest was made about the wholesale attacks on the 
Left and Unions which accompanied the new US policy. (Schaller, 1985: 136; DFAT, 
1995: 417-8, 543; Rosencrance, 1962: 123) 
In addition the Labor Goveriunent became increasingly concerned by American and 
British anticommunism, the growing hostility between the superpowers and the 
abrogation of the dreams of collective security under the United Nations for an older-
and with atomic weapons, increasingly dangerous-balance-of-power model. At Yalta 
Roosevelt had hoped that collective security might 'spell the end of the system of 
unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of 
power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries', but the dream 
was fading fast. In 194 7 the Truman doctrine was declared, and in August the 
Australian Legation in Moscow suggested that 'the next four to six months will 
determine the final success or failure of attempts to secure Russian co-operation in 
solving world problems.' It suggested America's obsession with Security could 'have 
serious effects' on 'Australian interests in Asia and the Pacific' and that because the US 
saw 
communist hares behind every Asiatic bush ... there is some danger that the United 
States may regard genuine and legitimate aspirations in Asia towards self-
govemment as necessarily Soviet inspired or controlled, and try therefore to 
restrict or suppress nationalist movements. This could have the opposite effect to 
that desired i.e. to make Nationalists see in Russia their only hope of salvation, 
and to lead them to regard United States and supporting powers as antipathetic 
and ignorant. (DFAT, 1995: 413-5) 
powers Evatt wanted a Commonwealth Conference to discuss a peace treaty with Japan (held in 
Canberra in August 1947). John Burton revealed the depth of Australian concern about the terms 
of a peace treaty when he wrote that 'reports .. .indicating that the UK Ambassador, MacArthur 
and the Japs have all agreed that there must be a substantial Jap force immediately after the 
peace settlement to prevent infiltration from Korea and elsewhere, are extremely disturbing.' 
(DFAT, 1995: 518, 524) 
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A more prescient account of future events in Vietnam, or Sukarno's Indonesia, could 
not have been made; from this point, feeling its own 'interests' were being damaged by 
the US obsession, the Government strove for a more independent course in Southeast 
Asia, especially Indonesia. 
Labor's approach to Indonesia was mixture of morality and pragmatism-sympathy 
for the nationalists combined with concerns about security and the promise of economic 
gain. Three months after the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945, W. 
McMahon Ball was sent to Batavia to investigate the situation and assess the calibre of 
the nationalist movement and its leaders. Ball wrote that Australia had to prevent the 
NEI becoming 'a focus of conflict between East and West. And from that focus the 
infection may spread with menacing speed to many other countries in South-East Asia.' 
Yet it was only after the Netherlands' July 1947 'police actions'-in which a hundred 
thousand troops were thrown against Republican forces in Java and Sumatra-that 
Australia helped sponsor a Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and 
negotiations. Burton justified Labor's intervention by saying that 'only by retaining 
initiative in this respect can Australian economic and security interests be promoted.' 
(DFAT, 1994: 106) 
Yet after a resolution was finally passed and a cease-fire in place, Australia-
through its representation on the Security's Council's 'good offices' committee on 
behalf of the Indonesian Republic-acted strongly to seek a settlement fair to the 
nationalists, to control Dutch infringements and assert Indonesian interests in the UN, 
against the consistent opposition of the Europeans, Canada and the USA. 9 Even after 
the second Dutch 'police action' of December 1948 the US frustrated Australia's efforts 
to support the republicans, both in the UN and by refusing to withdraw Dutch 
reconstruction aid. By this time concerns about security were gaining the upper hand-
in April 1948 the DEA had argued that the 'fundamental considerations underlying 
Australian policy ... are that there should be order and stability throughout Indonesia and 
that oil and other Indonesian products should as soon as possible become available to 
relieve current world shortages.' After the uprising by the newly formed Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) in August at Madiun in central Java-quickly crushed by the 
nationalist government of Sukarno and Hatta-Australian policy became driven by 
concerns that a delay in decolonisation would strengthen the PKI against the pro-
9 For a detailed account of this period, and Australia's role in it, see Margaret George, Australia 
and the Indonesian Revolution (1980), and the two volumes of documents compiled by the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Diplomasi (DFAT, 1994) and The Renville 
Agreement (DFAT, 1996). Margaret George has accused the Chifley Government-by listening 
to US advice not to take the dispute to the UN and waiting for ten days to do so-of being 
'indecisive' and 'procrastinating' and unwittingly allowing 'the Dutch to achieve the objectives of 
their military operations'. (DFAT, 1995: 296; George, 1980: 84) 
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Western republicans.10 Similarly the Government was relieved when West New 
Guinea (WNG) was left out of the new Indonesian Republic finally negotiated in 1949. 
Thus two potent themes for future Australian policy-hostility to communism and the 
fate of West New Guinea-were established even before the new Indonesian nation 
was brought into being. (DFAT, 1995: 135; George, 1980: 125, 149) 
Labor was also strong, at least initially, in resisting the ossification of Europe into 
two hostile blocs. Labor opposed the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) in opposition to the USSR, and criticised western policies which 
supported reactionary governments (like the junta in Greece) merely for their 
anticommunism. Evatt's departmental secretary John Burton warned that such policies 
'will be interpreted as another move to encircle Russia and will bring about just the set 
of circumstances that the proposal purports to avoid. In other words, this will be the 
signal to go ahead in including other countries in the Russian security zone .. .If this is 
US and UK thought, any responsible Soviet government must, in the interest of its 
own security, immediately take all possible steps to prevent the military encirclement 
which is being backed by economic encirclement.' (Lee, 1995: 87) 
Likewise Labor resisted such tendencies in defence policy, while otherwise clearing 
some crucial areas of common discursive ground. As early as 1946 the UK had pressed 
for an integrated Commonwealth defence plan, directed against the Soviet Union, in 
which the Middle East might be a crucial area. Labor sought a compromise in which its 
defence planning began with collective security under the UN, then regional defence 
within the Commonwealth, and finally local defence, and refused to commit Australians 
to serving outside the southwest Pacific or to designate the USSR as enemy. Labor 
thought it would be responsible for defence planning in the Pacific, and further hoped 
Australia could gain permanent admission to the policy machinery of both the United 
States and Britain. Betraying a conventionally Cartesian obsession with political and 
spatial certitude, such representation would also be a long term-but frustrated-
objective of the Menzies Governments. (Lee, 1995: 76-8) 
Labor's defence policy was a direct rebuke to the Australian Chiefs of Staff, whose 
194 7 strategic appreciation was preoccupied with Russia and recommended a vote of 
£90 million a year. This document also contained some prescient discursive themes 
which would eventually drive and obsess Australian policy. It showed anxiety about 
the consequence of growing third world nationalism: uncertainties had been created by 
10 On 15 September Evatt spoke of the 'serious menace of communist extremist groups', and in 
a series of cables following the Madiun uprising Australian representative Tom Critchley argued 
that, to prevent a 'swing [of] mass support to the insurgent communists', Australia must work 
with the US to keep the Dutch out of the dispute, pressure them to resume negotiations and 
facilitate shipments of trucks and jeeps from Bangkok to the Republicans through the port of 
Tuban. Following the failure of the uprising Critchley argued that unless the Dutch lifted the 
economic blockade on central Java and resumed negotiations 'the internal position of the 
Republic may be expected to get steadily worse.' (DFAT, 1995: 296-312) 
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independence in Burma and the division of India, by the civil war in China, and by the 
Indonesian nationalist movement which created 'a security problem as well as an 
economic problem.' In a formulation that would echo through Australian policy to the 
present day, it argued Indonesia was 'of great strategic importance. It is most desirable 
that this region should be administered by strong and stable governments with whom 
Australia could establish friendly relations, since the only route by which an aggressor 
weak in sea power could approach Australia is through this region.' (DFAT, 1995: 
292) An appreciation by the Joint Intelligence Committee, submitted in March 1947, 
also betrayed an early version of the thinking that would later coalesce into the 'domino 
theory': 
The real danger to Southeast Asia, and therefore to Australia will arise from the 
Far East if Russia should combine with China. Under these circumstances China 
could be well placed, and indeed might be prompted on her own account to 
embark on operations in Indochina, Burma, Siam, Malaya or elsewhere in the 
region. In such an event she would derive substantial assistance from the large 
groups of overseas Chinese who honeycomb these countries. (DF AT, 1995: 280) 
Similar thinking would emerge in a 'Political Appreciation' written by Burton in 
September 1948. Many of its themes, whilst seen at the time as 'almost heretical 
challenges to strategic orthodoxy', would closely prefigure the strategic axioms of the 
next twenty years. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 16, 54) In contrast to Defence 
Department views which argued for Australian participation in global planning against 
the Soviet Union, with a focus on the Middle Eastern theatre, Burton too raised the 
spectre of China. Citing the Chinese majority in Malaya-where the British had 
declared a state of emergency in June-and the large Chinese populations in other areas 
of Southeast Asia, he suggested: 
Any open conflict between north and South China, or any involvement in a 
broader global conflict, will lead to increased interest in South East Asia. A 
communist dominated China, which could result from the present confused 
political situation in China ... would certainly aim at acquiring the use of the 
resources of South East Asia, not by military action, as was the case with Japan, 
but by internal action, using Chinese populations and the already organised 
political groupings of secret societies. (Lee, 1995: 97) 
Whilst Burton argued for closer defence attention to Southeast Asia, he also outlined a 
range of non-military measures to secure western interests and block Chinese and/or 
communist subversion. These-including the development of Australian trading, 
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diplomatic and business links with the region and the provision of technical, financial 
and educational aid-prefigured the Colombo Plan initiated by Liberal Minister for 
External Affairs Percy Spender in 1950. While significant differences between Labor 
and the Defence Department remained, an important watershed had been breached-
Asia had been designated a prime area of strategic interest, and communism an 
emerging threat; military commitments to Malaya, Korea and Vietnam· could now 
follow. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 54-55; Lee, 1995: 97) 
The Malayan crisis was an important test of Labor's attitude to colonialism and the 
gathering Cold War. The British portrayed the uprisings as directed by the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) at the Kremlin's behest. As one of the largest earners of US 
dollars in the Sterling Area-at a time when there was a global shortage serious enough 
to threaten western economic recovery-Malaya was of enormous strategic importance 
to the UK. Australian business also held interests worth £6 million in 21 of the 86 tin 
mining enterprises, and £2 million in gold and rubber. Malaya also had a key strategic 
location: the 1947 strategic appreciation had emphasised Singapore as a focal point of 
communications in the area, and an essential link in sea and air routes between Australia 
and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Japan. Australian diplomats at the High 
Commission in Singapore argued that the uprisings were a prelude to Malaya becoming 
a 'Chinese Communist republic' and that a communist success would strengthen the 
communist parties in Indonesia and Burma, 'place control of our outer zone of defence 
in Chinese hands' and 'prevent any effective use by us of Indonesia as a strategic 
barrier between us and the populous countries of the Asian mainland.' In contrast, 
Chifley regarded the conflict as an anti-colonial revolt. The High Commission defended 
the violent British response, saying that a 'totalitarian threat' could only be met by 
'totalitarian countermeasures.' In response to pressures to provide military aid Labor in 
July and August 1948 sent 500 weapons and 160,000 rounds of ammunition to 
Singapore, while ruling out the dispatch of troops. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 
33-49; DFAT, 1995: 295) 
Evatt however had been more receptive to the High Commission's arguments, and 
later moved closer to US and British positions on Europe, supporting the formation of 
NATO at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference of October 1948. According 
to David Lee, 'Evatt was surprisingly supportive of the British case.11 He talked of the 
necessity, in some cases, of abandoning 'just' conclusions, arrived at after 
11 British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin argued that, in contrast to the USSR, the West 
supported elections in liberated countries. In Germany the Soviets had attempted to centralise 
the state, strip the East of its capital assets and command reparations from current production. 
Western political and economic imperatives, by contrast, required the reconstruction of the 
West German economy and the promotion of a decentralised, federal system. Soviet influence in 
Greece was seen as a strategic problem, portending Soviet control of the Dardanelles, Greece 
and Turkey. (Lee, 1995: 93) 
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consideration of individual problems in isolation, because of the 'overriding claims of 
expediency.' (1995: 91-3) On the other hand he and his Prime Minister refused to see 
in the shifting sands of Asia a general conspiracy: in 1949 Chifley refused to send 
troops to reinforce Hong Kong should the Communists take China, instead urging the 
British to negotiate with the communists, recognise their government and resume trade, 
and press for the return of Taiwan to the mainland. Labor however declined to 
recognise the regime itself, primarily for electoral reasons. (Lee, 1995: 104) In 
Parliament Evatt argued that nationalist movements were not all acting in unison, that 
'the majority of nationalists in South East Asia are not Communists; there is plenty of 
evidence that they resent being identified with Communism .. '. The West 'should not be 
dogmatic in relation to the future of China ... [if] we give the Chinese communists any 
ground for thinking that they can never expect international co-operation from the West 
in future, that very declaration might lead them to adopt an extreme course and to sever 
all their traditional contacts with the democracies.' (CPD, 21.6.49: 1221-3) 
Thus as the Cold War was rapidly spiralling out of the control of any one 
'idealistic' small power, Labor's efforts amounted to a series of ambiguous 
interventions.12 After early efforts to mediate between the US and the Soviet Union, 
and to moderate Western paranoia, Evatt had given NATO Labor's blessing. Principled 
and prescient action on Indonesia, and welcome scepticism about the links between 
communism and Southeast Asian nationalism, were countered by the export of arms to 
Malaya and domino-like anxieties about the Chinese. In Japan the problems became 
more complex: while the fears that drove Evatt' s efforts in 1946 and 1949 to lure the 
US into a NATO-style pact in the Pacific may have been overstated, and tempered 
Australian criticism of the occupation, they were exacerbated by the Americans-whose 
actions in halting the purge of militarists and rebuilding Japanese industrial capacity 
raised once again the spectre of a militarily powerful Japan. As Labor watched the 
dying fall of a world system based on justice and collective security, Evatt's faith in the 
possibilities of the UN system might have been tempered by the warnings of his first 
Prime Minister. In 1938, in a formulation that would perfectly sum up NATO as a 
vehicle of so-called 'collective security', Curtin had said: 
As an ideal collective security is admirable. But as a practical policy in a world 
based upon imperialism it is .. a highly dangerous idea which can be seized upon 
12 A revealing 1949 State Department assessment of Australian foreign policy illustrates this 
dilemma. The document disapprovingly noted Australia's policy on Japan and Indonesia, its 
'very independent line in UN affairs', Evatt's role during the Berlin crisis, and his 'reserved 
attitude toward the Atlantic Pact'-policies which serve 'to weaken the democratic front'. It was 
also critical of Labor's view of China, and the 'view that the principal threat to its security comes 
from Japan rather than from Russia.' Tellingly, however, the evaluation understood the limits to 
Australian opposition: 'Australia is anxious to see the U.S. military position in the Western 
Pacific strengthened and in matters involving Australian security cannot afford to oppose major 
U.S. policy toward Japan.' (Collected in Meaney, 1985: 552-4) 
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to excuse the very forces it is intended to defeat. When governments are co-
operating in the economic field on an anti-imperialist basis, collective security will 
become a very practical method of dealing with aggression ... The workers do not 
control the governments of the world. Until they do, it would be suicidal for the 
workers of Australia to join in supporting pacts, treaties, understandings or 
obligations of any sort which would involve them in war against the workers of 
any other nation .. at the dictate of capitalist governments. (Hasluck, 1952: 88) 
Multilateralism may have been portrayed by the US as a general good, but its aims were 
clearly to preserve (while diversifying) imperial economic patterns-now secured less 
by direct sovereign control than economic integration and indirect forms of political 
influence. By 1947 the reconstruction of both Europe and Asia became inseparable 
from the formation of an economic bloc that could resist the Soviet Union and counter 
the growth of domestic socialist forces. Most tellingly, the halting of Japanese 
reparations by SCAP involved a deliberate effort to postpone Asian industrialisation 
and integrate the region into a traditionally imperial pattern in which Japanese 
manufactures would be exchanged for Asian raw materials. In tum the Japanese could 
pay for American imports and western corporations could exploit opportunities for 
resource extraction and agricultural industry. (Borden, 1984: 103-42) 
Burton's views on Southeast Asian economic development as an antidote to 
communism, while drawing on social democratic ideology, would be subsumed into 
this neo-colonial strategic system-in which 'development' was subordinated to the 
international corporate interests that it had been designed to promote and strengthen. 
While Labor understood the strategic consequences of the international order the US 
was creating, it lacked a critique of the neo-imperial economics that was its essential 
twin. Having obscured the complexity, the greed, and the political calculation of this 
period beneath a language of enlightenment and universalism-even as it gamely 
struggled with them-in the next three decades Labor would find such totalising 
categories put to more effective use by its political enemies. 
OTHER AND SAME: 
AUSTRALIA'S COLD WAR IN ASIA 
At the December 1949 federal elections Labor was swept from office. Although it 
retained a slim majority in the Senate, the LCP won the House of Representatives by a 
staggering twenty-seven seats, beginning a conservative dominance of government that 
would last until 1972. In a campaign that could have been directed by Jeremy Bentham, 
the parties led by Menzies and Arthur Fadden conjured alarmist visions of 'socialist 
regimentation', and promised to reduce taxes, eliminate petrol rationing and ban the 
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Communist Party of Australia (CPA). While Chifley had been trying to protect 
Australia's scarce stock of US dollars, voters were frightened with the spectre of 
communism and seduced with visions of the good life. Fadden even claimed in 
Queensland that the 'platform of the Labor party' was 'paving the way for a communist 
regime ... conditions are ideal for the Communists to take over in a situation in which no 
constitutional means would remain to prevent them from putting their program of 
anarchy into effect.' Similarly the American Charge d' Affaires had written to 
Washington in 1948 of 'the strength of communism in the present Labor Government' 
and accusing Burton of being a 'fellow traveler'. A powerful new calculus of Being 
was under construction, stranding the individual and collective subjects between the 
fear of a communist other and the desire for an untrammelled prosperity. Out of this 
would be built the Australian 'way of life', and a crude, destructive experience of 
subjectivity. (Bolton, 1990: 75-7; CPD, 9.5.50: 2273; Meaney, 1985: 544-5) 
Within five years the fundamental elements of a vast new discursive formation 
would be in place, centering on the LCP Government's attempts to ban the CPA during 
1950 and 1951, the initiation of the Colombo Plan and the deployment of forces to 
Korea in 1950, the signing of the ANZUS and Japanese peace treaties in 1951, and the 
establishment of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. From there 
Australians could be sent to fight 'communism' in Malaya and Vietnam, according to a 
'forward defence' doctrine which extended Australia's frontiers-and thus the very 
borders of a vulnerable collective subject-to mainland Southeast Asia. What became 
central to Government discourse was the interpenetration of the domestic and 
international, in which the stability of Australian images of security and identity were 
made to hinge on the stability of an evolving 'order' to its north. What Manning Clark 
had said of the founding fathers was true also of this time: there was a constant and 
repeated incitement of 'the enemy without and the enemy within.' ( 1981: 68) 
That anticommunism was central to a policing of identity was clear when Menzies 
introduced the Communist Party Dissolution Bill to Parliament in April 1950. Framed 
'to outlaw and dissolve' the CPA and 'to pursue it into new and associated forms', 
Menzies defended it in a language which made its ground in the same images of · 
security and subjectivity I have traced from Hobbes through Bentham, and which 
replayed their deployment into an Australian constitutional structure. First, the Bill 
claimed to derive from the Constitution's defence powers because, 'in a most special 
and important sense, [it] is a law relating to the safety and defence of Australia. It is 
designed to .. give the Government power to deal with the King's enemies in this 
country ... a self-defending attack on treason and fifth-columnism wherever they can be 
found.' (CPD, 27.4.50: 1995) 
In turn this enemy was linked with the global threat Australia's strategic planners 
were already preparing to fight. Menzies conceded that if communism was merely 
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'militant unionism, opposed to arbitration but determined to alter the law by lawful 
means' the Bill would not be justified. However as it was 'an international conspiracy 
against the democracies, organised in a prelude to war and operating as a fifth-column 
in advance of hostilities' we must 'fight [it] wherever we find [it], leaving no immunity 
and no sanctuary at all.' Menzies made the same argument in a radio broadcast in 
September at which he announced the establishment of a national service scheme and a 
Citizens Military Force of fifty thousand in which recruits would be liable for service 
anywhere in the world. In March 1951 he told Australians to prepare for a new global 
war in three years, to be specifically fought against the legions of 'International 
Communism'. His objective was clearly to produce a heightened atmosphere of fear 
and crisis that would strengthen the Government's authority, make the population more 
credulous, and destroy the enemies of his party and his class. Yet the High Court ruled 
the Communist Party Dissolution Bill unconstitutional on the grounds that Australia 
was not in a state of war, and it was further rejected in a referendum held in September 
1951 (if by a slim margin of fifty-three thousand votes out of 4.7 million).13 Crippled 
by the growing strength of the anticommunist 'movement' in its ranks, the ALP did not 
vote against the Bill in the Senate. However Evatt acted as counsel for the CPA and 
unions in the High Court, and campaigned heroically for a No vote at the 1951 
referendum. (CPD, 27.4.50: 1995; Meaney, 1985: 597) 
The whole discursive matrix of this vision of domestic and international order was 
set out in a statement made by Minister for External Affairs Percy Spender to the 
Australian Parliament in March 1951. While he would only remain in the Ministry for 
eighteen months, Spender's role in the Colombo Plan, the negotiation of ANZUS treaty 
and in formulating strategic priorities would establish a structural and conceptual 
blueprint for Australian defence and foreign policy for the next two decades. Here the 
disciplinary ambition of the political project Australia was engaged in became starkly 
visible. The stakes were nothing less than the nation's future, the forward movement of 
idealism which gave the Australian subject its form and destiny: 'Geographically 
Australia is next door to Asia,' Spender said in January 1950, 'and our destiny as a 
nation is irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia. Our future to an ever 
increasing degree depends upon the political stability of our Asian neighbours .. '. Thus 
the achievement of security, of subjectivity, the whole movement of reason which 
would now express and complete Australia's being, was anchored in the truth of a 
space here named 'Asia'. 'No nation', he declared, 'can escape its geography. That is 
an axiom which should be written deep into the mind of every Australian.' (Meaney, 
1985: 557) Yet if land had been held out as the fundamental anchor of identity, as its 
13 The High Court ruled by a majority of six to one-the only dissenting judge was Chief Justice 
Latham, who as a Bruce Government Minister had attempted to use the Crimes Act to do what 
Menzies now sought to under the Defence powers. (Bolton, 1990: 81) 
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basic empirical fact, it was only through an act of deception. What was precisely at 
issue here was space itself-space and the whole network of bodies, meanings and 
economic flows that gave it form and life. Space was not an axiom, but was itself under 
construction and in dispute. 'Asia' became not a neutral index of the real but a highly-
charged semiotic entity, at once passive and turbulent, which was liable to intervention 
yet loomed over Australia like a vast, threatening sea. As Labor leader Arthur Calwell 
was to recognise when Menzies committed two combat battalions to Vietnam in 1965, it 
was a logic in which 'the very map of Asia becomes a kind of conspiracy of geography 
against Australia'. (Spender, 1969: 195; Meaney, 1985: 557, 681) 
Creating the illusion of a single rhetorical unity, the speech turned on a series of 
inter-related operations: a projection of geo-strategic uncertainty, of immediate 
insecurity and vulnerability, and a detailed partitioning of sameness and difference 
according to a necessarily mobile set of boundaries. Whilst many years ago, he argued, 
Australians could feel isolated from threat, now its security 'has become an immediate 
and vital issue because changes since the war have resulted in a shifting of potential 
aggression from the European to the Asian area, and our traditional British 
Commonwealth and United States of America friends have not yet completed their 
adjustments to the new situation.' Sameness was initially projected in the importance of 
western alliance and commonality: Australian security was dependent upon the 
'strength and influence' of Britain, with whose 'interests and safety' we must 'be 
vitally concerned'. Australia therefore had an 'interest in the maintenance of peace and 
security in Europe.' Second was the 'common tradition, heritage and way of life' 
shared with the United States which, by virtue of its status as 'the greatest Pacific 
power' required that Australia 'carry out [its] Pacific policies as far as possible in co-
operation with it.' (Meaney, 1985: 557-8) The effect of this was to smooth over the 
deep differences-of interest, sensibility and means-between the western powers, to 
narrow the scope for independent decisionmaking and tie Australia more closely to the 
strategic imperatives and outlook of the United States. 
Next came the imagination of otherness and threat. At the pinnacle was the Soviet 
Union, whose 'foreign policy is essentially global in character', whose 'ultimate 
objective is world communism' and whose 'immediate purpose is to work towards its 
ultimate objective by Communist infiltration in all democratic countries' by means such 
'as 'peace offensives', propaganda and industrial dislocation.' And setting out the great 
binary opposition, the enabling relation of self and other, he stated that whilst Europe 
had been 'the main focus of the conflict between democracy and communism', the 
same situation was 'now developing throughout Asia and the Pacific.' The Communist 
takeover in China had 'fundamentally changed the whole picture in Asia', and would 
give fresh heart to 'the efforts of international communism to control and direct the new 
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spirit of nationalism in these countries.' While conceding that there was 'still doubt and 
uncertainty about the way China is likely to act', he quickly closed it off: 
But even without actually invading neighbour states, or engaging in open 
intimidation of them, China, either in order to secure markets and raw materials, 
or as part of communist aims, without much expenditure of resources, could 
foment dissatisfaction in other countries. The Chinese have a ready-made 
instrument in the form of the many millions of Chinese scattered throughout all 
countries of South-East Asia. (Meaney, 1985: 558-9) 
This formulation would reach far into the future: in Indonesia it would legitimate the 
killings of Chinese during the great slaughter of 1965-66, and appear again in the 
period leading up to, and immediately following, the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor. Already in Malaya it was being used against the guerillas of the Malayan 
Communist Party and as a slur upon Malaya's Chinese communities. Spender again 
followed this with a partial (and short lived) opening. He said first that 'we do not 
accept the inevitability of a clash between the democratic and communist way of life' 
and hoped 'that the Chinese Communists would look for the sympathetic help of the 
Western democracies in the work of uniting and rehabilitating their country.' Yet China 
had already blocked this avenue: ' .. the Communists' behaviour to date, including their 
treatment of United States property and citizens, and their eager recognition of the rebel 
forces in Vietnam, leaves us uncertain whether the Peking Government will conduct 
itself in accordance with recognised principles of international law and refrain from 
interfering in the affairs of neighbour states.' (Meaney, 1985: 560) 
As later US actions in Vietnam, Korea, and many other third world states would 
show, 'principles of international law' were to become a highly flexible matter of 
interpretation. And to assert them in favour of South Vietnam's Bao Dai government, 
scarcely independent and only a few months old, was deeply misleading. French 
colonial power-in conflict with Ho Chi Minh in the north and represented by a 
surrogate in the south-was still in place, if looking vulnerable. To make the test of 
peaceful coexistence with China its support of the DRV, was to deny to Ho with one 
hand what was being offered to China with the other. This, of course, was a function 
of the emotional significance already being placed upon Vietnam. The key to this was 
the 'domino theory' which, whilst not formally enunciated by Eisenhower until 1954, 
had already appeared-a National Security Council (NSC) document endorsed by 
Truman in 1949 argued that 
it is now clear that Southeast Asia is the target of a co-ordinated offensive 
directed by the Kremlin... motivated in part by a desire to gain control of 
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Southeast Asia's resources and communication lines, and deny them to us ... The 
extension of Communist authority in China represents a grievous political defeat 
for us; if Southeast Asia is also swept by communism we shall have suffered a 
major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of 
the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia. 
(cited in Pemberton, 1987: 12) 
Spender echoed this thinking, expanding it into a detailed causal chain centred on the 
preservation of western power in Vietnam: 
[Vietnam] is the great present danger point in the South-East Asian area ... Should 
the forces of Communism prevail and Vietnam come under the heel of 
Communist China, Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together with 
Thailand, Burma and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further 
Communist activities. The establishment of Communist control over Vietnam-
and over Laos and Cambodia, which could scarcely be expected to offer much 
resistance-would bring Thailand next in line as a target of Communist 
pressure .. .In many respects Thailand is the most stable political entity in the 
whole of South-East Asia, and it is in Australia's general interest that it remain 
stable. (Meaney, 1985: 560) 
This investment in stability was also clearly behind the promotion of the Colombo Plan, 
and moderated Australian attitudes to the Japanese peace treaty. Spender commented 
that while Australia was concerned to prevent a 'resurgence of Japanese militarism .. .it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that Japan will have to be allowed to become self-
supporting by industrial production and trade. Whether we like it or not, there is little 
doubt that much of Asia at its present stage of development stands in need of many 
goods that Japan only is at present in a position to supply.' And in his discussion 
(presaging both ANZUS and SEATO) of the need for a 'Pacific Pact' for common 
defence, he remarked that it should also have 'positive aims-the promotion of 
democratic political institutions, higher living standards, and increased cultural and 
commercial ties.' The Plan, for a program of economic and technical assistance to non-
communist Asian nations, was first raised by Spender at the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's Conference in Colombo in January 1950, and formally established at 
London in September. Australia pledged £30.25 million over six years, and by 1952 
the US, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Burma and Nepal had joined the original 
signatories. Spender argued the plan would 'stabilise government and create conditions 
of economic life and living standards under which the ideological attractions which 
communism attracts will lose their force.' (Meaney, 1985: 564; Pemberton, 1987: 14) 
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Thus western governments were putting into place a series of strategies directed to 
a vast disciplinary project-that of securing, across the region, a certain kind of 
interdependent economic, political and cultural order. The scale, and enormous 
transformative power, of this project was not lost on western leaders. Speaking of the 
Colombo Plan Spender later remarked: 
Politically Southeast Asia had lagged far behind the movements which had 
characterised the civilisation of Europe. Centuries of history had excluded this 
vast part of Asia from the liberal influence of European thought and political 
ideas ... south and Southeast Asia had to face the immense task of creating a new 
economic structure. The natural wealth had to be tapped by the introduction of 
modem methods or the improvement of old ones. Almost entire populations had 
to be taught new methods of work and production, indeed new ways of 
thinking ... (Spender, 1969: 199) 
Difference, then, became more carefully delineated. Absolute otherness was reserved 
for movements named 'communist'; for them was designated confrontation, 
containment and elimination. For the different kind of otherness represented by Asian 
adherence to pre-modem political, cultural and economic forms, was reserved a 
strategy of transformation, a movement of integration and sameness. In their practical 
operation these coercive and 'transformative' strategies were closely co-ordinated and 
mutually reinforcing. In this way 'security' and 'development'-two potent 
philosophical universals-became the catchcries of an Hegelian geopolitics which 
sought to produce a movement from Other to Same, in the achievement of an essentially 
nineteenth century civilisational ideal. Similarly the claim that ancient societies had to 
shed their backward traditions and learn entirely 'new ways of thinking' betrayed the 
operation of the 'political double-bind', the easy conviction that spaces, populations 
and subjects could be simultaneously directed, managed and transformed into the 
substance of a new societal order. (Meaney, 1985: 564-5) 
The LCP Government moved quickly to back its rhetoric with force. In 1950 a 
squadron of Dakota aircraft, and another of Lincoln bombers, were sent to Malaya for 
use to 'saturate jungle targets'. Two thousand Owen guns were also dispatched. 
Breaching the limits set by Chifley, in 1955 Menzies announced Australia would 
deploy an infantry battalion, two fighter and one bomber and airfield construction 
squadrons, plus a naval force of two destroyers and an aircraft carrier, to a new 
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve available for service anywhere on the Asian 
mainland. Menzies argued that if communism overran Southeast Asia, Australia's 
existence as a free country would be at risk. Evatt, now opposition leader, opposed the 
use of Australian troops in the Emergency, instead advocating negotiations, a faster 
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move to self-government and the improvement of working conditions in plantations. 
His opposition was prescient: the draft directive of the force stipulated a role 'in 
operations against the communist terrorists.' (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 101, 
163-8; Lee, 1995: 131-6) 
Even a relatively uncontroversial deployment-of forces to Korea under United 
Nations authority to resist the North Korean invasion of June 1950-was twisted into a 
retrospective justification for the domino theory and the conspiracy of international 
communism.14 In his radio broadcasts of September 1950 Menzies chose to interpret 
the North,Korean attack as 'a new technique of world aggression': 
The communists undermine or over-run some European or Asiatic country. They 
set up a puppet government. They then . .inspire their new puppet or satellite to 
make an attack under circumstances which impose the greatest military 
difficulty ... The purpose of this strategy .. .is to disperse the democratic forces, to 
weaken the democratic reputation and authority, to maintain nervous tension, to 
force up costs and prices in democratic countries, and to create, in the minds of 
people like ourselves, a feeling that as any of us may be attacked we had better 
keep all our forces at home. (O'Neill, 1981: 102) 
Without humour or irony, he then pleaded: 'These are not heated fancies on my part. 
Men of authority all round the world know they are a true picture of this new and 
deadliest and subtlest form of aggression the world has seen.' We might wonder at his 
sense of history, but his fevered logic also contradicted more considered accounts of 
the war's origins. While the North Korean offensive was clearly naked aggression, 
South Korean leader Syngman Rhee had also repeatedly threatened to reunify Korea by 
force. Official historian Robert O'Neill has carefully weighed the actions of both the 
USSR and China, and concluded that neither was responsible for initiating the attack. 
Even where other accounts had suggested Kim 11 Sung sought prior Soviet and Chinese 
approval the initiative and timing came clearly from his government. (1981: 12-20) 
As well as seeing the invasion as evidence of a great power conspiracy, Menzies' 
words also aimed to reinforce the rigid binary model of identity central to the Cold War. 
In a way that presaged the later American doctrine of 'credibility' it made every act and 
manifestation of communism a test of and threat to 'democracy'-which had the effect 
of entrenching democracy's power as a philosophical universal, and shrouding its 
specificity in a fear-tinged metaphysical smoke. Moreover Australia could scarcely 
claim to have been defending democracy in South Korea. In September 1950, after a 
14 Australia supplied two infantry battalions, part of the First Commonwealth Division, two 
destroyers, an aircraft carrier and a fighter squadron. The decision was made very quickly, in 
July by Spender in Menzies' absence, in order to make the announcement ahead of the UK. 
Actual deployment took many more months. (O'Neill, 1981: 462) 
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visit to Korea, the head of the Australian mission in Tokyo Colonel Hodgson reported 
that there were over ten thousand political prisoners, and that the civilian population 
was 'terrified' of a police force which attacked them with 'the utmost ruthlessness.' 
Similarly Rhee, 15 whom he called an 'unpredictable stubborn reactionary', held 
dangerous ambitions of using the war to reunify the nation under his control. (O'Neill, 
1981: 115) 
Such a model of identity, and the attribution of the conflict to the domino theory, 
received a boost with the entry of China into the war in November 1950 after the UN 
forces had counterattacked north of the 48th parallel to within fifty miles of the Chinese 
border. Australia supported US plans to attack into North Korea and supported a UN 
resolution providing MacArthur with authority to do so, naively believing the attack 
would not provoke the USSR or China to intervene. When China retaliated with a 
massive offensive in November, the UN forces were driven out of Pyongyang and 
eventually out of Seoul. Truman resolved to counter the Chinese assault, and even 
considered the use of atomic weapons.16 While the US Joint Chiefs recommended a 
UN withdrawal from Korea followed by a 'limited' war against China, Truman decided 
to attempt to hold the line in Korea, and authorised MacArthur to reinforce with US 
forces in Japan. The British, concerned that any war with China could not be 
contained, urged the US to recognise the People's Republic and cede Formosa 
(Taiwan) back to the mainland. While the US was attempting to have the UN brand the 
Chinese as 'aggressors', the British were concerned this would bring the Soviets into 
the war, and proposed a negotiated settlement that would see Chinese forces leave and 
the holding of elections for a unified Korea. By January 1951 the US, more confident 
of its military position, pressed ahead with the General Assembly resolution, which 
Australia wholeheartedly supported. (O'Neill, 1981: 116-22) 
What is significant about these events is how they were subsequently interpreted. 
Spender argued the Chinese attack was not 'aggression for limited purposes' but 
'aggression open and notorious.' By portraying China as an 'aggressor', the 
Australians became determined to see its action as further evidence of deliberate 
expansionism and of a general conspiracy, rather than a discreet defence of its north-
15 Hodgson also commented that 'When the Korean affair is liquidated from the military point of 
view, there will be not only the problem of reconstruction and rehabilitation of industry, and the 
resettlement of the refugees, but a clean up of government and governmental methods will be 
necessary to ensure that the United Nations is, in fact, building up and supporting a democratic 
state. Every observer with long experience of Korean affairs holds the opinion that we have at 
present in Korea a reactionary government closely associated with unscrupulous landlords and 
bolstered by a vicious police force.' (O'Neill, 1981: 115) Such a 'clean up' was never to occur. 
16 Truman's revelation at a press conference of 29 November 1950 that he had delegated 
authority to MacArthur to use the Bomb aroused enormous concern in Britain, who feared it 
would be destroyed by Soviet retaliation. Atlee immediately arranged a visit to Washington to 
see Truman, where he sought an assurance that the US would consult the UK before using the 
weapon-an assurance the Pentagon immediately watered down. (O'Neill, 1981: 144-5) 
1 81 
j 
- I 
Cold War, Pacific Order 1945-1969 
eastern flank.17 A more critical interpretation might view the UN push north of the 
38th parallel as being as outrageous as the North Korean invasion of the south. Indeed 
Chifley had said that if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel 'they will become 
aggressors.' Rather than seeing how western actions could contribute to escalation, the 
Americans and Australians chose to view the second stage of the war as direct evidence 
of the domino theory. As Menzies was to say in 1955, the threat to Australia came from 
an 'expansionist and aggressive communist China, as demonstrated first by the conflict 
in Korea, then by that in Indochina .. '. Once the UN forces had consolidated their 
position south of the 38th parallel, MacArthur pressed Truman to allow him to 
counterattack into North Korea with troops and bombers, but was rebuffed. In March 
1951 the administration interpreted a buildup of Chinese forces in Manchuria and of 
Soviet submarines north-east of Japan as presaging a massive drive down the Korean 
peninsula co-ordinated with a naval encirclement of Japan. In response Truman 
authorised the transfer of atomic bombs to military control for use against Chinese or 
Soviet targets. While the British opposed re-crossing the 38th parallel, Australia was in 
favour, hoping the US could then negotiate the unification of Korea from 'a position of 
strength.' Truman replaced MacArthur in April and the war ground into a stalemate. 
(O'Neill, 1981: 143, 123; Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 169; Lee, 1995: 116) Thus 
having twisted events to fit a fanciful conspiracy-which would in turn affect future 
judgements about Malaysia, Laos and Vietnam-Australian diplomacy had also 
encouraged the US in actions which held the danger of terrifying escalation and greatly 
prolonged the war and its associated suffering. 
'SOVEREIGNTY' AND 'SUBVERSION' 
BETWEEN CONFRONTATION AND VIETNAM 
Where the Australian Labor Party had responded to the early challenges of 
decolonisation with some sensitive (if problematic) diplomacy, the LCP now saw only 
turmoil, threat and uncertainty-uncertainty they immediately sought to tame with both 
the ultimate in material force and the most rigid ontological categories. In turn, through 
treaty arrangements such as ANZUS and SEATO, the formation of Malaysia and 
considerable artifice in South Vietnam, they sought to bind such ontologies into an 
17 The British Government, aware of Chinese anxieties, attempted to provide assurances that 
the conflict would remain limited to Korea-but they were not made until after the US Eighth 
Army's offensive had begun. Later in November Spender made a public statement assuring the 
Chinese that United Nations aims did not extend to any infringement of their security. If the 
Chinese only had limited objectives, he said, it would be possible to negotiate a demilitarised 
zone between the two forces. Yet he could not resist the temptation to talk tough: If China's aims 
were not limited, he said, they could not expect that their bases in Manchuria would remain 
immune from attack indefinitely. Yet US Secretary of State Acheson had no interest in a cease 
fire or demilitarised zone-given the US intransigence and the speculation about the Bomb, 
Spender's comments could have only inflamed the situation. (O'Neill, 1981: 140, 147) 
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unassailable juridical form that would also facilitate further intervention. In short, 
ambiguity and doubt could not be countenanced or tolerated-generating a quest for 
certitude which drove the West's determination to see the Viet Minh as a Soviet/Chinese 
puppet; to accelerate the establishment of the Malaysian federation even as it 
antagonised neighbours like the Philippines and Indonesia; that drove its hostility 
toward 'neutralist' leaders like Sukarno and Nehru, and 'neutralism' in general; and 
spurred the desire to retain western control over events and the associated evolution of 
new political, cultural and economic forms. That Asian leaders quite accurately charged 
the West with neo-colonialism mattered less than its deep seated anxiety that a historic 
white hegemony might be in decline. Thus while there was a determination to enforce 
the identity-markers that polarised life between democracy and communism, they 
overlay stubborn older forms of (racial and civilisational) identity that were closely tied 
to crucial political and economic interests. 
For Australia, the Indonesian takeover of Dutch West New Guinea (WNG) was a 
particular source of anxiety, feeding into a triangular structure of military deployments 
and fears which joined the fates of Malaysia, Indonesia and South Vietnam into a 
volatile indice of Australia's future security. Channelled together in this way, they 
would see Australians fighting Indonesians in north Borneo, affect both Australian and 
US decisions to deploy large ground forces to South Vietnam, see Australia supporting 
US intervention in the Sumatra rebellion of 1958, and play into Australian diplomacy 
following the so-called 'coup' in Indonesia in October 1965. Permeating all these 
decisions were deep anxieties about the future of British power in Southeast Asia and 
the commitment of the United States, not only to the area, but to Australia's own 
security. This matrix of assumptions was most tellingly visible in the explanation for 
Australia's Vietnam commitments given by Ambassador to the United States Howard 
Beale. He said: 
There was another thing too, which had to do with our relationship with the 
United States and our right or expectation to receive assistance from her in the 
event of serious difficulty overtaking us in our part of the world. Australians live 
in a potentially dangerous area; we are a western outpost hard by Asia in 
revolution, and we need allies. The British upon whom we had relied through all 
our formative years were gone or going. We had the ANZUS Treaty with the 
United States, but this treaty, like others, was written in general terms with 
clauses which only bound each party 'to consult and act' according to its 
constitutional process. Treaties are not legally enforceable documents ... 
(Pemberton, 1987: 162; emphasis added) 
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A western outpost hard by Asia in revolution .. .it seemed that little of substance had 
changed since Billy Hughes had worried, during the Great War, that the Australian 
people 'were but a tiny drop in a coloured ocean.' (Meaney, 1985: 236) The nineteenth 
century images that underpinned the modem Australian identity were still strong-as 
the crimson thread of kinship began to fray, the LCP Government sought a new white 
protector. 
It thought it had found one when the ANZUS Agreement was signed in 1951, 
linking the two Anzac nations with the United States in a mutual defence treaty. 
(Australia had resisted the inclusion of the Philippines, Japan and Indonesia, whom the 
US wanted to prevent the appearance of a 'white man's pact'.) It contained provisions 
for 'mutual aid' to assist the three parties to 'develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack' and, ironically enough, obligations on the parties 'to 
settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means'. 
Article IV, described by US negotiator John Foster Dulles as 'the meat of the treaty', 
stated that 'each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.' Article V 
stated that an 'armed attack' on any party would be 'deemed to include an armed attack 
on any of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or 
on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.' (Pemberton, 1987: 27; 
Meaney, 1985: 587) 
While Article IV provided a trigger for an automatic response (not necessarily 
military), it also gave great sweep to the territories and facilities it would potentially 
cover-including the US controlled Pacific island groups, Australian and New Zealand 
island dependencies such as New Guinea, and military facilities, vessels and troops 
forward deployed into Southeast Asia. After resisting such a pact for nearly ten years, 
the US agreed to it to draw Australia into signing the lenient Japanese Peace Treaty, 
while also seeing in Australia's commitment to Korea a sign that they might be 
persuaded to involve themselves more heavily in Southeast Asia in future.18 Yet the 
US also sought to limit its own obligations: Dulles emphasised that 'it does not commit 
any nation to action in any part of the world. In other words, the United States can 
discharge its obligations by action against the common enemy in any way and in any 
18 A copy of the Japanese Peace Treaty is contained in R. N. Rosecrance, Australian 
Diplomacy and Japan 1945-51, MUP 1962: 251. The security provisions of the treaty pledged 
Japan to 'settle its international disputes by peaceful means' and 'to refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state', but 
recognised that 'Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense' and 'may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.' 
Spender commented that 'We have yet to be satisfied that freedom is now in full flower in Japan; 
that militarism has been completely eradicated; that the evils of huge monopolies have been 
utterly destroyed; and that the roots of the police state have been wholly torn from their soil.' 
(1962: 235) 
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area that it sees fit.' To this day the terms of the ANZUS treaty have never been 
specifically invoked; yet it was effective in drawing Australia more closely to US 
positions in Asia and facilitated an increased strategic and economic integration. It 
formed an alliance framework to cover the integration of Australian and US defence 
machinery and the establishment of US facilities on Australian soil, and to justify 
Australian commitments to Vietnam. It also emboldened the Menzies cabinet to take a 
hardline position against Indonesia during its 'confrontation' of Malaysia, believing that 
the US would intervene to protect Australian forces in Borneo if the conflict escalated. 
(Meaney, 1985:586;Lee, 1997) 
Furthermore, it symbolised the way in which the Menzies 'development' strategy 
for Australia would involve large amounts of new American investment, draw Australia 
more closely into the US economy and into the Asian economic bloc centred on Japan, 
and in tum help strengthen the US-dominated regional security framework.19 Building 
on the historic discourse which viewed Australia's economic development as an 
essential buttress against a threatening Asia, the Government argued in defence of its 
request for a $US250 million World Bank loan (to build new industrial, transport and 
communications infrastructure) that 'potential security advantages .. would accrue to the 
US from having an industrially stronger ally on the southern rim of Southeast Asia.' 
The US accepted this argument and supported the World Bank decision to grant an 
initial $US 100 million; by 1962 total borrowings were $US418 million. Dean Acheson 
commented that US interests 'would be served by the large-scale development which 
Australia is now undertaking.' Earlier, in 1949, the State Department's Policy Planning 
Staff had urged the NSC to focus more closely on Australia in its Southeast Asian 
containment strategy: 'We have here a "white" and "western" government which 
because of its geography and recent policy seems to have identified itself with the Asian 
states'-implying that if Australia could be coaxed into giving more weight to western 
views its interest in Asia might play into a strong commitment to the area. (Pemberton, 
1987: 20, 62) Of course dispossession had long been the obverse face of development, 
its enabling shadow, and thus the Australian movement of progress was functionally 
integrated with a global structure of reason which would have a similar effect on Asia's 
peasants and indigenous peoples. 
19 Signs of Australia-US economic integration included a double taxation agreement signed in 
1952, and a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation in 1955. In 1950 there was a total 
$US200 million US private investment in Australia, rising to $US742 million by 1959, 
concentrated in manufacturing, non-ferrous metals and oil refining. By the end of the 1960s it 
had risen to $US2360 million, making it the fifth largest recipient of US direct overseas 
investment. Moreover Australia's efforts to increase its trade into Asia dovetailed with US plans, 
which envisaged Australia acting as another 'Asian' country trading raw materials for Japanese 
manufactures. Also Australia's supplies of coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc and uranium made it, 
according to the NSC, 'potentially a significant supplementary source of industrial and defense 
supply for free Asia.' (Pemberton, 1987: 8-9, 64-66, 330) 
185 
Cold War, Pacific Order 1945-1969 
Mirroring this strategy were the construction of supra-national networks of 
sovereignty which might simultaneously enable greater western intervention, and efface 
its scandal. As leaders like Sukarno denounced western interference in Asia as neo-
colonial and imperialist, the images of political sovereignty and subjectivity dating from 
Hobbes were called upon to fashion an unassailable image of general will linking Asian 
and Western powers in a common project and identity. If the Colombo Plan acted as a 
bedrock economico-political strategy of this type, the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) was intended to combine a mechanism for co-ordinated military 
planning and deployments with an incontestable juridical form. Although it never quite 
worked as intended, it remained a crucial and effective mechanism.20 Such concerns 
over sovereignty-which disavowed its nonetheless well-understood nature as a 
problematic and constructed category-were also at work in the diplomacy over West 
New Guinea, Malaysia and South Vietnam. 
South Vietnam in particular became a space in which the construction of an 
apparently stable 'sovereignty'-which would in tum enable a clearer designation of 
the 'aggression' and 'subversion' of such an imagined political community-was 
sought through an elaborate combination of diplomacy, performance and political 
manipulation. Following the French defeat at the hands of Viet Minh forces at Dien 
Bien Phu, the Menzies Government sought observer status at the Geneva Conference 
on Indochina, and found itself disturbed by the outcomes.21 The Geneva accords, 
signed in July 1954, provided for the military partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, a 
ceasefire throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and free elections in 1956 for a 
reunified Vietnam. They also proscribed the stationing of foreign military bases or 
forces in the respective zones. The 17th parallel was to specifically form a military 
demarcation line, not a political or territorial boundary. The DRY (North Vietnam) 
clearly hoped the 1956 elections would lead to a reunified Vietnam under their control, 
20 Until 1960 the Government continually emphasised the role of SEATO as a regional 
framework for security. The organisation developed a headquarters in Bangkok and a network of 
military and political committees. In 1956 Australia provided £2 million in military aid to SEATO 
countries, and in 1958 announced £1 million more to Thailand, South Vietnam, Pakistan and the 
Philippines. In 1962 Barwick announced a further £3 million over the next three years. The aid 
was mainly provided in the form of communications equipment and technical training in Australia 
to military and civilian personnel. Edwards comments that SEATO 'was unable to attract any new 
members of even significantly to reduce the hostility of neutral Asian countries, such as India or 
Indonesia. Nor was Australia able to use SEATO councils and committees to achieve its 
longstanding goal of privileged insight into the military plans of the United States.' By 1961 
SEATO had been declared moribund because of the reluctance of France and the UK to support 
US diplomacy in Asia. (Pemberton, 1987: 109; Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 185) 
21 While concerned that anticommunism should prevail in Indochina, prior to the Conference the 
Australian government resisted US efforts to have they and other Commonwealth nations join US 
plans for direct military intervention in support of the French. Australia was concerned both with 
offending the US, but also with provoking an open conflict with China and alienating Asian 
opinion. Significantly, Casey also took the view that only non-communist Vietnamese could 
defeat the Viet Minh, provided the French granted them something like full independence. Such 
qualms would not prevail in later years. (Pemberton, 1987: 44) 
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while the US and Bao Dai governments were deeply unhappy with the Accords and 
refused to endorse them. The US was particularly unhappy with conceding territory to 
communist control, but hoped that at least the two zones could be turned into separate 
states such as in Germany and Korea. US policy thus became concerned to strengthen 
the South Vietnamese regime under the new Catholic Prime Minister (soon President) 
Ngo Dinh Diem, to assist him to eliminate his political enemies, and to block the 
elections provided for under the accords. Australia took a similar view, for whilst 
envisaging partition prior to the conference, had not expected the provision for elections 
and reunification. Menzies, alarmed, said the accords had not removed 'the menace of 
aggressive Communism' and that 'Our own security in Australia depends upon 
converting a temporary halt into a permanent one.' Labor's Arthur Calwell was even 
less restrained: he argued that communism had been brought 350 miles closer to 
Australia, and that the cease-fire was an attempt to save Europe by sacrificing Southeast 
Asia. 22 If a Southeast Asian defence pact were achieved, its headquarters should be in 
Darwin. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 146-9) 
Diem could not have been a more unlikely candidate for a Vietnamese popular 
hero--carefully chosen and imported by the United States to replace the French-
sponsored emperor Bao Dai, his regime was buttressed with vast amounts of US and 
military .aid; American officials under the command of Edward Lansdale supervised the 
construction of his intelligence agencies, police and armed forces (ARVN); and US 
advisors were present in the regime's bureaucracy and closely supervised military 
planning and operations against the Viet Minh.23 By the early 1960s his regime had an 
unparalleled reputation for corruption, nepotism and repression and was both deeply 
hated in Vietnam and seen as an obstacle by the West. He was assassinated, with the 
explicit connivance of the US Embassy, in November 1963. (Sheehan, 1990: 371) 
Yet in the intervening years Diem was widely hailed as a champion. He visited 
Australia in September 1957, at the close of a massive two year program of repression 
directed against the Viet Minh which saw the killing and torture of tens of thousands 
and the imprisonment, without charge or trial, of another fifty to a hundred thousand. 
The Australian government was unconcerned that this program entailed the gross abuse 
of the most basic human and civil rights, or that its impact on the guerilla organisation 
provoked the National Liberation Front (NLF) to resume its military struggle and call 
on support from northern Vietnamese-thus beginning an escalation of the civil war 
22 In March 1953, during a visit by French Minister for Indochina Jean Letourneau-at which the 
Government announced £250,000 in economic aid under the Colombo Plan-Evatt told him that 
the security of Southeast Asia and Australia depended on the defence of Indochina. (Edwards 
and Pemberton, 1992: 114) 
23 Between 1955 and 1961 the United States gave the Republic of Vietnam $US1.7 billion in 
economic assistance. Much of this was in the form of the Commercial Import Program, which 
according to Peter Edwards, 'virtually underwrote the operations of the Saigon Government.' 
(Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 245) 
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which would rapidly spiral out of control and eventually see the deployment of 
Australian and US ground forces in 1965. In May Diem had visited the US where he 
had been hailed by Eisenhower as a 'miracle man', and in Australia his visits to 
Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne were marked by twenty-one gun salutes and military 
guards of honour. He was made one of the highest imperial honours-a Knight Grand 
Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George. (Sheehan, 1990: 188; Edwards and 
Pemberton, 1992: 195-201) 
A telling photograph taken during his visit captures its elaborate and calculated 
theatre. Diem stands on the tarmac at Canberra airport, walking from a Qantas aircraft. 
He wears Vietnamese traditional dress; behind him stands Menzies, wearing tails, and 
to his right the Governor-General Sir William Slim in military uniform, his chest 
blazing with medals. Around them, in full military regalia, are an escort from the 
Australian and South Vietnamese armed services. Carefully assembled here, and no 
doubt at many other points in his visit, were all the signs of sovereignty, identity and 
cultural authenticity that were being invoked to produce the legitimacy of his regime and 
the western order in South Vietnam-with a sleek technological display of mobility and 
modernity looming in the background. In turn Diem's legitimacy was linked to those 
figures (Menzies, Slim and the Army leadership) which personified the Australian 
subject and the project of its security-a security which had already been paired with 
the survival of the South Vietnamese state. The Sydney Morning Herald said Diem was 
'one of the most remarkable men in the new Asia ... uncorruptible and patriotic ... 
authoritarian in approach but liberal in principle.' The Age, just as incredibly, argued he 
was 'not a morally equivocal figure, like Chiang Kai-Shek or Syngman Rhee'. Evatt 
joined the chorus, saying at a parliamentary luncheon that peace and democracy had 
been achieved in Vietnam. Such an effective semiotic performance of sovereignty was 
parallelled by other actions. In 1959 the Australian diplomatic mission in Saigon was 
elevated into an embassy-Australia now regarded the 17th parallel as a political 
boundary. In June 1962, the special report of the International Control Commission 
(ICC), in 'a diplomatic victory for Saigon and Washington', confirmed this view. The 
report was thus the culmination of a long series of verbal, visual and material 
performances of 'sovereignty' aimed at buttressing the legitimacy of the RVN regime 
and entrenching the partition of Vietnam. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 195-201, 
245) 
SEATO sought to build on such efforts, in turn integrating 'states' like South 
Vietnam into a vast sovereignty-effect, a kind of super-subject that could combine the 
status, resources and power of its constituent meta-subjects into an incontrovertible 
material and juridical force. The treaty was negotiated with astonishing speed-after 
only three days of substantive negotiations in Manila-and signed only 49 days after 
the final declarations of the Geneva Conference, on 8 September 1954. It came into 
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force at the beginning of February 1955. 24 In signing it, Australia sought reassurance: 
that the US could be drawn into Southeast Asia more deeply; that Britain would 
remained committed to the security of the whole Southeast Asian region, not merely to 
Malaya; that France's military strength might be retained as a factor in the regional 
balance after its colonial role had ended; and that these major western powers could be 
co-ordinated with Australia, New Zealand and as many Asian countries as possible in a 
collective defence system. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 154) 
Australia also wanted the treaty to have military 'teeth'-which implied something 
like the NATO formula wherein an attack on one party was declared an attack on all, 
rather than the ANZUS formula wherein each party 'would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.' What they had in mind was a 
provision that would allow the US President to act immediately, without consulting 
Congress. Dulles however resisted this formula, with the eventual agreement being 
more along ANZUS lines. Australia also met strong opposition when, in the hope of 
gaining access to US thinking, it sought clauses providing for joint military planning. 
The Manila Treaty was signed by Australia, New Zealand, the US, Britain, France, 
Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, and was effective over 'the general area of 
Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general 
area of the Southwest Pacific' south of 21 degrees north. Its key article (Article IV) 
included a provision for 'subversion': 
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty 
area or of any other state or territory .. .is threatened in any way other than by 
armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might 
endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to 
agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence. (Cited in 
Meaney, 1985: 612-13) 
This section was extremely broad and ambiguous, leaving governments great scope to 
interpret events as threatening across a wide variety of situations and a wide 
geographical area. This was of great significance for the Indochinese states, which 
while prohibited under the Geneva accords from entering into military alliances, were 
designated under a 'Protocol' to the Manila Treaty as being territories to which articles 
III and IV were applicable. Thus the three areas were not formal parties to the Treaty 
24 The ALP, under Evatt, was generally supportive of the treaty. Evatt criticised Australia's 
greater obligations as opposed to the US, and proposed an important amendment which would 
have required the Government to seek parliamentary approval before committing forces under 
the treaty. It was defeated on party lines. Labor Senate leader N. E. McKenna also suggested 
that Dutch New Guinea be added to the treaty area. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 158) 
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organisation, but were 'unanimously ... designated' by the parties as being within its 
scope. 
Just at the US was trying to produce the illusion of a unified body-politic in South 
Vietnam, SEATO was an attempt to give juridical form to an even vaster aggregation of 
sovereignty which, in combination with the detailed administrative techniques deployed 
through military and economic aid programs, could transform the subjectivity of 
individuals while policing an identity which both derived from, and exceeded, the meta-
subjectivities of its member nations. It was the vision of security presaged in Hobbes 
writ large: a super-Leviathan whose aims, purposes and project would be One and 
which would be arrayed against a single monolithic Other, who might appear at any 
place in the vulnerable flesh of this new political body.25 Hence the significance of 
'subversion' to the treaty-its injunction to its members to 'counter subversive 
activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability'-
combined with an apparatus that could now portray western intervention as a protective 
reflex coming from the very interior of the political body. 
Many however, were not fooled. Sukarno denounced the pact as neo-colonialism, 
and instead sponsored his own conference of Afro-Asian nations (a precursor to the 
Non-Aligned Movement) held in Bandung in 1955. Australia received no invitation to 
the conference, and the US was particularly angered as it gave Chou En Lai the 
international platform he had been denied by China's exclusion from the United 
Nations and challenged the global network of security alliances SEATO was designed 
to augment. (McQueen, 1991: 68) Mrs Pandit said sarcastically that SEATO was a 
'South-East Asian alliance minus south-East Asia', and Nehru himself argued the 
American proposals for the organisation 'came near to assuming protection or declaring 
a kind of Monroe Doctrine unilaterally over the countries of South-East Asia.'26 
(Harper, 1962: 175) In response the western powers became concerned that SEATO 
should perpetuate and extend the stark ontological divide between democracy and 
communism. Thus neutralism-with its connotations of independence, decolonisation 
and opposition to foreign military bases-was a scandal. Casey declared that 
Australia will respect the decision of any country to follow a policy of neutrality. 
We feel, however, that we have the right to expect neutral countries to follow a 
25 As George Kennan argued in 1946, 'World communism is like a malignant parasite that feeds 
only on diseased tissue.' (Cited in Campbell, 1992: 28) 
26Norman Harper concluded that 'even at the diplomatic level, SEATO did not become the 
medium for consultation with non-member states. Official circles in Vietnam and Laos, Burma 
and Indonesia, Malaya and India were reluctant to be associated with it. Increasing Communist 
pressure on Tibet and Laos and the growing concern in New Delhi at Chinese border claims 
produced no major change of attitude .. .'. Of SEATO's Asian members, 'Thailand, Pakistan and 
the Philippines had all attended the Bandung Conference, and while exercising a moderating 
influence on a number of issues, adhered to the final declaration of principles adopted by the 
Conference.' (Harper, 1962: 175) 
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policy of genuine neutrality ... They should not criticise or work against SEATO 
and other democratic countries, while pulling their punches when dealing with the 
communists ... They should not allow international communism to use the 
umbrella of neutrality to protect domestic communist subversion. (Harper, 1962: 
178-181) 
Similarly, the SEATO Annual Report of March 1957 had charged communist countries 
with exploiting neutralism: 'They have attempted to identify the widespread desire of 
peoples for national independence and integrity ·with the policy of neutralism. They 
have also supported neutralist claims that membership with other free nations in 
regional collective defence organisations is incompatible with national independence. In 
so doing, the Communists hope, by keeping up the outmoded cries of 'imperialism' 
and 'colonialism', to weaken the present friendly ties between Asian and other free 
countries and among Asian nations themselves, and so to increase their own influence 
and to mask the enlargement of their own empire'. (Harper, 1962: 181) 
It was typical of the Orwellian character of such claims that SEA TO itself was an 
attempt to solidify such an 'imperial' system, in a world in which its overt form was no 
longer tolerated. Realising this, the United Kingdom decided to decolonise its 
possessions in Malaya, Singapore and north Borneo in a way that would ensure its 
interests were preserved. It began by signing the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement in 
1956 which ensured that British forces (including the Commonwealth Strategic 
Reserve) could remain after the British had wound up their administration. Then in May 
1961, Malayan leader Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sabah, North Borneo and Brunei into the new state of 'Malaysia' (an idea 
Pemberton asserts 'was almost certainly of British inspiration'). The UK wanted to 
preserve access to its £600 million investments in oil, tin and rubber-which were by 
1963 the greatest source of US dollars in the Sterling Area-and the highly strategic 
port of Singapore.27 A federation would help the smaller territories resist pressure 
from China and Indonesia, and the inclusion of north Borneo mollify the Malays who 
feared the influence of the Chinese majority in Singapore. Australian External Affairs 
Minister Garfield Barwick told Cabinet that Malaysia 'was the only hope of a bastion 
against China' and anticipated new commercial opportunities in an integrated Malaysian 
economy. 28 The establishment of the new state, he said 'would contribute to the 
27 The United Kingdom had assured the loyalty of Singapore in an intelligence operation worthy 
of the CIA at its meddling best. Prior to decolonisation the Singapore Special Branch arrested 
leading communists in the People's Action Party, and M16 developed close relations with future 
President Lee Kuan Yew to promote his political fortunes. (Toohey and Pinwill, 1990: 68) 
28 By the mid-1960s there were 85 Australian companies with investments in the territories, 
having grown from $US5.8 million in 1948-9 to $US32.8 million in 1964-5. The greatest presence 
was in tin. {Pemberton, 1987: 167) 
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stability of the region . .it deserves support as a major act of orderly decolonisation.' 
Similarly US President John F. Kennedy said it was 'the best hope for security for that 
very vital part of the world.' (Pemberton, 1987: 166-169; emphases added) 
After the British violently suppressed the December 1962 rebellion in Brunei with 
the help of two Australian Hercules aircraft, Indonesia declared its policy of 
'Confrontation' against the new federation. Sukarno denounced it as 'an attempt to save 
the rubber, tin and oil of the area for the imperialists.' Already alarmed by the growth 
of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and having spent ten years attempting (and 
failing) to prevent Indonesia from absorbing West New Guinea, these events provoked 
renewed anxieties in Australia-which flowed into the eventual deployment of troops to 
Vietnam and the clear support for the Indonesian military against Sukarno after October 
1965. Australia had deployed much of its overseas forces in Malaya under its formal 
'forward defence' doctrine and saw Singapore as a strategic port. The Defence 
Committee's 1962 Strategic Basis document, in enunciating forward defence, argued 
that 'while Southeast Asia is held, defence in depth is provided for Australia.' It laid 
out an alarming scenario in which the decline of British strength and commitment, the 
divisions within SEATO, and the precarious Indonesian balance between the Army and 
PKI raised the spectre of 'the full threat of a communist Asia and a communist 
Indonesia.' (Pemberton, 1987: 167; Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 246) 
While the US and Australia initially sought to defuse tensions with diplomacy, and 
Sukarno argued Sabah and north Borneo should be independent or at least consulted 
via a plebiscite, the UK pushed for a fast decolonisation. After the British persuaded 
the Tunku in July 1963 to sign a document providing for the establishment of Malaysia 
in August-whatever the outcome of negotiations with Indonesia and the Philippines-
Sukarno demanded the removal of British bases from the region. At the same time 
Menzies asserted his leaning towards a more pro-British position.29 After the British 
Embassy and the offices of Shell in Jakarta were burnt down, and the assets of all 
British companies expropriated, Australia moved to support Britain militarily (while 
avoiding a total break in relations with Sukarno). In 1963 two naval vessels began 
patrols in Borneo and a battalion was diverted from the Strategic Reserve for operations 
against the MCP on the Thai border, which released British troops for Borneo. By 
February 1965 Australians were in Borneo (a regular battalion and an SAS squadron), 
and minesweepers had fought Indonesian patrol boats off Singapore. Between March 
and July, thirty Indonesians were killed by the Australians. While a complete break 
with Indonesia was averted, David Lee has since argued that 'a policy which turned out 
29 During the crisis Australian elite opinion was divided. Barwick had been pressing the British 
to involve Indonesia and the Philippines in discussions on the Borneo territories, while Australian 
Ambassador to Indonesia Keith Shann felt that Indonesia 'had a strong enough case against 
Malaysia, because of Malayan and British errors, to discredit the new state internationally,' and 
wondered if 'it were not too late for second thoughts about Malaysia.' (Lee, 1997) 
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to have no serious consequences for Australia could easily have turned into a tragic 
blunder' --0nly the (unforeseeable) destruction of the PKI and the removal of Sukarno 
had averted an escalation in which long-term Indonesian intervention in Borneo could 
have only been countered, warned Jakarta Ambassador Keith Shann, 'by an attack on 
Indonesia itself.' (Pemberton, 1987: 246; Lee, 1997) 
Here, the attempt to construct a seamless new body-politic amid the turmoil of 
decolonisation had again been challenged, and countered with a potentially disastrous 
deployment of military force. As Malaysia was consolidated after the Indonesian 'coup' 
of October 1965, the military efforts to solidify the fragile sovereignty of South 
Vietnam escalated. Australia insisted on seeing the problems together-Country Party 
leader McEwan wrote to Harold Wilson that Confrontation and Vietnam were .'coming 
to form a common pattern and a common threat.' Only the introduction of conscription, 
which was to provoke far-reaching political upheavals in Australia, had made it 
possible to both deploy forces to Borneo and ground forces to Vietnam. Australian 
military commitments to Vietnam began in 1962, with the arrival in Saigon in August of 
thirty advisors for the new Australian Army Training Team (AATV). Half had 
experience in the jungles of Malaya. That year a squadron of Sabre jet fighters was also 
loaned to Thailand to fight their communists. In September Cabinet approved Defence 
Budget proposals of nearly $650 million over the next three years-by 1968 Australian 
defence expenditures would peak at a level of 4.6% of GNP, from a low of 2.6% in 
1962. These commitments coincided with a rapid escalation of US involvement-in 
February 1962 the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Vietnam was 
replaced with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACY) under General 
Harkins; by the end of the year eleven thousand US personnel would be in South 
Vietnam. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 242-248) 
THE VIETNAM WAR 
The Defence Review increased defence expenditures from the 1962-63 figure of £212 
million (in 1962-3) to £280 million by 1966-7 and £300 million annually for the rest of 
the decade. Army numbers were targeted at 28,000 by 1967 and 33,000 as soon as 
possible thereafter. In January 1964 Cabinet allocated £250,000 of its SEATO defence 
aid to the 'strategic hamlet' program, which Barwick had seen when visiting South 
Vietnam in 1962. After this visit Barwick told Cabinet that 'we should regard Vietnam 
as our present frontier.' As the war continued to escalate, and the position of a 
succession of military regimes grew weaker, French President De Gaulle floated 
proposals for the 'neutralisation' of Indochina. In March 1964 Barwick told the 
Parliament that 'neutralisation' was 'a course of despair' requiring the removal of all 
western bases and conventional forces from the region. Betraying a ridiculous 
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Cartesian hubris, he argued the West needed to retain the option of 'controlled and 
graduated resistance'; if conventional forces were removed and guarantees of neutrality 
were to fail, the West would face 'the grave choices associated with recourse to nuclear 
weapons'. While the SEATO Council meeting of mid-April saw strong divisions over 
the correct course of action to take, in June the Cabinet approved a doubling in the size 
of the AATV to sixty-with approval for its members to accompany ARVN units into 
battle-along with six RAAF Caribou and crews. The AA TV was eventually increased 
to a hundred. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 271-300) 
August 1964 saw the passage through the US Senate of the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution, which freed the US Administration to escalate the war without recourse to 
Congress. The LCP Government affirmed its support for the US; in Parliament ALP 
leader Calwell called for UN intervention and a reconvention of the Geneva 
Conference, and questioned the lack of clear and public treaties to cover the.deployment 
of Australian troops overseas. He argued the conflict was essentially a civil war, and 
that the Vietcong (sic) drew 'its basic strength from the support it receives within South 
Vietnam itself'. Gough Whitlam, however, supported the government and the US 
Navy's actions in the Gulf of Tonkin and, referring to the retaliatory bombing raids 
Johnson had ordered, said that military action was necessary to enable the US and the 
RVN to negotiate from a position of strength! Jim Cairns, while happy for the US to 
retain a 'sea and air cordon' around Southeast Asia, opposed US intervention because it 
would only make the 'national revolutionary movement' more oppressive. No speaker 
advocated the withdrawal of western forces or aid; the overriding theme was a 
questioning of the legal basis of the western commitments. Now Minister for External 
Affairs, Hasluck admitted that the RVN had not requested Australian help under the 
SEA TO protocol, but asserted that the Australian commitment 'flowed from' the 
general obligations assumed under the Manila Treaty. Thus while western commitments 
did not directly invoke SEATO (due to the divisions among its members) the 
deployments still drew on the discursive and juridical illusions embodied in the treaty. 
(Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 313-4) 
On 2 March 1965 thirty-five hundred US Marines landed in Danang and the carpet 
bombing of North Vietnam ('Operation Rolling Thunder') began. On 2 April the 
meeting of the US National Security Council approved two more Marine battalions, an 
air squadron and eighteen to twenty thousand more support troops, with the Marines 
authorised to conduct counter-insurgency operations outside their bases. The meeting 
also decided that the deployment of forces from Korea, Australia and New Zealand 
should be urgently sought. 30 On 5 April the Defence Committee concluded that 
30 In December 1964 Johnson wrote to Menzies requesting 200 more advisors and shipping, 
and flagged the need for combat forces. Menzies replied that all instructors were needed in 
Australia (because of conscription), but that Australia would send military representatives to US-
Australian staff talks on the deployment of ground forces. The Australian COS had decided that 
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Australia should offer a combat battalion because it was in Australia's strategic interests 
to have a strong American military presence in Southeast Asia, and on the 7th April the 
Cabinet's FAD Committee met. Hasluck, supported by McMahon, suggested waiting 
until Johnson's major speech at Johns Hopkins University and for the outcome of 
recent peace initiatives. McEwen, Menzies and Defence Minister Paltridge argued 
Australia should commit the battalion in support of the US, who had intervened in 
Vietnam partly because they 'knew the security of Australia would be stake if South 
Vietnam fell.' After three weeks of convoluted diplomacy aimed at soliciting a 'request' 
from the RVN government, Menzies made the announcement in Parliament on the 
evening of the 28th April, while both Whitlam and Calwell were absent. His statement 
included the famous claim that the communist takeover of South Vietnam 'must be seen 
as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans'. 
(Pemberton, 1987: 272; Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 364-71) However fanciful, 
this drew on a series of historic images of threat from Asia and, in the interval which 
separated Pacific War posters of Japanese arrows thrusting towards Australia and 
Fadden's 1949 image of 'red spearpoints' bearing downward yet again, traced an easy 
mutation of yellow peril into a lurid shade of red. It was a monumental deceit, which 
nonetheless found its mark in a credulous population. A year later Harold Holt, riding 
on the euphoria of Johnson's visit to Australia, would win an unprecedented electoral 
majority on the strength of the war in Vietnam. 
A week later Calwell replied to Menzies. In one of the most remarkable speeches 
ever made in the Federal Parliament, he denounced the deployment as unwise, 
untimely, and politically and morally wrong. It was based, he said, on a flawed 
analysis of Vietnamese society, the nature of the struggle, and the strategic situation in 
Southeast Asia. Just as Menzies argued the force was needed for Australia's security, 
Calwell ironically asserted it would damage that security. Thus while a basic ontology 
of political strategy and being was agreed, the two men were totally at odds regarding 
its form and achievement. To call the struggle that of democracy against foreign 
aggression, he continued, was wrong; destroying the whole sovereignty-effect attached 
to the R VN, Calwell pointed out the south Vietnamese had suffered nine military juntas 
since the murder of Diem, half of whom the US had supported and half they had 
opposed: 'The Government of South Vietnam does not base itself on popular support. 
Yet this is the government at whose request, and in whose support, we are to commit a 
ground troops were necessary to seize back the initiative; DEA questioned the political situation 
in Saigon and the consequences of over-commitment. At the talks (held 1 April 1965 in Honolulu) 
the leader of the Australian delegation, Air Chief Marshall Scherger, told the US that Australia 
would respond positively to any US request-ignoring the Defence Committee which emphasised 
that his role in the talks was 'purely exploratory and on a "no commitment" basis'. The brief 
wanted him to gather more information on US plans, and to consider the many problems that 
could arise, particularly where western forces were intervening in a civil war in which 'they will 
have great difficulty distinguishing friend from foe'. (Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 358) 
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battalion of fighting men. And we are told we are doing this in the name of the free and 
independent Government and People of South Vietnam. I do not believe it ... '. The 
majority of south Vietnamese, uncommitted to either side, 'watch uncomprehendingly 
the ebb and flow of this frightful war around them, and as each day threatens some new 
horror, they become even more uncomprehending. And because this is so, our policy 
of creating a democratic anti-communist South Vietnam has failed.' (Meaney, 1985: 
680-6) He went on to argue that the obsession with the domino theory had generated an 
obsessive and dangerous militarism: 
It blinds and obscures the real nature of the problem of communist expansion. It 
lends support and encouragement to those who would see the problem in purely 
military terms, and whose policies would, if ever adopted, lead to disaster ... Pre-
occupied by the fear of a military Munich, we have suffered a score of moral 
Dunkirks ... Pre-occupied with fear of communist revolution, we have supported 
and sought to support those who would prevent any sort of revolution, even 
when inevitable; even when most needful. (Meaney, 1985: 686) 
Seeing also the enormously divisive potential of the decision, and for the conscription 
of reinforcements as Australia sank deeper into the quagmire, he concluded with an 
appeal for the 'dispute to be settled through the councils of the United Nations,' and 
with a profound warning to all the war's opponents: 
This course we have agreed to take today is fraught with difficulty. I cannot 
promise you that easy popularity can be bought in times like these ... When the 
drums beat and the trumpets sound, the voice of reason and right can be heard in 
the land only with difficulty. But if we are to have the courage of our convictions, 
then we must do our best to make that voice heard. I offer you the probability that 
you will be traduced, that your motives will be misrepresented, that your 
patriotism will be impugned, that your courage will be called into question. But I 
offer you the sure and certain knowledge that you will be vindicated ... (Meaney, 
1985: 686) 
The goal of a democratic south Vietnam had failed; escalation threatened a world-
destroying war; and the defence policy which generated the decision was based on a 
damaging series of strategic fallacies. Furthermore, in stating the need for social 
revolution in Asia, and the determination of the western powers to frustrate it, he 
recognised an economic fact of the post-war order whose basic truth had eluded 
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mainstream Labor, and would quickly be forgotten.31 It was an utterly damning 
critique, but one that would go unheeded, as he knew: ' ... when the great weight of 
western opinion calls for a pause, Australia says there must be no pause for reflection, 
no pause for reconsideration.' In August the size of the force was raised from 800 to a 
battalion group of 1050, and in March 1966 to a Task Force of 4500. At the end of July 
President Johnson affirmed the US was now deeply committed to the war, and would 
deploy forty-four battalions (fifty thousand troops), increasing total US forces to a 
hundred and twenty-five thousand. The US presence in Vietnam would reach a peak of 
some five hundred and sixty thousand troops in 1968. Johnson visited Australia in 
October 1966, but Australia's commitment was not increased again (and for the last 
time) until October 1967 when troop numbers were increased to eight thousand. 
Australia's support may have seemed militarily insignificant but, as Pemberton argues, 
was of enormous political weight-it assisted the US Administration to counter its 
domestic and Congressional critics, and its 'support as a fellow SEATO member was 
also crucial ... because America's obligations under the Manila treaty constituted an 
important element of the juridical basis of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and ultimately for 
direct US involvement.' On a smaller scale it was also militarily important: Australian 
Special Forces officers worked in the CIA's 'Pheonix Program' which, through the 
capture of 28,000 and the killing of another 20,000, decimated the NLF clandestine 
government in the years after 1968; similarly US Colonel David Hackworth praised the 
Australians' counterinsurgency skills and sent his own officers to train with them. 
(Pemberton, 1987: 308; Hackworth, 1989: 494-5) 
The war Australia gave unstinting diplomatic support to, and which Holt's Minister 
for the Army Malcom Fraser would decades later maintain was a just cause, would drag 
on until April 1975 and claim as many as four million Vietnamese lives, fifty-eight 
thousand Americans, and 500 Australians. South Vietnam was turned into a vast 
military and social laboratory, in which horrific new weapons were tested and 
deployed, populated areas designated free-fire zones and subjected to incessant 
bombing, strafing and napalm, and the environmental and genetic order poisoned for 
generations by the use of defoliants. Millions of refugees were created, while at least 
twenty-five thousand peasants were killed every year and another fifty thousand 
seriously wounded. Hundreds of thousands more were killed in combat, during the 
31 Jim Cairns and Whitlam also spoke against the commitment. Whitlam struck an ambiguous 
note, supporting Calwell but affirming his support for the United States as a global actor: 
'America's motives in Vietnam are above dispute.' He argued the LCP Government was diverting 
scarce resources from Malaysia, Indonesia and New Guinea, where Australia's security 
interests were greater. He also asserted that Australia was wrong in not acting formally under 
SEATO: 'The Government's sin is to have acted militarily without preparing the ground 
diplomatically.' (Edwards, 1997: 35) ALP opposition was formalised with a policy statement in 
May. It opposed conscription and the dispatch of troops, and undertook to withdraw them 
'without delay'. It said the Australian government should seek to broker a new cease-fire and 
negotiations and recognise the NLF as a 'party principal'. It should also 'support the Geneva 
accords for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.' (Meaney, 1985: 686) 
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bombing of the north or assassinated by both sides. A hundred and fifty thousand 
Cambodians were also killed by B52s as the war expanded into Cambodia in 1973. 
(Karnow, 1983: 11; Sheehan, 1990: 687; Kiernan, 1985: xii) The conflict that 
Government leaders asserted lay on Australia's frontiers was a cruel and brutal display 
of techno-scientific murder, a terrible apogee to the systemic chain which married the 
most rigid ontology of being with the Cartesian hubris that spaces, populations and 
resources could be easily moulded, controlled and exploited. Confronted by its 
failure-which was visible as early as 1962 and most conclusively after the Tet 
Offensive of 1968-the machine simply ground on, destroying everything in its path. 
In short, the war was a moral disaster of major order, rivalling the Holocaust in its 
marriage of industrial modernity with an amoral rationality that systematically 
demonised, and de-humanised, its victims.32 
As such, and as a conflict which had for so long been represented as crucial to the 
security of the nation's very being, we could expect it to hollow out a corrosive space 
of aporia within the progressive myth of Australian subjectivity. This was in part 
reflected in the social upheavals occasioned by the growth of the antiwar movement in 
Australia, yet there has never been the depth of moral reassessment provoked by the 
later recognition of Aboriginal dispossession and genocide. However, in this context 
Calwell's address was a crucial event-presaging a growing body of discourse which 
decisively challenged the whole structure of identity and geopolitical truth that the LCP 
had been inciting and deepening for fifteen years. However powerful it was to remain, 
especially in international policy, this version of subjectivity could never now be 
universal, and never absolutely hegemonic outside the boundaries of a small elite. The 
· drums would beat and the trumpets sound again, but many were no longer hearing the 
call. 
THE INDONESIAN KILLINGS 
If Vietnam was an event felt later in global economic upheaval and far-reaching 
transformations in Australian society, the enormous turmoil in Indonesia after 1 
October 1965 would have equally profound-and disturbing-consequences. More 
than any other, Sukarno's downfall and the destruction of the PK.I helped determine the 
coming shape of the Southeast Asian economic and geopolitical order, shaped the 
future direction of Australian foreign policy, and in tum played into a politics which 
32 For a more systematic version of this argument, which analyses the Vietnam war as 
producing a crisis in an American (and later global) metanarrative of western progress and 
rationality, and which played out into attempts to renarrate the American identity and develop 
more effective and nuanced strategies of geopolitical power, see my MA thesis, 'Someday This 
War's Gonna End': Vietnam Stories At The End Of History, University of Technology, Sydney, 
1994. Fraser's comments were provoked by the publication of Robert McNamara's self-critical 
memoir, In Retrospect, in 1995 (See The Sydney Morning Hera/dot 15/4/95). 
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sought to reinterpret and strengthen the linked Australian structure of subjectivity, 
security and identity. Once again, it was the interpretation of events-rather than their 
illusory 'essential' quality-which was most important here. Affirming the centrality of 
the Indonesian New Order to Australian international policy, by 1992 Paul Keating was 
arguing that Australia and Indonesia had 'joined destinies'. Thus the political 
vicissitudes of Indonesia were drawn into a vision of security which saw a re-
interpretation of the Australian movement of culmination, within the greater 
achievement of a stable geopolitical ideal. It would be no different for the governments 
of Holt, McMahon, Whitlam, Fraser or Hawke. Soeharto's New Order regime would 
be the beneficiary of its overdetermined importance to Australia's security and 
prosperity, and be the conduit for the stubborn endurance of rigid cold war ontologies 
in Australian policy, beneath the surface of otherwise substantial change. 
Since at least 1941 Indonesia had been seen as a space essential to Australia's 
security, which drove the war-time decisions to occupy Portugese Timor, confront the 
Japanese in Borneo and join the British reoccupation of Java. After 1945 Labor had 
responded, with one eye on economic and security considerations, to the challenges of 
decolonisation; yet an important precedent had been set with the obvious relief at the 
quick suppression of the PKI's rebellion at Madiun in 1948. During the 1950s the 
west's rigid ontological framework made Sukarno's neutralism an object of intense 
suspicion, which was only deepened by his raucous campaign to take over WNG, his 
friendship with China and acceptance of aid from the Soviet Union, and the growing 
size of the PKI. In 1958 the Australian Government secretly supported CIA assistance 
to rebels in Sumatra with the use of airfields, navy logistic and medical support, and the 
use of the Christmas Island base by US submarines.33 Yet the US had a parallel 
strategy of providing large sums of aid and training to the Indonesian army and police, 
with the hope either of drawing Sukarno closer to the West or bolstering forces which 
could eventually confront the PKI, which by 1955 had the fourth largest national vote 
and in 1957 won regional elections in central Java.34 Sukarno's visit to Moscow in 
33 In October 1957 the CIA Chief Allen Dulles told the ANZUS Council meeting that the US would 
only countenance the breakup of Indonesia as a last resort to keep US oil interests in Sumatra 
out of PKI hands. During the rebellion the US provided arms, ammunition, funds and some 
personnel to assist the rebels; aircraft flown by CIA pilots dropped supplies to the rebels and 
bombed government positions; and the seventh fleet was moved closer to Singapore in support. 
The rebellion failed, and in May US claims to have no involvement were exposed when a CIA pilot 
was shot down over Ambon. (McQueen, 1991: 69) 
34 The US aid program began in 1950 with a grant of $US5 million to the police. $8 million was 
supplied to the army in 1952, but caused the fall of the government after it was revealed the aid 
required close alignment with the West. In 1954 the US Office of Public Safety (OPS) began 
training police-by 1964 it had trained the Chief of Police, nearly every other high ranking police 
officer and all senior members of the police paramilitary unit. A parallel program for military 
personnel began in 1955, and in 1958 the US agreed to equip up to twenty battalions with light 
arms. By 1959 US military assistance was worth $US7 million, which increased to $US15 million 
as naval and air force components were added. Early in 1959 the NSC argued that the aid had 
'bolstered the determination of non- and anti-Communist elements in Indonesia to counter 
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1956-where he obtained $US100 million in credits to buy arms from Eastern 
Europe-sent further shivers up western spines. In 1958 Indonesia bought $15 million 
of Soviet arms and a further $US400 million in credits was granted in 1961. 
(McQueen, 1991: 68-9; Pemberton, 1987: 72-6) 
Australia's opposition to the WNG takeover foundered on this US strategy, which 
aimed to neither alienate Sukarno nor the armed forces, and to quickly resolve an issue 
which prevented the divisions between the PKI, the Army and Muslims from 
sharpening into a deeper (and more useful) antagonism. In 1950 Spender had argued 
against the takeover on the dual basis that the area was strategically vital to Australia 
and that its people had a natural cultural affinity with the Papuans, rather than Asians. 
Uncertainty about the future role of communism in Indonesia deepened such fears. By 
1961 the US, using those same fears, sought to persuade Australia to accept the 
takeover as a fait accompli. The NSC's Robert Komer, in a classically racist 
formulation, argued the US needed 'to sell [Australia] on the proposition that a pro-bloc 
(if not communist) Indonesia is an infinitely greater threat to them (and us) than Indo 
possession of a few thousand square miles of cannibal land.' In contrast Spender's 
argument that 'it hardly seems consistent with modem ideas that a million people who 
have not yet reached a stage of political consciousness and maturity should be 
transferred from one nation's sovereignty to another without their will having been 
ascertained' appeared a shining example of humanitarian virtue. A more pragmatic 
Barwick persuaded the Government to accept the Bunker settlement of 1962 under 
which control reverted to Indonesia in 1963, with provision for a plebiscite by 1969. 
(CNIA, 1950: 592-3; Pemberton, 1987: 70-106) 
As Confrontation escalated, antagonisms between Sukarno and the West deepened. 
In March 1963 the Soviet defence minister visited Jakarta, followed by Chinese 
officials a month later. In June a new agreement on profit shares was reached with US 
oil companies Caltex and Stanvac-only two weeks before they were to be expelled. 
After the British embassy was sacked in September US arms shipments were cancelled 
and $US50 million in IMF drawing rights revoked; but crucial aid for the army's civic 
action program was continued, as was training for army officers and the police mobile 
brigades. On 17 August 1964 Sukarno warned of a coming 'year of dangerous living', 
and in January 1965 the Foreign Minister Subandrio announced the formation of a 
'Peking-Jakarta axis'. As Sukarno's health became more uncertain, the PKI was now 
the largest communist party outside the Soviet Union-although it still had only a small 
and symbolic presence in the Cabinet. Visible symbols of US power, particularly 
United States Information Service (USIS) offices, came under attack. In February 
workers seized Goodyear rubber plantations, which were then expropriated by the 
communist influence'. By 1965 4000 officers had trained in the US, half the Indonesian officer 
corps and one third the general staff. (McQueen, 1991: 70; Pemberton, 1987: 77) 
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Government, and in March USIS withdrew. 35 By the end of April Sukarno had signed 
a decree ordering the confiscation of all foreign-owned enterprises, including all US 
assets and oil interests. (Pemberton, 1987: 182, 245) Given Indonesia's strategic and 
economic importance to both Australia and the United States, and Britain's interest in 
Malaysia, a series of developments calculated to arouse Western fears could not have 
been better assembled. The 'last domino' seemed in danger of falling. 
On the night of 30 September 1965 six of the army's most senior Generals were 
murdered, including armed forces head Achmad Jani. Defence Minister Nasution 
escaped, but his daughter was killed. The murders were the work of elements of 
Sukarno's Palace regiment, led by Lt. Col. Untung; neither Sukarno nor the PKI was 
directly involved or previously informed. Their motives appeared to be resentment 
against the generals for their corruption, their close links with the United States, and 
their covert resistance to Sukarno's policies. Both Kostrad Commander Soeharto 
(intriguingly left off the killing list)36 and Nasution-who seized the initiative by 
directing operations to capture the conspirators-saw the opportunity to decisively 
move against the PKI. The party was blamed for the coup, which was said to be 
directed against Sukarno's authority; in November PKI leader Aidit was killed and in 
March 1966 the party formally banned. In late October a campaign of archipelago-wide 
massacres began, directed by the Army and carried out mainly by soldiers and Muslim 
and Catholic youth. 'Very soon,' wrote Humphrey McQueen, 'there were too many 
corpses to bury. So many bodies were thrown into streams that they formed log-jams, 
turned the waters red and polluted the drinking supply. Orphaned children crowded 
railway stations begging for food.' (1990: 29) 
By March 1966, when the level of killing declined, between half- and one million 
people were dead, most of them communists, leftists and Chinese. In November the 
Soeharto group asked the US for assistance: communications gear and small arms were 
delivered as 'medicines'. CIA operatives complied a list of five thousand PKI cadres 
which were passed onto Army headquarters. At the end of October Green cabled 
35 As 1965 continued US policy toward Indonesia went into what Brands has called 'deep 
freeze'. By September US embassy staff had been reduced from hundreds to dozens. US 
companies helped bankroll anti-communist forces, with Caltex paying its royalties to Permina 
and Pertamin controlled by Suharto's close friend, General lbnu Sutowo. CIA funds reached the 
Suharto group through payoffs from aircraft sales. The arrival of Marshall Green as US 
Ambassador in mid-year signalled a more activist US approach, although connections with 
armed forces leaders were kept low key. {McQueen, 1991: 73) 
36 In May 1998 further information about Soeharto's role emerged. A close friend of Soeharto, 
Colonel Abdul Latief, told journalist Patrick Walters from Jakarta's Cipinang prison that he had 
known of the Untung strike in advance, had told Soeharto of its planning weeks before and, in 
particular, had told him on September 30 that it would take place that night. Soeharto declined to 
warn Army Chief Jani or Defence Minister Nasution that they were in danger. Latief was close to 
Soeharto from their days together in Central Java's Diponegoro division in 1950s-but was 
sentenced to death in 1972 and spent 11 years in solitary confinement because of his 
knowledge. The interview took place a few days after Soeharto's resignation as President, Latief 
saying Soeharto 'should be tried for what has happened to me.' (Walters, 1998: 1) 
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Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the army was resisting Sukarno's belated efforts to 
stop the slaughter, and Rusk cabled back that the 'campaign against PKI' must continue 
as 'the army are only force capable of creating order in Indonesia'. A week later Green 
wrote that 'we have made it clear the Embassy and USG generally sympathetic with 
and admiring of what Army doing.' In December he reported that between one hundred 
and two hundred thousand people had been killed in northern Sumatra and central and 
eastern Java alone. (Kolko, 1988: 180-3; McQueen, 1991: 75) 
The Australian government also looked on the killings with admiration and relief, 
and the embassy in Jakarta watched events closely and sought to influence their course. 
Declassified files reveal that it was aware of the level and scale of the killings, and took 
heart from the Army's determination to systematically crush the PKI. On 20 October 
Shann cabled Canberra that 'The Army, as of today, is refreshingly determined to do 
over the PK.I'. Another cable spoke of the 'brutality of [the Army's] methods now 
clearly revealed, and probably absorbed by the population as a whole ... We will never 
know how many people have lost their lives. We think it is a lot.' In Canberra Public 
Information Officer Richard Woolcott (later Ambassador to Indonesia and department 
head) provided Radio Australia (RA) with 'regular daily guidance' for their reporting 
into the Indonesian archipelago. Often at the behest of Shann, he warned RA not to use 
Radio Malaysia material, not to refer to army leaders as 'rightist' or 'anti-communist', 
to be 'on guard against giving information to the Indonesian people that would be 
withheld by the Army-controlled information media', and to highlight reports that 'tend 
to discredit the PKI and show its involvement in the losing cause of the 30th September 
movement' or that 'provide evidence of the involvement of communist China in the 
movement. •37 
Prime Minister Harold Holt was quoted as saying in July 1966 that 'with 500,000 
to one million communist sympathisers knocked off, I think it is safe to say a 
reorientation has taken place', while in February 1967 the new Labor leader Gough 
Whitlam wrote that 'If the coup of 18 months ago had succeeded, as it nearly did, we 
would have had a country of 100 million dominated by communists on our border. We 
can only imagine the additional and crippling sums we would now be spending on 
defence. Yet our aid to Indonesia and abroad generally is trifling and ineffective.' Thus 
there was acute awareness of, and bipartisan support for, the radical transformations 
37 See a report 'Radio Australia-handling of the Indonesian situation' of 18/10/65, and the 
exchange of cables between Shann, department head Gordon Jockel and Woolcott. The 
summary said that RA had been told 'it should bear in mind that it would be one of the only 
authoritative sources from which the Indonesian people would be obtaining information about 
their own country.' Daily phone calls were made to RA and meetings between Departmental 
officials and RA journalists were also held. Shann in particular stressed that 'under no 
circumstances, should we hint that Sukarno is implicated. The Americans have done this. 
Sukarno and Subandrio are howling for their blood. The Army is in a political dilemma. If they too 
blatantly seize control, Sukarno will claim Untung's talk of a generals coup was correct. We can 
only make the Army's task more difficult by inaccurate statements and wishful speculation.' (AA 
1838/280 - 3034/2/1/8 PT 3; emphasis added) 
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that took place during what have since become known as 'the Indonesian killings.' 
(Cribb, 1990) External affairs Minister Paul Hasluck travelled to Jakarta in August 
1966, returned in January 1967 to open the new Australian Embassy, and again in 
January 1968, just prior to Soeharto's appointment as President. In June 1968 John 
Gorton made the first state tour of Indonesia by an Australian Prime Minister. 
(Chomsky and Herman, 1979: 217; Whitlam, 1985: 102; Toohey and Pinwill, 1990: 
106-7; CNIA, 1966: 506, 1967: 41, 1968: 229; Young, 1970: 15-16) 
As the killings continued into 1966, the US pressed the generals for the removal of 
Sukarno and changes in other policy areas. Soeharto sought aid for the economy, while 
the US demanded a 'sympathetic posture on the Vietnam war, an end to aggression 
against Malaysia [and] protection of U.S. oil firms.' Achievement of all these goals 
was delayed-moves against Sukarno in particular had to be made slowly. On 11 
March 1966, in what Harold Crouch has called a 'disguised coup', Soeharto obtained 
formal authority to restore order and dissolve the PKI; in August an agreement with 
Malaysia was signed; in February 1967 the Indonesian People's Assembly (MPRS) 
made Soeharto Acting President and passed a new foreign investment law; and in 
October relations with China were freezed. (Kolko, 1988: 180-3; Crouch, 1988: 179) 
With the PKI destroyed, Sukarno removed and Confrontation ended, a whole raft 
of threats to Australian visions of security, prosperity and order had been removed-at 
a truly terrifying human cost. While Peter Edwards argued the events 'undermined 
much of the rationale for the Vietnam commitment', the LCP's psychological 
investment in the RVN was too deep to reverse course. Nevertheless by the end of the 
decade, with the Vietnam war heading towards stalemate, US forces being drawn down 
and the war's geopolitical verities under challenge, there was a sense that the certitude 
the Australian Government craved had largely been achieved. Having been wagered on 
the most rigid, antagonistic ontology, with the elimination of the PKI security could 
finally complete its own circle, return to its claustrophobic truth. In the death-clogged 
rivers of Java security found its meaning, its comfort, and its promised prosperity-
which were ours also. Security had become a vast Orwellian perversion, with its own 
perfect gulag. 
CONCLUSION: 
THE APORIAS OF STABILITY 
This chapter has traced a new achievement in the story of the Australian subject-less 
now of its growth than its refinement, narrowing and solidification. Drawing on the 
historic fears of Asia, a modern pattern of class war and the stubborn imagination of 
identity upon the threatening strangeness of the Other, it reduced Australian security 
and being to a fear-soaked core in which only the most rigid and coercive relation with 
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difference was possible. In short, it sought a consolidation of the Same, amid a time 
when new democratic, nationalist and anti-capitalist forces and aspirations strove for 
recognition. The 'way of life', which Spender had declared 'uppermost' in the 
determination of Australian foreign policy, was now simply assumed, even it was itself 
just another policing of difference, another reduction of variety, dissent and resistance 
to a single vision of existence-for which the quarter-acre block, the white picket fence 
and the Holden car stand as slightly surreal cartoons. As always, Australia's first 
peoples were excluded from this seductive index of Australia's being, and their children 
still being removed from Aboriginal homes in the hope they could be remoulded, their 
identities erased and their links with kin and land irrevocably severed. Around 
Maralinga their lands were fenced off for the testing of British atomic weapons-that 
overblown signifier of modern power and rationality-and became poisoned 
wastelands from which nature was banished. Similarly in remote areas all over the 
continent their lands were developed, without recourse or compensation, by 
transnational resource capital as the basis of an easy prosperity, which liberals since 
Smith had been proclaiming as the highest aspiration of modem human society. 
Thus the extension of the 'political double bind' to a vast disciplinary formation 
which merged individuals with the immense spaces and flows of geopolitics, was 
parallelled by the passage of the 'Australian' story of progress into a 'global' movement 
of reason that would be the glittering face of the new post-colonial imperial order. Here 
the most coercive and amoral core of realism was married to idealism's worst vice-
philosophical universalism-thus helping to efface the worst injustices which lay at the 
era's historical core. In this way former US Ambassador to Vietnam General Maxwell 
Taylor could say in 1972 that Indonesia's 'relative freedom from an internal communist 
threat is attributable, to a large degree, to what we've accomplished in South Vietnam.' 
The entry of substantial US ground forces after 1965, he maintained, emboldened the 
generals 'to run the risk of eliminating President Sukarno and destroying the 
Indonesian communists.' Likewise on returning from his Asian tour in 1967 Holt told 
Australians they should look beyond the horrors of the Vietnam war 'to a prosperous 
and secure future in Asia'. Others have more recently argued that US intervention in 
Vietnam provided a 'shield' for the rest of Southeast Asia to develop, free from 
communist influence. 38 Under the light of its carefree, prosperous sun Australia was 
simultaneously experiencing some of its darkest hours-and profiting from them. Yet 
even as a comforting new 'stability' was being established over the ashes of the PKI 
38 David Jenkins argued in a 1995 retrospective that 'It is also possible to argue that the US-led 
intervention in Vietnam bought time for the rest of Southeast Asia, paving the way for the 
increased stability and prosperity we see today; that stability is clearly beneficial to Australia.' 
(SMH, 29/4/95: 23). A few days earlier Greg Sheridan had argued that 'the American commitment 
in Vietnam did win for the rest of Southeast Asia the time to develop economically and socially so 
that it could resist the later challenges of communist insurgency.' (The Australian, 19/4/95) 
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and the establishment of new regional organisations like ASEAN and the five-power 
defence arrangements (FPDA), the ground was irreversibly shifting. At elite levels 
geopolitical truths were under challenge-by seeking 'detente' with China the US 
broke apart the monolithic image of international communism, while Nixon's 
proclamation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969 (which ruled out future US military 
intervention in Southeast Asia) was parallelled by External Affairs Minister Gordon 
Freeth's comments that Australia 'need not panic whenever a Russian appears.' A year 
before John Gorton had ordered a complete review of Australia's defence strategy. 
(Chomsky and Herman, 1979: 217; Edwards, 1997: 145; CNIA, Sept. 1969: 525-7) 
The social upheavals were even more sweeping. Along with the rise of a broad-
based movement to oppose conscription and the war in Vietnam, were a whole series of 
new claims and struggles-of women, indigenous peoples, the third world. The social 
transformations of what Coral Bell has called 'a slum of a decade' would act as a 
catalyst for new forms of dissent which challenged long-standing structures of power, 
identity and thinking. Already their effects were being felt in the mainstream-Labor 
had removed the White Australia plank from its platform in 1965, while Holt also 
disavowed it during a visit to Asia in 1967. That same year, Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders were formally recognised as citizens following the success of an 
historic referendum. (Ardnt et al, 1989: 7; Meaney, 1985: 705; Edwards, 1997: 145) In 
the hope that new communities, identities and modes of life might be recognised and 
heard, the public unity of subject and being was increasingly being questioned. In time 
elites would recognise the threats this posed, and seek new rhetorics, tactics and modes 
of disciplinary power to counter them. The next decades would be permeated by this 
confrontation. Yet something had undoubtedly changed, in ways which have largely 
made my own speech possible: beneath the great movement of culmination a reality of 
struggle, dissent and counter-truth had been revealed-discourses breaking apart with 
the inexorable momentum of tectonic plates. 
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All Australians must realise how damaging and dangerous a reputation Australia's 
present policies produce. We are a European nation on the fringe of the most populous 
and deprived coloured nations in the world. What the world sees about Australia is that 
we have an Aboriginal population with the highest infant mortality rate on earth, that 
we have eagerly supported the most unpopular war in modem times on the ground that 
Asia should be a battleground for our freedom, that we fail to oppose the sale of arms to 
South Africa, that the whole world believes that our immigration policy is based on 
colour and that we run one of the worlds last colonies. 
E. G. Whitlam, in Papua New Guinea, January 1971. 
(cited in Freudenberg, 1977: 200) 
Anyone hearing these words could have been forgiven for thinking a revolution in 
progress, given their dramatic challenge to longstanding modes of Australian identity, 
policy and belief-made only more ironic by the uncanny echo of Hughes' 1916 
declaration that 'we live almost within co-ee of a thousand millions of coloured people', 
framed now in an apparent disavowal of everything Hughes had believed and feared. 
Whitlam made the statement on his second visit to Papua New Guinea as leader of the 
Federal Opposition, where he was pressing his case for the early decolonisation of a 
territory Australians had long seen as absolutely essential to their security. In doing so, 
as his biographer Graham Freudenberg argues, he was 'going against some of the 
deepest and often the darkest instincts of Australians ... striking at their most cherished 
beliefs, linking them with two world wars, and some of their deepest fears and most 
cherished memories.' The obsession with New Guinea had been one of the most 
enduring themes in Australian diplomacy, from the earliest attempts at annexation in the 
1880s, to Hughes' appearance at Versailles as the living voice of sixty thousand dead, 
to the Kokoda track in 1942 and the failed efforts to keep West New Guinea out of 
Indonesian hands. In 1961 Hasluck as Minister for Territories had maintained that 
PNG would not be ready for independence for at least twenty years, perhaps not even 
fifty. Now Whitlam was proposing self-government immediately on the election of 
Labor, and independence by 1976. (Freudenberg, 1977: 189-191) 
206 
After Guam, New Order(s) 1969-1995 
Yet as radical as this seemed, the idea of PNG as a bulwark of Australian security 
would remain central to Australian policy, as the vast subsequent flows of military and 
economic aid would attest-what Whitlam was suggesting was that Australia's security 
could be preserved with PNG as an independent state.1 As Sir John Guise was to say 
as the Australian flag was lowered at the independence ceremony in 1975, 'It is 
important that the people of Papua New Guinea and the rest of the world realise the 
spirit in which we are lowering the flag of our colonies. We are lowering it but not 
tearing it down.' (Griffin, 1980: 347) Of equal moment for Whitlam was the 
symbolism involved in letting go-that Australia should begin to act in ways which 
appeared rational and just, at one with the general historic tide. Whitlam believed that 
decolonisation was needed to strengthen the Australian identity, which he felt had to be 
modernised and renewed. The kind of formula Curtin had worried over-which linked 
national with international subjectivity, narrative cohesion with diplomatic influence, 
and political symbolism with credibility-had resurfaced once again. 
Not that the statement came out of nowhere, having its roots in a series of broader 
political, cultural and discursive shifts-provoked by the failure of US strategy in 
Vietnam, the rise of third world. militancy and dissent in the West, and a corresponding 
re-evaluation of US foreign policy. Indeed the strategic implications ofWhitlam's New 
Guinea proposals-which saw the indigenisation of the Pacific Islands Regiment under 
Australian tutelage and with Australian aid-were more or less consistent with the 
dramatic shift in the strategic imagination marked by US President Nixon's statement to 
reporters on the island of Guam in July 1969. There, introducing a concept later 
formalised as the 'Nixon' or 'Guam Doctrine', he announced that while the US would 
continue. to stand by its treaty commitments (such as SEATO or ANZUS) it would 
increasingly expect Asian nations to assume responsibility for their own defence and 
security. The speech marked a new US reluctance to make extended military 
interventions in the third world: although these were not ruled out, economic and 
military aid would now be the preferred mechanism. Nixon remarked that 'the objective 
of any US administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the 
world.'2 (O'Neill, 1980: 21-22; Kolko, 1988: 208) 
1 For a more contemporary illustration of the perceived significance of PNG for Australian 
defence and security, see Alan Thompson ed. Papua New Guinea: Issues for Australian 
Security Planners, Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994. 
2 These remarks about Vietnam however were deeply disingenuous, as the Administration 
(whilst slowly drawing down the level of US forces) would continue large scale operations in 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (including enormous levels of bombing) in an endeavour to force 
the communists to negotiate an outcome that would leave the RVN regime intact. Nor did it 
prevent US intervention in Chile in 1972, the sponsoring of proxy wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan or the invasions of Panama or Grenada. As Gabriel Kolko has 
commented, the Administration's initial intention [in the Guam doctrine] 'never fully adjusted to 
the new economic and political structural context in which decisions had to be made, or the 
heritage of interests and attitudes that were inherent to American imperialism.' (Kalka, 1988: 
208) 
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In 1971 Nixon's 'Vietnarnisation' of the war was already underway, and within 
twelve months a new 'detente' with China would also have been initiated. Whitlam 
himself travelled to China with Dr Stephen Fitzgerald and a small ALP delegation in 
June 1971, only weeks before Nixon's National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger 
made a secret visit to Peking to smooth the way for a Presidential visit in 1972. In 
Australia the first shudderings of an earthquake had been heard in August 1969, when 
LCP Minister for External Affairs Gordon Freeth told Parliament that 'Australia has to 
be watchful, but need not panic whenever a Russian appears ... Reason for concern 
arises when the scale or methods or objective of the promotion [of Soviet influence] are 
calculated to jeopardise our direct national interests or to endanger the general security 
and stability in the region.' (Hudson ed. 1980: 173; Freudenberg, 1977: 208-9; Freeth, 
1969a: 414). 
The stark oppositions which had underpinned Australian foreign policy for thirty 
years were unravelling, but not without a storm of protest from conservatives, nor 
without the preservation of an underlying discursive and structural continuity. While 
early press reaction was favourable, the DLP quickly marshalled a counterattack. 
Senator Gair, without irony, called it 'a radical shift to the left', while the left of the 
ALP accused the government of 'ganging up' with the USSR on China. The leader of 
the Country party complained to Gorton about not being consulted about a 'major 
change in policy'. Freeth lost his seat at the 1969 elections, during which the DLP and 
the League of Rights had campaigned against him on the issue. The Soviet Embassy on 
the other hand welcomed the 'growing realism and independence of Australian foreign 
policy' which, as Coral Bell dryly remarked, proved to be 'a damaging endorsement.' 
(1988: 97-8) 
While the Soviets were still viewed with suspicion, Freeth had abandoned the 
rigidly binarized view of them, in response to obvious US moves toward detente. This 
marked the beginnings of a shift in the discursive structure of Australian security 
thinking, in which a link between strategic policy and national identity was no longer 
formed around a single axis of confrontation. Instead, the interplay between identity, 
otherness and fear-while remaining-would be structured by a series of more 
nuanced cleavages which nonetheless owed much to the geopolitical models of the 
preceding thirty years. While 'communist subversion and insurgency' was still 
threatening, he argued that 'these problems have to approached without over-simplified 
thinking. We have to distinguish between subversion and legitimate dissent, between 
rebellion and necessary change.' Nevertheless Freeth hoped that the US would 
continue to play a role in Southeast Asia. While he accepted that there should be 'no 
more Vietnams', this required helping 'other countries threatened by subversion' to 
'develop sufficient strength themselves to prevent aggression reaching the proportions 
which it reached in Vietnam.' In an echo of Spender and Colombo, this meant not only 
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military strength but 'decent standards of living, efficient and honest administration, 
harmonious relations with neighbours, and the easing of communal tensions within a 
country.' Citing Australia's defence co-operation programs, Freeth looked forward to 
building 'an appropriate international framework of co-operation for security and 
development.' The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Malaysia, 
Singapore, the UK and New Zealand, which took effect in November 1971 and under 
which Australian forces remained on the Asian mainland, were crucial here. (Freeth, 
1969a: 413-5; Bell, 1988: 96-7) 
Thus Australia was already moving to establish a new regional order which might 
deal with the anxieties which had drawn them into Vietnam-that US commitment to 
Southeast Asia (and Australia's own security) would wane, and in turn be compounded 
by the British withdrawal from its historic security role 'East of Suez'. The FPDA 
would lock the UK into the defence of Malaysia and Singapore and eventually, through 
the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS), offer a security umbrella to the broader 
Southeast Asian region. Military aid and training would strengthen regional forces, 
reinforce their pro-western orientation, and help with the confrontation of internal 
dissent and 'instability'. (O'Neill, 1980: 14) Anxieties about the US role were partly 
assuaged by the recognition of a more benign strategic environment (notwithstanding 
the persisting fears of China), the sense of shared commitment achieved in Vietnam, 
and the growing significance of the US defense installations at Pine Gap, Nurrungar 
and Northwest Cape to American naval and nuclear strategy. (Ball, 1979: 42) Thus 
w~ile 'forw~d defence' had receded as a doctrine, along with the cruder versions of 
the domino theory, policy had largely reverted to a pre-1962 status quo. 3 
CONSOLIDATING THE NEW ORDER 
Of enormous significance here were the changes in Indonesia since October 1965. As 
Soeharto slowly consolidated his power, a rash of Ministerial visits and exchanges 
were combined with a vast expansion of Australian aid to the new regime-with the 
aim of cementing Indonesia's integration into the new international economic and 
strategic spaces which for many would become synonyms of 'stability' and 'progress'. 
Obviously the ending of Confrontation in August 1966, the formation of ASEAN 
(among whose objectives was to strengthen 'the economic and social stability of the 
region') and of the Asian Development Bank underlined the dramatic regional 
3 This modifies a broadly-held view, expressed for example by Desmond Ball, that the decline of 
'forward defence' and the Guam doctrine provoked a 'period of radical transformation in the basic 
elements of Australia's national security policy'. (1979: 2; emphasis added) While defence policy 
may have undergone sharp changes, what I will emphasise is that our broader security policy-
taking in defence, foreign policy and economic diplomacy-did not, especially in regard to the 
nature of the regional order that was defined as 'secure' and the underlying discursive 
frameworks which aimed to keep it that way. 
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transformations wrought by the PKI's destruction. (CNIA, 1967: 327) Australia's role, 
both in protecting the New Order's position in Indonesia, and in securing the broader 
regional order it had enabled, would be absolutely crucial. Kathryn Young, an analyst 
with the US Research Analysis Corporation, wrote in 1970 that the development of a 
co-operative relationship between Australia and the New Order would be critical to the 
maintenance of Asian 'stability' after Vietnam-within an 'ambiguous strategic 
environment' marked by the Nixon Doctrine, the British withdrawal East of Suez, 'the 
general unpredictability of the outcome of the Vietnam conflict on the region' and 'other 
interacting uncertainties created by the as-yet-undetermined US, Soviet and Chinese 
weights in the Asian power balance.' The alternative was stark: if 'relations were to 
seriously deteriorate the prospects for stability in the wider Southeast Asian area would 
become quite bleak.' (1970: 32) 
In this scenario serious conflicts of interest (and emotional attachment) would 
develop for Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia-who had deep cultural, language and 
religious ties with Indonesia but military, trade and political ties to Australia-along 
with possible great power involvement as tensions escalated. Whatever the growing 
warmth in relations between Australia and the Soeharto regime, sensitivities over the 
PNG-West Irian border and the deep differences in 'modes of thinking, value systems, 
economies and forms of political organisation' left the relationship vulnerable to 
upheaval and misunderstanding. In short, she argued, the relationship rested on an 
unsettling paradox: 'the usual factors making for a sense of "community", or even 
sympathetic mutual relations, between two nations are objectively absent in this 
case ... Yet in spite of this objective dissimilarity a recognised and increasingly 
understood relationship has begun to develop between the two nations.' (Young, 1970: 
29) This was a trope that would appear again and again in the decades to come: an 
identity marker which was far from stable, incited within many different contexts and 
political moves. As I will seek to show, for all its apparent coding of 'difference' into 
foreign policy its political import would tend to a destructive consolidation of the Same. 
Thus added to the longstanding anti-communism of Australian elites and the 
massive relief with which they had greeted Soeharto's destruction of the PKI, was a 
potent blackmail which portrayed the relationship as a stabilising factor of 'global' 
significance, in a newly ambiguous and uncertain world. In particular, it would be used 
with frightening effectiveness by the New Order regime to thwart the influence of a 
highly critical public opinion on Australian foreign policy. However before 1974 such 
tensions were less visible-instead Australian actions, which aimed for a swift 
consolidation of the political gains made by Soeharto, were in implicit accord with this 
discourse. External Affairs Minister Hasluck visited Jakarta in August 1966, only a few 
months after the killings had subsided, returned in January 1967 to open the new 
Australian Embassy, and again in January 1968, just prior to Soeharto's appointment 
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as President. Indonesia's Finance Minister Dr Frans Seda visited Australia in October 
1967, followed by Foreign Minister Adam Malik in December for Holt's funeral. Malik 
returned in April 1968, and Prime Minister Gorton visited Jakarta in June. Gordon 
Freeth followed him in April 1969. (Young, 1970: 15-16) During this period 
Australia's policy toward Indonesia had three major prongs: to secure Indonesia's 
consent to the reconfiguration of defence and security arrangements in the region, 
particularly Australia's role in the FPDA; to promote the rehabilitation of the economy 
along capitalist lines, its opening to foreign investors and its integration with 
international economic structures; and to indicate strong political support for the regime. 
Added to the covert support Australia had shown the Generals in eliminating their 
political enemies during the turmoil of qctober and November 1965, was aid and 
diplomacy which sought to help the Army revive the economy---crucial both to alleviate 
widespread misery and to consolidate their political gains, which Australian officials 
feared 'could be eroded by economic discontent.'4 Australia immediately began a 
program of bilateral aid and also participated in the international consortium, the Inter-
Govemmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), formed in 1967 after earlier IMF missions 
gave the new regime their approval. The major donors were Japan and the USA, 
though Australia provided A$5.2 million of the US$200 million first annual grant. The 
Australian Government provided A$500,000 emergency aid in 1966, with a further 
A$200,000 in February 1967. In 1967-8 bilateral aid was A$6.9 million, the amount 
doubling to A$12.7 million in 1968-9, making Indonesia Australia's largest aid 
recipient outside Papua New Guinea. By 1969-70 Indonesia was Australia's largest aid 
recipient, with A$16.8 million-thirty-one per cent of total bilateral aid. In 1970 aid 
was further increased with an undertaking of $A53.8 million over three years. At the 
conclusion of his visit to Indonesia in June 1972 Prime Minister McMahon announced 
a further three year aid program for Indonesia (to June 1976) of A$69 million, an 
increase of A$16 million over the previous three years. (Crouch, 1988: 320; CNIA, 
1967:76, 1968: 105, 1970:441, 1972:291) 
Soeharto himself was also the beneficiary of the same kind of pomp and theatre 
which had earlier been extended to Southeast Asian leaders such as Diem. In February 
1972 he visited Australia accompanied by a veritable parade of the New Order's key 
4 This quote appears in a briefing paper written for the Australian delegation to a December 1965 
meeting of the western powers in London on the Indonesian situation. Major agenda items were 
economic aid, Confrontation and the evolving political situation. Elsewhere the paper argued that 
'the Army's primary objective' is 'to prevent the economic situation deteriorating to the point 
where it causes a political reaction against Army control.' It noted Australia had been 
approached by the Army for rice and medicines, with suggestions that aid be supplied indirectly, 
perhaps through Malaysia. The paper argued the chief problems the meeting should consider 
were: '(i) whether the supply to Indonesia of aid by Necolim [imperialist] countries could seriously 
harm the position of the Generals; {ii) if so, whether western aid could be concealed; {iii) how aid 
can be arranged so as to be of political assistance to the Army; {iv) what we can ask in return.' 
(AA CRS 1838/280 3034/2/1/8 Pt 2 "Quadripartite discussions on Indonesia: Brief for Australian 
delegation"). 
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political and economic ministers. The party was accorded a full ceremonial welcome at 
Fairbairn airforce base by the Governor General (Sir Paul Hasluck), Prime Minister 
McMahon and a ceremonial guard of cadets from the Royal Military College Duntroon, 
along with a twenty-one gun salute. In Canberra Soeharto held talks with the Prime 
Minister, opened the new Indonesian embassy building and, in a symbolic gesture of 
solidarity with Australia's veterans, laid a wreath at the Australian War Memorial. In 
paying his respects at one of the most sacred sites of the national identity, this last 
gesture was also symbolic of the way in which, over the next twenty years, the security 
of the New Order regime would become synonymous with the security of the 
Australian 'way of life' itself. ( CNIA, 1972: 17) 
The ceremonies were yet another elaborate performance of sovereignty which aimed 
to crown the repressive consolidation of Soeharto's rule. In March 1966 he had 
obtained sweeping powers from Sukarno to 'restore security and order', which he 
immediately used to dissolve the PKI; he was appointed Acting President by the 
Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in March 1967, and President a year later. In 
May 1967 Sukarno was stripped of all official titles, and he was placed under house 
arrest until his death in June 1970. Meanwhile Soeharto had purged the armed forces, 
bureaucracy and political parties of leftists and Sukarnoists, and in 1971, only a few 
months before his visit to Australia, his close ally General Ali Moertopo5 engineered a 
crushing electoral victory for the Army's new parliamentary vehicle Golkar. (Crouch, 
1988: 178-220; Schwarz, 1994: 32) 
Australian political leaders were neither disturbed by the vast slaughter which had 
underpinned Soeharto's rise to power, or by the blatant fraud of the 1971 elections. 
Indeed they responded, as one, with an extraordinary personal endorsement of his 
leadership. At the state luncheon held for Soeharto at Parliament House, McMahon 
expressed frank gratitude for his personal role following the events of October 1, 1965. 
He gave thanks for Soeharto' s decision to enter the army, and for his role as Kostrad 
(Strategic Reserve) commander on the night of the killings, saying: 
I believe ... that Providence intervened and placed you in a decisive position and 
one in which you were able to exercise your power and influence on the future in 
a way that no other person in the history of Indonesia has been able to do. And, 
Sir, because of those two actions ... you [were able] to make the decision that 
5 Murtopo headed a 'special operations' group, Opsus, which was later charged with managing 
the subversion campaign in East Timor in 1974-5. Civil servants were obliged to vote for Golkar, 
district leaders and village heads given 'quotas' of Golkar votes to fill and development funds 
promised to regions which voted overwhelmingly for Golkar. The internal security command 
Kopkamtib made hundreds of arrests, while hundreds of thousands more remained in detention. 
According the Adam Schwarz, the former Kopkamtib head Gen. Sumitro said that 'If you had left 
it to Golkar in 1971, without any interference from ABRI [the armed forces] the muslim parties 
would have won.' (Crouch, 1988: 223; Schwarz, 1994: 32) 
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saved Indonesia and I think has brought peace, order and goodwill to your own 
country. (CNIA, 1972: 35-6) 
The Country Party leader Doug Anthony was even more frank, saying that Soeharto 
was welcomed not only as a head of state, 'but in his own right as a man who has 
skilfully and patiently guided his country back from an abyss of political chaos and 
economic disaster': 
It is important to recall that night of September 1965, when many of his friends 
and colleagues were brutally murdered ... With bravery, with patience and with 
skill he restored the apparatus of state security. Some pressed him to hurry with 
the dismemberment of what is now known as the Old Order. Others wanted it to 
be fully restored. He followed neither course. But when, in February 1966, it 
seemed that Indonesia might retrace its steps, he acted with sensitive respect for 
the past, but with determination that the past was past, and that Indonesia's 
destiny lay in a new direction. ( CNIA, 1972: 39) 
This was a direct reference to Sukarno's last ditch (but potentially successful) attempts 
to reassert his authority in January and February 1966 at the expense of the Army 
leaders. Sukarno made speeches defending the PKI, sought to limit the authority of 
Army leaders in domestic affairs, ordered the release of 200,000 thousand PKI 
detainees, and announced a new Cabinet from which anti-communists like Nasution 
were sacked and in which Ministers the Army wanted removed-such as Omar Dhani 
(Air Force) and Dr Subandrio (foreign affairs)-were retained. These setbacks were 
only thwarted by the Order of 11 March, obtained in an atmosphere in which Sukarno 
feared Subandrio and himself might otherwise be arrested or killed. (Crouch, 1988: 
158-78) From Anthony's comments it seems clear the Holt government had watched 
these events with bated breath, fearful that the New Order might be swept away at the 
very moment it seemed most likely to take power. 
Gough Whitlam was also at the luncheon-he praised Soeharto, recalling a meeting 
in August 1966 at which he 'was immediately struck by the determination and the 
decorum of the General, the future President.' His speech also presaged later accounts 
of Indonesia's strategic importance to Australia: the need for Australia's maritime trade 
and aircraft movements to use Indonesian waters and airspace, and the resource and 
security interests that made seabed agreements a priority. And following Anthony's 
comments about the importance of trade and investment partnership-symbolised by 
the formation of the Australia-Indonesia Business Council and the establishment of 
thirty Australian enterprises in Indonesia-Whitlam also urged 'Australians of skill or 
wealth to help promote the development of Indonesia.' ( CNIA, 1972: 31-9) 
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Thus on the eve of Labor's election to Government in 1972, a series of complex 
political and discursive currents were in play. Longstanding forms of identity, policy 
and belief were under challenge, both from radical opponents of the Vietnam war and 
the post-war thrust of western imperialism, and-differently-from conservative 
attempts to retain hegemonic manoeuvre amid a more turbulent economic and 
geopolitical context. While the LCP government had been slow to respond, particularly 
with regard to China, it was also clear a new conservative consensus and a new 
regional order were successfully being shaped-in ways which preserved the same 
interests which had driven the Cold War and strengthened its underlying discursive and 
political architecture. Here the public incitement of fear which had characterised the 
Menzies era was giving way to the long-term objective of managing 'stability'. Thus 
the Defence Committee's 1971 opinion that Australia faced no immediate or obvious 
threat was no longer radical-a deeper continuity with Spender's (Hegelian) vision of 
security and development existed in the same politics of coercion and transformation 
that would underpin the new regional order. As McMahon said of Indonesia, 'security 
and stability [go] hand in hand with economic improvement and development. 
Australia's programmes of assistance w[ill] help strengthen the capacity of the 
administration, the networks of communications and transportation, and the security of 
the neighbouring countries.' (Dupont, 1991: 69; CNIA, 1972: 31) 
Meanwhile, drawing in part on the impetus and vision provided by the anti-war, 
womens and indigenous peoples movements, Whitlam was promising further sweeping 
change. However his disturbing response to Soeharto suggested it might also have its 
limits, and the next three decades of Australian foreign policy hinged on the way this 
tension played out. In short, Labor's election saw the nation straddling an abyss: 
between the promise of a declaration that the fundamental structures of Australian 
identity, policy and subjectivity should irreversibly change-along with the larger 
geopolitical order they had sustained--or the preservation of a regional order and a 
basic ontological continuity for which 'stability' would now be the catchcry. 
SECURITY, JUSTICE AND IDENTITY: 
THE WHITLAM TRAGEDY 
The Whitlam government's vision of the future, outlined during the election campaign 
of 1972 and swiftly implemented once it took power, would share much with that of its 
great Labor antecedents, the Curtin and Chifley governments. In the broad outlines of 
its domestic and international policies, it promised the same reconciliation of security 
and justice-at home and abroad-which could be found in Curtin's wartime speeches 
and Evatt' s energetic postwar diplomacy. In this it married a potent evolution of the 
'political double-bind'-which promised the simultaneous achievement of social and 
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national security-with a new extension of universal justice and principle into both the 
affairs of the nation and its broader geopolitical arena. As Whitlam declared in his 
policy speech at the Blacktown Civic Centre in November 1972, 'We have a new 
chance for our nation. We can recreate this nation. We have a new chance for our 
region. We can recreate this region.' (Freudenberg, 1977: 230) The Labor vision thus 
involved a dramatic re-imagination of the national identity, at least rhetorically, which 
departed from both the verities associated with the previous thirty years of conservative 
rule and many held dear by 1940s Labor-particularly in regard to Aboriginal peoples 
and the historic fears of Asia. But if the Chifley government had struck major 
difficulties in confronting the evolving structures of the postwar international order, in 
1972 Labor took office in a context in which they were now almost irreversibly 
entrenched, and in which Australia was closely allied with the very power most 
aggressively seeking to preserve them. To these obstacles were added the limitations of 
the Governments' own thinking. In assessing its record, particularly in the light of 
Whitlam's own retrospective and more recent attempts to identify a 'Labor tradition' in 
foreign policy, some key questions emerge.& Beneath its dramatic rhetorical re-
imagination, were the fundamental ontological structures of the Australian identity 
really changed? How different was the politics of security that sought to safeguard and 
realise it, and was it consistent with its other claim-to justice? While I will argue that 
the Whitlam Government failed to achieve a new relationship of self and other for the 
Australian subject-and in particular, that they failed to achieve a consistently ethical 
one-they introduced an instability into the dominant structures of Australian identity, 
truth and community which is still with us. 
'AUSTRALIA': A NEW ONTOLOGY? 
To conservatives still grappling with the implications of detente, the end of the White 
Australia policy, the decolonisation of PNG or the irritation of the Aboriginal tent 
embassy, much of what Whitlam espoused must have seemed shocking. 7 In its first 
6 See Whitlam's account of his Government's policymaking, The Whit/am Government (Penguin: 
Ringwood, 1985), and David Lee and Christopher Waters ed. From Evatt to Evans: The Labor 
Tradition in Foreign Po/icy(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997) Among its contributors Gareth Evans 
maintained an unproblematic continuity stretching from Evatt to himself, while Evatt's former 
department head John Burton argued both that Chifley and Evatt failed to entrench a Labor 
'tradition', and that contemporary Labor governments have failed to renew it. 
7 The 'tent embassy' was set up outside Parliament House in 1972 in protest at McMahon's 
Australia Day address which ruled out land rights for Aborigines, and was forcibly removed by 
Federal Police five months later. David Day suggests 'it represented a direct challenge to the 
legitimacy of two centuries of British occupation of the continent. Although the main focus was 
on land rights, the more fundamental question of sovereignty was raised by the very pitching of 
the self-styled embassy.' It followed earlier Aboriginal campaigns such as the Gurindji's attempt 
to reclaim traditional lands on Wave Hill station in 1967, and Justice Blackburn's rejection of the 
Yirrkala claim to lands under mining lease to Nabalco. (Day, 1997: 422; Bolton, 1990: 195-6) 
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months the new Government withdrew Australia's remaining forces from Vietnam, 
recognised the Peoples Republic of China and freed gaoled conscientious objectors. It 
opened moves to legislate land rights for Aborigines, to establish a universal health 
system, raise pensions, abolish tuition fees for tertiary education, and re-opened the 
case for equal pay in the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. It cancelled wheat 
exports to Rhodesia, closed down its information office in Sydney, and banned racially 
selected sporting teams from visiting Australia. More radical moves included the 
restoration of a passport to the journalist Wilfred Burchett, which symbolised the 
rejection of what Whitlam in his policy speech had called the 'eighteen years of 
bombing, butchering and global blundering' in Indochina. (Whitlam, 1985: 19-22; 
Freudenberg, 1977: 234) 
After two decades of personal equivocation on the Vietnam war, Whitlam had now 
firmly set his face against it, and it would be one of the most strident notes in the 
Government's new foreign policy. Along with the decisions on conscription and 
Aborigines, it boldly proclaimed the beginning of new era-and a new meaning for the 
Australian nation. At the Blacktown Civic Centre Whitlam declared the necessity of the 
new path: 'We cannot afford to limp along with men whose attitudes are rooted in the 
slogans of the 1950s-the slogans of fear and hate. If we made such a mistake, we 
would make Australia a backwater in our region and a back number in history. The 
Australian Labor Party-vindicated as we have been on all the great issues of the 
past-stands ready to take Australia forward to her rightful, proud, secure and 
independent place in the future of our region.' (Freudenberg, 1977: 230) What was 
clear here, and in countless other statements, was that policies would be framed to 
simultaneously strengthen Australia's diplomacy, cohesion and identity-in short, its 
security-in a constant feedback loop. Even the responsibility to right the historic 
injustices against the land's owners was cast in these terms: 
Australia's real test as far as the rest of the world, and particularly our own 
region, is concerned is the role we create for our own aborigines ... Australia' s 
treatment of her aboriginal people will be the thing upon which the rest of the 
world will judge Australia and Australians-not just now, but in the greater 
perspective of history. The world will little note, not long remember, Australia's 
part in the Vietnam intervention. (Freudenberg, 1977: 234) 
In many ways what he said was true and necessary, but what needs to be questioned 
here is its part in a larger ontological enterprise. If the dispossession and attempted 
genocide of Aborigines was an aporia within the very core of the Australian identity, 
Whitlam's rhetoric here suggested it could not only be easily closed over, but that it 
could be then appropriated to the task of manufacturing a new ontology, a new 
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imagination of being to which the past offered no resistance and no rebuke. The new 
ontology which promised both a 'recreated' nation and a 'recreated' region was also a 
process of forgetting, only compounded by the aside that consigned Australia's part in 
the Vietnam war to the dustbin of history. 
Clearly the idea that any event-even those as grave as the Indochina war or the 
dispossession of Aborigines-might resist the easy reconstruction of identity was 
anathema to Whitlam. Instead what appeared to be at work was an enlightenment 
idealism in which all possible contradictions could be smoothed over and resolved. It 
was a distinctively Whitlamesque vision which presaged the neo-Hegelian end-of-
history thesis that Fukuyama would later declare, at whose end would stand a glittering 
new being-a just, progressive, and prosperous 'Australia' that was a source of no 
shame. As the policy speech declared: 
The decision we will make for our country on 2 December is a choice between the 
past and the future ... There are moments in history when the whole fate and future 
of nations can be decided by a single decision. For Australia, this is such a time. 
It's time for a new team, a new programme, a new drive for equality of 
opportunities; its time to create new opportunities for Australians, time for a new 
vision of what we can achieve in this generation for our nation and the region in 
which we live. (Freudenberg, 1977: 229) 
No-one would begrudge a political leader, particularly at the beginning of an election 
campaign, the right to outline a new vision and new policies, and to dress it all in some 
kind of rhetorical grandeur. However when seen for what it was-the re-construction 
of a single, totalising image of identity which might banish all past and future 
contradictions-it should provoke some searching questions. What conflicts and 
differences could it efface, and what broader cultural possibilities might it close off? 
What was the politics of its images of self and other, and how different was it to that 
which had underpinned the policy of previous years? 
In contrast to the rhetoric of an absolute break with the past, and more revealing for 
the contours of the general ontology he was constructing, Whitlam's general foreign 
policy goals were more conservative. Striking a pose somewhere between the verities 
of power politics realism and the neo-Kantian dreams of liberal internationalism, he 
maintained that 
a nation's foreign policy depends on striking a wise, proper and prudent balance 
between commitment and power. Labor will have four commitments 
commensurate to our power and resources. First to our own national security; 
second to a secure, united and friendly Papua New Guinea; third to achieve closer 
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relations with our nearest and largest neighbour, Indonesia; fourth to promote the 
peace and prosperity of our neighbourhood. (Freudenberg, 1977: 235) 
Many will notice the same indexes of national power, and political 'prudence', which 
had marked Hans Morgenthau's political realism, and which seemed to sit oddly with 
Whitlam' s reputation as an internationalist-here power-politics formed the 
underpinning to a rhetorical idealism. What I would also emphasise is that its general 
framework, linking the two primary goals of security and prosperity, was still 
Bentham's-suggesting an underlying continuity with not only the past thirty years of 
conservative rule but with the general Australian project of liberalism begun by Deakin 
and Reid. Of note too was the stated importance of Indonesia, as integral to not only 
Australia's own security but Whitlam's vision of a 'recreated' Asia. 
This was most comprehensively underlined when Whitlam made his first visit to 
Jakarta as Prime Minister, in February 1973, only two months after being sworn in. 
Whitlam used the occasion to outline his government's approach to foreign policy, 
which aimed for 'a more independent Australian stance in international affairs firmly 
based on national identity, social justice, human rights and peaceful regional co-
operation, and not open to suggestions of racism.' During this address to the state 
banquet held in his honour Whitlam supported ASEAN' s proposal for a zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia which might preclude great power 
competition; yet also indicated support for expanded defence co-operation with 
Indonesia in the training of forces, the construction of technical facilities and the supply 
of equipment. (AFAR, 1973: 92-7) He also, and again without irony, declared his 
admiration for Soeharto's achievements: 
This region .. .is entering a new and more hopeful era. There are three principal 
reasons for my optimism. The first is the cease-fire in Vietnam, which has 
brought to an end 20 years of bloodshed, suffering and turmoil. The second .. .is 
in the progress Indonesia herself has made-under your guidance, Mr 
President-to achieve peace and development, and to restore fully the principles 
of harmony and justice, democracy and freedom embodied in your Constitution 
of 1945. A just and prosperous Indonesia is an essential condition of a just and 
prosperous Southeast Asia. We in Australia have looked to you to set an example 
to our neighbourhood of progress and social transformation. (AF AR, 1973: 97) 
Given what was known of Soeharto's rise to power, the fraud of the 1971 elections, 
and the fifty-five thousands political prisoners still languishing in camps and gaols 
8 This figure is an Amnesty International estimate for the minimum number still held in 1974-
though they also commented there were 'probably as many as 100,000' prisoners still in 
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across the archipelago, this is a truly astonishing statement. I am sure I am not the only 
person to have read it two or three times, in utter disbelief. That words such as peace, 
justice, democracy and progress could be plausibly used in this context strains 
credibility, and tears asunder the already tenuous principle linking language with reality 
in a way even Orwell might have found shocking. 
Yet at the time they probably passed as an unproblematic description of the changes 
Soeharto had forced, and which Australian elites found so comforting. Furthermore the 
formulation was absolutely germane to Whitlam's co-ordinated vision of security, 
identity and diplomacy of which 'justice' (as a possibility of general teleological 
achievement) was the crowning jewel. Soeharto's Indonesia would be essential to the 
new ontology Whitlam was in the process of constructing-after all, the region could 
only be 'recreated' in the context provided by the destruction of the PKI. Later in 1973 
he underlined this to the Australian Institute of International Affairs, saying that 
The importance of Indonesia to Australia is indisputable. We need, however, to 
see the development of our relations with Indonesia in a broader South-East 
Asian regional context ... our standing in other regional countries is not irrelevant 
to the importance which Indonesia will attach to Australia ... as our destiny is 
inseparable from Indonesia, so Indonesia cannot separate her own destiny from 
those of her immediate neighbours to the north in ASEAN. (AFAR, 1973: 33) 
Again the kind of blackmail Kathryn Young had outlined was at work, and would 
become an axiom in policymaking towards the New Order. Indonesia, it said, was 
crucial to our relations with the whole region-to fail here was to fail everywhere. 
Whitlam quickly moved to back such rhetoric with action-affirming his 
commitment to the three year aid program announced by McMahon, ratifying the 
seabed agreement between the two states, and concluding an agreement on the border 
between PNG and West New Guinea (now called Irian Jaya). This underlined 
Whitlam's conviction that Dutch control of WNG was an anachronism, regardless of 
the brutal and undemocratic way Soeharto's government had engineered the so-called 
UN 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969-again orchestrated by Soeharto's key to the 1971 
elections General Ali Moertopo. The voting process involved 1025 specially chosen 
community leaders to represent 700,000 Papuans, and was riddled with intimidation 
and threats. Moertopo personally threatened to shoot those who voted against Indonesia 
'on the spot'. In the years from 1962 the Indonesian military fought uprisings from the 
new Free Papua Movement (OPM), and had systematically imprisoned, killed and 
detention. (Fealy, 1995: 1) Harold Crouch suggests that, while it is difficult (given the 
overlapping pattern of releases and new arrests) to calculate accurate figures held at any one 
time, he suggests that the number held hovered between 200,000-300,000 between 1966 and 
1969, and that a total of 540,000 may have been held during the period. (Crouch, 1978: 225-6) 
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tortured the more politically active. Despite the highly critical report of the UN observer 
mission, the General Assembly voted to accept the plebiscite as a genuine 
demonstration of the West Papuans' wish to integrate with Indonesia.9 The legacy 
would be an ongoing guerilla war, bloody counter-insurgency operations and the 
movement of a vast number of refugees into PNG. After the vote The Sydney Morning 
Herald editorialised prophetically that 'we are helping to prepare the ground for a 
Papuan irredentist movement and laying up grave trouble in store for New Guinea and 
consequently for ourselves. Where else in today's world would the dictum be accepted 
that a people was too primitive ever to be free?' (AFAR, 1973: 30, 43, 90, 101; 
Osborne, 1985: 46-7) 
Whitlam also stepped up military aid to the New Order, which had been resumed in 
October 1967.10 It included an operational squadron of sixteen Sabre jet fighters, 
which made up a major component of the three year program of technical assistance and 
defence aid totalling $A20 million announced by McMahon in June 1972. Military aid 
also included work by Australian Army surveyors who mapped Kalimantan in 1970 
and the whole of Sumatra during 1971and1972-although portrayed as a 'foreign aid' 
project 'to allow planning to proceed for hydro-electric schemes, irrigation projects, 
trans-migration schemes and other national objectives', it no doubt assisted the 
Indonesian government's internal security objectives. Indonesian army officers were 
also among regional allies who trained in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare 
techniques at Canungra and in 1974 joint naval exercises were also held off the east 
coast of Australia. The close strategic and political ties no doubt helped the rapid 
expansion in trade and investment-between 1972 and 1974 trade with Indonesia rose 
fourfold, from A$21 million to A$97 million, and by 1974 there were fifty Australian 
corporations with Indonesian investments. (CNIA, 1972: 226-272, 1974: 51, 653) As 
Greg Pemberton has pointed out, such a continuation of military aid to repressive 
governments continued support for 'coercive approaches to the region's problems' 
despite the doctrine of forward defence having been formally abandoned. (1997: 158) 
9 Eighty-four states voted for integration, and thirty abstained. Australia, along with the US, 
France and Holland, had actively lobbied third world states for Indonesia. Estimated Papuan 
deaths from 1963-69 range from journalist Peter Hastings' figure of 3000, to former Governor 
Eliza Bonay's 1981 claim of 30,000. Ironically the ALP platform contained support for a fair act of 
self-determination. (Osborne, 1985) 
10 In 1967 officers of the Indonesian Airforce Command and Staff College (SESKAU) toured 
various Australian military installations and bases. A return visit by members of the Royal 
Australian Airforce Staff College was made soon after. In June 1968 the Commander of the 
Indonesian airforce visited Australia to seek assistance in establishing a workshop for the 
maintenance of Indonesian aircraft. A tangible outcome of this visit for the subsequent purchase 
by Indonesia of Australian military aircraft. In 1969 an Indonesian naval mission from the Navy 
Staff and Command College (SESKOAL) visited Australia, building on other forms of co-
operation between the two navies in hydrographic and oceanographic surveys. In September 
1969 Australia began to instruct and train Indonesian air force personnel under a 'mutual-
technical co-operation program'; plans for the training of Indonesian army personnel were also 
explored at this time. (Young, 1970: 20) 
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LABOR, THE USA AND 'THE END OF CERTAINTY' 
As disturbing as they already were, the full meaning of Whitlam' s Indonesia policies 
would not be revealed until the invasion of East Timor in December 1975, three weeks 
after his Government was dismissed; meanwhile the political and alliance relationship 
with the United States also displayed the tensions between continuity and change which 
marked his tenure. Whitlam was an admirer of the US, and had often softened his 
criticism of the Vietnam war by emphasising his opposition was aimed at helping end 
'America's agony'; similarly he affirmed support for ANZUS and the continuation of 
US facilities on Australian soiL 11 As his memoir explains, he was also aware of how 
the evolution of the strategic imaginary (which paired perennial cold war tensions with 
rapid advances in communications, space and military technologies) had bound the two 
states more closely, even as the Vietnam War drew to a close: 'The US is important to 
Australia as it is the most powerful and vital nation on earth. Australia is important to 
the US as it occupies a crucial position on the earth's surface and in relation to the 
heavens above and the waters beneath.' (1985: 30) Yet virtually upon taking office the 
Government was faced with a dramatic increase in tension with its closest ally. 
In December 1972 the Nixon Administration reacted angrily to Labor criticism of 
the 'Christmas bombings' of Hanoi and Haiphong which included a letter from 
Whitlam to Nixon, and a black ban on all US shipping by maritime unions.12 Cairns 
described it a 'brutal, indiscriminate slaughter' and Clyde Cameron an 'act of virtual 
genocide.' Marshall Green (now Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs) warned 
that the bans might provoke 'retaliatory action' from US unions and 'affect Australia-
US relations on a broad range of subjects.' In a meeting with US Ambassador Rice, 
Whitlam said that if the US tried to place further pressure on the Government, the US 
facilities 'would become a matter of contention here.' (Meaney, 1980: 183, 1985: 737) 
While much of the ALP was suspicious of the US facilities, Whitlam held few concerns 
about the satellite ground stations at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, and his Defence Minister 
Barnard had affirmed the Government's intention to preserve the intense secrecy 
surrounding their functions. However the US naval communications station at North 
West Cape, essential for communications with nuclear-armed Polaris submarines in the 
Indian and Western Pacific Oceans (and thus a primary Soviet nuclear target), was the 
11 See Whitlam's address to Parliament in May 1973, and to the Australian Institute of Political 
Science Summer School, in which he attempted to nuance the tension between continuity and 
change: 'On 2 December the nation changed its government, but did not and could not by that 
act change the essential foundations of its foreign policy. Australia's national interests did not 
change. Australia's international obligations [which included SEATO] did not change. Australia's 
alliances and friendships did not change. Nevertheless the change is real and deep because 
what has altered is the perception and interpretation of those interests, obligations and 
friendships by the elected government.' (AFAR, 1973: 30) 
12 The text of Whitlam's letter is reproduced in The Whit/am Govemment(1985: 42-3). 
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occasion for more controversy. Whitlam had already announced his intention to revise 
the agreement signed by Garfield Barwick in 1963, which ceded total control to the 
US. In 1973 the Government was further angered by the base's use to transmit a 
general nuclear alert to US forces during the Y om Kippur war. Whitlam remarked that 
it showed how the bases could be used to begin a third world war without Australia's 
knowledge. After negotiations the base was described as a 'joint facility' and 
arrangements made to employ more Australians and provide the RAN with access to its 
facilities. However, little of substance had changed-Australia failed to achieve 
scrutiny of messages passed through the station, and in 1978 the Fraser Government 
found out from the press that the US was planning to build a new ground station there. 
(Ball, 1980: 20, 52-7; Meaney, 1980: 192) 
Similarly Whitlam supported American plans for the new Omega station in Victoria, 
which would function as a global all-weather very low frequency transmitter for US 
aircraft, ships and submarines, and was crucial to underwater communications with US 
ballistic missile submarines. Whitlam sought to bypass hostile ALP opinion by 
referring the issue to the cross-party Foreign and Affairs and Defence Committee, 
which endorsed the project. In contrast, the Government consistently opposed US 
plans to expand the air and naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In 
conjunction with Labor's (unrealised) desire for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality 
in the Indian Ocean, this amounted to a challenge to the whole strategy of deterrence 
which underpinned US naval doctrine. However, not wanting to side with the USSR 
or undermine ANZUS, its opposition was muted and protest almost inaudible when 
Congress eventually voted funds for the base in July 1975. (Ball, 1980: 91; Meaney, 
1980: 194-202) 
Whitlam' s goodwill towards the United States did his government few favours, if 
the hysterical reaction from elements of the US intelligence community is any guide. 
They were disturbed by the criticism of the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings, Attorney-
General Lionel Murphy's raid on the Melbourne premises of ASIO and, most 
significantly, by public questions about the role and function of the bases-especially 
the CIA's (then secret) control of Pine Gap. In early November 1975 the head of the 
CIA's East Asia Division Ted Shackley approached the ASIO station in Washington 
(with what he later implied was encouragen:ient from Kissinger himself) and listed US 
concerns, which ASIO duly telexed to its headquarters in Melbourne. The message said 
that, in the wake of several CIA officers having had their covers blown, the bilateral 
intelligence relationship was now at risk, and explicitly recommended the message be 
kept secret. Whitlam was immediately shown the telegram by ASIO acting head Frank 
Mahoney-his response was that Shackley's approach to ASIO implied 'an 
understanding that the Australian organisation had [prior] obligations of loyalty to the 
CIA itself .. .its implications were sinister. Here was a foreign intelligence service telling 
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[ASIO] to keep information from the Australian Government.' (Toohey and Wilkinson, 
1987: 97) 
This cable, and the sequence of events leading up to it, has led John Pilger to 
suggest there was a fully formed US conspiracy to have Whitlam removed from office, 
given that the date on which the Pine Gap agreement expired was 10 December. Pilger 
maintains the CIA (quite fancifully) believed Whitlam was going to announce the 
cancellation of the Pine Gap agreement on December 9, and that an election would have 
to be called by November 11 if the Coalition was to be elected that year. Pilger cites 
former CIA deputy director Ray Cline as revealing the CIA passed information to 
opposition politicians 'who would have been pressuring the Governor-General' (while 
denying this amounted to 'a political operation'), and former agent Victor Marchetti 
who claimed the CIA had in fact aimed 'to get rid of a government they did not like and 
that was not co-operative .. .its a Chile, but [in] a much more sophisticated and subtle 
form.' Brian Toohey does not claim a general conspiracy, but both maintain that Sir 
John Kerr was briefed on the contents of the ASIO cable on November 9-a claim the 
Governor-General has denied. Whether it influenced his decision to sack the 
Government two days later is a secret he has taken to his grave. What is uncontested is 
CIA Director William Colby's assertion in his memoir that Australia and its 'left-wing 
and possibly antagonistic government' was one of the three greatest crises the CIA 
faced at the time. (Pilger, 1989: 217; Toohey and Wilkinson, 1987: 98; Pemberton, 
1997: 140) 
However paranoid the CIA may have seemed, its actions formed a small part of the 
United States' attempts to find responses to its gravest foreign policy crisis in the 
postwar era. Not only was it dealing with a looming defeat in Vietnam, but the 
inflationary stimulus of the war's expenditures had flowed into the global economy 
with devastating effect.13 By 1975 the Bretton Woods system was a memory-Nixon 
having in 1973 suspended the US dollar's convertibility into gold and made a sharp 
devaluation in an attempt to arrest a growing trade deficit and the vast haemorrhage of 
US gold stocks. The OPEC countries' response to the inflationary pressures (and to the 
American support for Israel during the Y om Kippur war) was first a complete oil 
embargo and then a vast price hike from $1.26 to $9.40 a barrel in 1974 (the price 
would eventually reach $24 by 1979). The corresponding effect on the US oil import 
bill was in the order of US$21 billion over three years. This setback was crowned in 
May 1974 with the call by a group of 77 third-world states for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) which would raise and stabilise raw materials prices, see the 
waiver of debt and increases in development aid and, most alarmingly, allow them to 
13 Anthony Campagna has calculated that US direct spending on the war was $173.2 billion, 
fuelling inflation increases from 1.2% in 1964 to 5.4% in 1969. He argues the OPEC increases 
were primarily driven by resentment that global inflation was 'erod[ing] the purchasing power of 
their oil revenues'. (1991: 83, 118) 
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nationalise foreign assets in tune with their own laws. (Kolko, 1988: 230; Denoon, 
1979: 4; Olsen, 1981: 10) 
This challenge, which followed Mexico and Venezuela's attempts to revive 
commodity associations along the lines of OPEC and the election of the socialist 
Allende in Chile, drove US efforts to find new political and economic mechanisms to 
thwart demands which one US liberal described as an attempt to 'reorganis[e] the 
character of world economic relations' which, if achieved, 'would be as fundamental a 
change in structure as occurred with the establishment of the Bretton Woods system or 
the shift from mercantilism to liberal trade in the nineteenth century.' The Chilean coup 
was one possible response-others came in the form of denying trade preferences to 
countries joining commodity associations, and aggressive resources diplomacy which 
mixed efforts to play off suppliers against each other, foot-dragging on North-South 
dialogue and pressure on third world states wishing continued access to international 
capital markets. (Denoon, 1979: 5-18; Kolko, 1988: 231) 
Disgusted by the CIA's role in Chile, Whitlam had withdrawn ASIS officers and, 
speaking in the UN General Assembly in September 1974, made veiled criticisms of 
the US by denouncing the attempt by certain states 'to bring about political or economic 
change in another through unconstitutional, clandestine, or corrupt methods '-words 
that would come to haunt him as Indonesia's subversion campaign in Portugese Timor 
gathered pace over the next year. He had established policies to secure 'greater 
Australian and government control and supervision of the use of our national 
resources', endorsed greater co-operation between countries producing raw materials, 
yet was lukewarm about the more profound changes envisaged in the NIEO. He 
assured the UN that 'we in Australia accept our responsibility to reassure countries 
which depend upon our resources that they shall have steady, secure access to those 
resources at fair prices ... Australia is not in the business of resources blackmail.' 
(Barrett, 1995: 177-182) 
At the same time the Government's ability to manage the economy (in a way 
consistent with its declared social programme) was being sorely tested by the 
transformations in the world economy wrought by Vietnam and the oil shocks. It 
confronted for the first time the phenomenon of stagflation-growing inflation and 
stagnating growth-which had previously been thought impossible. In turn the 
Keynesian consensus which had underpinned the world economic order since 1945 
came under challenge. In Australia inflation had already reached seven per cent by 
1971, and hit thirteen per cent by December 1973 in response to international pressure 
on food prices. A thirty-one per cent growth in adult male wages in 1974 saw inflation 
top sixteen per cent. While unemployment remained low and growth steady in 
comparison with most other western economies (at least until 1975), Whitlam's 
belief-expressed in the John Curtin memorial lecture of 1961-that socialists no 
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longer had 'to ration scarcity but plan abundance' had been shattered. His response was 
to begin a deflationary policy (with some important caveats) which nonetheless marked 
the beginnings of the Chicago School's supremacy in economic thought-one which 
quickly became orthodoxy in domestic management and through the 1980s increasingly 
influenced elite attitudes to the international economy and Asia-Pacific development. 
(Hughes, 1980: 59-65; Whitlam, 1985: 184) 
Cultural historian Lindsay Barrett has suggested that these events-within the 
broader context of Vietnam and the abandonment of Bretton Woods-destroyed the 
modernist project of 'Whitlamism' which had hinged on the ability of governments to 
plan and spend amid unproblematic growth and easy Keynesian interventions. Now 
economists were saying growth merely fuelled inflation and hitherto unacceptable levels 
of unemployment had to be sustained to keep it in check. In particular he suggests the 
Hayden budget of July 1975-which dramatically reduced the deficit in accord with 
monetarist 'inflationary expectations' thinking-was 'a much neglected watershed in 
Australian social, political and cultural history' which 'signalled that the era of certainty 
was over.' (Hughes, 1980: 115-7; Barrett, 1995: 243) The problem, however, was that 
an acknowledgment of uncertainty (such as Hayden made in his budget speech) did not 
shake the Cartesian certitudes of Australia's politicians and managers-instead it was 
replaced with a metaphysical faith in market economics and ever more systematic 
attempts to find effective forms of governmentality to control the new environment. 
Ironically, it would be the Labor governments of Hawke and Keating which most 
effectively did so-forcing changes in industrial and work culture, dramatic economic 
restructuring and the development of subtle new techniques of diplomacy. Even as 
'uncertainty' became endemic with the end of the Cold War and the unpredictabilities of 
globalisation, security and prosperity would require that it be tamed and controlled-
however illusory the resulting effect. 
'SECURITY' AND THE INVASION OF EAST TIMOR 
While this crisis was building through 1974 and 1975, amid escalating political turmoil 
for the Whitlam Government, it simultaneously faced one of the most profound and far-
reaching foreign policy dilemmas in recent Australian history. It would be a major test 
of Whitlam' s declared idealism, and come to dominate the relationship with Indonesia. 
In April 1974, following the coup in Lisbon which deposed the fascist Caetano regime, 
Portugal announced the imminent decolonisation of its overseas colonies. The interest 
of both Indonesia and Australia was immediately aroused. Indonesia-which was still 
trying to consolidate its control in Irian Jaya and had fought rebellions in Aceh, South 
Sumatra, the Moluccas and West Java-was already paranoid about national unity, and 
faced a potential new state in the centre of its archipelago; Australia had long seen 
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Timor as crucial to its security, making its first deployments of the Pacific war there in 
1942. The new twist was that while the geographical area-only 400 km northwest of 
Darwin-was seen as crucial to Australia's security, the relationship with the New 
Order was seen as doubly so. 
Thus Australia faced two options. In the first, it could take a strong, visible role in 
Timor' s decolonisation process leading to the birth of a new state-an approach which 
many Timorese leaders expected and may have involved tensions, or at least some 
involved and difficult diplomacy, with Indonesia. Alternatively, it could trust the New 
Order regime to define and act upon Australia's security interests in this area (which 
many had begun to see as synonymous with the indivisible power of the Indonesian 
state throughout the archipelago) whatever the human cost. In this analysis, integration 
with Indonesia was the preferred outcome. Australian policy eventually took the second 
course. Thus the world saw a remarkably disingenuous Australian policy, which 
combined active concern behind the scenes with a publicly low-key approach which 
continually played down Australia's interest and role while giving legitimacy to 
Indonesia's. 
By the end of May three new political organisations had been formed-the 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), the Timorese Social Democratic Association 
(ASDT, later Fretilin) and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). 
UDT initially favoured a gradual transition to independence over fifteen years, ASDT a 
similar (if slightly quicker) process over eight to ten years, while Apodeti favoured 
integration with Indonesia. Australia moved quickly to assess the situation, sending a 
departmental fact-finding mission in mid-year. Yet already the issue appeared to have 
been prejudged. A member of the team, former Australian Consul James Dunn, has 
since written they were aware senior Indonesian generals were taking a close interest, 
and that it was clear 'the Prime Minister and some key advisers were less than 
enthusiastic about the possibility of future independence for East Timor.' He says that 
the mission was 'under instructions not to push the idea that Australia had any interest 
in the proposition that the colony might become independent or would in any way 
underwrite it.' (Dunn, 1983: 58-9, 134-8) 
In July ASDT international representative Jose Ramos Horta visited Australia, hot 
on the heels of the fact-finding mission, to be a given a cool reception by the 
Government and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Horta met neither Whitlam, 
Foreign Minister Don Willesee or the Departmental Secretary Alan Renouf. In spite of 
this Renouf was later to claim that the policy decided in advance of Whitlam's visit to 
Indonesia in September, and approved by Willesee, was self-determination. This 
position was included in the brief provided to Whitlam-however, tellingly enough, it 
was not discussed with Whitlam beforehand, nor with the Cabinet or parliamentary 
caucus. The upshot was that during his talks with Soeharto in Central Java, in 
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Renouf's words, 'Whitlam changed the policy.' (Dunn, 1983: 66, 85; Renouf, 1979: 
442) 
The precise details of Whitlam' s comments to Soeharto have never been revealed, 
but the departmental briefing to journalists afterwards stated that: 
Mr Whitlam is understood to have indicated Australia felt an independent Timor 
would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the stability of the area. He is 
also thought to have made clear that the people of the colony should have the 
ultimate decision on their future. (Viviani, 1976: 199) 
It was simple, colourless bureaucratese, but its significance was world-shaking. 
Fairfax journalist Peter Hastings was one of few to see its import: 'despite the rider 
about self determination processes ... the Prime Minister seems virtually to be saying 
that the tidiest solution to Portugese Timor is to incorporate it within Indonesia, if 
means acceptable to international and Australian public opinion can be found.' (SMH, 
16.9.74) 
The report of the talks deeply angered the pro-independence Timorese, who had 
automatically assumed Whitlam would support them. As Dunn was to say of his talks 
with them in June: 
Australia's experience with decolonisation in Papua New Guinea, its excellent 
relations with Indonesia, and the Whitlam government's vigorous support for the 
principle of self-determination in international forums all seemed to our hosts to 
make Australia an ideal source of moral and material support ... above all, they 
seemed to take it for granted that Australia would now play a role in supporting 
whatever they chose to do. Some of the Timorese openly declared that Australia 
owed it to them because of their sacrifices on our behalf during World War Two. 
(Dunn, 1983: 139) 
Already it seemed the correspondence between security and justice-so crucial to 
Whitlam's rhetoric of identity-was under stress, even while being reminded of the 
great sacrifice of the Timorese in defence of Australia's security during the Pacific War. 
Yet if Timorese and Australians had been in partnership during 1942 in defence of 
Australian security, it was again security-or at least an interpretation of it, for 
Australia, Indonesia or the region-which sealed East Timor' s fate through 197 4 and 
1975. 
In arguing this it is necessary to break down some of the shibboleths which have 
since grown up in defence of Australian policy-in particular the arguments that 
Indonesia was so essential to Australia's security and well-being that relations could not 
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be risked over a matter of principle; that there was no way at any time of deterring them 
from a takeover; that Portugal acted irresponsibly in its decolonisation; and that the 
political evolution of Timor itself threatened Indonesian (and broader regional) 
'stability'. In contrast, I will argue Indonesia could not and would not have invaded 
East Timor if Australia had strongly and consistently objected (and that Soeharto' s 
delay in invading until Whitlam's government was dismissed is evidence of it); that 
Indonesia's highly developed campaign of meddling and subversion were more 
significant than any mis-judgements of the Portugese; and that charges an independent 
East Timor would become a stage for left-wing or external subversion were elaborate 
fictions, which the major Timorese parties themselves went to great lengths to dispel. 
As Renouf' s arguments suggest, support for self-determination was an available 
option from the very beginning-yet after the Wonosobo talks the department meekly 
fell in behind the Prime Minister: 'The policy approved by Whitlam .and Willesee in tum 
thus came to be that Australia's primary concern was self-determination in East Timor 
but that voluntary union with Indonesia through an internationally acceptable act of self-
determination would best serve the objectives of decolonisation and regional stability. 
This policy was clearly explained to Indonesia.' (Renouf, 1979: 444) Emboldened by 
Australia's response, Indonesia's subversion operation Operasi Komodo was begun in 
October 1974. It combined diplomacy pursued by Moertopo, Soeharto, and figures 
from Moertopo's Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); falsified reports 
in Army newspapers and the Antara news agency, and spying and intelligence work co-
ordinated by BA.KIN chief Yoga Sugama; and military planning co-ordinated by 
Brigadier Benny Murdani. Overall planning was co-ordinated by KOPKAMTIB head 
Admiral Sudomo who was close to Soeharto. Radio broadcasts attacking Fretilin and 
UDT were begun from West Timor, while Indonesian officials began cultivating 
Apodeti (and some UDT) leaders. By November The National Times' Andrew Clark 
wrote of 'an upsurge of 'reds under the bed' stories ... a dressed-up scenario of Chinese 
Communist infiltration into Portugese Timor would pose a huge security threat which 
could not be allowed to continue.' Clark cited the army newspaper Berita Yudha as 
claiming four Chinese generals had travelled to Timor via Canberra-which, while 
absolute fiction, had chilling implications for the future behaviour of Indonesian forces 
given the killings of Chinese after 1965 and the frozen state of Indonesia-PRC 
relations. (NT, 11.11.74) 
Late in 1974 the Portugese, having been swayed by the Operasi Komodo 
diplomacy' began to backtrack on independence and abandoned the proposed 
referendum. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, fearing that Jakarta was 
planning a military operation, warned Indonesia that 'Australia would not condone 
force'. Renouf claims that at these talks he also argued 
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that an independent East Timor should not necessarily concern Indonesia. By 
mutual co-operation and with the help of the UN and other ASEAN countries, 
Indonesia and Australia could ensure that East Timor freely chose integration with 
Indonesia or, if she chose independence, could ensure a stable and friendly East 
Timor. These arguments did not convince the Indonesians. (Renouf, 1979: 445) 
However his efforts were undermined by the wording of the argument (which still held 
out integration as the preferred solution), by Whitlam' s statements at Wonosobo, and 
by the actions of the Australian Ambassador to Portugal, F. W. Cooper, who had given 
encouragement to Moertopo in meetings with him in Lisbon. ( 1981: 197) 
In January Fretilin and UDT, encouraged by Portugese officers disturbed by 
Indonesia's ever more visible interference, formed a coalition for independence which 
marginalised the pro-Indonesia party Apodeti. In February the Australian press reported 
that Indonesia had held military exercises as a prelude to an invasion.14 Peter Hastings 
wrote that 'There are mounting and unwelcome indications-evidenced by increased 
foreign press awareness, in letters one receives from interested observers and by 
inevitable leaks in Jakarta itself-that the Indonesian government is seriously 
considering taking out Portugese Timor in a military operation in the not too distant 
future.' (SMH, 21.2.75) While these fears continued through February, the outcry 
probably forestalled an early invasion-instead Soeharto authorised Moertopo to press 
Portugal harder. And, beginning a pattern that would become all-too common in 
Indonesian diplomacy towards Australia, the regime responded to the leaks with 
blackmail. The Melbourne Age reported that Indonesian officials were angered by 'an 
anti-Indonesian conspiracy by the left-wing of the Australian Labor Party, certain 
defence and intelligence officials, senior figures in the opposition parties including the 
shadow foreign minister (Mr Peacock) and some Australian journalists.' (The Age, 
1.3. 7 5) One general raised the spectre of a downgrading of defence relations, saying 
that Indonesia was ambivalent about scheduled joint exercises. Whitlam' s response was 
to write to Soeharto, in a letter carried by Australia's new Ambassador to Indonesia 
Richard Woolcott, warning against the use of force. Willesee was believed to have also 
·made this warning to Adam Malik, adding that 'the primary consideration was self-
determination.' (SMH, 1.3.75 and 3.3.75; Viviani, 1976: 210) 
14 James Dunn strongly asserts that that the Australian government, through its intelligence 
capabilities, was in possession of all the facts about Operasi Komodo and Indonesia's February 
invasion preparations; yet Whitlam deliberately sought to suppress discussion of the issue 
within the Government. As the crisis deepened, 'the circulation of classified cables concerning 
the question, and, in particular, the distribution of certain highly classified and sensitive 
intelligence reports concerning Operasi Komodo activities, was further restricted. Thus, day-to-
day handling of the Timor question became confined to a small coterie of officials in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, in the Joint Intelligence Organisation, and in the Embassy in 
Jakarta.' (Dunn, 1983: 149) 
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By mid-year, some two months prior to the civil war between UDT and Fretilin, 
East Timor' s future was on a knife edge. An Indonesian invasion had already been 
deterred and Portugal seemed determined to lay the ground for eventual independence. 
Yet Indonesia was pressing on, both with Moertopo' s campaign of diplomacy and 
subversion and backroom military preparations. They did so with confidence that the 
western powers and other ASEAN states had no substantial objections-and Australia, 
as Indonesia's closest neighbour and the single most significant source of foreign 
opinion, must bear a great deal of responsibility for what followed. In Townsville in 
April Whitlam had again met Soeharto where, according to Renouf, he 'obtained an 
assurance that Indonesia would not use force in East Timor. He stressed that there 
should be no departure from an internationally acceptable act of self-determination, 
although he continued to believe that the best result of the plebiscite would be the 
incorporation into Indonesia.' Despite Renoufs contention that the alternative proposal 
(for self-determination as a client state of Indonesia) was again submitted-and 
rejected-in separate officials talks, Whitlam' s discussions had effectively buried any 
hope of an alternative being put to Indonesia as strongly held Australian policy. 
According to a confidential foreign affairs summary Ali Moertopo, in particular, had 
taken Whitlam's statement as a 'green light' for absorption of the territory. (Renouf, 
1979:445;Dunn, 1983: 151) 
Thus Australia had effectively condoned Moertopo's efforts at integration by 
stealth, and despite opposing force had never declared any public willingness to bring 
the Indonesians and Timorese together to discuss the very fears which allegedly 
motivated Indonesia's campaign. In February opposition spokesman Andrew Peacock 
had revealed his receipt of a telegram from the UDT-Fretilin coalition which declared 
they were 'prepared to start talks Australian Indonesian government for co-operation 
towards peace stability SEA [Southeast Asia].' (sic) Peacock appealed for the Whitlam 
government to 'bring the parties together for discussion' and informed the Department 
of Foreign Affairs about the cable, yet no action was taken. The cable, which was read 
into Hansard, also reminded the Government that it 'had great responsibility 
maintenance peace this geographical area ... thus to prevent any conflict real will 
Timorese people must be respected.' (sic) (CPD, 25.2.75: 641) 
No longer could Indonesia plausibly claim that internal developments in East Timor 
threatened its own (or broader regional) 'stability' while it refused to engage in a 
dialogue with the Timorese leadership. The Timorese appeared to have concluded that if 
Indonesia was to be deterred from intervention, Indonesia and Australia would have to 
be treated as parties principal along with Portugal. In fact, Indonesia's destabilisation 
and Australia's complicit diplomacy had meant that this was already the case-the 
difficulty was to draw them into a different role. The Timorese had recognised that 
'security' and 'stability', as they were then being framed and constituted by the two 
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governments, were the driving conceptual and practical issues that would determine 
their future. 
Yet all the Government could do was deepen its duplicity. In reply Science Minister 
(later Defence Minister and Ambassador to Indonesia) Bill Morrison would only say 
that Australia does not 'seek any special position in Portugese Timor' and-most 
damagingly-continued to assert the legitimacy of Indonesia's interest: 'We do 
understand Indonesia's substantial interest in the future of the territory. Is this so 
remarkably odd when Indonesia and Portugal have half of the island of Timor and the 
island of Timor itself is part of the geographical entity of the Indonesian Archipelago?' 
(CPD-HR, 25.2.75: 644-5) Insult was added to injury in Whitlam's reply to the Labor 
chairman of an Australian parliamentary delegation to East Timor, Arthur Gietzelt, who 
had urged him to reappoint Australia's consul in Dili and told him 'the overwhelming 
majority of East Timorese aspire to independence'. Whitlam wrote that: 
I myself hesitate to accept at face value the claims of the political personalities 
who have emerged in the first year of political activity in Timor..Most appear to 
represent a small elite class .. .It may be that this group may be able to win the 
allegiance of the people of the territory, but their claims are as yet untested. (Cited 
in Dunn, 1983: 154) 
Whitlam had never met any of the Timorese he so blithely dismissed, and had 
deliberately avoided meeting Jose Ramos Horta on two occasions. It underlined the 
Government's refusal to seriously consider the issue on the basis of what was 
happening in Timor itself, which would have led them to both the moral and pragmatic 
conclusion that the Timorese wanted independence and thus would strongly resist 
Indonesia's subversion and any invasion. Immense loss of life could be expected from 
a prolonged counterinsurgency operation, and any dispassionate analysis of Indonesian 
military culture (taking into account the 1965-66 massacres, and the mass imprisonment 
and ill-treatment of political suspects) should have created intense foreboding. Whitlam 
went on to argue that the division of the island was no more than an historical accident 
and 'four hundred years of Portugese domination may have distorted the image the 
Timorese have of themselves, and perhaps obscured for them their ethnic kinship with 
the people of Indonesia.' He continued to assert Australia was not 'a party principal' 
and that the situation must be considered 'against the fundamental importance to us of a 
long term co-operative relationship with Indonesia.' (Dunn, 1983: 156) 
Here was the crucial formula, that linked Australian security with Indonesia's, 
however brutally and unfairly it was achieved-and in which the peace and security of 
the Timorese themselves was of little moment. Yet if Australia had, in contrast, 
strongly and publicly asserted its preference for self-determination and its intention to 
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promote a dialogue between Indonesia and the Timorese on security issues, Moertopo's 
plans might well have been thwarted and western governments lulled from their 
slumber. In particular the United States, now aware their interests in Australia might 
also be at stake, would have been forced to moderate Indonesian behaviour. In the 
absence of this, the Timorese themselves tried to engage the Indonesians, only to be 
caught deeper in the Operasi Komodo web. In May Fretilin leaders Alarico Fernandes 
and Jose Ramos Horta met with Moertopo and YusufWanandi from CSIS, telling them 
Fretilin understood Indonesia's concerns and that 'an independent East Timor would 
not harbour PKI remnants nor would it support separatist groups in Indonesia.' (Horta, 
1987: 66) 
In early August DDT leaders Joao Carrascalao and Domingues Oliveira also met 
with Moertopo, disturbed by Soeharto's public comments in July (echoing Whitlam) 
that an independent East Timor was not possible because alone it lacked economic 
viability. While Moertopo argued that Fretilin was now a communist movement and 
that its left wing would attempt to take power on the 15th August, they said that 
Fretilin's radicalism was limited to a small group and posed no threat to Indonesia. 
Moertopo refused to listen, saying that Indonesia would not allow East Timor to fall 
under communist influence. Indonesia would 'close its eyes' to any move by the anti-
communist parties to correct the situation. Fearing the extinction of all their hopes for 
freedom, the two DDT leaders decided to stage a coup against Fretilin in the hope it 
would forestall Indonesian intervention. (Dunn, 1983: 119) It quickly degenerated into 
civil war, which provided Indonesia with more opportunities to arg1'.1e it should take 
over to 'restore order.' When Fretilin prevailed and drove the DDT remnants across the 
border into West Timor, the stage was set for a full scale Indonesian invasion-which 
was nonetheless delayed for another two and a half months. 
The dreadful irony is supplied by the lengths the Timorese were prepared to go to 
assuage Indonesia. On one hand, having failed to convince Moertopo of Fretilin' s good 
intentions, the DDT leaders had tried to remove Fretilin from the process by force; on 
the other, Horta had earlier approached Carrascalao and the Portugese Governor with a 
secret plan to expel each party's most radical wings-Fretilin's left and UDT's right. 
Horta's exasperated account, years later, despaired at how 
all our assurances of friendship, co-operation, membership of ASEAN, a foreign 
policy that was tantamount to Finlandisation 15 of East Timor-all fell on deaf 
15 Alan Renouf claims such a proposal was made by the Australians in a letter to Soeharto in 
March, However it was overshadowed by Whitlam's behaviour at the April talks in Townsville. 
'The proposal was that Australia, Indonesia, and Portugal should co-operate to see that East 
Timor duly became independent through self-determination but would, in effect, be a client state 
of Indonesia; the proposal would be implemented by a joint aid package, by Portugal's good 
offices and by UN approval. The proposal seemed to have a reasonable chance, as the Fretilin 
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ears. In retrospect, I cannot see what assurances and concessions we could have 
offered to buy our own survival. (Ramos-Horta, 1987: 66) 
From this time Australia's actions, as Indonesia began covert military intervention from 
West Timor and prepared a full-scale invasion, were absolutely unconscionable-given 
its detailed knowledge of Indonesian duplicity. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs, for instance, had a very acute understanding of 
the civil war's origins. In a submission for the Minister which was also cabled to the 
Jakarta mission, they argued that 'delicate sources ... suggest that UDT acted with at 
least some foreknowledge of the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body (BAKIN),' and 
speculated the action had the appearance of a 'stage-managed' scene designed to form a 
pretext for intervention. Other officials recommended that Whitlarn send a message to 
Soeharto reaffirming Australian opposition to the use of force and reminding the 
President of his verbal undertaking to Whitlarn in April. (Walsh and Munster, 1982: 77; 
Dunn, 1983: 188) In response Richard Woolcott, in an extraordinary cable to Alan 
Renouf in Canberra, objected strongly: 
As I stressed in Canberra last month we are dealing with a settled Indonesian 
policy to incorporate Timor .. .Indonesia is simply not prepared to accept the risks 
they see to them in an independent Timor and I do not believe we will be able to 
change their minds on this. We have in fact tried to do so. What Indonesia now 
looks to from Australia is some understanding of their attitude and possible action 
to assist public understanding in Australia rather than action on our part which 
could contribute to criticism of Indonesia. (Toohey and Wilkinson, 1987: 177-8) 
This very long message graphically portrayed the matrix of inherited and developing 
attitudes that would guide Australian policy on East Timor for the next two decades, 
and sought to intervene in Australian policymaking at a crucial time. Pressure within 
Indonesia for military intervention was rising, yet Soeharto himself was exhibiting 
caution.16 Woolcott unwittingly underlined how influential Australia could have been 
in deterring Indonesian aggression: 
Australia has been singled out by the Indonesians in their planning discussions as 
the country (along with China) that will be most vocal in the event of Indonesian 
and UDT groups had merged and at the UN no significant country was interested. Indonesia 
rejected the proposal.' (Renouf, 1979: 445) 
16 Hamish McDonald claims that Soeharto, concerned to retain access to the western loans 
needed to rescue the collapsed state oil corporation Pertamina, ignored advice to take Dili from 
hawks like Benny Murdani. (1981: 207-8) 
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intervention in East Timor. They know that reaction inAustralia-unlike other 
ASEAN countries and New Zealand-will probably be their main problem. 
(Toohey and Wilkinson, 1987: 178-9) 
Yet rather than take this clear opportunity to press a change of course, he recommended 
that 'From here I would suggest that our policies should be based on disengaging 
ourselves as far as possible from the Timor question; getting Australians presently there 
out of Timor; leave events to take their course; and if and when Indonesia does 
intervene act in a way which would be designed to minimise the public impact in 
Australia and show privately understanding to Indonesia of their problems.' (Toohey 
and Wilkinson, 1987: 179) 
He concluded with his by now infamous comment, since widely quoted, which 
focused on the broken seabed border between Indonesia and Australia, believed to 
contain enormous oil and gas potential: 
We are all aware of the Australian defence interest in the Portugese Timor 
situation [they had been arguing for self-determination to preserve public support 
for the bilateral defence relationship] but I wonder whether the Department has 
ascertained the interest of the Minister or Department of Minerals and Energy in 
the Timor situation. It would seem to me that [they] might well have an interest in 
closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and this could be much more 
readily negotiated with Indonesia by closing the present gap than with Portugal or 
independent Portugese Timor. I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather 
than a principled stand but this is what national interest and foreign policy is all 
about... (Toohey and Wilkinson, 1987: 179-80) 
The Timor Gap oil and gas would be a constant theme running through Australia's 
dealings with Indonesia for the next fourteen years, until an agreement was finally 
signed in 1989. The time it took to negotiate could be taken to indicate that Woolcott 
was mistaken on this foremost (and in this case overriding) issue of 'pragmatic' 
national interest. Furthermore, Australia's desire to close the boundary did not end with 
Indonesia's intervention, but was used to compromise Australian policy for the next 
two decades. 
The cables appeared to have a strong effect on Whitlam who, in statements to 
Parliament on 26 and 28 August, ruled out Australian diplomatic intervention. He 
remarked that Timor was 'in many ways a part of the Indonesian world', that Australia 
understood 'Indonesia's concern that the territory should not become a source of 
instability on Indonesia's border' and, citing the appeal by Portugal to the UN 
Secretary General for 'international intervention to effect a ceasefire', said 'The 
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Indonesian Government, which over the past year has expressed repeatly its intention 
not to intervene in East Timor, may thus be turned to as the only force capable of 
restoring calm in the territory.' Moertopo must have been thrilled-Australia had 
followed the Operasi Komodo script to the letter, and was now implicitly in support of 
Indonesia. Whitlam had even withdrawn his injunction against the use of force, having 
sent Soeharto a private message saying that 'nothing he said earlier should be 
interpreted as a veto on Indonesian action in the changed circumstances.' (CPD, 
26.8.75: 493, 509, 28.8.75: 688; McDonald, 1981: 207) 
As five Australian and New Zealand journalists were murdered by Indonesian 
forces crossing in operations from West Timor on 16 October, the Government 
concealed its knowledge (gained in a briefing from Indonesian intelligence officials 
three days before the attack, and confirmed within 24 hours by signals intercepts) on 
the basis that to have done so would reveal Australia's intelligence capabilities.17 Apart 
from a public statement by Senator Willesee on the 30th October, the Government was 
to make no further statements on the issue before its dismissal on 11th November.18 At 
this late hour Willesee finally offered an Australian venue for talks between Indonesia 
and Fretilin and stated that Australia 'viewed with concern widespread reports that 
Indonesia is involved in military intervention in Portugese Timor'. Yet Woolcott, 
before delivering the text to the Indonesian government, deleted the paragraph critical of 
Indonesian intervention because it would have exacerbated 'already difficult relations'. 
(SMH, 24.8.98; Viviani, 1976: 219-20) 
In desperation at their international isolation Fretilin made a unilateral declaration of 
independence on the 29th of November. Xavier Do Amaral, when sworn in as the new 
President, said: 'We have had to fight alone against UDT in Dili and against Indonesia 
at the border. We direct our appeal for peace to Indonesia but we will live by the 
slogan: independence or death.' The same slogan was still being shouted by young 
protesters twenty years later. On the fifth of December Adam Malik visited the Jakarta 
embassies of eight key nations (including Australia) saying they 'should not be 
17 James Dunn insists the Australian government had foreknowledge of the attack, having 
been forewarned by a senior Australian official before he left for Timor with an ACFOA mission on 
October 13. This has since been confirmed by Hamish McDonald, who revealed in a Sydney 
Morning Herald investigation that 'Indonesian intelligence officials gave the Australian Embassy 
in Jakarta a detailed briefing on plans for the Balibo attack.' Nevertheless, the Government 
sought neither to warn Australians in Timor, to warn Indonesia against the attack itself, or at the 
very least to seek assurances that journalists and aid workers they encountered would be 
provided·safety. No warning was given to the managements of Channel 7 or 9, nor was the 
Jakarta embassy told that Australian journalists were in the attack zone. (SMH, 24.8.98; Dunn, 
1983: 241) 
18 Two weeks after the Dili massacre in November 1991 an item appeared in the Melbourne 
Herald-Sun quoting former Whitlam minister John Wheeldon alleging that Australian officials were 
secretly urging the Indonesians to take over in the weeks before the invasion. Wheeldon, who 
was backed by Clyde Cameron, claimed he had been told of this by both Australian Foreign 
Affairs officials and by the Austrian foreign minister, who alleged Adam Malik had made the same 
claim to him. (Herald-Sun, 27.11.91) 
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surprised at any steps Indonesia should take.' The invasion would begin within 48 
hours. Cartoonist Bruce Petty summed up Australia's role, and Timor's long coming 
years of horror, when he drew a convoy of tanks labelled '1966 massacre of PK.I' 
headed in the direction of a sign saying 'East Timor'. In the foreground was an 
Australian diplomat hiding under his desk. (The Age, 1.12.75; Dunn, 1983: 273-277; 
SMH, 6.12.75; The Australian, 5.12.75) 
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor was thus the final act in the Whitlam 
tragedy, one largely of his own making. Enjoying unrivalled authority in international 
policymaking, he had ignored policy set by his own Department of Foreign Affairs, 
and ignored several crucial opportunities to stop the Indonesians in their tracks. In 
particular, had he stood firm in November 197 4 the essential cordiality of the bilateral 
relationship could have been preserved, along with Timor' s ability to shape its future. 
While later interventions would have generated a deeper rift, they would still have 
saved the relationship from the pernicious long-term effects of the Timor decisions. 
Instead he, Morrison and key bureaucratic players like Woolcott encouraged and 
legitimated an interpretation of the situation which drew on the same murderous 
fantasies which had given birth to the New Order and underpinned the hegemonic 
images of Australian identity and security through thirty years of conservative rule. 
Despite Whitlam's disavowal of the 'racist' anti-communism of Dulles, Menzies and 
Spender, and his swift recognition of China, Vietnam and Kampuchea, what was 
revealed here was an essential continuity with the past-the rhetorical abandonment of 
racism and a new sensitivity to Asian cultures and aspirations was a mere gloss over a 
power-politics structure which had already been violently achieved. 
Worse, the decisions on Timor were deeply interlaced with the linked images of 
security, identity and culmination which gave form to a newly totalised image of the 
Australian subject. Indonesia, and the favour of the New Order regime, had now been 
designated essential to the security of Australia's very being and the realisation of its 
larger project. These were the conditions under which Whitlam's vision of a 'recreated' 
region and 'recreated' Australia would coalesce. As much as we might assert the 
enormous contradictions involved, Whitlam spoke as if an anti-racist idealism and a 
cynical realpolitik formed an unproblematic unity-and a stable ontological foundation 
for a new Australian identity. It was an ontology too which assumed the crimes 
committed against Aboriginal peoples or during the Indochina war could simply be 
swept away by a new declaration of faith. However seductive this was-and however 
backed by genuinely progressive initiatives in the area of land rights19 and Aboriginal 
policy-it occluded a deeper historical understanding and a deeper need for pause. 
19 However, in a way that presaged the anguished debates after the High Court's Mabo decision 
in 1992, Minerals and Energy Minister Rex Connor oversaw a change in the ALP platform which 
removed traditional owners' right of veto over mining in cases where the 'national interest' was 
deemed greater. (Barrett, 1995: 204) This clause was included in land rights legislation (to be 
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Having ignored the moral lessons of Vietnam, 'forward defence' could be 
abandoned while a proxy army, maintained and directed by Soeharto's New Order 
regime, was trusted to protect Australia's 'security' throughout the Indonesian 
archipelago. Thus the safety, aspirations and freedom of the Timorese were to be 
sacrificed so that Australia could remain secure, and so that a century-old structure of 
identity could be preserved, along with its essentially violent relation to the Other. This 
was the meaning of Whitlam's judgement that a small neighbouring territory, with 
fundamentally indigenous traditions and forms of life, was too backward to ever 
constitute a 'viable state' and would thus by definition become a threatening conduit for 
left-wing subversion.20 If this formula seems far-fetched, it was still being incited by 
Richard Woolcott twenty years later, when he argued that 'sentimental notions of self-
determination for the East Timorese or Bougainvilleans .. threaten our national security.' 
(The Australian, 22.4.95) In this impoverished view, difference and uncertainty were 
to be dealt with in much the same way they had been for thirty years. Security's bloody 
trail was to drag on. 
FRASER AND HAWKE: 
THE SECOND COLD WAR 
The invasion of Dili, East Timor's capital, began in the early hours of 7 December 
1975, ironically enough the anniversary of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbour. By 
virtue of its excellent signals intelligence and its exchange agreements with the USA, 
the Australian Government was aware of it as it happened. In August Woolcott had 
revealed he had been promised 'at least two hours notice' of the operation; by 
December 3 the CIA was telling the US Administration Soeharto had approved 'the idea 
of full scale intervention' but that they were unlikely to move until President Ford and 
Secretary Kissinger had left Jakarta on December 6. Despite the Army's belief it could 
quickly wipe out Fretilin resistance the CIA wrote that Fretilin had been 'building up 
defences near the capital and moving supplies and weapons to the interior to wage 
guerilla war against an Indonesian occupation.' (Toohey and Wilkinson, 166-7) 
At around 2 a.m. the Navy began bombarding positions to Dili's east and west, and 
Kopassandha [Special Forces] paratroopers were dropped just before dawn in the 
effective only in the Northern Territory) drafted by Labor which while passing through the House 
of Representatives in 1975 was left in suspended animation on the Senate notice paper of 
November 11. It was reintroduced in a weaker form again by the Fraser Government the next 
year. (Whitlam, 1985: 466-77) 
20 Peter Hastings provided a convincing refutation of Whitlam's views when he argued in 
September 197 4 that, 'despite Timor's lack of political development and its lack of political 
institutions, why is it any less viable than Nauru, the Solomons, Tonga and Western Samoa? Its 
600,000 people, its coffee, vegetables, beef cattle, tourist possibilities and very probably 
onshore and offshore oil reserves make it potentially more viable than most Pacific island 
states.' (SMH, 16.9.74) 
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waterfront area. Some of the paratroopers were dropped short and fell into the sea, 
where they drowned under the weight of their equipment, while a body of Kostrad 
[Strategic Reserve] paratroopers were dropped directly on top of (rather than behind) 
Fretilin forces withdrawing from Dili. They took many casualties, and then came under 
fire from their own marines driving inland from the harbour. Those who survived, 
according to Hamish McDonald, then 'rampaged through the town, killing and looting 
at random.' Over the next week the Indonesians engaged in what James Dunn has 
called an 'orgy of killing'-hundreds of Chinese were murdered, along with hundreds 
more Timorese including supporters of Apodeti. Whole families were murdered in their 
homes, and numerous mass public executions held. A group of 150, including 20 
women, were shot before a crowd at the harbour, where their bodies fell from the jetty 
into the water. One of these women was Isabel Lobato, wife of Fretilin's military 
commander Nicolau. Some 2000 Timorese were killed during those few days-the 
Bishop was to say later the paratroops had drifted from the heavens like 'angels' and 
then behaved like 'devils'. (Dunn, 1983: 282-5; McDonald, 1981: 212) 
Worse, over the next few weeks the Army ransacked peoples' homes and shipped 
the proceeds to Java, while the female relatives of Fretilin members (and members of 
Timorese womens and student organisations) were imprisoned for months where they 
were tortured and repeatedly raped. Before year's end the Indonesians, finding their 
forces pinned down outside Dili, mounted two further invasions--on 10 December 
paratroops were landed at Baucau to secure the airfield, and over Christmas and Boxing 
Day 15,000 reinforcements were brought in. By April there were 35,000 troops in east 
Timor. When the towns of Liquica and Maubara were captured the Indonesians 
murdered nearly the whole of their Chinese populations; when Aileu was captured in 
February its entire population was liquidated, save children under four, who were 
trucked to Dili and later placed in a Jakarta orphanage under the care of a foundation 
owned by Soeharto's wife Tien. By May the Indonesians still controlled only Dili and a 
few major towns-the countryside was Fretilin's, who now had responsibility for 
some 500,000 people, many of them refugees who had fled the invaders' appalling 
brutalities. (Dunn, 1983: 283-6; Budiardjo and Liong, 1984: 23) 
In public the new Fraser caretaker Government condemned the invasion, but was 
already acting duplicitously. In the UN General Assembly Australia sought, with 
Indonesia, to avoid the adoption of a draft (sponsored by Guyana, Sierra Leone, 
Trinidad, Cuba and Senegal) which 'strongly deplore[d]' the Indonesian invasion and 
called for the complete and immediate withdrawal of all its forces. Australia tried (with 
India, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other ASEAN states) to delete direct references to 
Indonesia's military intervention, and while it eventually voted for the Guyana draft, 
abstained on votes for the paragraphs referring to Indonesia. (SSCFAD, 1983: 96; 
Clark, 1980: 148) While Australia supported the Security Council's action in sending a 
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representative to Timor, it refused UN envoy Winspeare Guicciardi's request for an 
aircraft so he could reach Fretilin-held areas. This followed a meeting between Adam 
Malik and new Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock on 20 January, at which 
he remarked that 'differences of attitude .. should be seen in the context of the long-term 
importance to both countries and the region as a whole of close and co-operative 
relations between Australia and Indonesia.' (Dunn, 1993: 342; AFAR, 1976: 42-4) 
Prime Minister Fraser visited Indonesia in October 1976, just after Federal Police 
seized a radio transmitter near Darwin being used to communicate with Fretilin. 
Fraser's official communique following the talks stated that 'the important thing now 
was to iook to the future, and to alleviate as far as possible the human suffering which 
had come with the fighting .. '. After he had left Indonesia Lt-Gen Sudharmono, an 
advisor to Soeharto, told journalists that 'although Indonesia saw Australia as agreeing 
with the steps Indonesia was taking in relation to East Timor, nonetheless Australia had 
other domestic interests of its own.' Fraser was said to have been angered by the 
statement that Australia's policy was two-faced-however it has been confirmed by 
former Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who told the author 
that while 'secretly both the US and Australia were applauding what Indonesia did, 
publicly they were outraged.'21 In the UN General Assembly sessions of 1976 and 
1977 Australia abstained on the East Timor motion. By January 1978 it had formally 
provided de facto recognition to the annexation, and in 1979 this was made de jure. 
Shortly after, negotiations over the Timor Gap oil and gas reserves began. At no point 
did Australia protest about the tremendous abuses carried out by the Indonesians-
these accommodating moves were made while Indonesian authority in Timor was weak 
and bitter fighting was taking place. In June 1976 two thousand people were massacred 
at a refugee settlement near the border at Lakmaras, while in February former UDT 
leader Lopes Da Cruz had told the Indonesian press 50,000 people had already died in 
the war. By the end of 1976 the Indonesian Catholic Church was estimating as many as 
100,000 may have perished. (Dunn, 1993: 342-5, 274; AFAR, 1978: 46, 1979: 305) 
AN 'ACTIVE AND ENLIGHTENED REALISM' 
The philosophy advanced by the Fraser Government to explain its foreign policy was 
proclaimed in 1976 as 'an active and enlightened realism'. Perhaps it was framed in an 
attempt to resolve the contradictions posed by its policies on East Timor, or to cloak a 
baseline realpolitik in a liberal gloss; in neither case was it an honest description of the 
structural challenges the Government was seeking to manage. Perhaps the Government 
hoped its acceptance of a f ait accompli in East Tim or could be explained by Fraser's 
21 Interview with Author, Jakarta, 21 November 1996. 
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argument that foreign policy must be based on assessments that are 'free from self-
deception, self-delusion. We must be prepared to accept the world as it is, and not as 
we would like it to be. '22 It was classic Morgenthau, justifying a refusal to moralise by 
appeal to an epistemic realism--obscuring the ways Australian policy constantly sought 
to intervene in, shape and cheer on the very realities it claimed to be so stubborn. 
(AFAR, 1976: 300, 1981: 242) 
It was not as if the Fraser Government was unaware of the principles at stake in 
East Timor-in 1979 and 1980 it repeatedly stated its strident opposition to the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even though 
he admitted in 1979 that 'Pol Pot's regime horrified the world' Fraser said that 
'Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea cannot be condoned' and called for an immediate 
withdrawal. 'The Australian Government,' he intoned, 'cannot accept the use of force 
for the settlement of disputes, whatever their cause.' At the end of the year, when 
receiving the Soviet Ambassador at Nareen, Fraser rejected his explanation for the 
invasion of Afghanistan. At stake, he told the Ambassador, was the principle that 'The 
Australian Government and people could not accept that there should be military 
interference by one power in the affairs of a neighbouring state. It was morally wrong 
and totally contrary to the accepted norms of international society. In this particular case 
it could only have a destabilising effect on an area which already had its fair share of 
problems.' (AF AR, 1979: 96) 
Transposed to the case of East Timor, his statement could not have been more apt. 
Yet by this time the Government could only say that 'although it remains critical of the 
means by which integration was brought about it would be unrealistic to continue to 
refuse to recognise .. that East Timor is a part oflndonesia.' (AFAR, 1978: 47) Perhaps 
words like 'hypocrisy' are overused, but it barely begins to capture the appalling 
double-standards advanced in this case. Worse, opposition to the Soviets and Vietnam 
would become a rallying cry for Fraser's vision of international reality. By 1980, with 
the Soviets in Afghanistan and having naval and air forces in Vietnam, Fraser's claims 
of renewed communist threat seemed plausible-without considering both Khmer 
Rouge and Chinese attacks on Vietnam being a possible factor in Soviet deployments 
there. In tum he claimed they presaged new direct threats to Australia's own security. 
The Afghanistan situation, he said, was 'the most dangerous international crisis since 
World War II' and had substantially changed 'for the worse the strategic order 
underpinning Australia's security.' He further emphasised its connection with the 
22 It must be acknowledged the Government expressed consistent opposition to Aparthied, 
even to the extent of supporting an investment ban, accepted large numbers of Vietnamese 
refugees and increased levels of foreign aid-measures consistent with a liberal foreign policy. 
However foreign aid was also justified in terms of political realism: 'extreme and widening 
discrepancies in the wealth of nations cannot.provide a tenable basis for a stable international 
community.' (AFAR, 1978: 459) 
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Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, suggesting that ' .. both events are related within 
some larger strategic purpose .. each carries implications for the other. Certainly the 
leaders of the ASEAN countries perceive linkages and are deeply concerned.' (Bell, 
1988: 135; AFAR, 16-24) 
This extraordinarily imprecise statement was pure speculation, and in its talk of 
linkage drew on the same logic which had underpinned the domino theory-possibly 
second nature to a former Army Minister ( 1966-71) who would still claim in 1995 that 
the Vietnam war had been an honourable cause. It further lacked any independent 
understanding of what may have motivated Vietnam's response-namely the attacks by 
Khmer Rouge forces on its territory between 1975 and 1979-nor took into account the 
genocide it had halted. Obviously Vietnam's early withdrawal should have been 
sought, but from here Australian policy merely chimed in with a cynical US strategy 
which prolonged a settlement for over a decade. Nor could the Soviet Union's brutal 
invasion of Afghanistan be condoned, yet the hypocrisy of Australia's response was 
underlined by Fraser's long list of retaliatory measures, which included a refusal to 
supply wheat embargoed by the USA, the suspension of Soviet cruise ship operations, 
a suspension of diplomatic relations and bilateral scientific and cultural co-operation, 
and the infamous attempts to force Australia's Olympic team to boycott the Moscow 
games. (AFAR, 1980: 24; SMH, 15.4.95; Pilger, 1989: 401) 
In contrast Indonesia's invasion of East Timor had been rewarded with increased 
levels of development and military aid, along with active support in the United 
Nations.23 At the 1982 UN General Assembly both Gough Whitlam (as a private 
petitioner) and the Australian Ambassador argued East Timor should be removed from 
the UN agenda permanently. This, after a famine which had killed almost a hundred 
thousand people in 1978 and 1979, and the failure of a massive military operation in 
1981 (Operation Security) which disrupted planting, saw thousands ofTimorese forced 
to march ahead of Indonesian forces and the massacre of hundreds at the village of 
Lacluta in September. By now it was clear the Government's opposition to the USSR 
and Vietnam was driven less by principle than by an overheated perception of the new 
strategic situation-which also drew on older modes of identity and foreign policy 
practice. In 1980 Fraser announced increases to Australia's defence budget, and 
increased operations-including air and naval patrols and joint exercises-in the Indian 
23 Development aid was increased to $86 million over three years, from the previous three year 
total of $69 million, perhaps in response to the Pertamina crisis. The three year military aid 
program of $20 million announced by Whitlam in 1975 was also continued-it included patrol 
boats, field radios and officer training (including combat skills) in Australia. Ten Nomad 
'Searchmaster' aircraft were donated, along with the use of RAAF aircraft for the aerial mapping 
of lrian Jaya, itself the focus of a war of counterinsurgency. The Nomads were provided 
ostensibly for maritime surveillance, but ALP parliamentarian Ken Fry argued they were being 
used in East Timor to search for guerillas. Twelve Bell 'Sioux' helicopters were also donated from 
1977 along with training for Indonesian pilots and mechanics. (AFAR, 1976: 129, 213, 1979: 229, 
236; Budiardjo and Uong, 1984: 30) 
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Ocean area, along with the upgrade of ports and airfields in Western Australia. Further 
increases included the Army Reserve from twenty-two to thirty thousand, the purchase 
of 75 tactical fighter aircraft (eventually the F/Al8 Hornet), naval weapons upgrades, 
and expanded defence co-operation within the ASEAN region. American B-52 aircraft 
on surveillance flights in the Indian Ocean were allowed to transit through the RAAF 
base in Darwin, and Indian Ocean home-port facilities for US vessels offered. Fraser 
had earlier reversed the Whitlam Government's opposition to the re-development of 
Diego Garcia-which may have been encouraged by US pressures in 1976 for 
Australia to cease its public opposition to Indonesia so that transit rights for US 
submarines through the archipelago would not be in jeopardy. (AFAR, 1982: 737-44, 
1980: 26; Dunn, 1983: 322-46) 
On Cambodia, the Fraser Government's policy quickly began to mimic that of the 
Reagan Administration. Australia tacitly endorsed a US strategy which saw China, 
Thailand and Britain giving military support and sanctuary to the Khiner Rouge, while 
they and the ASEAN countries ensured the UN seat remained with the Royalist 
Coalition (effectively controlled by the Khiner Rouge). This action prevented any of the 
UN' s humanitarian machinery being activated inside Cambodia. Like the US and other 
Wes tern nations Australia supplied aid to Cambodian refugees in Thailand, much of 
which in turn fed Khmer Rouge fighters.24 As Australia joined with ASEAN in loudly 
proclaiming that Vietnam should withdraw, the US combined a continuing aid and 
investment embargo (on both countries) with a cynical policy aimed at 'bleeding 
Vietnam white on the battlefield of Cambodia.' (Pilger, 1989: 448) The policy also 
provided a reassuringly stark model of identity, with the reversion to comforting 
images of western alliance and commonality with the United States and a continuation, 
by proxy, of war against Vietnamese communism.25 In 1982 Tony Street echoed 
Reagan Administration rhetoric that the USSR now 'combines both an expansionist 
ideology and military power on an unprecedented scale' and praised the 
Administration's effort to increase US military power. Street also praised the USA's 
new 'regional level assertiveness' in El Salvador, saying that 'The Australian 
Government fully understands the Administration's wish to cut off sources of 
disturbance and revolution there.' (AF AR, 1982: 240-1) 
24 A 1982 press release from Foreign Minister Tony Street boasted that Australia had supplied 
$23 million to the relief operation on the Thai-Cambodia border. The same document also spoke 
of the shipment of 862 tonnes of rice to Phnom Penh by Australia to deal with imminent food 
shortages. (AFAR, 1982: 484) 
25 Admittedly the continuing flood of refugees from South Vietnam and their reports of ill-
treatment in prisons and re-education camps hardly endeared Vietnam's Stalinist Government to 
the international community-yet the complex of problems in Indochina required not a slavish 
dedication to US foreign policy but a far more independent and creative diplomacy, of the kind 
the ALP brought to the issue through the second half of the 1980s. 
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As 'enlightened realism' justified the Government's decisions to support US 
strategic power and seek its deeper involvement in Asia and the Indian Ocean, so it 
framed the Government's approach to a newly assertive and vocal third world bloc. 
From its very first foreign policy statements it acknowledged the gravity of the calls for 
a NIEO and the formation of the United Nations Council on Trade and Development 
(UNCT AD) against the wishes of northern states like the US. However despite liberal 
rhetoric which spoke of how 'the appalling problems of poverty, hunger and disease 
are .. an affront to human dignity' the Government's major concern, said Fraser, was 
with how they 'constantly threaten discord and conflict between nations.' In the 1976 
Roy Milne Lecture he was more explicit, saying flatly that 'fostering the illusion that 
redistribution of the world's existing wealth will resolve all problems serves no one's 
interest. Redistribution has its place in the world's economic agenda-but much more 
important is soundly based international economic growth, and most fundamental of 
all, the pursuit by developing countries of domestic policies which foster enterprise and 
initiative.' When addressing the Indonesian Parliament later that year, he repeated the 
lecture, saying bluntly: 'We believe that the essential elements of the present economic 
system continue to hold the greatest hope for economic progress.' (AFAR, 1976: 302, 
479, 536) 
The only concession Australia sought to make, which unsurprisingly cleaved with 
the Government's monetarist interpretation of the national interest, was to push for 
greater liberalisation of developed country markets, especially for agricultural products 
and commodities. Yet despite saying in the UN, as Andrew Peacock did, that 'Australia 
supports efforts which will lead to the establishment of an effective international system 
of food security', the Government gave no support to broader third world demands-
for consistently higher prices for commodity exports, debt restructuring, or the right to 
nationalise foreign-owned assets. Instead the monetarist plank which offered higher 
volumes of trade over increased prices, and resisted deeper changes which might enable 
faster industrialisation or increased public sector investment and welfare, would 
become the basis of IMF structural adjustment programs which effectively buried the 
third world hopes of the 1970s. (AFAR, 1976: 483) 
HAWKE: THE END OF CERTAINTY II 
When the Hawke Labor Government took power in 1983 it was in a context of global 
recession, resurgent economic liberalism, a dangerous and unprecedented level of cold 
war confrontation and a hyper-aggressive United States. It inherited a foreign policy 
which was building Australia's defence capabilities, and cheering on the USA's new 
assertiveness and its brutal geopolitics in Indochina and Central America. War was still 
raging in East Timor, and ASEAN had formed into a cohesive political bloc which 
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protected its members from criticism of their 'internal affairs', rigidly enforced outward 
solidarity and was putting up a (seemingly) united front against Vietnam. These 
contexts, with their implications for both international policy and domestic economic 
and cultural management, provided real challenges to Labor which-at least in theory-
was committed to employment growth, public welfare and a liberal foreign policy. The 
ALP platform, for example, expressed opposition to uranium mining and support for 
an act of self-determination in East Timor, and provided for the suspension of defence 
co-operation with Indonesia until it was carried out. The party was committed to 
Aboriginal land rights, multiculturalism and a non-discriminatory immigration policy. 
Similarly its relations with the US-following the shadowplay of 1975 and the 
revelation of the CIA' s role during the Christopher Boyce trial in 1977-were marked 
by a heritage of mutual suspicion. 
Domestically Hawke's first two terms saw a bewildering array of policy and 
structural changes-including a formal 'Accord' with trade unions which delivered 
consistent falls in real wages through the next decade, the floating of the Australian 
dollar on international money markets, a dramatic reduction in industry protection, and 
a sustained attack on federal budget deficits which saw surpluses being achieved by the 
mid- l 990s. By that time centralised wage indexation under the Accord was beginning 
to yield to a push for wage bargaining at the enterprise level, paving the way for a 
systematic attack on workers rights by the conservative Howard Government after 
1996.26 
The 'reforms' quickly took on the character, at least in elite rhetoric, of embodying 
a systematic vision for a new Australian prosperity amid the ascendancy of monetarism 
and increasingly 'globalising' patterns of trade in goods, services, capital and labour. 
Free market economists and senior government ministers began to espouse an 
integrated approach which linked domestic economic management and reform (along 
with substantial cultural and attitudinal changes) with new priorities for diplomacy and 
regional economic integration-in short, a new combination of 'the political double-
bind' and the strategic imagination. 
Much of this thinking was collected in the 1989 report Australia and the Northeast 
Asian Ascendancy written by Hawke's former advisor Ross Garnaut, although its 
detailed themes had been flagged by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden as early as October 
1983. Such thinking influenced Hawke and Keating's energetic promotion of the Asia-
26 Many government corporations (including the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas) were fully or 
partially privatised, while telecommunications was opened up to new players. Some welfare 
benefits were cut, social security more closely 'targeted' through tighter eligibility restrictions, 
and partial fees for tertiary education were introduced. Such deflationary and 'market oriented' 
reforms were countered with increased public commitments such as the national health scheme 
Medicare, and the expansion of the post-school education system. More radical policies-such 
as a goods and services tax, a national identity card, and the full sale of Telecom-were 
defeated within the party. 
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Pacific Economic Co-operation trade liberalisation forum (APEC), the development of 
education policy, and new rhetorics of national identity. By 1984 Hayden was arguing 
'Australia's long-term future is as a Eurasian country', while Hawke spoke of seeking 
to 'enmesh' Australia in Asia. Journalist Paul Kelly argued in 1992 that it is 'the rise of 
a massive and prosperous middle class in the Asia/Pacific which will trade, travel and 
live in Australia that is the ultimate guarantor of a new identity.' He further contended 
that the raft of policy and cultural changes during the 1980s saw the 'irresistible 
demolition' of the five pillars of the 'Australian settlement' which had governed 
national life since Federation-white Australia, industry protection, wage arbitration, 
state paternalism, and imperial benevolence. (AF AR, 1983, 580-8, 1984: 10; Kelly, 
1992: 2-4) 
Much of this rhetoric was overheated, and by the time the full dimensions of the 
Asian currency crisis had emerged in 1998, could be placed under serious question. 
Such claims to a progressive new national direction, and to a radical break with the 
past, need to be placed under close and critical scrutiny. The poverty of Kelly's 
analysis can be already seen in the invisibility of millions in Asia who struggled at 
subsistence levels (even within economies growing at fantastic rates), and in his refusal 
to acknowledge how Aboriginal dispossession formed a crucial sixth plank of the 
'settlement.' Similarly Ross Garnaut neglected to acknowledge how repression and 
authoritarianism had often underpinned the 'social cohesion and political stability' 
which drove Northeast Asian growth. (Garnaut, 1989: 9) 
While boosters of Labor's reforms emphasise their courage and vision, they could 
also be portrayed as an accommodation to the imperatives of late-twentieth century 
capitalism and corporate power. Within Australia Labor prevailed over a dramatic 
transfer of wealth from poor to rich, while internationally they accepted the hegemony 
of liberal ideas and western economic domination which exacerbated the same 
trends.27 The third-world challenge to the international economic order now seemed a 
memory; Labor merely echoed the axioms of the World Bank/IMF Group in urging the 
need for greater liberalisation of global trade and investment, with emphasis on 
commodities markets. They assumed that increasing 'interdependence'-visible both in 
increased trade levels and multiple-site off shore production strategies-would produce 
equal benefits for all nations, and all members of those nations. They further endorsed 
a pressure shadowing the trade push-to liberalise foreign investment and taxation 
rules, for many nations still crucial to the generation of domestic capital-while 
ignoring labor rights and environmental protection. In short, Labor would not 
27 For instance in a speech to the Australia-Indonesia Business Conference in 1987 Hayden 
praised Indonesia's recent economic reforms, which included reductions in tariff levels, 
improved customs procedures and the 'liberalisation of investment-joint venture guidelines.' 
(AFAR, 1987: 486) 
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recognise that the world economy was fundamentally characterised by unequal power 
relationships, both between and within states. 28 What remained was an optimistic neo-
liberalism and the mantra-like repetition of Australia's recognition of Asia's 'new 
dynamism'. Even when the miracle faltered so badly in 1997-8, few were willing to re-
evaluate their core beliefs. 
Likewise there was substantial continuity in strategic policy. Strong support for 
ANZUS was an axiom of Hawke's policy, and been an early point of friction within 
the party.29 In 1985, when ANZUS co-operation was faltering, Hawke stated he 
would not want to be Prime Minister 'if central elements of the alliance, such as port 
access for nuclear ships and Australia's hosting of the joint facilities, were repudiated.' 
(The Australian, 7.3.85: 1) Not that this translated into the slavish devotion to US 
foreign policy that characterised the Fraser years. The Government distanced itself from 
the Reagan Administration's support for the Nicaraguan Contras and brutal regimes in 
Honduras and El Salvador, pressed hard for the negotiation of a comprehensive test 
ban treaty, criticised the space-based Strategic Defence Initiative and supported the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. However Australia used its influence in the South 
Pacific Forum to preserve transit rights for nuclear armed vessels-crucial to the 
Pentagon's aggressive naval strategy-and its disarmament initiatives were conducted 
partly to pre-empt pressure from a rapidly growing anti-war movement, which saw 
huge Palm Sunday marches and the formation of the Nuclear Disarmament Party (who 
contested the 1984 federal elections). As he explained in his memoirs, Hayden's fears 
were that if 'we [did not] move quickly to establish our ascendancy on peace and 
disarmament issues' they would face pressures from the Left to close the US bases, 
rescind ship visits and withdraw from ANZUS. (AFAR, 1986: 894; Hayden, 1996: 
392) 
Of greater moment was Labor's break with US policy on Cambodia. Here, in an 
initiative suggested by Hawke, Hayden pursued an active diplomacy with Vietnam, the 
Khmer Rouge-Royalist Coalition and the ASEAN countries in pursuit of common 
28 A glaring example of this naivete was Hayden's statement, in the United Nations in 1986, in 
support of the Baker Plan for third-world debt management (which provided for bridging loans in 
exchange for harsh economic reforms) and 'the general approach of the IMF to adjustment and 
conditionality.' He noted 'it should be handled with care' and that 'democratic institutions .. should 
not be undermined by the process. The economic benefits of conditionality have to be balanced 
against their potential for causing social distress and dislocation.' These were worthy caveats, 
but were undermined by the general support for a process which would systematically 
impoverish indebted states for decades to come-over funds borrowed and embezzled by 
corrupt elites in pursuit of economic models and living standards the West had long held out as a 
beacon. (AFAR, 1986: 895; George, 1988: 190-3, 229-263) 
29 The Government allowed the US navy access to Australian ports without questioning the 
vessels' nuclear status, engaged in regular joint exercises, pursued equipment purchases and 
continued the Fraser Government's policy of allowing B52s to transit through Darwin. It 
consistently justified the US military installations at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North-west Cape 
on the basis of their contribution to 'deterrence' through their early warning capability, and 
placed pressure on New Zealand to rescind their ban on nuclear-armed and powered vessels. 
(AFAR, 1983-87) 
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ground which might lead to a settlement. In doing so Hayden clashed with Thailand 
and Singapore, and directly undermined declared US policy. On the other hand, 
Indonesia supported Australian initiatives strongly within ASEAN and pursued parallel 
diplomatic efforts.30 American officials attempted to undermine Australia's diplomacy 
in Asian capitals, and Secretary of State George Shultz tried to dissuade Hayden in 
1983 from pursuing it. (Hayden, 1996: 382) 
In contrast with Fraser, Hayden was sanguine about the strategic implications of the 
Vietnamese invasion, saying that while Australia opposed it in principle, he understood 
why the Vietnamese had intervened and could not withdraw while there was a chance 
the Khmer Rouge could return to power. On the other hand, Hawke resisted fully 
implementing the ALP' s platform which called for the resumption of direct aid to 
Vietnam. 31 In response to Labor's (cautious) independence of rilind The Australian 
declared in 1985 that it was 'not the conduct of a worthwhile ally' and that Australian 
foreign policy was 'sliding into chaos.' Unfortunately the worth of the initiative was 
marred by the cynicism with which Hawke conceived it, playing off one part of the 
ALP platform against another he was determined to abrogate. In his memoir Hayden 
argues he suspected that 'Hawke had encouraged the Indochina initiative as a red 
herring to distract the party, especially the Left, from the vexatious and difficult to 
manage issue of East Timor.' (The Australian, 11.3.85: 1, 12.3.85; Hastings, 1984b; 
Hayden, 1996: 382) 
In 1984 Hawke publicly affirmed his government's de jure recognition of 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, and Hayden worked hard at the ALP's 1984 
national conference to have the platform re-written. With the New Order government 
reassured, negotiations over the Timor Gap could resume. While this capitulation 
preserved the friendly tenor of relations, at least until 1986, tensions remained. In 
September 1983 Hayden made a public statement of concern about indications of a 
renewed military offensive in East Timor, but no stronger action was taken. Hayden 
would have been aware of the replacement in June of General Yusuf as ABRI 
commander by Benny Murdani, and of Murdani's cancellation of the cease fire (and 
secret negotiations with Fretilin) which had been in place since March. Hayden would 
also have been aware that the ICRC had suspended relief operations because of new 
restrictions on its activities and, through intelligence sources, that Murdani had taken a 
30 In 1984 Indonesia's armed forces chief General Murdani spent five days in Hanoi at a joint 
seminar on Cambodia run by Jakarta's CSIS and Vietnam's Institute of International Relations. It 
was the first conference held between an ASEAN state and Vietnam on the issue, and there 
Murdani angered ASEAN partners by declaring that neither he nor ABRI believed Vietnam to be a 
threat to its neighbours. Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja also visited Hanoi in an 
attempt to build bridges between Vietnam and ASEAN. Indonesia's attitudes were motivated by 
fellow-feeling with the Vietnamese as a nation conceived in anti-colonial struggle and by a 
common hostility to China. (Hastings, 1984c; The Australian, 8.3.85: 1} 
31 While US pressure to prevent a resumption of bilateral aid to Vietnam worked, Labor did 
provide $7 .8 million between 1984 and 1986 through UN programs. (AFAR, 1985: 757) 
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top-level military delegation to Timor for planning meetings. Later the Australian 
government would defend its East Timor policy by arguing it was supplying 
humanitarian and development aid for East Timor-including through the ICRC-and 
that preservation of its political relationship with the New Order enabled it to take up 
human rights concerns. Hayden must have been aware the new military offensive made 
a mockery of this logic. Amnesty International reported that the offensive initiated a 
new wave of repression, including hundreds of arrests, disappearances, summary 
executions and the massacre of two hundred at the village of Kraras in August. 
(Budiardjo and Liong, 1984: 48; AFAR, 1983: 518; Amnesty International, 1985: 18, 
52) 
While Indonesia's media blackout and closed-door policy kept East Timor off the 
front pages, another crisis was brewing on the Papua New Guinea/Irian Jaya border. 
Following an abortive uprising by the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in and around the 
capital Jayapura in early 1984, Indonesian reprisals and security operations provoked a 
flood of refugees to cross into PNG. By the end of the year eleven thousand West 
Papuans were living in hastily erected camps near the border. PNG policy, influenced 
by Indonesian pressure, was to repatriate them as quickly as possible. While Indonesia 
provided 22,000 kina to feed the refugees, after this ran out in June the PNG 
Government allowed supplies to dry up in an attempt to make camp life as unappealing 
as possible. It had refused to allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) to become involved, as this would have internationalised the issue and 
provided the 'border crossers' with formal status as refugees. As a result famine 
struck, killing over ninety people by August 1984. Only now were the UNHCR and 
ICRC asked for assistance. (Harris and Brown, 1985: 1-44) 
As early as 1970, when PNG was experiencing a smaller refugee problem, Kathryn 
Young had emphasised how the border had the potential to destabilise relations between 
two key Southeast Asian states in the post-Guam era. (1970: 24) This was echoed by 
Harris and Brown, who argued that 'the Irian Jaya crisis has the potential to exercise a 
very destabilising effect on a region of considerable political, strategic and economic 
importance to Australia.' The refugee influx was accompanied by severe tensions 
between PNG and Indonesia, which culminated in the deportation of Indonesia's 
defence attache in April in protest at repeated incursions. Loathe to buy into these 
tensions, the Australian Government consistently maintained the refugees were a 
bilateral matter for Indonesia and PNG to resolve. Nor did they try to alter PNG's 
declared intentions to repatriate them to Indonesia or strongly encourage them to 
involve the UNHCR. Only after the deaths by starvation did Australia push for UN 
involvement and provide $600,000 in relief funds. Thus Australia (along with 
Indonesia, which failed to respond to a second PNG request for aid) must bear some 
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responsibility for the tragedy of the camps in mid-1984. (Osborne, 1985: 182; AFAR, 
1984: 711; Harris and Brown, 1985: 37) 
The Australian Government would have been aware of Indonesia's repeated 
incursions, and that if a larger intervention was made that it would have to provide 
military support to PNG-as recommended in the 1983 Strategic Basis and confirmed 
by a senior Australian officer in 1989. In such an event the whole structure of 'stability' 
Australia had sought with the Indonesian New Order would have been destroyed. 
However it chose to manage the danger by supporting a new bilateral treaty between 
PNG and Indonesia and encouraging PNG plans to police the OPM.32 The 1983 
Strategic Basis argued 'Australian policy should encourage Papua New Guinea 
wherever possible to suppress anti-Indonesian activity by Irian Jaya dissidents', and 
journalist Brian Toohey revealed in 1989 that the Australian SAS joint exercise with 
PNG, 'Night Falcon', included scenarios in which OPM guerillas were captured and 
interrogated by PNGDF units. In addition to the SAS training, Australia provided 
$500,000 to map the PNG border area and promised an army engineering contingent 
and four Iroquois helicopters for use there. Upon delivery, the helicopters were 
diverted to the war on Bougainville. (Toohey and Wilkinson, 1987: 258; Toohey, 
1990: 7; SMH, 7.11.85; McLellan, 1990: 5) 
Thus having turned a blind eye to the Indonesian killings between 1965 and 1969, 
and accepted afait accompli in East Timor, Australian policy now faced a situation in 
which any pretence to principle in its relations with Indonesia was continually thrown 
back in its face. While Hayden was arguing that a working relationship enabled 
Australia to make positive human interventions, Benny Murdani had begun a new 
military offensive in East Timor-over Australian protests-which equalled previous 
campaigns in their ferocity. Similarly he initiated the Petrus campaign, endorsed by 
Soeharto, which saw the summary killings of over five thousand alleged criminals 
between 1983 and 1986. In 1984 Murdani ordered troops to fire on Muslim protesters 
in the Tanjung Priok area of Jakarta, killing fifty, which was followed by a series of 
arrests and trials. In 1989, provoked by protests during visits by the Pope and the US 
Ambassador to East Timor, Murdani warned a meeting of community leaders to 
abandon their dreams of freedom: 'There is no such thing as an [East Timor] nation, 
there is only an Indonesian nation .. .If you try to make your own state and the 
32 In 1994 a recently retired Defence Department strategic planner, Dr Stewart Woodman, was 
still arguing that 'Clearly it is a priority for Australia to impress upon PNG the need for an 
effective presence in the border area, even amid other pressing domestic priorities. This could 
be best achieved through continued training support, especially in long-range reconnaissance 
and patrol, the provision of communications equipment, and enhancement of the PNGDF's 
logistic support and transport capabilities ... ln circumstances where PNG forces were acting 
more systematically against the OPM ... Australia might need to consider deploying additional 
surveillance and support assets, but not combat units.' (Thompson ed., 1994: 34) 
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movement is strong .. .it will be crushed by ABRI..don't start imagining things, don't 
start dreaming.' (Amnesty International, 1994: 64; Inside Indonesia, June 1990: 14) 
Australia did little in protest, and faced growing New Order pressure over 
Government, media and community 'interference' in its 'internal affairs'. Of particular 
sensitivity were Radio Australia reports of events in East Timor-ironic given its role in 
assistance to the Generals in 1965. Even an Australian vote in the February 1985 UN 
· Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in favour of a recommendation which urged 
continued surveillance of the human rights situation in East Timor (albeit only for a 
year) came under strong criticism in the Indonesian press. (AFAR, 1985: 241) When 
asked in the Senate about the sentencing of General Dharsono-a former Secretary-
General of ASEAN who had criticised the Tanjung Priok killings in a 'white paper' 
published by a group of dissident officers-to ten years gaol for subversion, Gareth 
Evans refused to criticise the use of the anti-subversion law or the killings themselves, 
saying only that 'Lt-Gen. Dharsono has been tried and convicted under due process of 
Indonesian law'. (AFAR, 1986: 422; SMH, 2.11.85) 
On the other hand, the economic payoffs for Australia's quiet diplomacy, while 
slow, were progressing well. By 1987 Indonesia was Australia's eighteenth largest 
export market, with Australia enjoying a handsome trade surplus of $200 million in 
1986-7. 33 The slow pace of this progress had little to do with political tensions (though 
they were never far from Australian minds) and more with limited complementarity 
between the two economies and an undeveloped foreign investment culture in Australia. 
This did not prevent a hundred Australian enterprises having investments in Indonesia, 
making Australian corporations Indonesia's ninth-largest foreign investor in 1987. 
Government Ministers also looked forward to the development of the Timor Gap and 
joint fisheries and gold and coal mining investments. (AFAR, 1987: 485, 1986: 154) 
Yet perhaps testament to the Regime's frustration with the robust criticisms they 
were suffering in Australian public life, the New Order government chose the 
publication by The Sydney Morning Herald in 1986 of an article critical of Soeharto 
family businesses as an opportunity to strike back. Defence co-operation and high-level 
government-to-government contact was unilaterally suspended, talks on the Timor Gap 
postponed, journalists expelled and a planeload of tourists deported. No matter that 
successive Australian governments had stood alone in providing de jure recognition of 
Indonesia's brutal incorporation of East Timor, and had defied the great weight of 
public opinion in doing so. It seemed that the price of having made Indonesia so critical 
to Australian security and being was increasing dramatically. Ironically while seeking to 
33 The $790 million of two-way trade between Australia and Indonesia in 1984-5, for instance, 
was well behind the figures for Australia's largest Asian trading partners China ($1.4 billion), 
Korea ($1.6 billion), Singapore ($1.7 billion) and Japan ($14.8 billion). Australian direct 
investment figures of $70 million contrasted with those in Singapore of $235 million. (AFAR, 
1986: 791) 
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restore relations as quickly as possible, Australian officials found themselves, for the 
first time, downplaying the significance of the relationship-with Hawke saying its 
importance had been 'exaggerated' and foreign affairs official John Holloway arguing 
for 'greater pragmatism and reduced expectations'. (AFAR, 1986: 421, 790) With one 
of its bricks so easily kicked away, the whole structure and promise of certitude sought 
so anxiously since 1969 was beginning to seem like an illusion. 
AFTER THE COLD WAR: 
THE POLITICS OF (UN)CERTAINTY 
Policymakers seemed genuinely shocked that a relationship they had elevated to a 
guarantee of certitude amid the change of the post-Guam period could be damaged so 
easily. In speech after speech they returned to the trope, already visible in 1969, which 
anguished over the disjunction between the 'common interests' shared by the two 
countries and the objective dissimilarity in culture, politics and historical experience. 
From the New Order's side, it served as a warning against the too-zealous promotion 
of 'western' democratic values; from Australia's, as an attempt to manage the same 
contradictions by acknowledging 'differences' yet emphasising the need for co-
operation. Yet the rhetoric was hardly a call for the respect of difference-in any ethical 
sense-deriving it is did from an overdetermined drive for sameness on both sides. 
Deleuze and Guattari make a revealing point here, when they discuss how the 
globalisation of capitalism generates elite expectations of greater cultural and political 
homogenisation (the end-of-history thesis). Yet they emphasise that capitalism is in fact 
isomorphic with a range of political forms-homogenisation is not its inevitable 
outcome, whatever its partial tendencies to it in the generation of common forms of 
bourgeois desire. (1987: 436) In the case of Australia and the Indonesian New Order, 
the drive to accelerate the isomorphy of capital demanded a political accommodation 
which was expressed in a language of sameness and common destiny. On each side 
this generated ironic expectations of homogenisation-that each government and 
society would internalise the other's values-which were inevitably disappointed. 
Heterogeneity was then rudely encountered in the confrontation between 'democratic' 
and 'totalitarian' political cultures. In 1986, common assumptions shared by the two 
countries elites foundered on the disbelief of Australia's public culture; when Soeharto 
was toppled by his people in 1998, the same irony would work in the opposite 
direction. 
The failure of 'sovereignty' as a meaningful sign of representation was palpable 
here, and it would only come under more pressure. As the Cold War ended and the 
Soviet Union dissolved into a federation of independent states, more questions were 
asked about the long reign of Soeharto and the inevitability of Indonesia's boundaries. 
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Launching a campaign for dialogue over East Timor on behalf of resistance leader 
Xanana Gusmao, The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) argued that the 
time for a just resolution of the issue had come. The geopolitical environment which 
surrounded Indonesia's 1975 invasion was gone, along with any rationale for its 
continued occupation. Likewise the UN was now a more significant force in world 
affairs, especially in the area of conflict resolution and peacekeeping. (Scott, Feith and 
Walsh, 1991) Indonesia's response was the massacre of hundreds of independence 
demonstrators (many of them children) at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili in November 
1991, and an intensified campaign of torture and intimidation in urban areas; Australia's 
was to press for a return to the pre-1986 status quo and to trust Soeharto to maintain 
'stability' in Indonesia. 
This approach appeared to bear fruit in 1989, when new Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans, with Indonesian counterpart Alatas, signed the Timor Gap Zone of Co-
operation Agreement aboard a Garudajet flying to Jakarta. The tensions of 1986 now 
seemed a memory, as Evans boasted the agreement--effectively a combined act of theft 
from the Timorese-would add much needed 'ballast' to the relationship and 'illustrates 
eloquently how differences between the two systems can be overcome for our mutual 
benefit.' Yet it only deepened the basic contradictions which had led to the rift of 1986. 
Australia had worsened the compromise of its own declared values, and provided 
Indonesia with both a potential economic windfall and renewed recognition of 'the 
sovereign reality' of its annexation, in defiance of Australian public opinion. Portugal, 
still recognised by the UN as the legitimate administering power in East Timor, vowed 
to prosecute Australia in the International Court of Justice. Evans retorted that there was 
'no binding [international] legal obligation not to recognise the acquisition of territory 
acquired by force.' (Scott, Feith and Walsh, 1991: 11; Evans and Grant, 1995: 200; 
Walsh, 1990: 14) 
It was symptomatic of a powerful tendency at this time-for Australian elites to 
seek predictable, Cartesian frameworks with which to manage a whole series of new 
challenges and uncertainties. The end of the cold war was removing the visible 
landmarks which had guided policymakers for decades; the strategic environment was 
changing; the question of the 'succession' in Indonesia was looming.34 Within 
Australia, Aboriginal claims were gaining prominence in sober contrast to the populist 
34 A revealing speech on this question was made by Australian Ambassador to Indonesia Phillip 
Flood in 1990. He asked 'will progress be hindered by political or social tensions?' and bluntly 
stated the Australian Government's concern that 'the succession, whenever it occurs, be 
managed smoothly.' Yet his underlying assumptions were deeply flawed-that racial and social 
tensions could be easily managed, that the Indonesian government was doing so, and that the 
New Order structure could and should maintain an essential continuity beyond Soeharto. While 
Flood believed that 'elements' of liberal democracy would increasingly be put into practice he 
held to a faith that 'the institutional framework of the New Order is able to adapt to accommodate 
the political aspirations of various groups in a growing economy.' When Soeharto was finally 
forced to resign in April 1998, none of these conditions would be in existence. (The Monthly 
Record, April 1990: 209) 
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celebrations of the Bicentenary, and 'multiculturalism' moving further into the 
mainstream of domestic life-where it aroused considerable anxiety among some. A 
whole framework of political, cultural and ontological certitude was unravelling. As 
Gareth Evans later wrote: 
When I became Foreign Minister in 1988 . .it was not very long before I had to 
confront the reality that the set of verities that had fixed the shape of the post-war 
world as we had known it, and within which we had defined and pursued our 
national interests, was rapidly crumbling. Trying to make sense of this avalanche 
of change, and not be overwhelmed by it, I found myself asking some very basic 
questions. Where did Australia now fit? How should we be reacting to the myriad 
of events and choices crowding in on us? (Lee and Waters ed. 1997: 17) 
Yet the drive for Cartesian solutions only stifled innovation. In 1989, Evans released 
the report Australia's Regional Security, which betrayed a faith that space and politics 
could be clearly mapped and interpreted, and that on the basis of this interpretation it 
was possible to construct a coherent and systematic approach to policy which could 
harmonise all its instruments, clearly identify and rank Australia's 'interests' and 
control the environment in which it would intervene. (Fry ed. 1991: 170) 
The Statement was not a total account of foreign policy, in the way Evans' book 
Australia's Foreign Relations or the Howard Government's 1997 White Paper would 
be, but it did form a notable precedent in its attempts to systematise problematic 
'realities' and lay out a predictable blueprint for state action. It revealed a quest for 
effective, flexible new modes of governmentality which might work on some of the 
globe's most intractable forces. In short, it marked a new intensification of the strategic 
imagination-in ways which were, unfortunately, hardly new. At its core was a 
conventional neo-realism which assumed that 'the possession of military power will 
always be of major importance in international affairs' and that Australia must 'develop 
policy responses accordingly.' Based on a view that the Government's 1987 defence 
white paper-which developed a regional strategy of 'defence-in-depth'35 based on 
substantial long-range strike capabilities-had 'liberated' Australian foreign policy, the 
35 Graeme Cheeseman has written extensively about the policy debates leading up to and 
following the 1987 defence white paper, and expressed grave reservations about the kind of 
defence strategy it implied. He worried that it was insufficiently independent of the United 
States, particularly in the areas of logistical support and technology; that it relied on expensive 
high-tech solutions which Australia could not sustain and were inappropriate to the real threats it 
faced; that the increase in capabilities had the potential to increase regional insecurity; and that 
plans for an increase in defence exports and co-operation exacerbated regional conflict and 
were inconsistent with Australian values. (Cheeseman, 1993) Of note too is the origin of the 
phrase 'defence-in-depth', which appeared in the 1962 Strategic Basis as an argument for 
forward defence: 'While Southeast Asia is held, defence in depth is provided for Australia.' 
(Edwards and Pemberton, 1992: 246) 
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Statement bragged that 'Australia's military capabilities are, and are perceived to be, 
formidable in regional terms.' This in turn contributed to the 'strategic stability' of the 
Pacific and Southeast Asia and provided 'the foundation for our capacity to contribute 
to a positive security environment through the exercise of what might be described as 
military diplomacy, or politico-military capability'. Thus Australia's military capability 
enhanced the nation's international status and, in combination with defence co-
operation programs, 'strengthens our ability to exercise leverage across many fields.' 
(Lee and Waters ed. 1997: 16; Fry ed. 1991: 187-8) 
The Statement was notable for laying out the broad outlines of Australian defence 
policy for the next ten years, and for articulating a vision of its seamless integration 
with broad areas of domestic and foreign policy-a vision in which military force and 
diplomacy could be an effective intervention into the future shape of the regional 
political, strategic and economic order. Superficially, Evans may have been right to 
argue its distinction from the Menzies-era 'forward defence' doctrine, but this was to 
obscure both the permanent escalation in Australian airforce and naval deployments into 
the region, the projected growth in defence co-operation, and the endeavour-identical 
in its sweep and ambition with that of the 1950s and 60s-to use military capability to 
influence change within the region. 36 
By 1994, when the Keating Government issued a new Defence White Paper, such 
ambitions would be bluntly stated: 
Australia's future security-like our economic prosperity-is linked inextricably 
to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific. Australia's strategic 
engagement with the region is an integral element of our national effort to make 
our place in the region. Our defence relationships underpin the development of 
closer links in other fields. Our ability to defend ourselves and contribute to 
regional security does much to ensure that we are respected and helps us engage 
in the region by giving confidence that we can manage uncertainty and assure our 
security. (DoD, 1994: 3; emphasis added) 
A familiar Benthamite language was visible here, as was a frank statement of the desire 
to control and manage uncertainty. Yet discernible also, two years after Paul Keating 
became Prime Minister, was a view of how defence policy was contributing to a 
transformation of Australian identity within an optimistic vision of economic and 
36 For instance, Australian deployments of P3C Orions over the South China Sea from 
Butterworth assisted the USA in surveillance of Soviet naval movements from Cam Ranh Bay; a 
western strategic presence also enabled the isolation of the communist New Peoples Army in the 
Philippines, which the 1987 White Paper said threatened 'the long term prospects for reforming 
Governments and also raises the possibility that unwelcome external powers could become 
involved.' Likewise the gift of Nomad aircraft and patrol boats to Indonesia helped ABRI to seal 
off Fretilin from sources of outside support. (DoD, 1987: 14-16) 
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cultural progress-for Australia, the region and globally. Drawing on concepts from 
Indonesian security doctrine, the 1993 Strategic Review had made a similar argument-
that the Australian Defence Force (ADP), by 'contributing to regional resilience and 
security' could 'protect key trade and commercial interests, and thus our national way 
of life'. Such a 'strategy of active regional involvement' required 'that all aspects of 
national policy be brought to bear with greater coherence.' (Ball and Kerr, 1996: 121; 
emphasis added) 
The full import of this drive for policy coherence and certainty, and its part in a 
larger ontological enterprise, would become most clear in the speeches and policy of 
Paul Keating. Taking his cues from the 'governmental' visions of Curtin and Whitlam, 
Keating sought to re-vision the Australian identity in a way which, while recognising 
pressures for change, preserved an essential continuity with the past. Turning around a 
repetition of three main themes-'Mabo', 'The Republic', and 'Asia'-it again invoked 
the 'political double-bind' in a vision of the future which might finally reconcile 
security, justice and progress. Amid dramatic new cultural, economic and geopolitical 
uncertainties, it was yet another ambitious attempt to re-imagine, define and limit the 
Australian subject. 
In some ways the gesture was quite radical. Keating's 'Redfern Park Speech' was a 
historic landmark in the official recognition of the crimes committed against Aboriginal 
people during colonisation, and of a remaining series of debts to be discharged. He 
seized particularly on the High Court's Mabo decision as an opportunity to legislate a 
limited form of Native Title in permanent recognition of prior Aboriginal settlement of 
the continent. If, as I have argued, a deep-seated version of the Australian identity was 
constituted in the decades-long struggle for the Nation's very interior-in a 
simultaneously physical, economic and ontological sense-the disturbance represented 
by Mabo and Labor's vocal support for it was quite profound. Similarly his public 
support for multiculturalism (following the dangerous public debates over immigration 
initiated by the Coalition parties in 1988) was a frank challenge to the silent matrix of 
attitudes which had underpinned the White Australia policy and which, despite three 
decades of public disavowal, still remained strong. The depth of the challenge 
represented by these two rhetorical stances was demonstrated by the Howard 
Government's aggressive repudiation of Native Title (backed by the National Farmers 
Federation and conservative State and Territory Governments) and by the rise in 
support for Pauline Hanson's One Nation. 
Yet on the other hand, each of these moves possessed utility for the most significant 
element of the vision: 'Asia'. It was a vision which went beyond pragmatic calculations 
of economic interest-important as they were-to the projection of a new national 
destiny in close partnership with Asia in ways which would both force and require 
significant cultural and attitudinal changes within Australia. Thus Aboriginal 
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'reconciliation' and growing cultural diversity would enhance Australia's reputation for 
tolerance and encourage acceptance from a region with enduring memories of the White 
Australia policy; likewise Republicanism would make Australia more politically 
coherent to Asians; and structural economic reform would serve as an example of the 
kind of neo-liberal changes the Government sought in the regional political economy. 
Men like Keating and Evans would later take pride in three main developments in the 
drive to realise Australia's 'destiny' within a more cohesive 'Asia-Pacific Community': 
the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) trade forum, the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) security dialogues, and the passing of Cold War tensions in Indochina 
with the Paris agreements on Cambodia. Unsurprisingly, New Order Indonesia would 
be seen as crucial to them all. 
This became clear soon after Keating became Prime Minister in early 1992. Like 
Whitlam twenty years before, he chose his first meeting with Soeharto as an 
opportunity to outline his vision of change for both Australia and the region, and 
sought Soeharto's co-operation in realising it. The anguished trope repeated since 1986 
was at the forefront, with Keating saying at the banquet held in his honour that 'at a 
time of rapid economic and strategic change, Indonesia and Australia have more in 
common than our different histories and cultures suggest.' Here a common destiny-
'to participate fully in the rapid economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region'-required 
more than a rich endowment of natural resources. For Indonesia it required 'national 
resilience', and for Australia something he portrayed as its mirror image: 
We know that to reach our full potential we must work co-operatively, combine 
our talents and energy, harness our human and material strength, and make 
Australia more truly one nation ... In the 1990s I believe you will see Australia 
face these realities as never before. I think you will see us pursue our goals as 
never before-with an unparalleled sense of purpose and efficiency. (Keating, 
1992a: 2) 
A more frank statement of the liberal ontology, and of the economic bottom-line for 
Keating's vision of the new Australian identity, would be hard to find. This he 
reinforced by outlining the changes he saw necessary for Australians to 'positively 
engage with the region in which we live'-'in the 1990s I believe the Australian 
identity is being reshaped in a way which is consistent with the multicultural reality of 
our society, and the final passing of the vestiges of our colonial past.' ( 1992a: 4) 
It was an extraordinary claim, which showed little understanding of how his 
embrace of Soeharto may have been intimately connected with Australia's 'colonial 
past'. A clue was visible in his assertion that Australia and Indonesia shared 
'fundamental interests in the stability and security of our region' and, as he said the 
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following day, that Australia had benefited from Soeharto's achievement in 
'establishing political stability and economic progress in Indonesia.' In asserting 
Australia's common stake in 'national resilience'-the doctrine which had legitimated 
the Anny's oppressive control of Indonesian life for twenty-five years-Keating 
betrayed how the two states shared common ontological assumptions and political 
technologies. These he would try to deepen through arguments about a common neo-
liberal future and through increasing defence co-operation (which would increasingly 
double as a diplomatic and political channel to the New Order). In this vision of 
essential sameness, played out in a 'shared future', Keating saw a reconciliation of 
otherwise substantial differences: 'We are different-culturally, historically, 
politically-but we can handle the difference ... The Asia-Pacific, as well as Indonesia, 
can achieve unity in diversity.' (1992b: 5; emphasis added) 
The stakes involved in this enterprise were made clear by the occasion which 
shadowed his visit-the Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor, which had taken place 
only four months before and formed the greatest challenge to the bilateral relationship 
since the original invasion in 1975. As many as four hundred people may have died in 
the killings, which were secretly videotaped and subsequently broadcast around the 
globe. Australian-based journalists and aid workers witnessed the massacre, and a 
Malaysian-New Zealand student resident in Australia, Kamal Bamadhaj, was one of its 
first victims. Gareth Evans, at an APEC meeting in Seoul with Indonesia's Ali Alatas, 
commented that 'Everyone feels a little sick in the stomach about the news', while 
Prime Minister-Hawke said the killings were 'an appalling tragedy' and demanded that 
the perpetrators be punished. A few days later, in an unprecedented development, he 
urged the Indonesians to negotiate a settlement with the East Timorese, including the 
resistance, although he ruled out UN involvement. He also said that Indonesia's 
policies had failed to win the 'hearts and minds' of the East Timorese, and that his 
planned February 1992 visit to Indonesia hinged on the results of the government's 
investigation. Other sections of the ALP were pressing for the suspension of the 
defence co-operation program and a sweeping review of the bilateral relationship 
should Indonesia's response to the killings be inadequate.37 (Parkinson, 1991a, 
1991b, 1991c; Metherall, 1991a, 1991b; Austin, 1991) 
In each of his speeches Keating devoted only one line to the 'tragic events' in Dili, 
and publicly stated that the Government's response to the massacre-a military-
dominated commission of enquiry which blamed the demonstrators for provoking the 
troops, and the replacement of the regional and provincial military commanders (in the 
latter case, with a far more hardline figure)-was 'credible'. Hawke's uncharacteristic 
37 In an attempt to head off caucus pressure for greater sanctions, Evans agreed to visit 
Indonesia to deliver a protest. When there, he found himself unable to secure a meeting with 
Soeharto and encountered strong resistance to Australian proposals for a consulate in Dili or a 
substantial reduction of the military presence. (Parkinson, 1991c) 
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call for an inclusive dialogue on East Timor' s future was ignored. While Keating also 
privately appealed for the criminal trials of independence protesters to be abandoned, he 
was rebuffed. This was not to stand in the way of rebuilding a relationship he later 
described as Australia's most important: 'If we fail to get this relationship right, and 
nurture and develop it, the whole web of our foreign relations is incomplete.' Eighteen 
months later he underscored the compromise when, on a visit to the United States, he 
urged congressmen and the Clinton Administration to tone down their criticism of 
China and Indonesia so that momentum on APEC would not falter. (Keating, 1992b: 8; 
Schwarz, 1992: 9; Ryan ed. 1995: 201; SMH, 15.9.95) 
The crowning gesture came in December 1995, shortly before he lost office, when 
he announced the conclusion of the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) which 
he had personally negotiated with Soeharto, in secret, for the previous eighteen 
months. The Agreement provided for substantial future increases in defence co-
operation-by then already at an all-time high-and for possible joint deployments with 
ABRI in the event of 'adverse challenges' to either nation's security. When questioned 
by the ABC's Kerry O'Brien about the wisdom of involving Australia so closely with a 
force that had such a poor human rights record, Keating replied: 
We are not going to hock the entire Indonesian relationship on Timor. A Prime 
Minister's duty, his first duty, is to the security of his country. (SMH, 16.12.95) 
This was the crux of the rhetoric of sameness and common destiny-an Agreement 
negotiated against the initial advice of his defence and foreign ministers, without 
consultation with the broader cabinet, party or community, and which was frankly 
premised on the refusal to risk relations with Indonesia-and by implication, the whole 
ontological project of the Australian subjectivity-by recognising the legitimate claims 
of the Timorese.38 Once again, and rarely so baldly, their future and well-being had 
been bartered against Australia's own security. When speaking of Australia's 
engagement with Asia in 1992 Keating had assured his audience that 'Australia's 
democratic institutions and traditions are non-negotiable'-yet in this case they had 
been blatantly negotiated away. Instead Australians had to be satisfied with assurances 
that the AMS was 'about providing for Australia's future and creating greater certainty 
about that future.' As foreshadowed in Australia's Regional Security and in the 1987 
Defence White Paper, it was the logical extension of a judgement that Soeharto's 
38 See Hartcher (1996a and 1996b), who argued that both Gareth Evans and Robert Ray were 
unenthusiastic about the idea, forcing Keating to assume carriage of negotiations personally, 
while keeping them informed of progress and consulting them about possible wording. One point 
that Hartcher makes is that the Australians were happy to accept the wording 'adverse 
challenges' as a trigger for action, even while maintaining Australia would never become involved 
internally. 'It also occurred to them that-one day-it might be in Australia's interests to have 
the scope to assist Indonesia in dealing with internal strife.' 
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regime had been the 'most beneficial strategic development to affect Australia and its 
region in thirty years', and which sought to provide certainty through the post-Cold 
war period by promoting 'the commonality of shared strategic interests between 
Australia and the countries of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.' (Ryan, 1995: 
190-201, emphasis added; Canberra Press Conference, 14.12.95; DoD, 1987: 6) 
What this produced was a disturbing convergence of elite attitudes which ignored 
both the growing popular dissatisfaction in Indonesia with Soeharto, and, when taken 
as a measure of Australia's new maturity and Asia-Pacific identity, only increased the 
distance elites were stretching between the 'new' strategic, economic and ontological 
architecture and fundamental democratic aspirations in both societies. Opponents of the 
AMS rightly questioned the boost it gave to Soeharto at a time when his rule was 
coming under increasing challenge, and in the capabilities Australia's defence co-
operation program-which outstripped that of any other nation-gave to ABRI units 
such as the Kopassus special forces which had been at the forefront of repressive 
operations in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh. While Australian officials emphasised 
training was provided only for external defence, they failed to consider its use by a 
force configured primarily for internal security. Indeed a former Australian Army 
attache in Jakarta confirmed to the author that training could and was being utilised 
against opponents of the regime.39 Officers like Aminullah Ibrahim (Chairman of the 
ABRI faction in the Indonesian Parliament) may have hoped the AMS would improve 
the image of the Indonesian Army in Australia-instead it only underlined the 
irreconcilable divergence in values between both nations' elites and their publics, while 
binding them into obligations they had never condoned. (Jakarta Post, 16.12.95: 2) 
Such 'differences' could not so easily be 'handled' or bridged. 
CONCLUSION: ON THE EDGE 
OF THE 'ASIA-PACIFIC COMMUNITY' 
1995 is no doubt an artificial point at which to break this narrative off, but in many 
ways it offers a useful moment for pause-a moment marked simultaneously by 
enormous change, transformation, and the unbridled confidence of Australian elites that 
they still held the keys to the future. Security and prosperity were guaranteed by the 
growing neo-liberal transformation of regional economies amid stunning levels of 
growth, by an aggressive trade strategy centred on the region, and by a growing 
39 Interview with Robert Lowry, Australian Defence Studies Centre, 26 February 1997. Lowry is 
a respected scholar of the Indonesian military and regional security issues. He is the author of 
Australia-Indonesia Security Co-operation: For Better Or Worse?, Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre ANU, 1996 and The Armed Forces of Indonesia, Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin, 1997. Lowry's points here directly contradicted assurances the Author was given during 
a November 1996 meeting with Australian Military Attache to Indonesia, Brigadier Ernie 
Chamberlain, that Australia provided no training which could be used for internal operations. 
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political acceptance built around strategic policy, military diplomacy and a thoroughly 
compromised embrace of a dying New Order regime. Even Gareth Evans was moved 
to predict the imminent realisation of Fukuyama's neo-Hegelian 'end of history' in 
Asia--citing moves by the Chinese and Vietnamese toward market economies, the 
'democratisation' of Taiwan and South Korea, and the growing acceptance amongst 
regional leaders of APEC. (Evans, 1990) Uncertainty wore many faces through this 
period-a blackmail of danger and opportunity, genuine geopolitical and ontological 
challenges, and a state which Government believed itself still capable of mapping and 
controlling. 
Yet viewed from only a short distance in time, the confidence was clearly 
misplaced. A new Australian Government was shortly to be elected and, while 
continuing the broad thrust of defence and foreign policy as Labor had established it, 
made determined (and successful) efforts to repudiate its larger visions of Australian 
identity. In 1997 .and 1998 the dreams of endless growth and prosperity, and of Asian 
economies turning into a global economic engine, were destroyed by the worst 
economic crisis in fifty years. In Indonesia, worst hit by the terrible fall in currency 
values and the dramatic flight of capital, the unthinkable happened-Soeharto's 
fortunes plummeted with the rupiah until he was finally forced to resign on 21 May 
1998, amid nation-wide rioting and upheaval which killed hundreds in only a few days. 
Nonetheless the power of the metaphysics which foretold a transformed Australian 
identity in concert with the realisation of a new 'Asia-Pacific community' cannot be 
underestimated-it remained strong, and would still be the prism through which the 
crisis was understood and tackled (at least in elite circles).40 Likewise it continued to 
inform powerful concepts of nation-building and identity within Australia. The 
problematic legacy of 1990s Labor lies in its claim, like the governments of Whitlam 
and Curtin before it, to reconcile security with justice-in a way which went beyond an 
idealist synthesis of domestic and international policy to a reconciliation of some of the 
darkest features of the Australian historical experience. If there are doubts that these 
weren't all interlinked questions absolutely crucial to the survival--and renewal--of a 
unitary Australian subjectivity, they should be erased by Keating's remarkable Redfern 
Park Speech in December 1992 to launch the International Year for the World's 
Indigenous People, only thirteen months after the Dill Massacre: 
40 For instance The Australian's international editor Paul Kelly wrote in July 1998 that the Asian 
crisis 'will either make or break the idea of an Asia-Pacific community, whose creation has been 
the central objective of Australian policy for a decade.' Similarly Paul Keating argued in March 
that 'The whole direction in which the Asia-Pacific has been moving-towards economic and 
political openness, towards a sense of Pacific community-is at risk. It is a perilous moment and 
there are real questions in my mind as to whether we and our institutions can meet it 
successfully.' (The Australian, 29 July 1998; Paul Keating, 'Australia and the Asian crisis', 
Speech at the University of NSW, 25 March 1998, http://www.keating.org.au/newspeech.html) 
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This will be a year of great significance for Australia. It comes at a time when we 
have committed ourselves to succeeding in the test which so far we have always 
failed ... a fundamental test of our social goals and our national will: our ability to 
say to ourselves and the rest of the world that Australia is a first-rate social 
democracy, that we are what we should be-truly the land of the fair go and the 
better chance. There is no more basic test of how seriously we mean these things. 
It is a test of our self-knowledge. (Ryan, 1996: 227-8; emphasis added) 
They were eloquent, courageous, historic words-but when judged against the 
barefaced and calculated indifference to the Timorese, so horribly ironic. Consider 
another part of the same speech, which argued that the starting point in bringing justice 
to Australia's indigenous people must be an 'act of recognition' of the systematic 
crimes committed against them: 'With some noble exceptions, we failed to make the 
most basic human response and enter into their hearts and minds. We failed to ask, 
how would I feel if this were done to me? As a consequence, we failed to see that what 
we were doing degraded all of us.' (Ryan ed. 1996: 228) In vain may we wait for the 
day when an Australian Prime Minister makes the same gesture of recognition to 
Soeharto's many victims. Perhaps they were just (unwittingly) cynical words, written 
for a man unaware of their irony, but they mark a larger failure of discourse-the 
failure of a sweeping formation of thought and being which is still hegemonic. 
Its failure lies in its approach to the profound challenge of this moment-
symbolised by the irreversible force of the Mabo decision-and in its attempt to close 
out one aporia in the Australian identity while leaving others to fester; indeed, in its 
belief that such aporias can be ultimately closed out at all. At a time which called for a 
recognition of difference (on the Other's terms and in ~ays which forced profound 
transformations of Self) Keating's speech betrayed a continued quest for totality, for 
unity, for one Australian nation with one destiny and one path to realising it. While his 
praise for Mabo indicated a partial recognition of the need to destabilise identity, along 
with its historic legacy, the reflex was toward the older certainty of being and the 
spiritual integrity of the body-politic. This is the subtext of his call, in the Redfern Park 
Speech, for 'the deepening of Australian social democracy to include indigenous 
Australians': 
Where Aboriginal Australians have been included in the life of Australia they have 
made remarkable contributions. Economic contributions, particularly in the 
pastoral and agricultural industry. They are there in the frontier and exploration 
history of Australia. They are there in the wars. In sport, to an extraordinary 
degree. In literature and art and music. In all of these things they have shaped our 
knowledge of this continent and of ourselves. They have shaped our identity. 
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They are there in the Australian legend. We should never forget-they have 
helped build this nation. (Ryan ed. 1996: 230) 
They have shaped our identity ... they have helped build this nation-yes, in ways he 
hardly allows. What could be more basic historical facts, than that they have helped 
build 'this nation' by being dispossessed, by dying and disappearing, by suffering 
ethnocide, by their exclusion from every act of law and sovereignty and foundation? In 
the same breath that acknowledges the raw fact of these crimes their challenge to 'The 
Australian legend' is wilfully forgotten; instead Keating seeks to assimilate indigenous 
Australians into a new mythology of 'the Australian social democracy' in which their 
only value is to nation-building and production-the very forces which threatened their 
extinction. Worse, their value is constructed in ways which reinforce liberal economics 
as an index of being and destiny, as if we are too stupid or mean-hearted to recognise 
the intrinsic grandeur, integrity and difference of their unique cultures. In short, 
Keating's speech refused to acknowledge how this experience bums an unbridgeable 
gap between the economics of the liberal ontology and its moral claims to justice and 
enlightenment. Some events, some wounds in the spirit of the body-politic, cannot be 
healed. 
This was a symptomatic of a discourse which, however remarkable the changes it 
advocated, still felt the need to link up with mythical points of origin and lines of 
tradition-such as Federation, the Pacific war and the development work of the 
pioneers. This perhaps allowed 1990s Labor to reconcile its compromises with its 
idealism-to call for a continued faith in the ANZUS Alliance and a US strategic and 
economic engagement in Asia, to dispatch a naval force to the Persian Gulf following 
Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and to support the Bush Administration's 
appallingly violent solution to the impasse; and to seize on Soeharto's New Order as a 
Whitlamesque key to a (thirty years new) Australian identity. Even their most laudable 
foreign policy enterprise, the final achievement of a negotiated resolution of the war in 
Cambodia, in the face of resistance from the US, China and some ASEAN states, 
involved depressing compromises.41 At the February 1993 session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva Australian officials, at Evans' direction, 
helped scuttle a vote which would have provided for the appointment of a special 
rapporteur with wide powers to investigate and monitor human rights in Cambodia after 
UN forces left later that year. UN officials argued this contravened the spirit of the 
Paris Accords-but given the violence and instability which have marked Cambodian 
41 Critics have also focussed on the failure to disarm the Khmer Rouge, the effects of the huge 
UN contingent (costing US$2 billion) on the stability of the Cambodian economy and the growth in 
prostitution, and on the poorly planned and corrupt pattern of development initiated by the return 
of western loans, aid and investment to Cambodia. (See Lindsay Murdoch, 'The Spoils of Peace', 
The Good Weekend, May 15 1993: 41) 
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politics ever since, the rapporteur's appointment would have been a prescient move. 
Australian officials told the UN that Canberra's instructions warned: 'Don't provoke 
ASEAN [which feared the precedent of a country-specific monitor] on this'. (Murdoch, 
1993a: 8) Such weak-kneed compromise, and the continuing deafness to the plight of 
the East Timorese, underlined the ultimate tragedy of the period. Whatever glimpses 
there were of an ethical future in talk of 'good international citizenship', the broad 
structure of stability and future prosperity remained that which had been established 
over the blood-turned soil of Indonesia between 1966 and 1969. 
Yet in the Cambodian solution, however problematic and flawed, were the seeds of 
a genuinely new vision of global community. This was further pursued into Evans' 
1993 'blue book' Co-operating For Peace,42 which sought to envision a 'co-operative 
security' based on enhancing the UN's role in 'the prevention and resolution of all 
kinds of deadly conflict' in ways which emphasise 'reassurance rather than deterrence' 
and do not 'advance military solutions over non-military ones.' (Evans and Grant, 
1995: 102) In a later article, Co-operative Security and Intrastate Conflict, Evans 
acknowledged that security should be 'as much about the protection of individuals as it 
is about the defense of the territorial integrity of states. "Human Security", thus 
understood, is at least as much prejudiced by major intrastate conflict as it is by 
interstate conflict.' (Evans, 1994: 9) Yet moves to involve the UN in a far-reaching 
dialogue on East Timor-surely the most pressing 'intrastate conflict' at Australia's 
shores-were not made, short of Evans' bizarre acknowledgment, late in Keating's 
term, that while the Timorese right to self-determination had never been expressed, this 
should occur within the framework of Indonesian sovereignty. (George, 1996: 15) 
This was perhaps 1990s Labor's most intriguing legacy-in texts like these, we had 
glimpsed worlds they refused to give us. 
42 Numerous writers, while supporting the broad thrust of Evans' enterprise in Co-operating for 
Peace, have expressed doubts about its success-in particular, its ability to detach itself from 
an underlying power-politics framework or to properly respond to the pressing 'security' issues 
faced by the millions left out of the 'globalisation fairytale'. See the contributions to Cheeseman 
and Bruce ed. Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, 1996, and Jim George, 'Australia's 
Global Perspectives in the 1990s: A Case of Old Realist Wine in New Nao-Liberal Bottles?', in 
Leaver and Cox ed. Middling, Meddling, Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy, Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1997. 
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Concluding Essay 
It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the 
working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent-to criticise 
them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself 
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that we can fight them. 
Michel Foucault, 1974: 171. 
Conclusion 
After Security 
Man is not the lord of beings. He is the shepherd of Being. 
Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, 1969: 221. 
My most immediate feeling is despair-confronting this history, the history of this 
ontology, an ontology of Australian security and being which, whatever its dramatic 
historical permutations, has rested on a single, persistent, violent drive for sameness. 
Through the original fears of the British Crown as they faced an imagined 'criminal 
class' in their midst, to the war of the pioneers against the backward, unproductive 
Aboriginal, to the culmination of an Australian subject in the blood sacrifice of the 
Great War, this murderous fantasy of identity has systematically effaced the (cultural 
and industrial) conflict at its heart and made its lifeblood the fear and extinction of 
difference. Worse, as the wartime fears of Japan were morphed into a sweeping 
strategic and ideological confrontation of (Asian) communism, culminating in the 
Vietnam War and the liquidation of the PKI, this ontology took a virtual stranglehold 
on reality. Thus as the folly and brutality of the Indochina war became evident, and 
patterns of Australian identity were changed with the abrogation of White Australia, 
moves towards Aboriginal justice and an 'engagement' with Asia, the general structures 
of this ontology would be preserved. The tragedies of East Timor and Cambodia, 
among many, are testament to its terrible perseverance. 
Yet it is important to remember that this history, in its entirety, has been shadowed 
by opposition and dissent-from British liberals opposed to transportation, whites 
disturbed by the dispossession and murder of Aborigines, working class opposition to 
Federation and the militarism of the Great War, to the modem peace, human rights and 
democracy movements. Tragically, they have often failed, but they have also prevented 
terrible policies becoming worse again. On one hand, their failures have been the spur 
to this study, and require its findings to be critically explored further. (Thus my 
concern to understand security's hold on subjectivity and its successful subversion of 
democracy.) On another, the very existence of this counter-tradition is a major source 
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of hope and possibility. Allied with a continuing project of innovation and rethinking, it 
might mitigate this despair and provide valuable clues to a vision of life after security. 
But what might come after security? Security? A different kind of security, detached 
from its moorings in the nation-state and the fearful imagination of totality? Or 
something else again? 
I cannot provide a conclusive answer, and some will be appalled by the very 
question. But perhaps, at least on my part, refusing to provide definitive answers-in 
the form of easily mapped and solved Cartesian problems-is part of the solution. This 
is to argue that one of the keys lies in developing the kind of 'thinking spaces' Jim 
George (1989: 273) and others have long called for-spaces in which the very 
foundations of thought and action can be understood and called into question, can be 
laid open for debate, rather than existing below the threshold of understanding like an 
impermeable ground. Where that space of thinking and debate remains permanently 
open, and in which the discursive constitution of problems themselves, prior to their 
'solution', is simultaneously up for grabs. To open up such a space of thinking, to lay 
out the history and contingency of this 'ground' we have called security, has been a 
fundamental objective of this study. Thus my concern, beginning in chapter two, to 
understand security in terms of the construction and narration of its ontological 
certainties, the limits of its modes of subjectivity, and the meanings it has applied to 
reality. Having tracked the diverse linkages of this chain, we can begin to pry them 
apart. 
Yet the question remains-what comes after security? A few provisional answers 
can already be made. 
First I would argue that Security does not come after security. I fear it is no longer 
salvageable-except perhaps as a vernacular figure-but no longer as a hegemonic 
concept or a credible statement of universal human need. Its perversion has been too 
final, its ossification into a metaphysical canopy for the worst manifestations of liberal 
modernity too damaging. This is where I break with nearly everyone-realists, liberals, 
and critical thinkers like R. B. J. Walker, James der Derian, J. Ann Tickner and the 
Secure Australia Project. Obviously at a more concrete level security describes real 
needs and legitimate concerns, but these have other names which retain the virtue of 
specificity: human, land and women's rights, self-determination, environ~ental 
protection, conflict prevention and resolution, the right to adequate food, housing and 
services, the right to control one's own economic destiny, freedom from assault and 
violence and exploitation, and so on. While some of these terms have their own 
metaphysical baggage, my point is that we should speak of such needs and priorities in 
their specificity-in the detailed structural and political contexts in which they arise and 
must be fought out. To subsume them within a new rubric of 'human security', for 
instance, contains new dangers-it risks doubling the forgetting that the discursive 
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apparatus of national and international security has utilised; it risks diverting the need to 
conduct policy and economic management critically, responsibly and accountably, into 
a new debate-suppressing metaphysical claim; and it risks unwittingly buttressing the 
claims of elite national security discourses to the real, by closing off an interrogation of 
how security itself frames and limits the problems it pretends to solve. We need to push 
back further, into what William Connolly (1995: 1) calls 'the ontopolitical', to question 
the very being security claims to preserve. 
This requires first a critical questioning of security's ontological certitudes, along 
with their philosophical structure and political conditions. This task has been the central 
focus of this study. Second, it requires efforts to consider whether such ontologies can 
be rethought or abandoned and, if so, how? What might come in their place? Focus 
here has fallen on the question of agency-new possibilities for subjectivity in relation 
to larger social forces and formations-and on ethics-imagining new ethical relations 
between individuals, between individuals and institutions, between states and 
communities, and between humans and ecosystems. This is obviously a vast project, 
whose pre-occupations are visible across the gamut of post-marxism, environmental 
philosophy, critical theory and post-structuralism, and reflected in many contemporary 
political debates and struggles. More directly it is the focus of much of Foucault's 
work, the feminist writings on ethics and difference of Rosalyn Diprose and Moira 
Gatens, books like Lyotard's The Differend, William Connolly's The Ethos of 
Pluralisation and Toby Miller's The Well-Tempered Self, and Jim George's 1995 essay 
Realist 'Ethics', International Relations and Post-Modernism. I can only began to 
outline its possibilities here. 
This is where I think Heidegger's intriguing phrase-'Man is not the lord of 
beings, but the shepherd of Being'-suggests some initial signposts. While I would 
resist the way, in the Letter on Humanism, he resolves the issue-by asserting a 
reconciliation of man with the 'truth' of Being-we should not underestimate its 
dramatic departure from metaphysics. Directed against the 'unconditioned self-
assertion' of Descartes and Hegel, it offers a vision of being which is not possessed by 
humans, which does not culminate in 'subjectivity', and which is not limited to the 
hubris of the animal rationale. It suggests Being exists outside and beyond the 
obsessive self-knowing, self-making capacities of modem subjects (whether they are 
individuals or nations); that Being is humble, elusive even; that humans should take up 
a position of 'guardianship' for a being which they do not solely own or control-a 
care for Being. Thus being is 'being-in-the-world', in which the world 'does not at all 
signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of Being.' (Heidegger, 1969: 
221-226) 
What is most crucial in the Letter on Humanism is the way, firstly, in which Being 
is thought as openness, rather than completion and finality; second, the way the link 
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between nationalism and (Hegelian) subjectivity is criticised; and third, the way in 
which Heidegger is willing to permanently lay being-and thus metaphysics and 
ontology-open to question. He urges that 'thinking .. risk a shock that could for the 
first time cause perplexity concerning the humantitas of homo humanus and its basis. In 
this way it could open a reflection .. that thinks not only about man but also about the 
nature of man, not only about his nature but even more primordially about the 
dimension in which the essence of man, determined by Being itself, is at home.' This, 
he argues, does not lead to a defence of the inhuman but 'opens other vistas' for the 
human. ( 1969: 227) Half a century after the Letter on Humanism was first published, 
many of these vistas have been opened, and the work must continue. Already it offers 
valuable clues to the kind of critical humanism (or ethical anti-humanism) needed to 
rethink a security which styles itself as both the mechanism and telos of a chain which 
links nation, identity and being in global opposition to otherness, uncertainty and 
difference. 
I use Being here to refer to both the individual's experience of existence, and that of 
the larger structures of community (such as nations and civilisations) which elites have 
tried to imagine within stable forms of identity. Here we confront the basic power and 
cunning of the political technology I have called security-its ability to organise 
particular experiences of personal subjectivity in tight conjunction with larger, totalising 
forms of (national or civilisational) subjectivity. This is what Foucault has called the 
'political double-bind'-a 'tricky combination in the same political structures of 
individualisation techniques and totalisation procedures.' It was, he thought, a 
particularly insidious form of power, and one particularly hard to thwart or resist. Yet 
challenge it we must-he urged people to forget the injunction (so central to a politics 
of identity) to 'discover who we are', and instead to 'refuse who we are ... the political, 
ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try and liberate the individual 
from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state 
and from the type of individualisation which is linked to the state. We have to promote 
new forms of subjectivity through refusal of this type of individuality which has been 
imposed on us for several centuries.' (Rabinow, 1984: 22) 
In Australia's case this experience of 'individuality' and collective identity has been 
with us for a little over two centuries-yet, as I sought to show in chapters two and 
three, it drew on deep roots in western culture and British imperial history. Given this 
continuity, its solid basis in Australia's domestic political culture, and its dramatic 
effects on the surrounding region, I am under no illusions that it can be quickly swept 
away. In short, its power lies not only in its historical ability to define Australian 
identity but in what it shares with a general structure and experience of modernity. On 
the other hand, there are numerous tendencies in global politics and culture which 
directly challenge its operation: the dissident forces which have successfully challenged 
267 
Conclusion 
authoritarianism, abuse and exploitation in co-operation with supporters from across 
the borders of nation, culture and experience. Together, often against enormous odds, 
they have toppled dictators-most recently and spectacularly Indonesia's Soeharto-
and continue to confront the highly organised and systemic forces which would 
naturalise the destruction of human dignity and endanger the natural inheritance of the 
planet. If such creative movements are to be acknowledged and allowed to flourish, if a 
vision of life after security is to be imagined and lived, a careful unmasking of 
security's key concepts and mechanisms must be carried out. From there a more 
creative and daring work of thought must begin, which seeks to imagine new forms of 
subjectivity which escape security, which might generate new-more just and ethical-
forms of economic and political life. 
Genealogy, a genealogical writing of the kind I have tried here, is a crucial first 
step. In answer to the challenge that genealogy is merely critique, that it provides few 
signposts to the future, I would argue that it is itself an intervention-a work of hope. 
William Connolly seems to agree. He argues Foucault's genealogies 
open us up to the play of possibility in the present... they incite critical responses 
to unnecessary violences and injuries surreptitiously imposed upon life by the 
insistence that prevailing forms are natural, rational, universal or necessary. The 
idea is to deploy genealogy to loosen up sedimented forms and to cultivate a care 
for life already there in protean form-to incite energies on behalf of extending 
diversity ... Foucauldian genealogy is an essential component in an ethico-political 
orientation that asserts that the fundaments of being are mobile ... (1995: 34) 
The danger is that whatever the 'protean' energies of the dissident and idealistic 
movements currently in play, they might be recaptured by new variants of the totalising 
political technology they implicitly contest. Francis Fukuyama has provided the model 
for one of the most common: the nee-Hegelian triumph of liberal democracy and 
economic thought, which again conceals its effects behind a universalism of which 
security is still a part. Thus my additional preoccupation in this study has been to 
demonstrate how a third move is launched from the 'political double-bind'-the 
extension of a totalising political imagination into a geopolitical one, which in tum is 
projected back into the very interior of the self. A 'strategic imagination' which 
provides meaning and solidity to space, organises its control and capacities, its human 
and economic flows, and which, through the rhetorical incitement of security and 
danger and global possibility, can shape and limit the psychic interiors of individuals. 
Australia has experienced its whole history within the operation of this technology. 
Thus the monotonous pairing of security with prosperity. Here freedom is first 
exchanged for security-the state offering its protection and sovereignty its promise of 
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identity-and later, in a way clear in Bentham and Hegel, a strong image of the state 
can be married to an acquisitive, productive and self-ish mode of economic subjectivity. 
Having made individuals relinquish to the state so much autonomy, prosperity is 
mobilised as a totalising appeal to human desire. In tum 'sovereignty' provides both a 
mode of representation and-in the form of international policy-of action in the vast 
spaces of geopolitics. Security and prosperity become naturalised in the idea of the 
national interest-a key idea which must be placed under permanent question. Because 
it links constructions of sameness, self-interest and economic self-ishness with modes 
of group thinking and international policymaking, it is a particularly effective, and 
dangerous, mechanism. The idea of the national interest, which so many still invoke as 
a founding category, is alone one of the greatest obstacles to a vision of life after 
security. Through it elite interests can be naturalised as those of all, and conflict, 
inequality and powerplay masked by the illusion of the common good. Morality can be 
subsumed beneath 'prudence', and ethics smothered by a power which refuses to speak 
its own name. Yet this vision is not without a universalist gloss, projecting as it does an 
osmosis between the self-interested seeking of 'national interests' and the achievement 
of international progress and order-security and prosperity, blackmail and promise, 
this is 'who we are'. Dare we be otherwise? 
Yet it is not enough to conduct this debate within the terms of either a liberal-realist 
conflict or a liberal-realist synthesis-both derive from the same model of identity and 
both assume the essentially unproblematic, if debatable, status of national interests. We 
need to question the unity and representative power of 'sovereignty', and question its 
ability to supply a meaningful framework for international policy or the workings of the 
international system. We also need to question the detailed incitement of desire, 
obedience and fear which integrates individuals with such totalising representations of 
state. My hunch is that pushing beyond security involves the development of tactics 
which can work at all these levels-which empower individuals to recognise the larger 
social, cultural and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection 
and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and which in tum 
contributes to efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange and power 
which sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. Toby Miller has already hinted 
at such a project, saying that we need to push beyond the discourse of citizenship 
because it 'is a doctrine of equivalence that denies difference' and 'is not usable for 
producing selves that are otherwise outside convention.' This, he says, 'is to assert the 
existence of agency. It assumes that people can organize their own emancipation from 
definition and enclosure, in search of selves that are not transactions with the deeply 
secreted truth, but rather rejections or appropriations of surface categories.' (Miller, 
1993: 221-4) 
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Drawing on his work, and that of the thinkers I cited earlier, my initial suggestion is 
for a new ethics-dynamic, open and self-critical, the basis for more work rather than 
renewed certainty-whose fundamental task is to problematise the unity of nation and 
self, and turn it outward to a different economy. 
Such an ethics might cultivate and acknowledge an intertwined series of needs and 
transformations: 
• to connect self with other, in a way which recognises their interdependence and 
develops genuinely ethical principles for their interconnection; 
• to connect human with animal, environment and ecosystem in a similarly ethical 
relation, as an alternative to modernist dreams of Cartesian mastery and 
exploitation; 
• to develop a permanent ethos of responsibility towards difference, and in the 
exercise of the power and capacities of the self in their military, economic and 
cultural dimensions. This requires that we resist the appeal to desire and 
subjection which security has utilised to thwart such a sense of responsibility; 
• to develop ways of thinking and acting which resist the reflex to control and 
master uncertainty, which too often expresses a drive to refuse what is unfamiliar 
and challenging in it and can, as Connolly says, actually exacerbate fragmentation 
and contingency. Instead uncertainty must be searched for what in it calls for the 
unthought, for new connections not old forms; and finally 
• for a permanent critique of totalities and universals which, while rejecting what is 
metaphysical about them, and the egoistic drive for sameness they too often 
express, retains the trace of what is ethical and empowering in them. While 
security may be of little use here, ideas of justice, emancipation, community, 
tolerance and harmony need to be preserved and rethought. 
William Connolly calls this 'an ethos of critical responsiveness', an 'ethics of 
engagement' with the other on-as far as possible-its own terms. Likewise Moira 
Gatens argues for dialogue with the Other that might allow space for the unknown and 
unfamiliar, for a 'debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics'-
an encounter which involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. For 
Connolly, this would generate a new mode of being which affirms an 'indebtedness to 
what it is not while reconfiguring dogmatic interpretations of what it is.' If this can be 
found, 'a new respect might emerge for drives by the other to break out of injurious 
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definitions, even as these drives destabilise and denaturalise the identity of established 
constituencies.' This is a vision of 'the political' reshaped to 'honor the politics of 
disturbance, the politics of enactment, and the politics of movements across state lines.' 
In short, as I suggested in chapter two, it is a vision of the Other which never returns to 
the Same. (Connolly, 1995: xviii; Gatens, 1996: 27) 
No doubt some remain incredulous. They might ask, what would you do instead? 
Is there anything more than critique at work here? How does this translate into policy? 
Contained within such questions is a political and epistemological realism, which 
further demands to know: 'What is your orientation to reality, if its not an enlightened 
realism that does its best to express our values in a competitive and imperfect world? 
How does this amount to a viable platform for intervention?' 
I have many ideas for policy, even policy which might introduce substantive 
changes within 'established' political constraints. Similarly, throughout this study I 
have sought to suggest alternative decisions, and to recover the history of debate and 
conflict which surrounded those that were taken. Yet this is not merely a policy 
manual-that presupposes too much. To accede to this demand is to leave unquestioned 
those frameworks-'the national interest', 'the way of life', 'prosperity'-which 
precede policy and relieve decisionmakers of so many choices. At the outset, and in 
thinking alternative policy paths, these underlying structures need be placed under 
permanent critical suspicion. This leads to a questioning of 'reality' itself, to a form of 
history which uncovers its contested and problematic nature, reveals the motives of 
those who speak it, and speculates that dramatically different political, economic and 
cultural possibilities might be available. Such an approach would reveal a very different 
'art of the possible.' 
I would also suggest that an 'ethic of engagement' has profound and immediate 
implications for policy. Translated into policy, and particularly international policy, 
such an ethic would go far to dethrone coercive definitions of the national interest and 
its callous disregard for the suffering of the other. This achieved, statements like 
Richard Woolcott's-that 'sentimental' notions of self-determination for the Timorese 
or Bougainvilleans threaten our security-become impossible. Because it is exactly 
sentiment that has to be put into action here; thus recognising our indebtedness to the 
other, a sense of debt for the wartime suffering of the Timorese might lead us to 
support their right to self-determination, and the genuine transformation of the political 
and ontological forms which currently suppress it. In Bou gain ville' s case it would lead 
to a genuinely democratic vote on the island's future which does not, as political leaders 
have so often done in the past, automatically preclude independence or substantial 
autonomy. It would lead to a regional economic order in which the claims of workers, 
women, environmental sustainability and domestic welfare take priority over swift 
profits. It would likewise lead to a recognition of Aboriginal claims and history, and to 
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the struggles of indigenous people everywhere-an ethic of engagement pursued not in 
search of redemption but in the permanent discharge of historic responsibility. 
This ethic demands the empowerment of communities against a sovereignty which 
claims their allegiance but rejects their participation, and the coding of empowerment 
into the fabric of aid and diplomacy. Could we give aid self-lessly, and ensure local 
groups determine its priority and management? Could we support the evolution of a 
more just international economic order, without resorting to an impoverished (and often 
erroneous) calculus of self-interest? Could the self-affirming dreams of neo-liberal 
ideology be punctured, however briefly, by the voices of the dispossessed? As the 
thirty year edifice of the Indonesian New Order found, they are ignored at everyone's 
peril. Yet however true, that should not be our first reflex-rather a simple human 
response to fellow tragedy, turmoil and hope. Happily we see such responses all 
around us-they must be built on and nurtured. The upheavals of the Asian political 
and economic crisis, which have so dramatically exposed the bankruptcy of the 
repressive development models foisted on Asian peoples, have only made such moves 
more urgent and necessary. Few greater opportunities for ethical cross-border 
engagements have ever been so obvious. 
Possibilities even hide in the core of the liberal tradition I have found so suspect. In 
this sense we can oppose the most radical promises of liberalism-democracy, agency 
and emancipation-to its most repressive manifestations in the drive for the Same. In 
Australia's sense, a politics of radical democracy has roots in our political traditions, as 
long as they are detached from the apparatuses of capture which blunted them-the fear 
of the other and the enabling sacrifice of the Anzac tradition. Examples abound, from 
the struggle against fascism in World War II (forgotten in its mutation into a global war 
against otherness), the support of trade unions for Indonesia's independence in 1947, 
the global empathy of civil societies as they cheer the struggle of others for freedom, to 
the peoples movement for reconciliation which refuses both aggressive new assertions 
of self and 'just' rhetorics of totalisation. 
I am referring here particularly to Paul Keating's idea that 'reconciliation' could be 
appropriated to a renewed enterprise of nationbuilding and identity-here the Labor 
record presents us with a peculiar challenge. Beyond making 'national interest' the 
basis of their international policies, they have promised a reconciliation of it with a 
spirited pursuit of higher ideals-the promise, familar since Curtin, that security could 
be reconciled with justice. Furthermore, they argued it drew on deep-seated Australian 
traditions and values. Gareth Evans maintained that the idealism in Australia's foreign 
policy derived from its convict experiences and its record of immigration which saw 'a 
significant proportion' of the population made up of 'those fleeing persecution or 
seeking a better life.' As a result, 'at least part of the national psyche is profoundly 
committed to notions of reform or improvement. And being the size and weight we are, 
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it is in Australia's national interest that the world should be governed by principles of 
justice, equality, talent and achievement, rather than status and power.' (Evans and 
Grant, 1995: 42) 
Thus paired with security, justice becomes at its worst merely a strengthened, 
idealised form of the political double-bind which, while suggesting new openings and 
transformations, only serves to strengthen a destructive ontology of being. Regrettably, 
this is the only way we can reconcile the Whitlam government's rhetoric with its 
support for the Soeharto regime. Yet there is much-as a statement of principle-to 
admire in Evans' words, however flawed their implementation during his term as 
Foreign Minister. Their import has already been recognised in the ALP's new foreign 
policy platform, which advocates self-determination for East Timor and reintegrates 
human rights and democracy as central values in international policy. At the same time, 
there is a continued faith in the market as an unproblematic agent of international peace 
and development, and a conventional power-politics approach to security co-operation 
with the region. (ALP, 1998a) Thus it would seem prudent to doubt such totalising 
claims to justice while retaining a commitment to its ethical promise. However valuable 
and necessary a principle, justice too needs to be thought in its specificity. We are left 
with an idea and practice of justice which is more contingent, more suspicious, more 
alert to the concrete forms of reality in which it might be achieved-and which it must 
continue to contest and examine. Above all, it is alert to the unthought and unimagined 
that lies outside the currently hegemonic space of discourse. Justice here is not 
reconciled with security but suggests paths beyond it. 
The idea of a world based on 'justice, equality, talent and achievement' is worth 
fighting for, and the idea that the desire for it has roots in Australia's past is worth 
retaining. What it suggests is a form of identity which is more mobile and provisional, 
which recognises diversity and difference, and whose ethic of responsibility is spurred 
by its origins in past injustices rather than imperial hubris. Evans' words give us a 
bridge from the past to the future, in stark contrast with a past and future so many still 
hold out as ideal. We live at a time when the ethnocentric belief in progress, free-
markets and power-politics-the ontological trinity of a modem antipodean politics of 
security-has never seemed so destructive or so bankrupt. In such a context, the 
opportunities for change have rarely been more profound. We have only our selves to 
lose, and others to find. 
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